Levee Failures in the Sacramento - San Joaquin River Delta: Characteristics and Perspectives by Hopf, Frank
 
 
 
 
 
 
LEVEE FAILURES IN THE SACRAMENTO-SAN JOAQUIN RIVER DELTA: 
CHARACTERISTICS AND PERSPECTIVES 
 
 
A Dissertation 
by 
FRANK HOPF 
 
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
December  2011 
 
 
Major Subject: Geography 
 
 
 
 
 
LEVEE FAILURES IN THE SACRAMENTO-SAN JOAQUIN RIVER DELTA: 
CHARACTERISTICS AND PERSPECTIVES 
 
 
A Dissertation 
by 
FRANK HOPF 
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
Approved by: 
Co-Chairs of Committee  Christian Brannstrom  
 Douglas J. Sherman 
Committee Members  Vatche Tchakerian 
 John Vitek   
Head of Department Vatche Tchakerian 
 
December 2011 
 
Major Subject: Geography 
 
 
iii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Levee Failures in the Sacramento – San Joaquin River Delta:  
Characteristics and Perspectives.  (December 2011) 
Frank Hopf, B.S., Lafayette College; 
M.B.A., Boston University 
Co-chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. Christian Brannstrom 
        Dr. Douglas J. Sherman 
 
Between 1850 and 1922, agriculturalists built 1,700 kilometers of levees to 
convert 250,000 hectares of tidal marsh to farmland where the San Joaquin and 
Sacramento Rivers enter the San Francisco Bay (the Delta).  Drained, farmed and isolated 
from the water channels, the organic soils behind the levees subsided to elevations as low 
as 8 meters below sea level, turning “levees” into “dams” that hold back water constantly.  
Engineers built water transfer projects in the mid-20th century, transferring water from the 
south Delta to 25 million Californians who now rely on the “dams” accidentally converted 
into supply channels.  In 1972, however, a levee failure caused a salt-water intrusion into 
the Delta, raising the prominence of the polemic Peripheral Canal which, if built would 
replace the levees in the trans-Delta water transport role.  Levee failures in 2004 (the 
Delta) and 2005 (New Orleans) have re-ignited the debate, fueled by comments made by 
public officials who warned that the Delta levees posed more risk of failure than did the 
pre-Katina Louisiana levees.  This background motivates two research questions: What 
are the social perspectives regarding levee failures of the experts managing the Delta; and 
what is the history of levee failures that might support their perspectives? 
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The research employed Q-Method to identify and describe four social 
perspectives: Delta Sustainers, Abandon the Levees, Levee Pragmatists, and Multi-Purpose 
Levee Advocates.  A critical element underlying differences among the perspectives 
revolved around the perceived history of failures of Delta levees.  This dissertation 
employed semi-structured interviews, archival record searches, and historic map and aerial 
photograph comparisons to compile a history of 265 levee failures since 1868, many of 
which are referenced to location, segment, and levee type.  In addition, the dissertation 
compiled a list of emergency repairs and successful flood-fights.  The history of failures 
indicates that important levees of the Delta have performed significantly better than 
previously identified.  Sharing these social perspectives and research results among the key 
actors addressing Delta issues may lead to improved consensus decisions.  
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NOMENCLATURE 
af or acre-feet   Volume of water covering one acre to a depth of one foot 
CALFED California – Federal Initiative for San Francisco Bay and the  
 Delta 
 
CVP US Bureau of Reclamation Central Valley Project 
DF&G California Department of Fish and Game 
DRMS Delta Risk Management Study 
DSC Delta Stewardship Council 
DWR California Department of Water Resources 
ESA Endangered Species Act (Federal) 
SWP California State Water Project 
SRCD Suisun Resource Conservation District  
SWRC State Water Resources Council  
RD Reclamation District 
USACE United States Army Corps of Engineers 
USBR United States Bureau of Reclamation 
USGS United States Geological Survey 
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PROLOGUE TO DISSERTATION 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832), the German poet and amateur 
geomorphologist/geologist closed his classic work Faust Part 2 with the disjointed 
discussion of the future of marsh reclamation involving the hero Faust and 
Mephistopheles.  The region of marsh reclamation remains undefined but the similarities 
with the Sacramento- San Joaquin Delta of today makes it an appropriate prologue to this 
dissertation.  Goethe left Faust Part 2 to be published after his death. 
“A swamp there by the mountain lies, 
Infecting everything attained; 
If that foul pool could once be drained, 
The feat would outstrip every prize. 
For many millions I shall open spaces 
Where they, not safe but active-free, have dwelling places. 
Verdant the fields and fruitful; man and beast 
Alike upon that newest earth well pleased, 
Shall settle soon the mighty strength of hill 
Raised by a bold and busy people’s will, 
And here inside, a land like Paradise, 
The let the outer flood to dike’s rim rise, 
And as it eats and seeks to crush by force, 
The common will rush to stem its course. 
To this opinion I am given wholly 
And this is wisdom’s final say: 
Freedom and life belong to that man solely 
Who must reconquer them every day. 
Thus child and man and old man will live here 
Beset by peril year on busy year.” 
 
– Dr. Faust on his deathbed to Mephistopheles (the Devil). 
 
 “And yet all your activity 
Serves us, with dam and dike creation; 
For Neptune the great water devil 
You are preparing one big revel. 
You all are lost in every wise 
The elements are our allies, 
And things head for annihilation.” 
 
- Mephistopheles’ preemptive response directed to the audience, not Faust.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
1
 
 
 Governor Schwarzenegger’s Blue Ribbon Panel declared, “The California Delta is the 
heart of our state, at once a water supply, an ecosystem, and a place that is indispensable to 
modern California” (Delta Vision Blue Ribbon Panel 2008, 1).  If the Sacramento – San 
Joaquin River Delta (hereafter “Delta”) represents the heart of California, its levees form its 
arteries. Over the last 160 years, farmers, developers, and the Corps of Engineers have 
widened, heightened, extended, and transformed the natural levees in the Delta into an 
artificial levee system that now comprises more than 1760 km (1110 miles) of tidal shoreline, 
a length longer than the open Pacific coastline of California.  The builders modified the 
geomorphic features to permit farming of the rich organic soils of the Delta, now a $650 
million a year agribusiness.  Later, engineers took advantage of the access to dry land and 
flood-protection provided by the levees and built highways, railroads, pipelines (fuels and 
water), gas production and storage wells, and telecommunication facilities across the Delta. 
 About half of the total runoff (from 40% of the total area) in California flows between 
the Delta levees, with water diversions supplying water to 25 million Californians as far 
away as San Diego and irrigating over 3 million acres of prime farmland that was once arid 
scrubland.  Delta levees are critical to preventing the intrusion of salt water and absorption of 
organic carbon (TOC) in route to pump intakes inconveniently located at the southwest 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of The Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers. 
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corner of the Delta.  At the same time, the levee-defined Delta ecosystem provides haven for 
over 750 plant and animal species (USACE 2006, 4). 
 Delta levees are a critical geomorphic feature of the human-modified Delta socio-
ecosystem that is now in crisis (Isenberg 2008a, 1).  The presence of levees supports ongoing 
subsidence, soil oxidation, and wind erosion that continue to lower elevations of the Delta 
islands.  Some spots have already dropped to as much as 8 meters below sea level, increasing 
the constant hydrostatic pressure across the levees and forcing them to function as “dams,” 
not true “levees” (USACE 1994, USACE 2000).  This exacerbates the concerns over the 
vulnerability of levees that have been attributed to questionable designs, weak foundations, 
and heterogeneous soils generally not suitable for levee or dam construction. Rising sea level 
will add to these woes, as will projected increases in the frequency, size and duration of Delta 
floods because of climate change in the watershed (Florsheim and Dettinger 2007).  Whereas 
no record of seismic-related damage exists for Delta levees, the potential of multiple, 
simultaneous levee collapses caused by an earthquake (DWR 1980, DSC 2010b,  Benjamin 
J.R., and Associates 2005, URS 2008a) haunts the residents of the Delta and managers of the 
water supply system dependent on it.  Loss of a single levee at Jones Tract in 2004 halted 
deliveries of water to a thirsty state for a few days.  The 20-island flood, theorized under an 
earthquake scenario, could stop downstate water deliveries for years, at a cost to the 
California economy in the hundreds of billions of dollars (RMA 2005; Jack R. Benjamin 
&Associates 2005; Lund et al. 2008; Fleenor et al. 2008).  Meanwhile, several pelagic and 
anadromous fish species headline the list of native species of wildlife and vegetation that the 
accumulation of human activities in the Delta are suspected of having driven onto the state 
and federal endangered and threatened lists.  
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 Little disagreement exists that the Delta socio-ecosystem is in crisis. As one expert 
put it, the Delta is “…oversubscribed in every way imaginable” (Interview 120-2009). The 
question of how to establish a governance process that will help create a sustainable Delta 
socio-system has consumed much time and energy in California politics since at least 1972.  
In 1994, California Governor Wilson directed the various state agencies to join federal 
counterparts in what would become the 25-member CALFED (short for CALifornia – 
FEDeral) initiative.  CALFED had four objectives: to improve quality of the water, increase 
the quantity of water available for export, improve the viability and sustainability of the 
ecosystem, and strengthen the integrity of the levees (flood-control), in the Delta.  By early 
2000, Delta scientific research had been advanced but establishment of goals agreeable to all 
remained elusive, prompting many of the stakeholders to rename it “Cal fail” (Hundley 2001, 
418).  Attempting to restore creditability and effectiveness of CALFED, California Governor 
Davis and U. S. Interior Secretary Babbitt ordered that CALFED cancel the public meetings 
with stakeholders until the agency representatives could identify the most critical water 
problems of the state and present an action plan (Hundley 2001, 419).  This step excluded 
from the process more than 80 Delta reclamation districts (RDs) who for 150 years have held 
first responsibility for integrity of Delta levees.  As one reclamation district representative 
complained, the agencies continually refer to the RDs as “interested stakeholders rather than 
as their partners, and we do consider that we are partners in maintaining the levees” 
(Interview 102-2009, 44:18).  
 CALFED issued its plan in June 2000 and received lukewarm support from many 
stakeholders (Hundley 2001).  President Bush, after 2001, and California Governor 
Schwarzenegger, after 2003, failed to support the CALFED collaborative effort.  Whereas 
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CALFED drew praise from scholars for its effort to rely on best science in creating policy 
and for developing innovative solutions, it failed to create timely results (Lejano and Ingram 
2009; Owen 2009; Hanemann and Dyckman 2009; Kallis, Kiparsky and Norgaard 2009).  
The inability of CALFED to successfully involve all stakeholders and to develop consensus 
by 2005 resulted in excluded groups like the California Farm Bureau Federation, the Central 
Delta Water Agency, and the Regional Council of Rural Counties suing.  These groups 
obtained a district court ruling throwing out much of the plan created by CALFED because 
the analysis did not consider the alternative action of reducing or eliminating exports of 
water. Endangered-fish counts were collapsing, biological options were forcing reductions in 
water exports, plus  the June 2004 unexpected “sunny-day” levee failure at Upper Jones 
Tract all raised questions about the effectiveness of CALFED.  The governor and legislature 
authorized an independent “Little Hoover Commission” review of CALFED.  The 
commission report (Alpert 2005) condemned CALFED because of lack of leadership and 
effective public participation.  Therefore, in June 2008, when the California Supreme Court 
overturned the lower court decision and reinstated the plan adopted by CALFED (Abbott 
2008), Governor Schwarzenegger had already effectively replaced CALFED by an Executive 
Order dated 17 September 2006 that created the Delta Vision process directed by the Blue 
Ribbon Task Force.  The order charged this “independent” group of leaders, selected from all 
over California, with creating a long-term vision for the Delta and developing an 
implementation plan for that Vision by December 31, 2008.  The Vision the Task Force 
developed pictured a Delta “managed for the coequal goals of reliable water supply and a 
sustainable Delta ecosystem, while recognizing that the “California Delta is a unique and 
valued area, warranting recognition and special legal status from the State of California” 
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(Isenberg et al. 2008, 1).  In December 2009, the legislature created the Delta Stewardship 
Council (hereafter DSC) and charged it to carry out the recommendations of the Delta Vision 
and create a detailed plan for the future of the Delta by January of 2012.   
 In its condemnation of CALFED, the Little Hoover Commission singled out the lack 
of leadership to “engage stakeholders in a renewed effort to resolve conflicts” and that 
“interest groups and stakeholders need more effective ways to understand and influence 
government decisions” (Alpert 2005, 2).  The Blue Ribbon Panel’s transmittal letter of the 
Delta Vision plan acknowledges that “consensus on improving the existing Delta water 
export system remains elusive” (Isenberg 2008a, 2).  Unfortunately, the Delta Vision plan 
fails to suggest that understanding the underlying nature of the conflicts and social 
perspective of the leaders and experts of the various stakeholders and agencies should be a 
priority and an early step to help create consensus. 
 Therefore, this dissertation will investigate the social perspectives held by the experts 
of the Delta levee system so that the critical differences and the areas of near agreement can 
be better understood.  In this effort I have followed the lead of other scholars in employing 
the Q-method to help understand conflicts in science and resource management that hinder 
effective policy making (Raadgever, Mostert, and van de Giesen 2008; Focht 2002; Bischof 
2010; Barry and Proops 1999; Ellis, Barry, and Robinson 2007).  These researchers have 
found that the social perspectives of experts dominate scientific knowledge when uncertainty 
must be overcome to permit forecasting and policy creation.  Review of recent studies on the 
Delta levees and public comments on those studies (URS 2008a) suggest that forecasting and 
policy decisions must be made in the face of uncertainty about the probability of an 
earthquake damaging levees and the stability of the levees as demonstrated by the history of 
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levee failures.  The probabilities of damage to levees from earthquakes may always remain 
“unknowable” but historical geography and remote sensing methods or approaches can help 
develop a better knowledge base of the history and experience of failures of Delta levees.  
Therefore, to understand a potential source of divergent social perspectives, this dissertation 
will create and analyze a concise and rigorous record of failures of Delta levees.  This effort 
will add to the work of Thompson (1957; 1962; 1996; 2006) by adding the historic record 
temporally, providing more detail and completeness, and by locating the exact failure 
locations critical to improving empirically based models of levee failures.  The data collected 
have been housed in an Access database and the locations mapped in an ARCMAP GIS 
system with the intent of eventually making them accessible to all interested stakeholders and 
experts. 
 Empirical study of the discourses of Delta levee science and an improved record of 
the failures of Delta levees may lead to better understanding between and among Delta 
experts and enhance the opportunity to work to consensus.  It can also help identify critical 
areas where additional research might provide the most value.  I constructed a database and 
analyzed recent failures of the levees to narrow the uncertainty among views underlying all 
perspectives of levee performance, again to help move toward a consensus discourse.  The 
concern remains that without addressing the items critical to all social perspectives, the 
resulting policies and solutions will be sub-optimal and subject to resistance, to the 
disadvantage of all parties. 
 This dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter II identifies and limits the spatial 
extent of the study, defines the nature of the “levees” in the study region, describes the 
understanding of perspectives on Delta levees from the political arena, and describes the 
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scholarship that underpins this dissertation and to which this dissertation will contribute.  The 
chapter also identifies the information gaps that this dissertation works to close.  Chapter III 
provides background information on Delta levees.  Chapter IV summarizes the history of 
changing governance and governing processes influencing Delta levees and the current social 
perspectives of the key actors in the Delta levees.  Chapter V identifies the methods that will 
be employed to close the information gaps, centered on the Q-Method to identify the social 
perspectives and the variety of approaches used to obtain input for the levee failure database.  
Chapter VI identifies and describes the four social perspectives or factors of Delta levee 
experts concerning the meaning of the failures (and successes) of Delta levees.  Chapter VII 
introduces the database of levee failures and the GIS mapping tool and reviews the 
differences with published histories of levee failure.  Chapter VIII discusses the meanings of 
the findings of the two parts of this dissertation, highlighting particularly the interaction of 
the social perspectives with the findings of the historical record.  Chapter IX summarizes the 
effort, provides findings based on this work, and identifies areas of additional research to 
continue to close the knowledge gaps.  The Appendix includes detailed data about the Q-
Method and representative examples of reports available from the database of levee failures. 
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CHAPTER II 
STUDY REGION, KNOWLEDGE GAPS, AND CONTRIBUTION OF THE 
DISSERTATION 
STUDY REGION 
 Humans have built levees around marshes and wetlands, and then drained and 
“reclaimed” them for agriculture since at least as far back as the civilization at Ur in 
Mesopotamia in the fourth millennium B.C.E. (Wagret 1968).  The Frisians built the first 
Dutch polders in the ninth century A.D. (Wagret 1968) and the English started developing 
the peat marsh of the Fens in 1529, led at times by the likes of King Henry VIII and Queen 
Elizabeth I (Darby 1940).  In 1850, just after the discovery of gold in California, the United 
States government gave the states under the Arkansas Act, title to the almost worthless 
“swamp and overflowed lands” to develop and earn revenue selling them.  The marsh of the 
Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta was among the first of these lands reclaimed in California.  
After several false starts, the California legislature authorized establishment of locally 
organized reclamation districts (RDs) to build the levees and keep the land dry and 
productive.  The legislature empowered the districts to elect boards of directors to govern and 
raise taxes, and build and maintain levees and pumps to convert marsh to farmland.  By 
1922, the reclamation districts had completed building the Delta levees with  their “unique 
machinery and modern methods (had) brought about the settlement and agricultural 
productivity which set this delta apart from all other deltas of the world” as Thompson 
concluded (1957, 445). 
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 Whereas the “unique” machinery may help set the development of Study Area apart 
from that of other reclaimed wetlands of the world, they did not spare the Delta from sharing 
the inherent problems farming former marsh.  Darby’s (1940) classic study of the 
reclamation of the English “Fens,” a former tidal freshwater marsh about the same size as the 
Delta, concludes by identifying that after over 400 years of development, the Fens in 1939 
had survived as an agricultural area with a legacy of four major problems. These included 1) 
continued lowering of the peat land surface; 2) the constant care required to maintain the 
banks (levees) built with inadequate materials, particularly against seepage; 3) the constant 
danger posed by high water levels produced by “a combination of adverse pressure and wind 
conditions, a high spring tide, and heavy land floods” (Darby 1940, 254); and 4) the 
complexity of the involvement of multiple agencies that even collectively have limited 
resources.  Darby could have been discussing the Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta  if he 
had just mentioned two other issues, the stress of being the hub of water distribution  
(Mitchell 1993) for the 25 million people and one of the largest economies in the world, and 
the risk of devastation triggered by earthquakes. 
  In 1959, the California Legislature would take the step of providing special 
recognition and protection for the Delta as described as the Legal Delta in Section 12220 of 
the Water Code, otherwise known as the Delta Protection Act (DWR 1992).  This act 
outlined the Legal Delta as shown on Figure 2.1.  The act represented the first official 
recognition that the Delta and its levees would play a major role in water deliveries of the 
State Water Project (SWP).  It passed at the same time as the Burns-Porter Act which 
authorized a statewide bond issue to build the State Water Project (SWP), a bond issue that 
the voters approved in 1960 (DWR 1992). 
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Figure 2.1 - Map of the Legal Delta and Dissertation Scope (DPC Undated) 
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 The Study Region of this dissertation is the “Legal Delta”, which  includes two major 
sections, the Uplands or Secondary Zone above elevation +5’ and the Lowlands or Primary 
Zone which sits below the +5’ contour line.  In the Primary Zone, economic activities are 
limited by law to agriculture. Certain areas below the 5’ contour such as around the City of 
Isleton and have been designated as part of the Secondary Zone to permit some commercial 
and other non-farming activities.  The boundaries of the Study Area were first defined by the 
legislature in the state Water Code in 1959.  In 1982, this body took the additional step to 
establish in state law, (the Water Code, Section 12961) a special status of the Study Area 
because of the statewide significance of this unusual area of meandering waterways and 
island that support productive agriculture, varied recreational opportunities, and special 
habitat for wildlife.  The law established that the state of California believes that the 
“physical characteristics of the delta should be preserved essentially in their present form, 
and that the key to preserving the delta’s physical characteristics is the system of levees 
defining the waterways and producing the adjacent islands” (California 1982, 56).  It is 
fitting, therefore, to focus on the levee to understand the Study Area. 
LEVEES OF THE STUDY AREA 
 The “system of levees” of the Study Region includes four functional types of 
structures that are all called “levees” and all should include an appropriate adjective in 
technical discussion: 
1) Natural levees – Fluvial overbank depositional features which constrain all but the 
highest flows to the channel. 
2) Enhanced levees – natural levees augmented by humans to increase area that is 
not inundated during floods. These were important in the pre-clamshell dredge 
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(pre-1870) including potentially the pre-Eurasian settlement period but are no 
longer significant, if any remain. 
3) Flood control levees – structures built in the floodplain at locations not limited to 
the tops of the natural levees that are built to constrain flood waters to a certain 
area larger than the channel itself, to protect the remainder of the flood plain from 
inundation only during flood.  Whereas most of the levees in the Sacramento-San 
Joaquin watershed and the nation as a whole meet this definition, less than 10% of 
Delta levees do, all in the Secondary Zone. 
4) Levee-dams – human structures along a river or bayhead delta which hold back 
water continuously or nearly so.  Levee dams can start as human enhanced natural 
levees or levees first constructed for flood control, which later must function as a 
levee-dam because of lowering of the land surface of the isolated part of the flood 
plain or an increase in the normal water level.  These represent at least 90% of 
Delta levees, including all of the levees in the Primary Zone.  Nationwide, I have 
only found them in the greater New Orleans area, the Skagit and Snohomish River 
Deltas of Washington state, and the Delta. 
 The surfaces of most of the islands or tracts of the Study Region were originally 
saturated peat, some places up to 12 meters thick.  Reclamation has led to subsidence of this 
peat-dominated surface by as much as 8 meters, leaving the land surfaces well below normal 
water levels in the channels.  They remain dry exclusively because of the levee-dams and 
pumps.  As suggested by Lund et al. (2008), these features should more properly be called 
the Dutch term “polder.”  Unfortunately, this term has historically been used in the study area 
to describe proposals to construct dams across channels to combine multiple islands into 
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fewer, larger ones.  For this reason, the dissertation uses the generic term “island” to describe 
dry land surrounded by water regardless of relative elevations.  The terms “island” and 
“tract” are used interchangeably; the “islands” typically started out as marsh surrounded by 
river channels and the “tracts” started as peninsulas in the marsh with a land connection to 
the upland areas.  Many of the peninsulas were converted to islands by the construction of 
back levees with water-filled borrow areas, making them truly islands, but the title “tract” 
sticks. 
 This dissertation does not focus on urban levees, or on urbanization in the Delta.  It 
instead focuses on the levees that continue to protect primarily agricultural lands, wetland 
recreation and habitat lands, and the small legacy communities of Isleton, Walnut Grove, 
Courtland, Hood, Thornton, Ryde, Terminous, and Clarksburg.  Mitchell (1993) reviews the 
conversion of agricultural land to residential use that took place on Bethel Island and 
adjacent Hotchkiss Tract where the Pleistocene sand dunes restricted peat formation and the 
agricultural value of the land played out quickly and led the landowners to turn to residential 
(waterfront) development starting in the 1950s.  Mitchell (1993) also reviews the 
development of the Discovery Bay on Byron Tract, residential-commercial development near 
Tracy in the southeast corner of the Delta Secondary Zone, the entire Stockton-Manteca 
development in the Secondary Zone east of the San Joaquin, and the Stone Lakes and Elk 
Grove residential expansion of Sacramento to the south toward the Secondary Zone. 
 Pressure to urbanize parts of the Delta continues to increase; notwithstanding the 1992 
Delta Protection Act intended to eliminate additional urbanization in the Primarily Zone and 
to restrict it in the Secondary Zone (Eisenstein, Kondolf and Cain 2007).  Ludy (2009), in her 
study of the Spanos Park West Development on Delta tracts Bishop and Atlas in 
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northwestern Stockton, argues that the 1971 National Flood Insurance Act has encouraged 
urbanization in the Delta while masking the risks to those urbanites moving into areas 
supposedly protected by levees.  The degree and location of urbanization of the Secondary 
Zone of the Legal Delta is a very important issue but it one that is outside the scope of this 
dissertation.  Any references to and discussion of levees in the Study Area, except as 
explicitly noted, relates purely to levees protecting agricultural lands, wetland habitat and 
hunting areas, and the legacy communities. 
KNOWLEDGE GAPS AND WHAT IS “KNOWN” ABOUT SOCIAL 
PERSPECTIVES AND THE HISTORY OF DELTA LEVEES FAILURES 
Knowledge Gaps 
Introduction 
 As indicated in Chapter I, this dissertation will close two gaps in the knowledge of the 
levees in the Study Area defined as the “Legal Delta” of California.  It will first identify and 
describe the social perspectives of the experts on the Delta levees relative to the meaning of 
the history of failures of the levees.  Second, it will establish a database on the suspected 
cause, exact location, and type of levee failures or near misses (the emergency repairs and 
successful flood fights that prevented levee failures) experienced in the Delta. 
Political discourses and social perspectives on Delta Levees 
 A review of the literature indicates that scholars have not identified the social 
perspectives of Delta levee experts on these levee failures and near misses.  Three major  
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Figure 2.2- Conceptual Route of Peripheral Canal and the Often Discussed  
Tunnel Route also Marked (DWR 2007) 
 
Route of Tunnel 
Preferred Option 
(2010 to May 2011) 
16 
 
political discourses, however, currently dominate the public discussion ongoing about the 
Delta, its levees and its future.  Since 1972, political discussion about the Delta deals with the 
idea of extending the two great water export systems, the SWP and CVP, around, or 
potentially under, the Delta, to directly access to the primary source of fresh water, the 
Sacramento River.  Figure 2.2 shows the possible route for the Peripheral Canal option for 
this extension and the alternate tunnel route. 
 Table 2.1 outlines the characteristics of the three dominant or at least most frequently 
heard opinions about the Delta when this research started.  The  first discourse emphasizes, 
quoting the website (http://restorethedelta.org/ accessed 6/28/2011) the importance of 
protecting “the economic interests of the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta, including but not 
limited to fishing, farming, recreation, and tourism.”  This perspective further finds it 
important to establish “a governance system that protects the ecosystem of the Sacramento-
San Joaquin Delta defends local Delta water needs” and seeks “the reduction of water exports 
to restore and sustain the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta’s ecosystem, to protect native and 
desirable species, to protect public health, and to improve water quality…”  The diverse 
supporters of this perspective have come together to oppose the Peripheral Canal or Tunnel.  
The supporters have created the “Restore the Delta” organization to advocate the perspective. 
Members include groups as diverse as the Stockton and the Delta chambers of commerce, the 
Natural Resources Defense Fund, a real estate developer (Gruppe), two of the three Delta 
water agencies (essentially the reclamation districts), several fishing and hunting clubs, and 
the Stockton Catholic Diocese Environmental Justice Project (http://restorethedelta.org/ 
accessed 6/28/2011).  
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Table 2.1 - Known Political Perspectives of Delta Levees and the Future of the Delta Itself 
Prime Proponent(s) View Or Perspective Spatial 
Scaling Of 
Issues 
Implications 
For 
Governance 
Of Delta 
Implications 
For Delta 
Levees 
Implication  
For 
Peripheral 
Canal 
Implications For 
Environment 
Restore the 
Delta(nonprofit 
organization)  Website: 
http://restorethedelta.or
g 
Need to protect Delta as a viable 
economic (agricultural) region and 
excessive water exports are the 
primary problem  causing  the 
deterioration in the ecosystem 
Delta Region 
Only 
Strong local 
involvement in 
managing 
levees and 
Delta activities 
Delta levees 
protect the 
economic 
interest and 
should be 
continually 
improved 
Peripheral 
canal purely a 
tool for 
additional 
water exports 
– not desired. 
Ecosystem will 
improve when water 
exports  drop to 
sustainable levels 
Public Policy Institute 
of California (PPIC) 
(non-profit 
organization) and 
Center for Watershed 
Science – UC Davis 
(CWS) 
Sea-level rise, past and future land 
subsidence, substandard condition  
and highly probable earthquake 
doom existing levees  so efforts 
should be made to prepare for 
New Delta 
At least state-
wide 
Delta needs a 
strong state 
governing 
agency to 
make hard 
decisions  and 
take difficult 
steps 
No additional 
investment in 
levees and 
preplanning 
required on 
which levees 
should be 
abandoned when 
they fail. 
Required as 
soon as 
possible if 
California 
water supplies 
are going to 
be continued 
from the Delta 
The estuarine 
endangered fish will 
do better in a salty-
brackish open water 
Delta.  Additional 
research will be 
required to help make 
the transition   
Delta Vision –
Governor initiated   
effort to develop 
consensus political 
view of future of Delta 
California must manage the Delta 
with two co-equal goals – improve 
reliability of water exports to rest 
of state and restore the Delta 
ecosystem. 
California 
exclusively 
Strong plan 
with wide 
participation in 
development 
executed by 
single agency 
Delta and Delta 
levees important 
but secondary  
to co-equal goals 
Necessary to 
support co-
equal goals 
Replacing lost habitat 
and relocation of 
water export intakes 
will help endangered 
species recover. 
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The second political perspective is a more complicated in its origin, source and 
supporters but is very well defined in a series of texts that are available in print or online at 
no cost to the reader (Lund et al. 2007; Lund et al. 2008; Suddeth, Mount, and Lund 2010;  
Hanak et al. 2011).  The UC Davis Center for Watershed Science (CWS) produced these 
books and supporting works with an undefined amount of funding for the work coming from 
the Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC).  The CWS defines itself as an 
interdisciplinary group of engineers, geologists, biologists, and economists.  Since at least 
2004, the CWS and PPIC have identified, developed, and promoted a new perspective of the 
Delta that foresees inevitable, dramatic changes for the Delta and its levees, one which given 
the importance of water exports from the Delta to the California economy, supports the 
immediate construction of the Peripheral Canal. 
Citing concerns about inevitable earthquake damage, sea-level rise, and continued 
subsidence, Mount and Twiss (2004:2005) first identified the high risk of failure of the Delta 
levees and identified that the “accommodation space” behind the levees would cause the 
Delta to look very different once the levees started failing.  They defined the 
“accommodation space” as the missing 2.5 billion cubic meters of eroded and subsided peat 
soil that has disappeared from behind the levees largely because of agricultural practices.  In 
a series of studies and resulting documents that built on these concerns (Fleenor et al. 2008; 
Lund et al. 2007; Lund et al. 2008; Moyle 2007; Suddeth, Mount and Lund 2010; and Hanak 
et al. 2011), the CWS proposed a future Delta where fewer and fewer levees would be worth 
saving and more and more open water space would appear.  These papers first suggested that 
certain levees be issued “do not resuscitate notices,” indicating that society should not 
expend any more energy trying to preserve non-sustainable agricultural levees in the Delta.  
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Further, they identified that the resulting open water would increase the tidal prism resulting 
in most of the new open water being brackish or salty.  They propose that this environment 
would be more conducive to the survival of the endangered native estuarine fish and the 
striped bass than the current socio-ecosystem.  The Delta would inevitably become a new 
salt-water environment, so managers should take action to accommodate these changes as 
effectively and quickly as possible, including construction of the peripheral canal to secure 
fresh Sacramento River water for export south before its contamination in the salt water bay.  
The CWS continued its research and in 2010 argued that few Delta islands are viable to 
reclaim after levee failure, and that none of the Delta levees are worth upgrading to higher 
standards to prevent or delay inundation (Suddeth, Mount, and Lund 2010).  These findings 
led to the view that government should discontinue support for Delta levees, including the 
remaining largely unspent percentage of the $450 million approved by voters for Delta levee 
enhancements with the 2006 passage of bond propositions E-1 and 84. 
The most visible advocates of this perspective, the  PPIC, identifies itself as a non-
profit, independent public policy research institute that derives its ideas for research topics 
“from a variety of sources, including policymakers and other leaders, funders, and internal 
and external experts…covering the range of concerns, such as immigration, education, 
governance, the environment and economic development.”  The work with the Center for 
Watershed Science on the future of the Delta is not the only initiative of the PPIC and no 
obvious overall worldview connects the PPIC to advocacy of this perspective.  The Hewlett 
Foundation funded the endowment for the PPIC; however, the PPIC reports that 
“foundations, government entities, and other nonpartisan organizations” (PPIC website 
accessed 3 May 2011 at www.ppic.org) fund it.  
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The members of the CWS consist of recognized scholars who have addressed Delta 
issues for many years.  In addition to the PPIC published texts, the group has advocated their 
perspective almost exclusively in an electronic outlet, the Journal of San Francisco Estuary 
& Watershed Science, which CWS and the CALFED Science Program created in 2003.  
Edited by UC-Davis professors, the CWS members have been the source of more than half 
the articles published since the demise of CALFED.  The journal masthead identifies it as 
“peer reviewed”; however, the two editors and eight of the thirty associate editors are 
members of the CWS.  It is not one of the 2,616 American scholarly journals recognized and 
monitored by the ISI Web of Science as of June 28, 2011, however, its articles can be 
searched in Google Scholar.  It is a part of the Directory of Open Access Journals 
International (DOAJI)  where the goals of the Journal of San Francisco Estuary & Water- 
shed Science are identified to include providing “a forum for commentary, discussion, and 
debate on the scientific and management questions and issues pertaining to the science of the 
Bay-Delta estuary, its watershed and adjacent coastal ocean, and management of their 
resources,” that is “widely discoverable, searchable, and accessible through digital libraries, 
public Internet services, and other emerging information technologies” 
(http://escholarship.org/uc/search?entity=jmie_sfews;view=aboutus, last accessed 2 July 
2011).  This could describe a journal that potentially is a forum for part scientific content, 
part political advocacy; however, in April of 2011, the editors’ took the unusual step of 
declaring that all articles they had accepted completely avoided “advocacy of specific 
policies” (Luoma and Muscatine 2011, 1).  The journal received over a quarter of million 
dollars in state funding from the Delta Stewardship Council to operate from July 2011 to 
June 2012 (Luoma and Muscatine 2011; DSC 2011). 
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Whereas the first two political perspectives about the Delta and its levees have a 
degree of grass-roots origin to them, the third, the Delta Vision, clearly developed as an 
attempt by the executive branch and the leadership of the legislature to establish an official 
policy perspective of the state government of California toward the Delta and, thereby, the 
Delta levees.  Governor Schwarzenegger established the scale at which the political discourse 
would be conducted on this issue by appointing leaders from all over California to the task 
force.  The “Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta” became the “California Delta,” which in 
turn was identified as “the heart of California” (See page 1). The executive order did not 
include federal agency involvement, establishing that the future of the Delta was primarily a 
state, not a federal problem.   
In late 2008, after holding hearings all over the state, the Task Force identified a 
perspective or “vision” of a Delta that would be managed so it could produce more reliable 
and better quality water for export to other parts of the state while the Delta ecosystem would 
be restored to allow return of the endangered fish species to non-threatened levels.  Thus 
began the often-noted “coequal goals” of the state government (DVC 2008, 1). The Task 
Force also called for “strategic” levee investments, completion and approval of the Bay Delta 
Conservation Plan (BDCP) to eliminate the need to shutdown exports when endangered 
species congregated too close to the export pumps by 2010, and breaking ground on the new 
water conveyance system (Peripheral Canal) by 2011, among other goals (Isenberg et al. 
2008; DVC 2008; Isenberg 2008b).  The creation of Task Force clearly spelled the doom of 
CALFED which shrunk to the home of the Science Program by late 2008 when the Task 
Force issued its ‘Vision’ of the future California Delta. To oversee this, the Vision identified 
that a single state agency, originally to be called the California Delta Ecosystem and Water 
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Council, should be created to take over all the state agency responsibilities in the Delta for 
governance and governing.  Whereas the Delta Vision acknowledges the Water Code 
commitment to preserving the Delta as “special place,” that clearly takes a lower priority to 
the “coequal” goals. 
Three primary political discourses have evolved in the Delta, two advanced by non-
profit public interest organizations, and the third, the Delta Vision view, was developed by 
Governor Schwarzenegger’s effort to end the discussions and proceed to some form of action 
on this issue.  Whereas the viewpoints differ, the three political discourses share strong 
public relations and political campaign elements, complete with electronic newsletters e-
mailed to supporters, op-ed piece writers waiting in the wings, rallies, and carefully 
developed point messages and messengers.  The Delta Vision political discourse has the 
advantage of being delivered by elected and appointed government officials of California 
from the governor on down, all with honed skills of delivering point messages and the full 
force of the government websites and other media outlets. 
Whereas the three viewpoints represent the dominant political discourses about the 
Delta and its levees, this dissertation will empirically measure the social perspectives of the 
experts on the Delta levees regarding failures of Delta levees.  In identifying these social 
perspectives this dissertation will explore the connection and the conflict between the social 
perspectives of those with expert knowledge of Delta levees, and the scientific claims 
reflected in the political discussion and final policy. This partially responds to a need 
identified by Agnew in his Presidential Speech to the AAG (2011, 473), to understand the 
connections and pathways between the claims of scientists and the policymaking that they 
purportedly drive.  Agnew expressed specific concern for this in water provision while 
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highlighting the California 2009 Water Bill and its proposed funding “of a new management 
system for the Sacramento Delta” (Agnew 2011, 471). 
Records of existing levee failures    
             In identifying that a full understanding of the history of levee failures in Delta 
represents an important knowledge gap to fill, this dissertation recognizes that others have 
attempted to develop lists or count the number of levee failures.  In 2010, N. Snard of Ryer 
Island submitted a chart (Snard 2010) to the Delta Stewardship Council, detailing the results 
of the numerous summary reports of Delta levee failures produced since 1975.  He compiled 
and submitted this table to the policy makers because these reports, particularly the DRMS 
report (URS 2008c) were being used to assess the condition and future prospects for Delta 
levees.  Mr. Snard and his neighbors believed the reports were inconsistent and inaccurate, 
specifically relative to Ryer Island (http:www.ryerisland.com/images/floods/delta_floods. 
final.pdf, last accessed 30 June 2011).  Snard identified the conflicts in the totals but did not 
note how little detail and documentation of Delta levee failures is available. Some failures 
have been mapped, as shown in Figure 2.3, but again with few references and little detail.  
The lack of detail robs the lists of any power to help determine potential causes of failures 
that would help assess the probability of futures failures, to potentially anticipate, and help 
prevent those failures.  Merely counting the number of “islands that flooded” is insufficient 
because engineers have designed the levees of several islands and tracts to fail in flood 
conditions; they are parts of floodways, the formal ones at Liberty Island and Prospect Island 
in the Yolo By-Pass, and the informal ones at the McCormack-Williamson Tract (MWT) in 
the North Delta.  
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The exact locations of the levee failures are important because anyone of a number of 
levee characteristics vary greatly over the Delta.  With more pinpointed locations and details 
we can begin to determine if relationships exist between the failures and the these 
characteristics, such as the soil composition of the levee potentially generalized based on the 
geomorphic feature it was built on, the depth of peat,  island elevation, levee geometry and 
size, levee surface characteristics (rip-rap, vegetated, etc.), nature of the original builder 
(USACE versus local levee district), wind exposures, potential channel scour, what levee 
district performs the maintenance, boat and ship traffic exposures, and at some point, the 
design standard the levee meets.  It is not determined which, if any, of these factors influence 
the risk of levee failure, but until sufficient events and characteristics are mapped in detail, 
progress is unlikely.  To maximize the ability to close the knowledge gap, I have 
incorporated the database of levee failures database into a GIS system and divided levee 
segments as finely as differentiable.  In such a GIS system, other spatial data such as LIDAR 
elevation, soils, and levee surface maps; and aerial photography and historic maps can be 
incorporated. Filling this gap should help scholars attempting empirical studies of the 
probability of future levee failures to reduce the concern over the inadequacies in the record 
that Houston, Duncan, and the USACE (1978); Logan (1989; 1990); Burton and Cutter 
(2008); and URS (2009c) expressed.   The DRMS contractor URS ( 2009c) tried to address 
this problem in its analysis of future failures based on the empirical record of the past but it 
was constrained to only using existing records by their contract.  They did make requests 
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Figure 2.3 – DRMS map of levee failures (URS 2008c, Table 3-2) 
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to several DWR and reclamation district engineers to quickly pull together a table listing of 
known failures, which they completed within the time constraint as a sidebar to their normal 
job responsibilities (Interviews 103-2009, 106-2009, and 124-2009).  A University of Pacific 
based proposal to develop a complete history of Delta levee failures would have helped close 
this important knowledge gap but unfortunately it  did not get funded by the Sea Grant Delta 
Science Program in 2011 (Interview 118- 2010B).  Therefore, the gap remains. 
 Still missing from the latest summaries of levee failures, such as DRMS, are the 
details.  These include the locations, the time and date, river level conditions, known or 
speculated pre-failure levee conditions; responding agencies; all identified possible causes; 
repair and damage details; repair costs, damage estimates; speculated causes: and resulting 
changes in regulation and management, maintenance, and/or construction practices; and 
public and political reactions to the incidents.   
To learn to prevent future failures of the levees we must understand the details of past 
failures, flood fight and emergency repairs.  Petroski (1985) encourages all engineers to first 
study failures, noting that “no disaster need be repeated, for by talking about and writing 
about the mistakes that escape us, we learn from them, and by learning from them we can 
obviate their recurrence” (1985, 227).  He also notes, however, just how difficult this is to 
achieve as he highlights the tremendous problems created because society defaults to the 
legal system to determine cause and liability, a system poorly structured to render such 
judgments.  Petroski goes so far as to suggest that liability constraints drive those wanting to 
discuss failure of levees to do so in works of fiction, not professional journals.  He suggests 
that creative writing, where the places and people are fictitious but the circumstances of 
engineering failure are real, represents a possible way to skirt legal department concerns.  
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This dissertation will not resort to that tactic but provides the alternative of capturing the 
confidential reports from the interviews, recorded without attempting to analyze or to assess 
validity or legal liability.   
The database also helps fill a void in the basic information about levee failures in the 
Delta, created when the DWR indefinitely delayed issuing its annual reports on California 
flooding.  Starting in 1962, DWR issued annually the Bulletin 69 series entitled “California 
High Water” which provided information on the levee failures and others floods of the 
previous water year (October 1 to end September).  DWR published Bulletin 69-86 covering 
year 1985-86 in May 1988 and included information about the nature of levee failures for the 
1986 water year (DWR 1988), including those in the Delta and large one on the Sacramento 
Valley System at Linda, California.  In 2003, the State of California and DWR lost on appeal 
a court decision that resulted in a $464 million settlement from the failure of the levee at 
Linda (LOA, 2005) in 1986.  DWR issued the latest issue, and perhaps the last, in 2003 
covering water year 1995 (DWR 2003), many years after the events.  The reports covering 
the flooding and levee failures in 1997 and 2004 have not been issued; they appear to have 
been prepared but have not gotten through legal review to be issued.  Since 1996, no levee 
failure has been officially documented by DWR in the structure of Bulletin 69, apparently 
because of concerns over the liability of the state (Interview 103-2010A). 
Finally, this dissertation attempts to expand the record by documenting with the same 
level of detail, the near misses, and the successful flood fights.  It expands the record and in 
many cases, as much if not more, can be learned from them as from actual failures.  This is 
particularly true with Delta levee failures where the water rushing down the landside of a 
failed levee with 5 to 10 meters of differential head (pressure) quickly and completely 
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destroys the evidence of a beaver den, erosion spot, or seepage path, lateral sliding plane or 
whatever caused the failure.  Making information available about near misses to all is 
important to advance the engineering and understanding of Delta levees. 
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
 This dissertation builds on and contributes to several scholarship streams.  First, the 
database of failures of Delta levees and identification of the social perspectives of Delta levee 
experts extends temporally and expands Thompson’s (1957; 1962; 1982; 1996; 2006) 
historical geography of the settlement of the Delta.  Whereas Thompson’s scholarship 
remains the most recognized on the Delta, his interests were limited to the 1850-1955 period 
of settlement activity.  Thompson’s student Mitchell (1993) expanded the study of the Delta 
to its development as the hub of the California water supply network and to the initiation of 
urbanization on the Delta fringe. 
Thompson focused on Delta farmers and developers efforts to convert worthless 
swamp and overflowed lands into productive farms, a process promoted and encouraged by 
the federal and state governments and society of the time.  Prince (1997) describes the farmer 
conversion by artificial drainage of the wetlands of the Midwest to cornfields during the 
same period (1870 -1920) as Delta farmers were doing the same by building the levees of the 
Delta.  Prince highlight the changes in perceptions of the wetlands first identified by society  
as wastelands that needed to be made productive, to the current view that values wetlands as 
important ecosystems, a view confirmed in the 1989 federal executive order mandating no 
future loss of wetland function.  As Prince suggests, for better or worse, the changing and 
varied mental constructs of nature will determine the future of the wetlands, and by 
extension, the Delta levees.  Prince also believes that in the Midwest society is forcing 
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farmers to reinvent and develop “mixed species communities in which they (the farmers) 
could continue to have a place to live” (1997, 346).  This dissertation will identify how the 
re-evaluation of wetlands has affected the discourses about the Delta levees. 
In addition to wetland reclamation, the Delta levees represent the physical 
manifestation and focus of the two other great movements in the development of the 
American West: control of flooding and the irrigation of the arid and semi-arid land that John 
Wesley Powell first wrote about.  The Delta levees stand in the middle of reclamation of 
wetlands, flood control, and water exports for two-thirds of Californians, a position which 
limits and defines the discourses about the future.  Depending on one’s social perspective, 
Delta levees are now either the tools of or the impediments to the political economy of 
California, at a scale that has increased greatly since the local farmers finished building the 
system in the 1920s.  
 Two scholars, Karen O’Neil (1998; 2006) and Robert Kelley (1989), detail the 
development of flood control and the history of changing social perspectives and resultant 
political decisions in the Sacramento River Valley.  O’Neill (2006) outlines the development 
of discourses and political maneuvering that led to the development of the Mississippi and 
the Sacramento flood control systems, often with locals from each region working together to 
promote the development of these managed, tamed rivers.  O’Neill suggests that society has 
come to expect that the U.S. government, led by the USACE, will completely engineer the 
major rivers so they can manage them, in conjunction with the state and local governments.  
She argues that this challenge now includes responsibility to additionally manage the rivers 
for economic development, public safety, and environmental protection.  She argues that as 
early as 1930 state, federal, and local flood control interests and agencies were working as a 
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surprisingly seamless team.  All those involved in this cooperative endeavor grew more 
powerful through the interaction.  She points out that today society, prodded by 
environmental NGOs, now also requires a functioning, pleasing environment as well as flood 
control and water supply, something that ironically must now be “engineered” into the 
designed river system, including Delta levees.  Over time, the federal government has taken a 
larger role in flood protection, intervening in response to crises, neither a planned takeover 
by the USACE nor a calculated effort by local elites to shift the cost and responsibilities to 
others.  O’Neill suggests that the working relationships of federal, state and local agencies, 
river contractors, and the public, as reflected by congressional delegations pressuring at the 
USACE district level, may have developed a fairly rigid physical and organizational structure 
that inhibits changes to the system. This inflexibility may make it difficult for the system to 
effectively incorporate environmental protection and restoration into flood-protection 
projects. The Delta levees, specifically the 75% of Delta levees that were never reworked by 
the USACE, present a case not really explored by O’Neill (1998; 2006) where the 
involvement of state and federal agencies in the flood protecting levees came in at the same 
time as environmental protection became one of the norms.  This dissertation will explore the 
social perspectives of Delta levee experts on the nature of these working relationships in an 
area and time unexplored by O’Neill (2006). 
Robert Kelley’s (1989) Battling the Inland Sea addresses the entire history of levees 
and flood control projects in the Central Valley from the first recorded inundations to the 
monstrous Central Valley flood of 1986.  He concentrates on levee failures and developments 
upstream of Sacramento so the levee failure database that is part of this dissertation will 
make the record of Sacramento River flooding more complete temporally and spatially.  
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Kelley details the background of the hydraulic mining era that helped drag the Corps 
reluctantly into flood control responsibilities on the Sacramento River.  He notes how the 
flood of 1907 demonstrated the folly of USACE approaches and stopped implementation of 
what would have been a disastrous plan for the Sacramento based on the previously long held 
USACE levees-only policy. Kelley traces the USACE involvement in Sacramento River 
flood control from reluctance to deep involvement and jealousy of their role and resulting 
power.  Kelley concludes that the taming of the Sacramento floods represents the political 
victory of the “Whig-Republican” philosophy that it is the role of government to help support 
private economic activities by taking on large infrastructure projects, like flood control 
levees, navigation projects, and water supply/irrigation schemes.  He also characterizes the 
USACE and the others involved in bringing flood control to the Sacramento Valley as “a 
people slow to learn” (Kelley 1989, 323) and reluctant to initiate change because of deep 
psychological and sociological as well as material ties to the status quo.  This research will 
assess Kelley’s (1989) conclusions to determine if they can be identified in the social 
perspectives of Delta levee experts today. 
 Starting in 1940 the Delta levees also served a major role in moving water to some of 
the major water transfer and irrigation projects in the West.  The history of the development 
of reclamation effort in the U.S. West, including prominently the CVP and the SWP is laid 
out in the works of four scholars: Donald Worster’s (1985) Rivers of Empire, Marc Reisner’s 
(1986) Cadillac Desert, Norris Hundley’s (2001) The Great Thirst, and Donald Pisani’s 
(2002) Water and American Government.  Each of these emphasizes slightly different spatial 
and temporal aspect and each reaches a different view of what the great projects tell us about 
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and how they affected the changing relationship of society, government, and the 
environment.  
 Worster (1985) provides a critical view of the political economies that have driven 
development of increasing larger water projects of the U.S. West.  He relates a dark story, 
highlighting the growth of the USBR and the irrigation projects they built, including the 
CVP.  Worster looks for and finds signs in the California projects elements of the Hydraulic 
Empires as defined in the early work of Karl Wittfogel (Worster 1985, 23).  Wittfogel 
studied the ancient hydraulic empires of China, the Indus, the Euphrates and the Nile where 
control of the water meant wealth and absolute power for the individuals or bureaucracy who 
controlled it. As one of these, Assyrian Queen Semiramis, explained to eternity on her tomb: 
“I constrained the mighty river to flow according to my will and led its water to fertilize 
lands that had before been barren and without inhabitants” (Worster 1985, 39).  She 
apparently did not sense the need to add that all power and wealth flowed back to her through 
her bureaucracy that made irrigation and life possible.  Rulers of the Hydraulic Empires, like 
Semiramis, exercised absolute power over their subjects and in their minds over nature itself.  
In detailing the development of the CVP by the USBR, Worster highlighted the growth of the 
agency bureaucracy and the development of a hierarchical social structure and capitalist state 
featured in the areas served by the USBR.  He also predicts the eventual collapse of the 
hydraulic society that exists today in California and the rest of American West, just as the 
Assyrian hydraulic empire collapsed.  
Marc Reisner (1986) similarly questions the sustainability of the culture and society 
built in the semi-arid and arid areas of California through the great irrigation projects, 
including the CVP and SWP.  He challenges the economics of the federal and state 
33 
 
 
investments in water projects while noting the great wealth it has created for a few 
beneficiaries of the subsidized water is wealth that translates into power to keep the water 
and money flowing.  Reisner further explores how this accumulation of wealth and power 
translated into the political maneuvering and corruption he found in the selling of 
development of CVP, SWP, and other water projects of California and elsewhere in the west.  
Reisner plays particular attention to the political maneuvering around the 1980-1982 version 
of the fight over the Peripheral Canal.  Reisner identifies the contributions, contradictions 
and shenanigans of each of the major players in that two year battle to build the one missing 
piece of what Reisner classifies as  “uniquely productive, creative vandalism” (1985, 503), 
the water projects of the U. S. West.  Many of the same participants are back to tangle in the 
latest attempt to build the canal.  The dissertation may allow identification of which, if any, 
perspectives of Delta levee experts share Reisner’s distrust of the political leaders and overall 
distaste for the large water projects.  
   Norris Hundley (2001) relates the story of California water use from the earliest 
Spanish mission to the high water mark of CALFED in 2000 when it issued its Record of 
Decision or ROD.  Hundley quickly dismisses Wittfogel’s Hydraulic Empire theory adopted 
by Worster and proceeds to provide a less negative description of a plethora of fragmented 
authorities including DWR, USBR, MWD, and the Central Valley corporate agribusinesses 
and their water districts, which developed the system that accidently made the Delta the hub 
of a badly managed water supply system.  Unlike Worster, Hundley blames the American 
public, not a strong central power water bureaucracy, for continuing to support giant water 
projects in the face of evidence that they are damaging nature.  Hundley sees tremendous 
problems with the waterscape that has developed, in the Delta and throughout the West but 
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sees the authority to act too fragmented to effectively act.  He concludes that: “Ultimately 
what seems clearly warranted is a coordinating agency authorized to take charge” (italics in 
original) (Hundley 2001, 553).  The challenge he identifies is to make this agency 
accountable to the people, dismissing the legislature as incapable of solving the problems 
whereas the issues are unsuitable for resolution in the courts, and too complex for the 
initiative process.  Hundley (2001, 553) may have inspired creation of the Delta Vision Blue 
Ribbon Task Force he suggested (in 2001) that the complex water problems of California 
“deserve the attention of the nation’s best minds in and out of government: a task force 
approach.”  The book also outlined eight years earlier, many of provisions that would be 
included in the 2009 Water Bill package including creation of the Delta Stewardship Council, 
attention to groundwater and aquifer storage options, and the need for statewide water 
conservation, indicative of the insight of Hundley’s (2001, 554-558) work. He remained 
silent on the need for the peripheral canal but this dissertation will potentially find the threads 
of Hundley views in one or more social perspectives of Delta levee experts. 
Donald Pisani (2002) also analyzes Worster’s portrayal of a powerful federal agency 
leading the growth of the hydraulic society that developed in California after the start of the 
CVP.  He looked at the USBR from its establishment in 1902 until it assumed control of the 
CVP from the state of California (1902-1935).  He found that rather than the USBR coming 
out of Washington as a powerful federal agency able to bestow great wealth on its supporters, 
the USBR struggled to survive in Congress.  Few of its projects were completed and even 
fewer financially successful for anyone.  When Franklin D. Roosevelt looked at the CVP as 
way to jump-start the New Deal, he selected the USBR over the USACE to run the project, 
but even then initially only assigning the Friant Dam piece of the project.  FDR did not select 
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the USBR to run the Central Valley project because he perceived the USBR would be more 
effective, he merely used the logic that the USACE should build flood-control or navigation 
related dams and the USBR would construct hydroelectric and/or irrigation dams.  Thus, the 
USBR, USACE, and (later) the DWR designed and managed dams and reservoirs in the 
Sacramento and San Joaquin watersheds, with each dam designed for the specific purpose of 
the particular project and agency.  Pisani describes the USBR in these early days as an 
agency that failed to achieve its original ideal of a top-down social engineering project of 
populating the dry West with millions of Jeffersonian yeoman farmers.  Instead, it accidently 
created an agricultural elite by providing heavily subsidized water to those willing to take it.  
The industrial farms of the Central Valley prospered because the USBR had no choice but 
turn a blind eye to acreage limit violations if it was going to survive as a politically viable 
agency. 
Whereas  Pisani  (2002, 295) generally agrees with Hundley’s views, he does raise a 
concern, potentially counter to Hundley’s desire for “smart” people to take charge, that water 
resource development in the United States and California has been susceptible to “high 
modernist technology” as James Scott’s  Seeing Like a State (1998) noted.  Scott’s book 
details the failures of several modern authoritarian state attempts to create a new social and 
economic order, including places like Tanzania, Brazil, and the collective farms in the Soviet 
Union, where an all-knowing, privileged hegemonic science excluded “the necessary role of 
local knowledge” or metis as Scott refers to it.  This dissertation, by determining and 
describing the major social perspectives of Delta levee experts, will help identify the variety 
of views of what constitutes the best available science that should be applied in development 
of Delta levee policies.  It will also determine social perspectives on the role of metis in what 
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constitutes the best available science relative to Delta levees, and may indicate which if any 
formulations of best science is hegemonic.  This dissertation will identify the major 
perspectives on what constitutes the best Delta levee science and practice today. 
All of these works tell part of the story of the political and social forces that lead to 
the levee system existing in the Delta today and the roles and interactions of the various 
actors. Many Delta experts that I interviewed had read Kelley, Worster, Reisner, and 
Hundley, therefore, their works may play a role in establishing, refining, shaping, or 
reinforcing  the attitudes and social perspectives of their readers.  Each of these authors takes 
a different view or at least emphasis on the interaction and power relations between the 
government and society, the agencies and individual interest groups.  
Hurricane Katrina destroyed New Orleans and heightened concerns of everyone 
dependent on levees for protection of their safety and well-being. Given the role the Delta 
levees play in water distribution in California, the well-being of two-thirds of the population 
of the state depends on them.  Craig Colten (2009), in Perilous Place, Powerful Storms, 
reviews the historical development of the Greater New Orleans Hurricane Protection System, 
over the years since Hurricane Betsy (1965) clobbered south Louisiana badly enough to 
trigger Congressional approval of the project and the creation of the National Flood 
Insurance Program (Colten 2009, 36).  He emphasizes the human processes that led to the 
failures in 2005 precipitated by the landfall of Katrina, specifically looking at the complex 
interrelationships and interactions of the  USACE, state and local agencies, environmental 
groups, and other special interest groups (fishermen, shippers, local businessmen, etc.) that 
help contribute to the levees failures in 2005.  By interviewing the Delta levee experts and 
determining the social perspectives of the effects of the human interactions on the stability 
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and the security of Delta levees today, this dissertation can lay the groundwork for a similar 
analysis for the Delta without the backdrop of the catastrophic event.  In closing, Colten 
(2009, 147) dismisses views that precarious places like New Orleans or the Delta should not 
be inhabited, noting risks lurk everywhere and making decisions to live in the face of risk of 
levee failure “more typical than lunatic,” a perspective that may find support and opposition 
in the social perspectives uncovered among Delta levee experts. 
 A survey of the literature suggests that scholars have not determined the social 
perspectives on any issue in the Delta.  The Q literature, to be developed more fully in 
Chapter III, however, shows at least three research efforts have been directed at 
understanding the social perspectives of scientists and experts elsewhere (Bischof 2010; 
Focht 2003; Raadgever, Mostert, and van de Giesen 2008).  All of these scholars also used Q 
to help identify the social perspectives of scientists and experts; Bischof on coral reef science 
and the other two on water management issues.  Focht identified the social perspectives of 
those working on watershed management issues on the Illinois River in Oklahoma, and 
Raadgevar on flood control in the Rhine watershed in Europe.  This dissertation will extend 
this approach into the very complex Delta socio-ecosystem for the first time. 
 As Bischof (2010, 598) suggests, by “deconstructing the subjectivity that is embedded 
in the statements about the environment, some first steps are made towards extricating the 
scientific uncertainty and ontological artifacts that generate friction and disagreement.”  As 
Bischof did with coral reef science, this dissertation will use the Q-Method to identify and 
explore the social perspectives of Delta levee experts and managers that help determine the 
opinions they have about the past and future of failures of Delta levees and the actions they 
recommend. The identification of the perspectives of the key actors in the Delta in 2009 adds 
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temporally to the work of Prince, Kelley, Pisani, and O’Neill in their exploration of the 
changing attitudes and roles of society and  local, state and the federal government visa vi 
each other, to the exploitation of resources, and the environment.  Table 2.2 summarized the 
works of these scholars and their relevance to Delta levees. 
 The scholars listed in Table 2.2 and described above have studied and described with 
differing perspectives and emphasis, much of the history of the public discourses and policy 
outcomes of the governance of the major environmental and resource use issues still very 
much at issue in the Delta.  These scholars describe much of the underlying attitudes and the 
history of events that help shape the social perspectives that persist in the discourses that 
address governance issues of today.  Some of these writings have become so well read they 
may be considered direct influences on one or more of the social perspectives that this 
dissertation seeks to understand about Delta levees.  These scholars in relating their accounts 
do not attempt to understand the social perspectives behind the governance debates and 
conflict they detail, and indeed, it would be impossible to do retrospectively. This 
dissertation contributes back by looking at the social perspectives about one element, the 
stability of Delta levee, at one point in time that touches the great conflicts of the settlement 
of the American West, land reclamation, flood control, large state irrigation projects, and 
environmental restoration. 
SUMMARY  
 The chapter described the defining of the region of interest of this dissertation to be 
the Legal Delta as defined under the California Water Code since 1959.  The legislature 
defined the Delta as a place requiring special treatment because of its importance as an 
agricultural producer and gathering point for water transfers between northern California and 
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southern California.  The chapter then described the special type of levee that dominates the 
study area, the Levee-dam, a structure that must protect against flooding even during average 
or low water levels and compared this requirement to other structures call “levees.” 
 The chapter then identified the pre-dissertation answers to the two research questions.  
First, it identified three widely heard political perspective on the Delta levees: 1)  build the 
Peripheral Canal before the inevitable collapse of the conversion of the Delta to a salt water 
bay view;  2) restore the Delta, its levees, and environment by investing a little more in the 
improving  levees while looking to reduce the water exported out of the Delta argument; and 
3) build the Peripheral Canal so California can make use of every drop of Delta while 
restoring the endangered species official position of the State of California. 
The chapter identified the pre-dissertation answer to the research question relative to 
the history of failures of Delta levees as the list of “flooded islands”  listed in the State issued 
DRMS report (URS 2008c).  The primary failings of this report was the lack of detail about 
the incidents and the locations, lack of references, and absence of indication of near-misses, 
defined as the sum of the successful flood fights and emergency repairs. 
 The chapter concludes with a discussion of the efforts of scholars whose work 
provide a significant part of knowledge base for approaching the research questions.  Prince 
(1997), O’Neill (2006), Worster (1985), Reisner (1986), Pisani (2002), and Colten (2009) 
provide data on the events and discourses that potential influence the social perspectives of 
today.  Thompson (1957, 1962, 1996, and 2006) and Mitchell (1993) provide much of the 
detail on the early history of failures of Delta levees.   
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Table 2.2 Summary of Important Scholarship Relative to Delta Levees 
Scholar and 
Work(s) 
Emphasis Time 
Frame 
Major Assertions Implication for Delta Levees 
Thompson (1957, 
1962, 1996, 2006) 
The Delta 1860-1957 Delta was the first major wetland 
reclamation effort to be attempted with 
modern methods and equipment 
Listed major flooding events and 
levees failure through 1957 with an 
emphasis on those prior to 1930. 
Mitchell (1993) The Delta 1920-1993 Updates Thompson and documents 
conversion of Delta to water hub and 
introduces issue of urbanization of Delta 
Reviews abandonment of Franks 
Tract and establishes role of levees in 
water exports 
Prince (1997)  The draining of the 
wetlands of the 
Upper Midwest (US) 
1850-1920 
1970-1990 
Societal attitudes towards the wetlands 
have changed significantly, as mental 
constructions of Nature have changed. 
Attitudes towards the levees and the 
levee builders have eroded with 
changing perspective of the value of 
the wetlands they eliminated. 
Kelley (1989) Development of the 
flood control system 
on the Sacramento 
River (largely 
upstream of Delta) 
1850-1986 The development of the Sacramento River 
Flood Control System (not necessarily in 
the 75% of the Delta protected by non-
federal levees) was critically shaped by 
party or at least ideological politics and a 
USACE that went from an agency reluctant 
to become involved in flood control, to one 
jealous of that role. 
The significance of party politics in 
flood-control and the toward property 
rights, water rights, and the role of 
government assistance to private 
economic interests could have major 
impacts. 
O’Neill (2006) Historic development 
of the Mississippi and 
Sacramento River  
flood protection 
systems 
1803- 1936 
(some post 
1936 
references) 
Local interests in the Mississippi and 
Sacramento River basins worked together 
and separately to promote USACE 
involvement with local and state agencies 
to build the flood control systems.  The 
existing physical and organizational 
structure inhibits changes to the system.  
For the most part Delta levees were 
not built by the USACE, the working 
relationships between the local, state, 
and federal interests in the levees 
play an important role. 
Worster (1985) The “Hydraulic 
Empires” of world 
history, focus on the  
Central  Valley 
1847-1985 History teaches that large water 
distribution systems require strong, 
dictatorial powers and are doomed to 
failure 
If California has become a hydraulic 
empire, the only important role the 
levees will have is as a water 
conveyance system and little else. 
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Table 2.2 Continued 
Scholar and 
Work(s) 
Emphasis Time 
Frame 
Major Assertions Implication for Delta Levees 
Mitchell (1993) The Delta 1920-1993 Updates Thompson and documents 
conversion of Delta to water hub and 
introduces issue of urbanization of Delta 
Reviews abandonment of Franks 
Tract and establishes role of levees in 
water exports 
Prince (1997)  The draining of the 
wetlands of the 
Upper Midwest (US) 
1850-1920 
1970-1990 
Societal attitudes towards the wetlands 
have changed significantly as mental 
constructions of Nature have changed. 
Attitudes towards the levees and the 
levee builders have eroded with 
changing perspective of the value of 
the wetlands they eliminated. 
Kelley (1989) Development of the 
flood control system 
on the Sacramento 
River (largely 
upstream of Delta) 
1850-1986 The development of the Sacramento River 
Flood Control System (not necessarily in 
the 75% of the Delta protected by non-
federal levees) was critically shaped by 
party or at least ideological politics and a 
USACE that went from an agency reluctant 
to become involved in flood control, to one 
jealous of that role. 
The significance of party politics in 
flood-control and the toward property 
rights, water rights, and the role of 
government assistance to private 
economic interests could have major 
impacts. 
O’Neill (2006) Historic development 
of the Mississippi and 
Sacramento River  
flood protection 
systems 
1803- 1936 
(some post 
1936 
references) 
Local interests in the Mississippi and 
Sacramento River basins worked together 
and separately to promote USACE 
involvement with local and state agencies 
to build the flood control systems.  The 
existing physical and organizational 
structure inhibits changes to the system.  
For the most part Delta levees were 
not built by the USACE, the working 
relationships between the local, state, 
and federal interests in the levees 
play an important role. 
Worster (1985) The “Hydraulic 
Empires” of world 
history, focus on the  
Central  Valley 
1847-1985 History teaches that large water 
distribution systems require strong, 
dictatorial powers and are doomed to 
failure 
If California has become a hydraulic 
empire, the only important role the 
levees will have is as a water 
conveyance system and little else. 
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                                                                                            Table 2.2 Continued 
Scholar and 
Work(s) 
Emphasis Time 
Frame 
Major Assertions Implication for Delta Levees 
Reisner (1986) The large water 
projects of the USBR 
in the Western US, 
and other major 
water projects in 
California 
1803-1984 
(mostly 
post -1902) 
The water supply and irrigation projects of 
the US West have been tremendously 
wasteful of the water resources; they were 
built largely through political maneuvering 
and corruption, creating an environment 
where water flows uphill to money and 
power. 
The financial and political forces and 
even some of the key actors (Jerry 
Brown and Jerry Morel for example) 
have not changed since the last great 
debate over the Delta and the 
Peripheral Canal raged in 1982. 
Hundley (2001)  The changing 
waterscape of 
California from pre-
European contact to 
2001. 
1000-2001 Popular support for large water projects, in 
spite of knowledge of the problems they 
helped create, is the reason California has 
a water mess on its hands.  Hundley calls 
for the best minds to take a task force 
approach to fix the problems. 
CALFED was identified (in 2001) as a 
good approach. 
Huntley emphasized the need for 
stronger political leadership and a 
better informed electorate to make the 
hard choices to clean up the water 
mess in California 
Pisani (2002)  The effects of the 
USBR on the 
development of the 
US West and the 
inability of the 
American state to 
shape Western 
society through large 
scale irrigation 
projects. 
1902-1940 The Reclamation Act that established the 
USBR had the makings of a state driven 
attempt to rework the US West into a large 
social engineering project.  Fortunately it 
failed because of the weakness of the 
USBR in a federal system of checks and 
balances and distributed power.  He 
concludes by suggesting there is still the 
possibility that per Scott (1998) the 
potential exist for water projects to entail 
hegemonic planning that excludes local 
knowledge and knowhow.  
Even in the US, state power has been 
known to attempt to establish 
hegemonic scientific discourses, with 
little or no study or justification, and 
little or no recognition of local 
knowledge and experience.  
Colten (2009) The events that lead 
to the failures in New 
Orleans due to 
Hurricane Katrina 
1948-2009 The failure of human systems in planning 
to prevent the failure of the levees during 
Katrina, the failures of people who 
knowingly put themselves in harm’s way. 
The political, social and economic 
wrangling can be more difficult to deal 
with than the complex physical risks 
that the levees face.  
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CHAPTER III 
BACKGROUND: DELTA LEVEES 
OVERVIEW 
 This chapter will discuss the background on the levees to understand the history of 
levee failures in the Delta and the reflection of that history in the social perspectives of Delta 
levee experts.  The chapter starts with a short description of the geology and geomorphology 
of the surfaces on which human constructed the levees, followed by a brief history of the 
development of these levees by the local reclamation districts for agriculture.  The chapter 
then reviews the involvement of USACE in providing a flood control system for the 
Sacramento River and then later the San Joaquin River, upland from the Delta, followed by 
an explanation of the interaction of island subsidence and the Delta levees.  The chapter 
concludes with a short explanation of the modes of levee failures and the design standards 
that have evolved for the Delta levees. 
GEOLOGY AND GEOMORPHOLOGY OF THE DELTA 
 The Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta represents the eastern-most inland portion of 
the San Francisco Bay estuary.  Approximately 400,000 years ago, the ancient inland lake 
covering most of the Central Valley of California (Lake Clyde) overtopped the confining 
Coast Range and eroded what today is the Carquinez Straits west of the Delta and Suisun 
Bay.  This established the Delta as an area where the Sacramento, San Joaquin, and 
tributaries that drain about 40% of the modern state of California join and begin westward 
flow to the sea (Harden 1997, 279).  The drainage basin includes the northern two-thirds of 
the Central Valley, west slopes of the Sierra Nevada, east slope of Coast Ranges, south slope 
of the Klamath Range and part of the Modoc Plateau.  Since the erosion of the Carquinez 
44 
 
 
outlet, sea levels have risen and fallen at least three times.  Each time sea level fell, the 
drainage incised the Delta down to near the lowered sea levels.  Each time sedimentation and 
vegetation rebuilt the land surface of the Delta as the transgressive sea re-flooded the valley, 
the current re-development starting about 6700 years B.P. (Shlemon 1971; Atwater 1982; 
Weiss and Goman 1994; Goman and Wells 1999; Drexler et al. 2007). 
 The Delta differs significantly from the typical delta of the world in that it is a bayhead 
delta (Davis and Fitzgerald 2004), overlain with a bird’s foot delta of the Sacramento River 
(URS 2008b) as it enters the marsh, as shown in Figure 3.1.  It does not exhibit the classic 
form of the advance of fluvial deposition into the sea that has caught the attention of scholars 
from Herodotus to Syvitski et al. (2009) and thus it is rarely discussed as a Delta.  As a 
bayhead delta, it does not discharge directly into the Pacific, but rather it discharges through 
80 kilometers of first a constricted outlet (Carquinez Straits) and then through a series of 
estuarine bays and straits.  The land surface reflects deposition of Holocene muds and 
organics on top of earlier deposits of alluvial and aeolian sediments (Atwater 1982). Atwater 
and associates (Atwater and Belknap 1980, Atwater et al. 1979) and map (Atwater 1982) 
describe in detail the resulting locations of natural levees, flood basins, and aeolian sand 
deposits of the Delta itself.  The alluvial fans that originate in the Sierra confine the Delta 
lowlands to the east and the Montezuma formation and hills and the fans originating in the 
Coast Ranges limit the Delta to the west.  Rising tidal water reached the tapered western 
section of the Delta (where Sherman Island stands today), about 6,000-6,700 years ago when 
sea level was about 8 - 10 meters below the current levels and tidal waters were just 
transgressing into the Delta (Atwater and Belknap 1980, 97; Atwater et al. 1979; Goman and  
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Figure 3.1 – Pre-1850 Delta Showing Channels, Limits of Types of Wetlands, and 
Legal Limits of the Delta under the California Water Code (URS 2008b) 
Sacramento River 
San Joaquin River 
To Carquinez Straits 
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Wells 1999; URS 2008b; Drexler et al. 2007).  The water remained fresh under most 
circumstances and the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers tends to carry the clay sediments 
entrained in the flow westward where they settled out in the brackish and saline waters of 
Suisun and San Pablo Bays.   
 The rapid growth of vegetation adapted to shallow freshwater, particularly the bulrush 
(Scirpus acutus) or “tules,” allowed organic rates of sedimentation to keep pace with water 
levels rising at rates of approximately one plus meter per millennium over the last 6,000 or 
7,000 years (URS 2008b).  Water and climatic conditions in the Delta allow the tules and 
associated species to produce 2.5 kg of dry organic material per square meter every year 
(Atwater and Belknap 1980, 96).  With the large roots and rhizomes remaining sub tidal after 
the winter die off, organic material built up a rate able to match the rate of sea-level rise plus 
the rate of consolidation and crushing of the organic deposition from previous years. This 
restricted the increase in the tidal prism as sea-level rose, which helped the water remain 
fresh in the Delta. Conditions were kept perfect for peat accumulation in the Delta because 
the water levels and the inundated surface area continued to grow reaching an area of about 
1,500 square kilometers by 1850 (Atwater and Belknap 1980, 97) or most of the current 
Delta peat islands.  For the past 5,000-6,700 years, these tule marshes built up the elevation 
of the surface at an average rate of 1-2 mm per year (Atwater et al. 1979; Goman and Wells 
2000; URS 2008b), whereas relatively little suspended riverine sediment deposits in the 
Delta.  The rivers transport most of their estimated 1.5 million cubic meters each year of 
suspended sediment through the Delta to the depositional environment in the brackish mud 
flats and marshes of Suisun Bay and the rest of the San Francisco Bay, where Scirpus acutus 
and associates did not prosper. 
47 
 
 
 Before the gold seekers poured into the region starting in 1848, the Delta consisted of a 
large fresh water tidal marsh with 3 to 4 meter tall tule growing over 2 to 12 meter thick beds 
of Holocene peat.  The Sacramento River entered this wetland creating, what some have 
described as, a classic bird’s-foot Delta (URS, 2008b) into the northern part of the “Delta” of 
channels defined by the natural levees which grew shorter and narrower as the river ran 
deeper into the tidal marsh.  Upstream of the Delta, the river also built natural levees which 
grew to an elevated position above the flat Central Valley flood plain, such that for hundreds 
of kilometers, the tops of the confining levees of the river and its tributaries stand high above 
the floodplain.  Wide flood basins running parallel to the river, often on both sides, 
developed.  The natural levees confined the normal flows to the leveed channels.  The 
drainage basin, however, sits in either a Mediterranean or Mountain climate zone and 
experiences highly variable seasonal and year-to-year precipitation.  Floods in the 
Sacramento River can be 20 times average flows.  The capacity of the natural channel of the 
Sacramento River is limited upstream of the Delta to approximately 3285 cubic meters per 
second (115,000 cfs), slightly less than the flood capacity of the American River tributary 
that joins in Sacramento city (Hyatt 1942).  In floods, the river overtops its natural levees and 
sends the excess flow into the wide flood basins that run parallel to the levees, historically 
creating Kelley’s (1989) “inland sea.”  Floods arrived in the Delta via the Yolo flood basin to 
the west of the river, and then dumped back into the Sacramento through Cache Slough 
between Rio Vista and Isleton.  Pre-development, the east bank below Sacramento also had a 
floodway that ran between Interstate 5 and the river, entering the Delta through Snodgrass 
Slough east of Walnut Grove.  In the natural state, floodwaters cut crevasses (holes) in the 
natural levees to enter these flood basins and natural depositional processes closed them 
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when flood levels dropped.  In the 1920s, the USACE flood control system incorporated 
some of these “holes” as controllable weirs to create an engineered Yolo Floodway that can 
dump five times the flow of the normal river channel into the Delta.  This floodway includes 
two weirs (floodgates to control flow rates) and confining levees.  Land development in 
south Sacramento precludes intentionally utilizing the natural floodway on the east side of 
the Sacramento. 
 The San Joaquin enters the Delta from the south and splits into two main 
distributaries south of the tule marsh.  The Old River runs westerly from the divergence then 
turns north to run up the western edge of the Delta.  The main San Joaquin runs more 
northerly and enters the historic marsh just south of modern day Stockton.  Flows in San 
Joaquin are much smaller, and sediment supply is less than carried by the Sacramento. 
Vegetation and sea level rise turned the southern 70% of the Delta into a level, tidal 
freshwater marsh.  The vegetation helping create the marsh included tules or bulrush (Scirpus 
sp.), cattails (Typha sp.), and common reed (Phragmites sp.) (Atwater and Belknap 1980; 
URS 2008b). 
 Restricted by the narrow outlet to Suisun Bay and confined to the east and west by the 
alluvial fans from the Sierra and the Montezuma formation, Atwater and Belknap (1980) 
suggest that the Delta channels themselves did not migrate very much over time.  This 
resulted in the Holocene deposits of the Delta dominated by rather simple sequences of tidal-
wetland (peat and silty clay) and natural levee facies as shown in Figures 3.2 and 3.3. 
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Figure 3.2 – The Modern Delta (URS 2008b, Figure 3. Cross section A-A’ shown in 
Figure 3.3). 
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CLIMATE AND HIGH WATER EVENTS 
 As noted above, the Delta and most of the watershed has a Mediterranean climate with 
moist to wet winters and dry summers.  River flows vary significantly during the course of 
the year into the Delta and the watershed is prone to droughts and large amounts of 
precipitation over periods of several days (Interview 103-2009).  The Sacramento River 
drains 8,900 square miles (23,050 square kilometers), with an average discharge of 24,670 
 
Figure 3.3 – Cross Section A-A’ from Figure 3.2  
Showing Simplified Delta Stratigraphy (URS 2008b, Figure 4) 
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cfs (699 cubic meters per second).  Most runoff generally comes after large amounts of 
rainfall across the watershed, often combined with rapid snowmelt during December to May. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In the old natural marsh, now termed the “Delta Pool” by residents and regulators, 
ocean tides dominate water levels and increased riverine flows have the primary effect of 
Figure 3.4 – The Natural Channels and Sloughs in the Central Delta on which the 
Levee System was Constructed (Based on Tidelands 1869) 
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backing out some of the volume of tidal water originating at the Golden Gate, with tidal 
channels and sloughs as shown in Figure 3.4.  Delta Pool floods occur during a very high tide 
in the diurnal cycle of the Delta tides.  The highest or springtides occur in conjunction with 
the direct alignment of the sun-Earth-moon twice a lunar cycle (New moon and Full moon 
phases).  Strong onshore winds and low atmospheric pressures can stack water in the estuary 
can increase high spring tide levels in the Delta to very high levels. Pacific storms that create 
the large winter precipitation events (the “Pineapple Expresses”) can also produce strong 
onshore winds and generate very low-pressure readings.  When these storms hit during spring 
tides, Delta pool flooding can occur.  Unlike the riverine floods where water levels build for 
several days and then fall over a similar time frame, Delta pool floods rise with the tide and 
fall with the tide and result in short periods of predictable risk on a twenty-five hour or so 
cycle. 
BUILDING THE DELTA LEVEES FOR AGRICULTURE 
The federal Arkansas Act of 1850 that conveyed swamp and overflowed lands from 
federal ownership to California and other states, initiated state encouragement of small 
farmers (initially grants were limited to 320 acres per family) to reclaim swamps and marshes 
into land with exchange and use values (Thompson 1957; Thompson 2006; Prince 1997).  
Many emigrants from the American East and Europe recognized that agriculture held more 
promise for them than the gold mining that originally drew them to California and soon they 
lined the natural levees downstream of Sacramento with small farms.  These farmers built 
earthen ramparts on top of the natural levees to increase the area they could farm protected 
from flooding (Thompson 1957; Dillon 1982, 89).  Reclamation of the tule-covered back 
marsh, however, did not occur until potential reclaimers could secure clear title for the land 
53 
 
 
that had to be leveed and drained.  It would take until 1861 for California and the US 
government to resolve which “swamp and overflowed lands” had been conveyed from 
federal ownership to the state.  California created the short-lived Board of Reclamation 
Commissioners (1861-1866) to promote sales of swampland to small landholders, and to take 
direct control of reclamation activities.  This agency authorized the process of local 
landowners forming and funding local reclamation districts with taxation powers granted by 
the state.  In 1866, the California legislature eliminated the Board and turned swampland 
development over to the counties.  Within five years, the Contra Costa, San Joaquin, 
Sacramento, Solano, and Yolo county surveyors had sold of much of the 500,000 acres of 
state swampland in the Delta.  Gone too were the 320 acre limits; indeed, George Roberts, 
the organizer of the Tide Land Reclamation Company  (Thompson and Dutra 1983, 27) 
ended up controlling about half of the Delta swampland in the early 1870s  (Thompson 
1957).  Figure 3.5, modified from an 1869 map, shows the predevelopment Delta and some 
of the large landholdings accumulated. 
Thompson (1982; 1957; 1962; 2006) details the early successes and failures of early 
1870s reclamation of Delta, largely consisting of levees built out of blocks of peat by hand 
by mostly Chinese immigrant labor.  Sherman Island became the first major complete 
restoration project, finished in April of 1869 and Tidelands enclosed Twitchell Island the 
same year with hand-built peat levees. Initially, crop returns were excellent but floods that 
overtopped the levees in 1872, 1875, 1876, 1878 and 1880 destroyed enthusiasm for this type 
of levee project.  Developers abandoned Twitchell after the 1875 flood and Sherman Island 
returned to marsh after the 1880 levee failure.  They remained un-reclaimed until 1893 and  
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Figure 3.5 – Early Large Landholdings in the Delta (Thompson 1957, 228) 
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1894, respectively, when levee builders employed clamshell dredge technology to try again 
to farm the islands (Thompson 1957, 481).  The clamshell dredge first saw use in building 
Delta levees before 1880 and almost immediately, it became the preferred tool and method of 
levee construction.  
The history of nearby Brannan Island reads similarly, with peat levees raised in 1873, 
failures culminating in an 1881 collapse that led to abandonment until 1894.  Whereas the  
wheelbarrow and shovel built peat levees make an interesting story of human effort, the 
levees that they created largely washed or floated away during long periods of abandonment, 
prompting one engineer in 1882 to state that no peat islands had “been successfully 
reclaimed.  Levees made of peat have proven failures in every instance” (Thompson 2006, 
29). 
 The clamshell dredge and other dredges, either developed or perfected in the Delta, 
would set off the second wave of reclamation.  The clamshell dredge first found use in the 
Delta around 1879; it held the advantage of simplicity coupled with the ability to access 
materials from the depths of any channel and deliver it relatively dry to a levee surface 15 to 
60 meters from the edge of the water.  It could also build a levee across a back marsh, 
floating in on its own ditch and digging as deep as necessary to access better levee 
construction materials.  Thompson and Dutra (1983) discuss in detail the development of the 
dredging equipment, including hydraulic dredges that subsequently built the Delta levee 
system.  With the help of the new dredges, the independent, self-governing, often clamshell 
dredge-owning Delta reclamation districts eventually gained some control over the marsh 
and outlasted major floods in 1893, 1902, 1904, 1906 , 1907, and 1909 that destroyed miles 
of levees and repeatedly inundated most of the reclaimed land (Thompson 1996).  The arrival 
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in the Delta of tons of mining sediment eroded from the Sierra foothills by 30 years of 
unregulated hydraulic mining exacerbated these floods.  Floodwaters transported the 
sediments out of the foothills and dropped them, clogging river channels in the valley and 
Delta which added to the flood heights (Gilbert 1917; Thompson 1996; Kelley 1989).  Flood 
prevention pitted the two major economic interests in the state, agriculture, and hydraulic 
mining, against each other (Isenberg 2005).  For the first time the levees of the Delta were 
placed into the spotlight of political fights between major economic interests.  Where the 
streams entered the valley, floods left the coarser sediments in thick layers on the previously 
fertile fields.  By the time the floodwaters reached the Delta, the less competent Sacramento 
River deposited thick layers of sediments in the channel bottom and on the growing levees. 
Shoaling exacerbated flooding but also provided channel bottom sediments (potentially 
tainted with mercury from the upstream gold extraction activities) for the dredges to add to 
the heights of the levees.  Hydraulic mining would effectively end in California after a court 
order banned the practice in 1884 and the economics of the method had deteriorated; 
however, it took several decades for the rivers and streams to transport the bulk of the 
artificially eroded material through the watershed.  During the period of 1850-1915, Gilbert 
(1917) estimated that the amount of sediment delivered to the Delta jumped almost tenfold 
from pre-mining levels to 14 million cubic meters per year. This level would decline to about 
a third of that amount by the late 1950s as the slug of hydraulic mining sediment moved 
through the Delta (Atwater and Belknap 1976, 1980; URS 2008b). 
 Farmers and developers built the agricultural levees that remain today between 1897 
and 1920 from adjacent soil materials collected by clamshell dredges and in some cases 
hydraulic dredging equipment.  Mormon board scrapers and the locally invented “caterpillar” 
57 
 
 
bulldozer helped shape the levees.  Over time, the reclamation districts, several of which 
owned their own clamshell dredges until the Great Depression , added height and width using 
the same techniques (Thompson and Dutra 1982).   
 Materials of construction varied along a levee, depending on the nature of the 
depositional development and the depth of the excavation.  As shown on Figures 3.2 and 3.3, 
four types of depositional environments dominated the pre-development Delta.  The first 
were the channels of the main rivers, the Sacramento including distributaries Steamboat 
Slough, Prospect Slough, Georgiana Slough, and 3-Mile Slough; the San Joaquin River, 
including its two distributaries, the Old and Middle Rivers, and the Mokelumne River (North 
and South branches).  Deposits in these channels tend to be clastic materials originating in 
the Sierra with the largest sizes, in the Delta, being gravels and sands.    
 Floodwaters would carry sediments over the levees into the marsh behind, with the 
largest sediments, mostly sands and larger silts, settling out closest to the riverbanks as water 
velocity declines when the floodwaters expand out of the channel.  This deposition created 
the natural levees immediately adjacent to the channel, again mostly sand and larger silts 
fining into the marsh. 
 The marsh behind the natural levees always experienced the slowest rates of flow, 
allowing deposition of the finer clastic sediments, mostly clays and fine-grained silts.  As 
discussed earlier, the primary deposition in the Delta marsh over the last 6,000 years has 
been of the organic roots and stems of the marsh vegetation spircus and pragmatus. 
 The last major depositional environment developed in the crevasses and tidal 
channels, particularly in the tidal pool where twice a day the flood tide overwhelmed low 
spots in the natural levees and allowed the water to inundate the marsh.  These twice-daily 
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flood flows created permanent channels, holes in the natural levees to allow water and some 
sediment into the marsh and then back out as the tide ebbed.  Unlike the main channels that 
had net positive flows to the sea, the tidal channels mostly had small net negative flows as 
evaporation rates exceed precipitation over the course of the year; however, they could have 
significant flood and ebb flows.  Deposition in these sloughs would vary with rates of flow 
but would be similar to the natural levees at the levee “breach” fining further into the marsh.  
Perhaps as significant, the tidal flows erode away the organic materials and fines clays and 
silts along the course of the sloughs.   
 With the clamshell dredge, developers built levees on one of five types of alignments, 
each of which has implications for the materials of construction of the levees still standing 
today.  The first alignment followed the course of one of the main river channels.  The 
dredge bucket would dig materials from the channel bottom and perhaps the natural banks to 
build a silt-sand-gravel levee on a similar natural levee foundation.  On the fringes of the 
study area, the natural levees were large, but shrank as the rivers ran further into the tidal 
pool.  At locations where the levee was built across a crevasse or opening of a tidal slough, 
this hole in the levee had to be filled in with dredged material and a tidal gate would be 
installed to permit drainage during low tides of any excess precipitation.  The dammed 
slough continued to provide a drainage path even after the island land elevation subsided 
below the low tide elevation and required a pump to drain the interior of the island, replacing 
the tidal gate.   
 Often, ownership issues or the size of the slough would require that the levee builders 
build along the slough rather than across the slough, creating the second type of levee 
alignment, simply termed “Slough.”  Here the levee builder’s clamshell bucket would find 
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some sand and silt, but depending on the size of the slough and the distance from the main 
channel, it could also pick up more clay-peat mix from the marsh.  Again, the levee builder 
would build across and block any side sloughs, and again would install initially tidal gates. 
Eventually the farmers would be required to install pumps to maintain drainage after 
subsidence dropped the landside elevation below low tide levels.  
In the center of Delta pool, both the main channels, particularly the Old River and  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 – Google Earth Image of Middle River between Jones Tract and Victoria Island 
Showing the Levees Built to Cut Off the Meander Bends with the Original Channel Marked in 
Blue 
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Middle River and the larger sloughs, such as Disappointment and Potato, meandered through 
the marsh and created large swampy point bars.  The levee builders often took their clamshell 
on straight lines between cutbanks of the river or slough, forming the third and fourth types 
of levee alignment, the main channel meander and slough meander cutoff alignments.  Figure 
3.6 shows the original meandering river or slough and the main channel meander and slough 
meander cutoff alignments, specifically showing the original meandering river and the levees 
built to reclaim Victoria Island, Upper Jones Tract and Woodward Island, cutting off the  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7 - Google Earth Image of Venice Island Marked to Show the Different Types of 
Levees Alignments Involved in Reclamation of the Delta 
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bends and leaving behind the mid-channel marsh islands.  The dredges building the meander 
cut-off would find differing materials; such as river channel deposits at the cutbanks, more 
organic materials, and peat foundations between the bends.  The soils materials contacted and 
used for a meander cutoff levee along a slough, such as the one shown in Figure 3.7 along 
Potato Slough on both Bouldin and Venice Island sides may have possessed even greater 
variation than a typical main channel cutoff variety.  
 
 
 
  
Figure 3.8 – Google Earth Image Showing Grant Line Canal and Levees on the South 
Side of Union Island, one of the Cross-Marsh Levees Built in the Delta by Clamshell 
Dredges. 
62 
 
 
The final alignment used by the levee builders went along property lines, which 
generally required the dredgers to cut across the marshland, building clay-peat soil levees on 
clay-peat soil foundations, depending on peat thickness at the location.  Figure 3.8 shows the 
Grant-Line/Fabian and Bell Canal, the classic property-line, cross-marsh levees.  The 
alignment dates to a Mexican land grant boundary.  By the 1870s, the owner of present day 
Union Island, George Roberts could not reach agreement on levee protection with his 
neighbor to the south of the old Mexican land grant line.  Roberts built a levee on the “grant 
line” which formed his south property line, working the dredger across the marsh, floating in, 
digging the canal in front of them, and creating the Grant Line Canal in the process.  As 
shown in Figure 3.8, the owner of Fabian Tract to the south later built his levee across the 
marsh immediately south of the property line and of the Grant Line Canal to protect the north 
side of the Fabian Tract.  A thin band of marsh was left between these borrow pits/canals, 
either to provide spoil material for future levee repairs or to avoid trespass claims.  Straight, 
parallel canal pairs became rather common alignments in the Delta.   
Figure 3.9 summarizes identification of the levee types in the Central Delta by reverse 
engineering the Delta levees known to exist today, identifying what was there initially, and 
recognizing the technology at the disposal of the levee builders.  The record indicates few 
variations in the techniques used by the levee builders after the development of the clamshell 
dredge and the type of alignment represents an identifiable “design” factor.  The exceptions 
to building the levees exclusively from immediately adjacent dredge material included the 
method used to develop Union Island of first constructing parallel peat walls, which the 
builder then covered with hydraulically dredged deposits (Thompson 1957).  Some of the 
USACE levees built for the Stockton Deep Water Ship Channel shown in Figure 3.7 and 
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marked on Figure 3.9 (Hardeman 1986) were also exceptions in that the USACE and Port of 
Stockton built these essentially cross-marsh levees in the 1930s by first excavating the  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9 – Levees Built 1869-1935,  By Type – Lower San Joaquin, Based on Tide 
Land Map (1869) 
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organic soils at the base of the levee foundation and replacing them with granular material 
dredged from the river.  They completed the levee with dredged material from the new 
channel (Hardeman 1986).  
SUBSIDENCE OF PEAT ISLANDS 
By 1922, reclamation district levees ringed the Delta marsh and converted most of it 
to farmland.  Most agricultural crops do not tolerate saturated soil conditions so farmers had 
to clear the new land, usually by burning, and drain it.  The organic soil material of the 
former tule marsh, sub-aerial for the first time, oxidized rapidly.  Whereas the marsh plants 
were gone, ending the creation of replacement organic materials, the gradual consolidation, 
and compression from gravitational loading of the underlying materials continued.  Winds 
eroded the fine oxidized particles and the subsidence of the Delta farmlands commenced, a 
process that continues to this day and now leaves the islands “bowls” with centers as much as 
8 meters below sea level.  Today the average elevation in the reclaimed Delta stands about 5 
meters below sea level.  This subsidence process, first measured by Weir (1950) on Mildred 
Island, occurs at a rate of 3-6 cm per year and has irreversibly changed the geomorphology of 
the Delta.  Approximately 2.5 billion cubic meters of the peaty soils (Mount and Twiss 
2004), that constituted the fresh water marsh of the Delta and developed purely from tules 
and related vegetation, has oxidized, consolidated, or blown away.  Wide spread 
abandonment of Delta levees would see eventual filling of these holes with water so deep 
that, as Reed (2002) points out, the fresh water plants that built the marsh cannot grow.  If 
subsidence stopped today, it would take over 500 years to make up for these loses if all the 
sediment delivered to the Delta deposited on the islands. Whereas the subsidence rate has 
slowed, the process continues under current farming practices. Approximately 20% of the  
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Figure 3.10 – Cartoon Showing the Steps in Land Reclamation and Peat Soil Subsidence in 
the Delta, that Saw the Marsh Progress to Islands Protected by “Dams”  adapted from URS 
(2007, 39). 
Natural levees and back marsh 
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sediment delivered to the Delta remains in and along the Delta channels or deposits in the 
Clifton Court Forebay, the new sub-delta of the Sacramento and San Joaquin.  Figure 3.10 
shows the stages in this subsidence process. 
THE USACE AND FLOOD CONTROL LEVEES 
O’Neill (1998; 2006), Kelley (1989), and James and Singer (2008) detail the story of 
how the debris from hydraulic mining accentuated flooding in the Sacramento Valley and 
culminated in the devastating flood of March 1907.  This flood overtopped most of the levees 
in the Delta and destroyed most towns and levees north of Sacramento.  The flood reached a 
peak flow rate into Suisun Bay of over 20,880 cubic meters per second, a rate twice what 
state and federal engineers had estimated to be the absolute maximum possible flood and the 
one used to define the design basis for the flood control plan the state had proposed in 1906.  
The 1909 flood would nearly duplicate the 1907 levels, events that finally helped overcome 
the resistance of the collection of individual reclamation districts, who in the words of the 
state engineer, were content to continue to protect their properties by waging “a struggle or 
war, in which the biggest and strongest levee would certainly be the winner” (O'Neill 2006, 
115).  Some levee owners considered sabotage of others’ levees during times of high water.  
The release of floodwater onto one island would always lower water levels everywhere else 
in the system.    
The reclamation districts all up and down the Central Valley would join the state and 
similar groups in the Mississippi River valley to press Congress to get the U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers (USACE) to help improve flood protection on the Sacramento and the 
Mississippi Rivers (O'Neill 2006).  Prior to 1917, the USACE had resisted working on flood 
control issues; however, Californians were able to convince Congress that the federal 
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government had greatly benefitted from the hydraulically mined gold and, therefore, should 
help fix the problems it had created.  Congress first created a state – federal agency, the 
California Debris Commission in 1893 to regulate the debris dams required of mines to keep 
the tailing out of the river system.  Congress would house the federal part of this early 
federal-state joint agency with the USACE.  The Debris Commission would eventually 
propose a flood control plan for the Sacramento that fortunately deviated from the “levees 
only” policy the USACE so stubbornly held to on the Mississippi (Davis 2000; Gomez 2000; 
Kelman 2000; Pubis 2000; Shallat 2000; Colten 2005).  The final proposal included a system 
that would be composed of levees, flood control dams, and flood bypasses. The USACE 
commenced executing this plan in 1913, officially completed it in the 1960s and it protects 
the Sacramento Valley today. 
As noted above, the USACE, so deeply involved today in the levees and flood control 
structure of the Delta and the rest of the Central Valley, had long resisted this role, preferring 
to limit civilian activities to maintaining the navigable waterways of the U.S.  The USACE 
got into the new role slowly, initially starting the part of the total flood control project that 
involved straightening and widening the Sacramento between Cache Slough where the Yolo 
Basin re-enters the main river and Suisun Bay.  This allowed the USACE to ease into the 
new role of responsibility for flood control on a project that also helped improve navigation.  
Congress fully authorized the involvement of the USACE in 1917 with flood control projects 
in the Sacramento and Mississippi River basins only.  Congress would not expand USACE 
involvement in flood control on the rest of the rest of the rivers of the nation until 1928 
(Kelley 1989).  From 1917 to the early 1950s, the USACE, with the assistance of the local 
Reclamation district would re-build about 15% of the Delta levee to provide improved 
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Figure 3.11 – Project, Direct Agreement, and Non-Project Levees in the Legal Delta 
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flood control for much of the Central Valley. These so called “Project” levees extended along 
the main Sacramento to its confluence with the San Joaquin along with Steamboat, 
Georgiana, Cache, and Three-Mile sloughs as shown in Figure 3.11 and established an 
approximate 100-year flood standard. When completed, the USACE turned the levees over to 
the State of California who assumed the liability for them.  The state then turned the levees 
back to the local reclamation districts who continued financial responsibility to maintain the 
levees under their own taxing and borrowing authority, as they had before the USACE rebuilt 
and strengthened the levees.  After damage from flooding on the San Joaquin River in water 
year 1951, the Central Valley congressional delegation would successfully pressure the 
USACE to rebuild the levees in and around Stockton and south along the San Joaquin 
(Interview 124-2009). 
Under the 1936 Flood Control Act, federal flood control projects required the states 
and locals to a) provide the rights of way; b) “hold and save harmless the United States free 
from damages due to the constructed works; and c) maintain and operate all works after 
completion in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Army” (Nolan 
1984, 538).  The so-called “Project” levees are generally assumed to meet the 100-year return 
flood design standard and are among the strongest in the watershed.  Most of the mileage of 
the Project levees extends outside the Delta, up the Sacramento-Feather to Oroville and 
Hamilton City and down the San Joaquin to near Fresno.  In total, the USACE reworked 
about 15% of the levees in the Delta as part of the flood control project (Robie 1975). 
Several railroad embankments were built to carry the tracks across the Delta, most  
notably the Santa Fe (now BNSF), constructed in 1899 (Thompson 1957; San Francisco Call 
1899).  This embankment separated the two Jones Tracts and played a significant role in 
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flooding on those island/tracts.  Railroad engineers copied the method of constructing the 
embankments across the marsh from the local levee builders (San Francisco Call 1899) and 
therefore the many of these railroad embankments were constructed as levees and function as 
levees at times. 
  The USACE also completed the Stockton Deep-Water Ship Channel between 1923 
and 1933 (Hardeman 1986), which involved building and reinforcing levees along the San 
Joaquin between Antioch and Stockton, as part of their more traditional role of expanding 
and maintaining navigable waterways.   The project deepened the 75-mile waterway to a 39 
foot depth and cut off some of the meanders that made the old route torturous (Hardeman 
1986).  Many of these meander cutoff levees do not directly protect reclaimed land because 
most of the pieces cut off were too small to justify reclamation.  Therefore, they remain as 
“tule berms” or pieces of semi-natural marsh.  In 1963, the USACE completed a 9-meter 
deep ship channel to West Sacramento.  Unlike the Stockton Deep Water Channel that 
followed the San Joaquin area, the USACE dug a new channel for the Sacramento Ship 
Channel, starting at Cache Creek where the Yolo Basin reconnects with the Sacramento 
River.  The channel runs on the east side of the Yolo Bypass and spoils from the channel 
reinforced the confining levees of the Bypass.  After construction, the Ports of Stockton and 
Sacramento assumed responsibility for the levees from the USACE on the ship channel and 
turned responsibility for them to local reclamation districts.  By official terminology, they are 
named called “Direct Agreement” levees, and they constitute about 10% of the total levees in 
the Delta. 
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DELTA LEVEES: STANDARDS 
Millions of U.S. residents live, work, farm, go to school, and/or play in places 
protected from flooding by an estimated 100,000 miles of “levees,” including the 14,000 
miles in the USACE levee safety program initiated in 2006 (http://www.usace.army.mil 
/LEVEESAFETY/ACTIVITIES/Pages/act_nldb.aspx, last accessed 12 August 2011).  One 
potential reason why the public, the politicians, the managers and even the engineers and 
scientists seem to have little grasp of the problems posed by the current flood protection 
systems, especially those in the Delta, may be rooted in the inconsistent use of the terms that 
define the components of those systems, by politicians and the general public.  The word 
“levee” is used in general parlance and in government and industry design standards to 
describe at least three different functional “structures” separating land and water.  For 
example, the USACE who engineered of 25% of the Delta levees and are responsible for 
14,000 mile nationwide, provides on the website of the Coastal and Hydraulic Engineering 
Section, the following definitions for a “levee”: “1) an embankment constructed to provide 
flood protection from seasonal high water; 2) a dike or embankment to protect land from 
inundation; 3) a ridge or EMBANKMENT of sand and silt, built up by a stream on its flood 
plain along both banks of its channel; and 4) a large DIKE or artificial EMBANKMENT, 
often having an access road along the top, which is designed as part of a system to protect 
land from floods”  (upper and lower case usage per original)  (USACE, not dated).  The third 
definition clearly fits the natural levees.  Artificial levees built for reclamation and flood 
control purposes fit in first and fourth definitions for those designed to protect only against 
seasonal flooding, whereas the second definition is not so specific.  With respect to the 
human-built levees, the USACE does not distinguish between the dominant 
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geomorphological forces involved (waves, tides, or fluvial) or whether the protection 
provided against inundation is constant or only under extreme flood conditions.  
Terminology does not even permit distinguishing between natural and human-built 
structures.   
This lack of precision lumps the levees in the Delta pool that restrain water in the 
channel constantly, with those upstream along the San Joaquin with both sides dry except 
during the occasional flood, under the same name – a levee. When one looks at the detail of 
the USACE engineering standards, however, distinctions are apparent.  The USACE standard 
EM-1110-2-1913,  Design and Construction of Levees (USACE 2000), describes in the 
“Introduction” that  “(1) The term levee as used herein is defined as an embankment whose 
primary purpose is to furnish flood protection from seasonal high water and which is, 
therefore, subject to water loading for periods of only a few days or weeks a year.  
Embankments that are subject to hydraulic loading for prolonged periods (longer than normal 
flood protection requirements) or permanently, should be designed in accordance with earth 
dam criteria rather than the levee criteria given herein.”  Still, the only place where the 
USACE standards for the I-floodwall levee design that also had to hold back water 
permanently but failed so tragically in New Orleans is defined is on page 8-14 of the levee 
standard (USACE 2000).  Whereas few, if any, of the levees in Legal Delta primary zone, 
whether built by the local reclamation districts or the USACE, meet the USACE definition of 
a “levee,” none were designed as “earth dams” per USACE EM-1110-2-2300 (USACE 
1994). 
The primary differences between what I call the “levee-dams” that hold back water 
constantly and standard flood control levees, standing high and dry most of the time meeting 
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the standard of EM 1100-2-1913 are that levee dams require “spillway structures” so the 
structure is not eroded away when overtopped, and they must meet standards for seepage 
control.  No spillways exist in the Delta levee system and what has evolved is a separate, 
Delta-Specific, less formalized set of engineering standards that have been developed by the 
USACE, FEMA and DWR exclusively for the Delta levees and applied to levee-dams and 
flood control levees without differentiation.  Cross-sectional geometry requirements 
represent the primary features of the Delta standards, which gain support from the 
reclamation districts because those levees not meeting the particular standards are not eligible 
for federal flood insurance programs and /or post-flood assistance.  
Figure 3.12 shows the current levee standards, in reality largely geometry standards, 
developed in the 1980s after several costly failures of Delta levees.  The standards were first 
initiated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) which had concerns that 
the lack of standards would lead to repetitive claims against the Federal Flood Insurance 
Program by properties with clearly substandard protection, and no incentive to improve 
protection.  Working with DWR, FEMA issued the short-term Hazard Mitigation Plan 
(HMP) standard, which became the minimum standard for work supported by the DWR 
subventions program after the 1986 floods.  FEMA established the requirement that after 
September 11, 1991, that they would only honor emergency relief claims on properties 
protected by levees certified meeting the HMP standard (Betchart 2008).  The HMP standard  
was considered a temporary minimum standard with 30.5 cm (one foot) of freeboard required 
over the 100 year flood and minimum with 3 to 2 slopes on the water side and 2 to 1 on the 
island side.  It also required a minimum crest width of 4.88 meters with an all-weather road 
on the top to facilitate inspection and repair, a requirement apparently not emphasized 
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Figure 3.12 – Current Delta Specific Levee Standards for Agricultural Areas 
Required all-weather roadway 
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initially by DWR documents.  The standard also includes requirements that internal surveys 
be made for weaknesses in the levee, that any piping or other conduits through the levee be 
inspected, and vegetation controlled to facilitate inspection (DPC 1994, 20).  In September 
1990, a year before the deadline, DWR inspected the districts participating in the Subvention 
Program and declared 22 out of 47 of them 100% HMP compliant.  Nearer the deadline, a 
joint FEMA-California Office of Emergency Management (OEM) team inspected 52 
island/tracts and found only Rindge Tract, Tyler Island, Stark Tract, and Glanville Tract to 
have met all requirements.  The list of islands not inspected included Little Mandeville, 
which subsequently suffered a levee failure and has not been reclaimed (Norris 1996).  Many 
that did not pass met the geometry requirements but apparently lacked an all-weather road.  
A follow up DWR inspection in 1995 suggested that 31 islands had achieved the standard.  
Discussions with several Delta experts, interviewed for this dissertation, suggest that many 
islands and tracts still have not achieved this minimal standard (Interviews 112-2009 and 
124-2009) but all are working toward it.  Betchart (2008) suggests many of the non-
compliant islands/tracts are too small and/or poor to raise the 25% reclamation district cost 
share under the subvention program to complete the work to meet this standard everywhere 
in the Delta. 
The next more stringent levee standard is the PL84-99, the response of the USACE to 
the Public Law 84-99 requirement to establish a standard.  This standard represents the 
minimum requirements for the federal flood control project levees (Project levees) although 
most were built before this standard was established.  After the 1997 floods on the San 
Joaquin broke several USACE levees, the USACE rebuilt them to this standard.  It requires a 
foot and a half freeboard above the 100-year flood, and requires a slope of less than 2 to 1 on 
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the waterside and as gradual as to 7 to 1 on the island side, slope depending on peat content 
and other soil conditions. 
After 1987, non-Project levees certified by the USACE to meet the PL84-99 standard 
became eligible for 75% federal reimbursement for rehabilitation in the event of failure.  In 
1995, the USACE Sacramento District office viewed Holland and Byron Tracts as the only 
two non-Project levee surrounded islands to have achieved the PL84-99 standard at that time 
(Norris 1996).   
In most regards, the DWR 192-82 standard, issued in 1982 represents the most 
stringent of the current standards for agricultural levees.  Nevertheless, compliance has no 
real legal or financial incentives built in, notwithstanding that from the standpoint of DWR, 
the HMP standard represents only an interim step in achieving the 192-82 requirements.  In 
agricultural areas, 0.522 meter (one and a half feet) of freeboard above the 300 year 
reoccurrence flood level is required by 192-82; it maintains the same maximum waterside 
slope of 2 to 1 as PL84-99, however, the land slopes are expected to range from 3:1 to 7:1, 
depending on levee height and soil conditions.  By 1995, only Webb, Twitchell, Bacon, and 
Bouldin had achieved or were near achieving the 192-82 standard (Norris 1996) and they 
were all part of the long delayed Delta Wetlands project described by Mitchell (1993).  Webb 
and Holland Tracts had achieved the standard but subsequent subsidence of the peat 
foundations dropped them back out of compliance.  It is likely that PG&E has helped 
McDonald Island make the necessary investments to achieve the standard so it could protect 
its natural gas storage facility since 1995.   Most of the other islands still aspire to this 
standard. 
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Many of the islands/tracts, particularly those with full or partial enclosure by 
“Project” levees have obtained FEMA 100 year flood certification for urban use.  This means 
that residents can obtain federally subsidized flood insurance for their homes (Ludy 2009).  
Whereas this standard requires 91.44 cm (three feet) of freeboard against the 100-year flood, 
its landside slope requirement only stipulates that an engineer confirm the stability of the 
levees.  FEMA grandfathered as meeting this standard many of the USACE project levees, 
such as those on Grand Island, Pierson District, Hastings Tract, and urbanized areas like 
Discovery Bay and Walnut Grove.  In 2008, however, FEMA de-certified the grandfathered 
levees pending re-certification of the levee by a competent engineer (Booth 2008), to the 
consternation of the residents on the islands. 
Betchart (2008) introduced to Delta Vision the concept of a wetlands levee standard 
for areas like some of the islands in the Suisun Marsh and other areas such as Little Franks; 
an agriculture and infrastructure standard probably similar to PL84-99; a new urban levee for 
standard new developments with a 200 year-flood standard; and a standard for the legacy 
urban areas like Walnut Grove.  He also projected the potential need for earthquake resistant 
and earthquake repairable standards at least for the last three land uses, if the regulators agree 
on the need for earthquake standards. 
None of the published Delta-specific levee standards differentiate requirements based 
on the normal water level; only 100-year flood levels.  Therefore, we still have no difference 
in the standards in the Delta for what I call “levee-dams” and what I would prefer to call 
“flood-control or protection levees.”  Whereas everyone involved would enjoy the limitations 
on seepage that the “Dam” standard would require (USACE 1994), the fact remains that the 
Delta levees were constructed out of porous sands, gravels and peats, whatever was available 
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to the bucket of the clamshell.  They were built on foundations of similar materials.  The 
reality is that these structures function as levee-dams only with large inputs of labor and 
expertise to manage the constant and often excessive seepage.  This approach has enjoyed 
relative success in an agricultural Delta. 
Delta levees are primarily soil and rock embankments which can fail because of  1) 
overtopping, 2) erosion (top or of either side), 3) excessive seepage through the levee or its 
foundation where the fluid velocity exceeds the threshold required to initiate erosion of the 
material in the levee, causing internal erosion called “piping,” or 4) structural failure.  In 
Delta levees, the USACE holds that most common structural failure takes the form of a 
horizontal displacement of part of the levee along a surface of inadequate resistance to 
sliding, such as happened in Wilnes in the Netherlands in 2003 shown in Figure 3.13 
(Duncan and Houston 1983; Interview 126-2009, Van Baars 2008).  (Note that the picture of 
a horizontal displacement failure comes from the Netherlands, not from the Delta, because 
the USACE have never truly proven this type of failure in the Delta.  The Vilnes failure took 
place on a secondary levee, the primary levee held, so that after the failure, pressures quickly 
equalized and the flow did not last long enough to erode away the plug and start lateral 
erosion.  In the Delta, few such secondary levees exist and the virtually unlimited supply of 
water attacks and exploits any failure, eroding away the displaced soil, leaving no evidence 
of the cause.) 
 Voids (created by rodents, humans, rotting tree trunks, etc. in the levee section can 
contribute to each of the failure modes.  The Tyler Island Reclamation District was one of  
the first to conduct an internal inspection of their levees, discovering buried pottery, 
abandoned irrigation water conveyances (including a wooden box channel and pipes of all 
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types), and in one strange case, a hand-dug cave in the levee  (Cavanaugh and Stefani 1984).  
The purpose and excavators of the cave remain unknown but it was large enough to stand in 
(Mello 2008).  Other mammals represent a more common threat; every levee engineer in the 
Delta has his or her favorite beaver-den-in-a-levee picture, and many of the pictures of water 
pouring through a levee break may mark the location of a former rodent burrow. 
Whereas different only in velocity, the erosive flow involved in “piping” is not to be 
confused with normal seepage of water (non-sediment bearing) through the porous levee 
material lenses.  The Delta levees hold back freshwater and the islands siphon or pump in 
Figure 3.13 - Levee failure at Vilnes NL 2004 (van Baars 2008) 
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large amounts of irrigation water over the levees routinely; seepage without damage to the 
levees is manageable.  Seepage generally does deteriorate into “piping” and, thus, requires 
monitoring and in most cases, controls and repair. 
EXISTING STUDIES OF DELTA LEVEE FAILURES 
 As the early Delta farmers built and watched the levees fail, few outside the island that 
flooded noticed the levee failure.  Those who abandoned Sherman, Twitchell, and Bouldin 
for many years in the late 19th and early 20th centuries and even Franks Tract in 1938 
absorbed the tremendous financial losses.  Thompson in 1957 detailed the various levee 
failures and overtopping but did not attempt to analyze them or even catalog them; they were 
merely part of the human settlement of the region.  Efforts to get federal help in flood 
fighting and recovery came slowly for people in the Delta and in other flood prone areas of 
the country.  The Army sent a small crew to help try to save the levee on Webb and Bradford 
Tract during the high tides of June 1950.  The first case I have uncovered of significant help 
for non-Project levee failures came at the insistence of Congressman John Baldwin of Rio 
Vista who pressured the USACE to help repair Thor Kofod’s levees at Quimby Island after 
they were destroyed around Christmas of 1955 (Delta Herald 1956).  The Quimby Island 
levees remain Special Agreement levees to this day, a tribute to the importance of the 
friendship of a congressional representative with a key role on the House Subcommittee on 
Flood Control that controlled the USACE budget.  Not until the damage caused by Hurricane 
Betsy on the Gulf Coast in 1965 made national television news did federal flood insurance 
gain support to help fill the void of a virtually non-existent private insurance for flooding 
(Colten 2009, 41: FEMA 2002).  
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 By 1969, the levees, Project, Special Agreement, and Non-Project, as will be 
developed in the next chapter, were assuming a larger role in the California water supply 
system, justifying more state and USACE involvement in providing increasingly expensive 
help to recover from Delta levee failures. 
 Under contract to the USACE, Duncan and Houston (Houston, Duncan and the 
USACE 1978; Duncan and Houston 1983) attempted to assess what society could 
expect out of these unusual levees of the Delta.  They determined that data were insufficient 
to develop theoretic models of the levees, so they elected to employ an “empirical approach 
to estimating probabilities of failure…” (Duncan and Houston 1983, 268).  They first 
developed a list of levee failures on the 44 major agricultural islands/tracts from 1950 to 
1976 so they could compensate for the uncertainties of their assumptions “through 
adjustment of the results to fit the history of failures” (Duncan and Houston 1983, 268).   
 A primary assumption Duncan and Houston made was that rates of levee failures on 
an island/tract basis depended on the original thickness of peat soil.  Using the 26-year 
history of failures they constructed, Duncan and Houston found a strong correlation 
empirically, identifying that an island that started with 13.7 meters (35 feet) of peat was 
almost eight times more likely to suffer a levee failure than an island identified as having 
originally less than 4.6 meters (15 feet).  They assumed that a rate of 7.6 cm (3 inches) per 
year of subsidence would continue everywhere to project into the future and they established 
four classes of peat thickness (0-15’; 15’-25’; 25’-35’; over 35’).  Perhaps because the 
USACE was involved in the original research (Houston et al., 1978), they assigned a 
probability near zero that a “Project” levee would fail, regardless the thickness of island peat.  
On islands like Tyler with Project and Non-levees, the authors assigned the Project levees a 
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length of 0.0 miles whereas in calculating the risk on Grand Island, totally protected by 
Project levees, they assigned a 2-mile length to the levees instead of the actual distance of 30 
miles.  The other islands totally protected by Project levees received the same 2 miles worth 
of assigned risk.  Houston and Duncan did not consider the “failures” of the height-restricted 
levees that are designed to fail at the McCormack-Williamson tract and the ones in the Yolo 
By-pass in their analysis.  Duncan and Houston (1978) estimated that 28 failures of levees 
would occur across the group of 44 islands/tracts that they considered the major agricultural 
islands.  Individual island/tract failure probabilities were also developed and published for 
each of the 44 islands/tracts. 
Samuel Logan applied a similar approach (Logan 1989; Logan 1990), based on the 15 
levee stability failures he found between 1950 and 1986 on the 46 island/tracts he elected to 
study.  Logan based his estimates of future failure rates also on various peat thickness 
classifications, this time using the map of peat thickness developed by DWR (1976). He 
established three peat thickness classifications, those with peak thickness in 1976 averaging 
between 10’ and 20’, those with less than 10’ of peat, and those with more than 20’ of peat.  
Logan also highlighted that “much of the process of estimation of levee failure probabilities, 
no matter how sophisticated or rigorous in appearance, must be judgmental” (1989, 9).  
Logan deviated slightly from Houston and Duncan in that he did include the McCormack-
Williamson Tract failures, a height limited floodway levee, in his analysis.  
Logan used his part-judgmental and part calculated analysis to determine that in the 
event of future levee failures it made the state economic sense to reclaim only 13 of the 46 
islands studied.  Historically this had been a reclamation district or local farmer decision to 
reclaim after failure and the Franks family had abandoned Franks Tract in 1938 after the 
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second levee failure in two years; owners had abandoned Sherman, Twitchell, and Bouldin 
Island for many years after levee failures.  With increased subsidence, the size and cost of 
repairing levee breaches and de-watering had grown tremendously and state and federal 
emergency funds have become very critical in disaster recovery everywhere, including Delta 
reclaimed islands.  
Logan combined economic analysis with empirical failure analysis to focus on 
determining which islands/tracts made economic sense to restore after levee failure; in other 
words, which islands/tracts could produce sufficient economic return before a second levee 
failure to justify repair, de-watering and restoration after the first (next) levee failure.  Logan 
based his financial calculations on failure probabilities for each island/tract with annual 
probability of failure ranging from a low at Dead Horse of 0.0024 to a high of 0.0347 at 
Mandeville Island.  He determined the annual probability of one of the 46 islands suffering a 
levee failure as 0.6169. 
Starting in March of 2006, the URS Corporation under contract to DWR to perform 
the legislature-mandated evaluation, based on information already available, of the risk and 
consequences of Delta levee failures, the Delta Risk Management Study (DRMS).  One of 
the first steps created a list of all levee failure in the Delta and Suisun Marsh for the previous 
106 years, going back arbitrarily to 1900.  Figure 3.14 is adapted from one published 
separately in a poster (Gaddie et al., 2008) to summarize and communicate the results of this 
analysis.  DWR did not authorize URS to do new research, contractually limiting URS to 
compiling and analyzing existing reports and studies.  URS explained in the final report, “We 
observed that not all the details of historical flood events are recorded or available.  It is 
recommended that failures in the Delta be fully documented in a formal and comprehensive 
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way that covers the necessary details to reconstruct the events and verify them numerically.  
This documentation will provide increased validity to future modeling” (URS 2009c, 7-29).  
This lack of detail and completeness in the record they were able to identify did not hinder 
the preparers of the “Executive Summary” of DRMS from declaring that in spite of 25 years
 
 
 
Figure 3.14 – URS Chart of the Number of Delta Islands Flooded by Levee Breach 1900-
2008, modified from Gaddie, V., M. Mierzwa, and J. Marr.  2008  
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of increased state investment in Delta levees, failures continue at an unacceptably high level. 
To generate a forecast of future levee failures from the two non-earthquake related factors of 
high water and “Sunny-Day” failures, URS took different approaches.  URS researchers 
created a “Sunny-Day” failure empirical model, taking from the history generated that  six 
such failures had occurred since the first one recorded in 1950 (Webb Tract).  They 
used this to determine that the standard “Sunny-Day” rate of failure would be 1.06x10-4 per 
year per levee mile (URS 2008c, 29).  Therefore, DRMS forecasts 10 “Sunny-Day” failures 
in the Delta over the course of the 21st century.  
 Unlike Houston, Duncan and the USACE (1978) and Logan (1989, 1990), and their 
own “Sunny Day” failure rate calculation, URS elected to deviate from empirically-based 
models to forecast failures from high water to a quasi-mechanical model.  This model looked 
at the geometry of typical levee sections based on available data to determine exit gradients 
across the levees during simulated events of high water. URS also factored meters with an 
all-weather in peat thickness combined with channel width to establish modifying factors for 
each of 12 levee classes based on relative resistance to failures.  They then relied on expert 
elicitation of selected Delta levee engineers and scientists to predict the probabilistic 
relationship of exit gradient to rates of levee failures.  The selected experts were invited in 
and asked to graph, based on their perception, the relationship between exit gradient and 
probability that the levee would fail for a standard levee section, which they called the 
“conditional probability of failure function.”  The model employed an averaged curve of 
these “expert guesses” to simulate probabilistically failures under exit gradients determined 
by a Monte Carlo simulation of future water levels at various locations based on historic high 
Delta inflow events.  Actually two “probability of failure functions” were developed, one 
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based on the instructions to the experts to assume no intervention, meaning no human effort 
to fight flood, and the other assuming the standard flood-fight response.   
 URS had generated a very detailed model with levee geometries, historic 
relationships between water level readings during floods, and channel width and peat depth 
but all resting on the averages perspectives of the levee experts selected to participate.  
Indicative of the differences in viewpoints of the experts, the standard error of the expert 
responses was approximately  22% under the no flood-fight regime, with a projected levee 
water gradient of 1.0 (URS 2009c, Figure 7-71).  Indicative of the perceived importance of 
flood fighting in the Delta, the average expert estimated probability of failure with a gradient 
of 1.0 falls from 38% to 5% when human intervention was expected. 
  Section 7 of DRMS (URS 2009c) included a map summarizing the island-by-island 
forecast of annual probabilities of levee failure (except earthquake related) for the next 
hundred years.  Sherman island, Tyler Island, Venice Island, New Hope Tract, and Sargeant-
Barnhardt Tract and most of the Suisun Marsh districts had predicted annual rates of failures  
of over 7% (84% over the next 25 years); whereas Quimby, Deadhorse, Upper Roberts, 
Victoria and Coney Islands and several tracts on the edges of the Delta had failure 
probabilities less than 1% per or 22% cumulative over the 25 years.  The total URS estimate 
came to 140 failures over the 2005 to 2105 period, including the 10 “Sunny-day” failures but 
not including earthquake related incidents. 
SUMMARY
 Encouraged by state and federal governments, farmers and developers started to 
convert the great tule marsh of the Sacramento and San Joaquin River Delta into farms by 
building levees after 1861.  In the first two decades of this effort, the levees were constructed 
87 
 
 
from the land (marsh) side by hand cut and wheel barrowed materials, often blocks of pure 
peat.  Regular flooding, exacerbated by increased silting of the rivers indirectly caused by 
hydraulic gold mining in the Sierra until 1884, destroyed most of the early hand-built peat 
levees by around 1882.  The Delta might have returned to marsh except for the local 
development of the clamshell dredge.  From about 1879 to 1920, individual districts and 
developers dredged from the main rivers, some of the many tidal channels, and even worked 
their way across the open tule marsh on property lines building the 1700 kilometers plus of 
levee in Delta and established the agricultural islands and tracts of today. 
 Between 1913 and 1955, the USACE would rework about 25% of these levees to help 
provide improved flood control for the upstream parts of the Sacramento and San Joaquin 
River basins and to create deep-water  ports in Sacramento and Stockton.  About 75% of 
Delta levees remained the sole work and responsibility of the locally elected reclamation 
district boards.  Most of the levees, those built by the USACE and those built by a local 
reclamation district, were constructed before the 1930s when modern soils engineering 
practices were first introduced into the United States.  Practical engineering standards have 
evolved for Delta levees based on what appears to have worked over the years with 
increasing reliance on engineering principles and judgment.  Meanwhile, subsidence of the 
organic soils now farmed has caused much of the Delta island farmland to sit, 5 meters or 
more below sea level, placing a constant hydraulic load on most of the Delta levees.  Given 
all the variety and uncertainty of development, scholars have only been able to assess the 
capability of the Delta levees to continue to perform through empirical models based on 
histories of levee failures limited by short time frames, limited detail, and collection at the 
island or tract scale; or with mechanical models forced to rely on expert elicitation to 
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estimate the relationship between forces, form and failure.  This dissertation will add detail to 
the historical record, extend back to the 1860s, and present it at a much finer scale and 
identify the several social perspectives of Delta levee engineers, scientists, and managers 
providing expert elicitation.  
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CHAPTER IV 
BACKGROUND: LEVEE DISCOURSES AND GOVERNANCE 
OVERVIEW 
This chapter provides the necessary background to understand the social perspectives this 
dissertation analyzes empirically in Chapter VI.  This chapter describes the development of 
an expanded role for the Delta levees beyond wetland reclamation and flood control into a 
central place in water conveyance for 25 million Californians and 2 million acres of irrigated 
cropland.  Society then began to recognize the damage done to the ecosystem by the 
exploitation of the soils and waters of the Delta.  Thus, new constituencies and discourses 
about the Delta sprung up, the complexity grew and new governance and governing 
processes were attempted.  These provide the backdrop for the social discourses about Delta 
levees that this dissertation explores. 
 Built originally to allow farming in the marsh and to protect the reclaimed land from 
floods, the role of Delta levees became more complicated after 1940 when they accidently 
became part of the water delivery system, first to Contra Costa County and then later to the 
Central Valley Project (CVP) and then the State Water Project (SWP).  This chapter provides 
the background on how that role developed.  After the first Earth Day on April 21, 1970, 
increasingly environmental concerns over the management of Delta levees have been a part 
of the discourses also.  As more groups wanted more from the Delta conflicts developed, 
sometimes triggering unilateral exercise of power, such as the USACE did in 2007 when it 
started enforcing long-ignored vegetation-free levee polices which are discussed next.  This 
represents the latest controversy in the Delta and the latest focus of power struggles between 
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the key actors with interests in use of the resources of the Delta (Cowin and McCamman 
2010). 
The rest of this chapter develops the background on the recent  attempts to provide 
effective governance and governing of the Delta starting with the formation of  CALFED, 
hailed by scholars like Kallis, Kiparsky, and Norgaard (2009, 631) as “the most ambitious 
experiment in collaborative policy and adaptive management the world has seen to date.”  
The chapter then provides background on the demise of CALFED and its replacement with 
the Delta Vision effort and then the Delta Stewardship Council.  Some of the attempts to 
govern, specifically the Delta Risk Management Study (DRMS or “dreams”) and the Bay 
Delta Conservation Plan (BDCP) are also introduced along with along with some of the 
elements of the discourses generated in those processes.  All along, the element behind most 
discourses about the Delta and the levees since 1972 has been the desire by some interests to 
construct an isolated conveyance system to transport export around  (the Peripheral Canal) or 
potentially under (Cross Delta tunnel) the troubled Delta. 
DELTA LEVEES BECOME PART OF THE WATER EXPORT SYSTEM 
The Sacramento River Flood Control Project encouraged expansion of irrigated 
agriculture and irrigation water withdrawal upstream of the Delta, which by the 1920s and 
1930s, threatened Delta access to fresh water.  This competition, coupled with drought, drew 
salt water deeper into the Delta.  Lower flows in the rivers into the Delta meant that during 
the late summers of several years during the 1920s and 1930s, salty and brackish water often 
lapped against the levee banks far into the central Delta, rendering irrigation worthless.  In 
March 1922, the State Supreme court denied the claim advanced by the city of Antioch 
(Jackson and Paterson 1977) that prior use of water established a legal right to “fresh water” 
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before new upstream users could tap the resource.  Defeated in the courts, in-Delta water 
users began looking to engineering solutions to solve the salinity problem.  Engineers first 
advanced the idea of constructing barriers to block seawater from the Golden Gate from 
entering the Delta during low flows, but eventually the state and federal government would 
address this problem while solving another problem, the depletion of ground water and 
resulting subsidence in areas of the Central Valley lacking access to surface water (Jackson 
and Patterson 1977; Hundley 2001, 239).  Dams upstream of the Delta rather than ones 
downstream would counter the salinity intrusion (Jackson and Patterson 1977). 
Much of the fertile land in the Central Valley lacked access to runoff from the 
streams flowing year round out of the Sierras.  By the 1930s, however, agriculturalists had 
sunk 23,500 wells into a once great aquifer and converted 1,500,000 acres of steppe and 
desert into a green empire (Reisner 1986, 157).  Water levels dropped 100 meters in some 
wells and experts forecasted that the Central Valley irrigators would mine the entire aquifer 
dry by 1970 unless surface water became available for irrigation. The  Central Valley and 
State Water Projects have supplied this irrigation water. 
California engineers viewed the excess precipitation in the northern part of the state 
as a solution to the unmet need in the south, so they developed a comprehensive plan to 
provide surface water for irrigation in the southern Central Valley, as shown on Figure 4.1 
and schematically in Figure 4.2.  It also included salinity control for the Delta and a new 
fresh water supply for Antioch and the rest of Contra Costa County.  In 1933, the legislature 
approved the plan, the governor signed it into law, and voters defeated an initiative challenge 
(Hundley 2001; Jackson and Paterson 1977; Pisani 2002; Reisner 1986).  The failure to sell 
the $170 million bonds in the Depression-racked economy stalled the project, but President 
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Roosevelt’s 1935 executive order directing the Public Works Administration to use un-
designated federal budget money got the project going.  In Reisner’s view (1986, 159) 
Roosevelt acted to find homes and farmland for a 100,000 farmers displaced by the Dust 
Bowl.  Financially strapped California let the federal government assume full control and 
funding responsibility for the project with the passage of the River and Harbors Act of 1937 
(Jackson and Paterson 1977).  The state project, thus, became the Central Valley Project 
(CVP) of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (USBR), which included the large storage of 
Sacramento River water behind Shasta Dam and the San Joaquin water behind Friant Dam.  
The Friant Dam allowed the USBR to channel the upper reaches of the San Joaquin into a 
new artificial river flowing into the Kern River Basin.  A canal (Delta-Mendota) with intakes 
on the south side of the Delta would furnish replacement water for the San Joaquin north of 
Fresno.  Contra Costa County cities and industries would get their new fresh water supply via 
a canal with an intake also on the southern portion of the Delta at Rock Slough.  This put the 
intakes for the CVP on the Old San Joaquin River upstream of its junction with the much 
larger and cleaner Sacramento River.  Once the lake filled behind the Shasta Dam, the large 
upstream storage reservoir built by the CVP, the system managers could keep the whole 
Delta pool fresh by increasing reservoir discharges during periods of low natural flows.  This 
satisfied Delta residents by promising fresh water in the Delta all year.  Deliveries on the 
Contra Costa County supply system out of the Delta started in 1940 and Shasta Dam first 
closed its gates in 1944.   
With 75% to 80% of the water coming into the Delta pool from the north on the 
Sacramento and all of the exports leaving from southern edge of the pool, the USBR added a 
short cut from the Sacramento to the San Joaquin when it built the one mile long Cross-Delta  
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Channel and Gates at Walnut Grove in 1951.  Opening the gates during the summer 
maximum water delivery times creates an additional flow path for the Sacramento that allows 
Figure 4.1 – Key Elements of CVP in Purple and SWP in Orange (DWR 1999, ES 3-2). 
California Water Supply Systems 
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Figure 4.2 - Schematic of Delta as Accidental Hub of California Water Supply 
 
 
water to move more directly to the intakes “upriver” or “cross pool” on the San Joaquin  (Old 
River). In 1945, buoyed by the success of the CVP, driven by the rapid wartime growth of 
the California population and economy, and pushed by landowners in the un-served 
southwest part of the Central Valley, the California legislature created the predecessor to the 
Department of Water Resources to look into a second water re-distribution scheme of similar 
scope.  Hundley (2001, 277) details the promoters as including some of the largest and most 
powerful landowners in the state, e.g., the Kern County Land Company;  Belridge, Standard 
(Chevron), Shell, Occidental, Tidewater, and Richfield oil companies; and the Tejon Ranch, 
itself controlled by the Times Mirror Company that also owned the Los Angeles Times 
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(Hundley 2001, 277).  The state plan attracted additional support when the USBR also 
announced in 1945 plans for a large number of projects for inter-basin water transfer across 
the West.  The thoughts of sending Klamath River water from Oregon to California sounded 
good but the plan to move American River water to Nevada lacked appeal to Californians.  
The larger landowners supported a state-owned water project because the USBR could 
legally only irrigate farms no larger than 160 acres, a requirement that the federal agency did 
not enforce but remained in the regulations.  Southern Californian water interests also feared 
the USBR plan to send part of the Owens River water to irrigate the Mojave, so they too 
enthusiastically supported the state role (Hundley 2001, 279).  In 1951, the legislature 
authorized studies of a state water project originating in the Delta.  In 1956, a disastrous 
flood inundated what Hundley (2001, 280) claims was 100,000 square miles of California, 
including some islands in the Delta, and spurred the legislature to consolidate the 56 state 
agencies involved in water issues.  This created the Department of Water Resources (DWR), 
which would be large and powerful enough to manage a huge water redistribution project 
(Hundley 2001).   
California voters approved the plan and the $1.75 billion in bonds to finance the 
project in November 1960, although only 10 (most importantly, Los Angeles) of 58 counties 
in California approved the measure (Reisner 1986, 367).  The Metropolitan Water District 
(MWD), the giant water supplier to urban areas of southern California, announced support of 
the plan just days before the vote.  The initial reluctance, according to Worster (1985) and 
Hundley (2001), stemmed from its directors’ concerns that access to Sacramento River water 
would undermine MWD claims to less expensive water from the Colorado River, then under 
challenge in the U. S. Supreme Court by the state of Arizona.  The state project would also 
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provide very expensive water for its customers, water not required by urban customers for 
many years. Hundley (2001, 284) also suggests MWD had its eyes on an Owens River 
aqueduct-like project to tap the Eel River in far northwestern California, exclusively for 
residential and commercial users in the Southland.  When environmental opposition to that 
idea grew, the State Water Project (SWP) looked more attractive than the Eel River. 
Governor Edmund “Pat” Brown, the main political driver of the SWP, had 
understated the cost and/or over contracted water deliveries (Reisner 1986, 364).  By the time 
the money ran out, work on the project came to a halt, and two critical pieces, a system to 
store and transfer water in from the Eel River watershed, and the so-called Delta facilities, 
remained unfinished, as they are to this day. 
Just weeks after the election victory of the SWP, the fight over the Delta piece 
started.  The SWP needed this piece to facilitate transport of the Sacramento River water 
around (or through) the Delta to avoid its salty tidal intrusions.  The discussion of what the 
Delta piece should look like started late November 1960, weeks after passage of the State 
Water Project.  Jackson and Paterson (1977, 75-99) outline the original efforts of DWR to 
consider various options of water barriers, largely variations of the Biemond Plan.  None of 
the barrier plans proved very popular with Delta interests, particularly Contra Costa County 
looking to use Delta water to drive its own growth.  In September 1964, the Interagency 
Delta Committee, composed of representatives from the DWR, USBR, and USACE would 
present the project with an alternative.  The alternative called for a Peripheral Canal from the 
Sacramento River south of Sacramento around the Delta to the east and then across the Delta 
to the pumps on the southwest side of the Delta.  This represented a resurrection of an old 
USBR plan that it  scaled back in the late 1940s to the one mile long Delta Cross Channel, a 
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gate controlled connection of the Sacramento between Walnut Grove and Locke to the 
Mokelumne.  The USBR completed this shortcut in 1951.  Even though the DWR had 
representatives on the interagency study group, they formed an internal group of experts not 
involved in the interagency study to study this issue.  The DWR internal study concluded that 
the interagency report ”does not demonstrate the clear economic advantages of the Peripheral 
Canal on the basis of tangible benefits, nor does it demonstrate that the greater  cost of 
intangible benefits is justified” (Jackson and Paterson 1977, 97).  Demonstrating that more 
than one social perspective existed then in the hierarchy of the DWR, the Director agreed that 
tangible benefits were not proven but that intangible benefits justified approval of the 
concept and DWR moved to proceed with building the Peripheral Canal.  The USBR agreed 
while the USACE remained silent on the project.  Moving forward on this jointly funded and 
operated facility required Congressional approval and state funding.  When neither was 
forthcoming in 1967, California put work on the design of the canal on hold.  
  By the time DWR-USBR got back to pushing the project again, Californian had 
elected Reagan governor and the federal National Environmental Protection Act of 1969 had 
become law.  The Sierra Club joined other environmental activists, Contra Costa County, and 
the Delta water agencies (dominated by the Delta farmers and legacy communities) in 
objecting to the Canal, while the Environmental Defense Fund sued to require DWR develop 
an environmental impact statement for the project.  Indicative of some of the concerns, an 
unpublished memo by scientists at the EPA in San Francisco stated that the Peripheral Canal 
should not be constructed because of environmental issues.  It went on to suggest that the 
Federal government should acquire all 886 islands in the Delta for inclusion in a new 
national park, showing how opposition to the Peripheral Canal could come from several 
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social perspectives (Jackson and Paterson 1977, 160).  The count of 886 islands might be a 
typographic error or it may reflect a count of the mid-channel islands, mostly tule berms, 
sand bars, and river bend cut-offs in the Delta, the bits of marsh left surrounded by water by 
the clamshell dredges reclaiming the larger chunks of peat land. 
 In October 1971, the pumps built at Clifton Court Forebay on the south edge of the 
Delta started to feed water to the 80,000 horsepower A. D. Edmonson Pumping Plant south 
of Bakersfield.  This facility boosted the water up over the Tehachapi Range to the L.A. 
Basin and the project started full operations without the benefit of SWP Delta faculties.  This 
“temporary” operational mode continues 40 years later.  The Project, Direct Agreement, and 
Non-Project levees continued to help deliver water to the largely agricultural interest of the 
CVP and accidently became part of the water supply system for much of urban southern 
California.  I term the role an accidental one for the levees; farmers developed the levee 
system to support agriculture years before the idea of water exports from the Delta gained 
credibility.  Since at least 1965, engineers have planned some sort of water conveyance 
system that would be peripheral to the Delta and its levees, concerned about the Delta levees 
fulfilling that role (Jackson and Patterson 1977: Hundley 2001; Reisner 1987) but the 
political leaders have not yet gained full approval and funding and the facilities remain in 
design phase.   
 Within a year of the start-up of the water deliveries to Los Angeles, the Delta levees 
failed in their new role of helping transport quality water to the pumps for the first time when 
the Direct Agreement levee on the San Joaquin on Brannan-Andrus Island blew out in the 
middle of the night of June 20-21, 1972.  Two state highways flooded and Isleton, the once 
growing city of 2,200 on the island, evacuated.  Figure 4.3 shows the failure location and a 
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flooded Highway 12.  The USACE effort to build a cross levee to save the Isleton failed and 
the town inundated.  Previous levee failures had occurred on isolated islands that affected 
only the few island residents or they occurred during widespread flooding such as the 
December 25, 1955, failure at Sherman Island.  It marked the first time that a levee, working 
as part of the water conveyance system, failed during low water inflow to the Delta. This 
triggered the first “Big Gulp,” the surge of seawater into the Delta to fill the subsidence 
created holes that the waters rush to fill when a levee fails.  When a levee fails because of 
high river levels, the so-called “accommodation space” behind the failed levee serves to 
dampen the flood crest; but in normal and low flow periods,  the origin of the water dumping 
into the space can only be the Golden Gate.  The gulp of seawater can throw the entire Delta 
off specification on salinity as water enters municipal treatment plants and is used for 
irrigation purposes.  At Brannan-Andrus in 1972, with river flow at early summer levels in a 
dry year, seawater helped provide much of the 17,150 hectare-meters of water that flooded 
most of Isleton.  Six hours after the break, DWR closed the gates at Clifton Court and USBR 
idled five of the six CVP pumps because of concerns over water quality.  The USBR released 
24,670 hectare-meters from Shasta Dam and DWR released about half that amount from 
Oroville to flush salt water out of the Delta.  Ten days after the break, the CVP started 
ramping back up, but DWR and USBR could not restore normal operations on the two water 
projects until mid- August.  The official annual DWR report (DWR 1973a, 42) on the SWP 
lamented that they could have restored the system to full operation in less than three weeks 
with the Peripheral Canal in place.  Figure 4.4 shows schematically how a Peripheral Canal 
frees the big water supply systems from dependence on the Delta.  
  Of course, DWR did not have a Peripheral Canal and the damage to Isleton and the 
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rest of Brannan-Andrus Island triggered interest in Delta levees far beyond the flooded area. 
As the USACE was pumping out Brannan-Andrus, DWR issued a report raising the question 
in its title: “Delta Levees – What is their future?” (DWR 1973b).  This report only obliquely 
acknowledged that Delta levees now served the SWP and CVP while suggesting that 
California taxpayers should pursue one of three levels of levee improvement.  DWR 
Figure 4.3 – Photo taken 25 June 1972 of the Brannan-Andrus Island Flood - Picture 
courtesy of Rio Vista Historical Museum 
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Figure 4.4 – Schematic of Delta Showing Peripheral Canal Allowing SWP and CVP Export 
Water to Avoid the Delta. 
 
 
estimated the price of a 100-year return flood protection option at $192 million capital and 
$7.5 million annual operating expense (1973 dollars).  To highlight the concern over the 
levees and the unplanned and un-designed role in the water delivery system, DWR mapped 
(DWR 1974) and highlighted 33 levee failures that led to island flooding (including the 1973 
failure) in the previous 43 years.  Thus, it was that in the wake of the Brannan-Andrus levee 
failure in 1972 that the California State legislature held two days of hearings (DWR 1972). 
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These hearings would lead to the Legislature and DWR to formally acknowledge the 
importance of the Delta levees in the unplanned and unanticipated role of water delivery for 
the state and the uncertain and potentially fragile condition of the levees.  Publication of the 
DWR report (1973b) introduced several of the issues still dominating discussion in 2011: the 
proper type, role, and place of vegetation on Delta levees; the condition and failure record of 
the private levees; the underfunding of the maintenance of the Delta levee maintenance; and 
the high cost of necessary upgrades and maintenance for the levees.  In the last regard, 
whereas all three options seemed designed to facilitate transport and export of water (one 
map even shows the flow arrows), the report did not identify CVP and SWP customers as 
potential financial contributors to better Delta levees.  Instead, it identified residents, 
businesses, utilities, customers of the water lines crossing the Delta, state and county 
highway departments, environmental funds from state and federal environmental and wildlife 
agencies, recreational boaters, and the ports as those who benefit and, thus, should contribute 
to improving the Delta levees. The report also pointed out the importance of Delta levees at 
the local, state, and national scales.   
Meanwhile, the legislative hearings into the Brannan-Andrus levee failure (DWR 
1972) resulted in the passage of the Way Bill.  Named for the committee chair, this act 
provided state matching funding for improvements of the Delta levee and maintenance for 
the first time.  Under the legislation, the DWR managed this “subventions” program and the 
local reclamation districts designed, managed, and provided upfront financing for the work.  
The legislation essentially called for state reimbursement of 75% authorized expenditures for 
levee maintenance after the first $1000/mile spent per year.  The program depended on the 
funding levels set by the legislature and the early authorizations were meager, $2000 total for 
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the whole Delta in the first year (Interview 115-2009; Agnew 2011).  In practice, 
reimbursements to reclamation districts have averaged 50% of total expenditures, but with 
reimbursement made only after completion of all work for the year.  The program achieved 
success in improving the condition of the Delta levees, as evidenced by the annual report on 
of flooding in California by the DWR (Bulletin 69 series) for water year 1983.  It credited 
“the millions of dollars spent in recent years by the Corps of Engineers and the Reclamation 
Districts to fortify Delta levees” (DWR 1984, 58) and the flood-fighting efforts of the 
California Conservation Corps (CCC) with limiting levee failures in 1983 in spite of record 
high water levels at Rio Vista and across the Delta pool. 
After approving financial support for the reclamation districts that had accidentally 
become DWR partners in moving water across the Delta to the export pumps, the Reagan 
administration put the Peripheral Canal on the “deferred list.”  After his election in 1975, 
Governor Jerry Brown ordered a reappraisal of the project and evaluation of alternatives.  
Two years later, with the state in the second year of the worst dry spell on record, Brown did 
not wait for the formal report and came out in favor of building the Peripheral Canal 
(Hundley 2001, 323).  In 1980, water users in Southern California won a major victory as the 
legislature and Governor Jerry Brown approved the Canal. 
Not quitting the fight, project opponents forced a ballot initiative to reverse the 
approval of the project.  They were able to win the referendum 63% to 37% on an almost 
pure North-South division of votes (Hundley 2001, 332).  Northern Californians and 
members of the emerging environmental movement led the fight against the canal that would 
have freed DWR, USBR, and the big water project contractors (Westlands Water District, 
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MWD, etc.) from concerns that a Non-Project Delta levee failure could interrupt supplies by 
pulling salt water into the supply channels. 
During the second political fight over the Peripheral Canal (1980-1982), two Delta 
levees failed (Lower Jones Tract in September 1980 and McDonald Island in August 1982) 
under similar circumstances to the June 1972 failure.  These were classic “Sunny-day 
failures” occurring unexpectedly at low summer flow rates, making them nightmare 
scenarios for water exporters.  After precautionary shutdowns and slowdowns of the export 
pumps, DWR quality sampling showed that the levee failures were not causing the same 
increases in salinity as the 1972 failure had.  Full operations of the water projects were 
quickly resumed (Rabbon and McCullough 1986). 
DWR ran their Bay-Delta hydrodynamic models, which indicated that the “Big Gulp” 
represented the greatest risk to water quality at the pumps when the one of westernmost 
islands in the Delta “gulped.”  Part computer modeling, part DWR expert “intuition,” this 
evaluation led to the identification of Sherman, Bradford, Twitchell, Bethel, and Jersey 
Islands and Webb, Hotchkiss, and Holland Tracts as areas where levee failure created the 
greatest risk to Delta exports without a Peripheral Canal (Interview 119-2009).  DWR 
successfully lobbied the legislature to pass AB-34 in 1986, which essentially established that 
one-half of the available state levee funding would go to “Special Projects” dedicated to the 
levees of the eight western islands.  DWR became directly involved in the maintenance of 
these levees on the eight islands, particularly on Sherman and Twitchell where state land 
acquisitions have made DWR the majority landowner and, therefore, the dominant player in 
these reclamation districts.  AB-34 also increased funding levels for the subventions program 
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in the wake of more record Delta water levels in February of 1986 and ensuing failures of  
levees. 
During 1985, critics mounted the first attacks against the provisions in the Water 
Code that established as public policy of the State of California to preserve the Delta as a 
“special place.”  Faced with increased state expenditures on Delta levees, Assemblyman 
Willie Brown introduced in December 1985, legislation (AB 25) that declared that 
“continued agricultural use of certain high flood risk islands in the Delta is no longer in the 
interest of the people of the state…” (Logan 1989, 1).  AB 25 did not pass, however, AB 955 
was signed into law in 1985 which included the statement that “the Legislature recognizes 
that it may not be economically justifiable to maintain all Delta islands” (Logan 1989, 1).  By 
1986, levees were “accidently” a critical part of the water supply for Southern California and  
Delta residents could no longer rely on the total commitment of the state of California to 
preserve the Delta islands as a special place. 
After 1990, the increased public concern for the environment and the increased 
activity of environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) began to increase the 
focus on the health of the Delta ecosystem.  The dams and pumps of the water project were 
playing havoc on the two main classifications of native fish.  The CVP and SWP dams 
upstream reduced or eliminated the spawning and rearing habitat for the most of the 
anadromous species native to the Delta.  Further, re-routing of water across the Delta to the 
export pumps could confuse salmon trying to find their spawning gravels (Moyle, Israel, and 
Purdy 2008).  Even the “imported” striped bass that arrived on one of the first trains that 
completed the transcontinental trip across America and had flourished into a great sports 
fishery in their new home began to decline in number.  The numbers of Delta smelt, the 
106 
 
 
primary native pelagic fish of the Delta, plummeted, apparently also suffering loss of habitat 
attributed in part to the Delta operation of the export pumps and from competition from 
invasive species (Moyle 2007). 
Changes in the Delta levees themselves have also not helped.  The reclamation 
districts and the USACE have steadily placed rip-rap (large boulders) and concrete rubble 
(now discouraged) up to at least to the high water line to protect against levee erosion from 
boat wakes and flows of water to the pumps and to the Bay.  Sherman et al. (2007) noted 
their detailed mapping of the levee, which revealed that of 1294 km of Delta levees, over 870 
kilometers of levees were protected with rock or broken concrete surfacing at he waterline.  
Unfortunately, this also generally reduces the habitat and routes of safe passage for 
endangered native species of fish along the levees.  
GOVERNANCE, GOVERNING, AND THE CREATION OF CALFED 
 By the early 1990s, at least 24 state and federal agencies were charged with managing 
the increasingly taxed and troubled Delta socio-ecosystem, each with responsibilities for 
parts of the problem, each with its own supporters and detractors.  The responsibilities of 
agencies often conflicted as much as the positions of the constituents of each agency.  The 
state agencies, particularly the Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB), were vulnerable 
to pressures from California water users to keep more water flowing south.  This bothered the 
Delta interests and fish advocates because the Racanelli decision in 1986 affirmed state board 
authority over water quality and quantity issues (Hundley 2001, 404) but SWRCB buckled to 
pressure from Central Valley irrigators and MWD (Hanemann and Dyckman 2009).  ENGOs 
turned to the U.S. Congress and helped get the Central Valley Project Improvement Act 
passed in 1992 that set aside 98,680 hectare-meters (800,000 acre-feet) of CVP water largely 
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to help save endangered native fish in the river system.  The next year the National Marine 
Fisheries Service and the U. S. EPA challenged the SWRCB water quality regulations for the 
Delta and the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service listed the Delta smelt as “Threatened”, making 
the ingestion of smelt into the pumps a federal issue.  Agencies were pitted one against 
another and gridlock loomed.  In response, Interior Secretary Babbitt and Governor Wilson 
created CALFED in 1994, a grouping of initially 15 state and federal agencies that came 
together as “a collection of federal and state agencies with their own responsibilities and 
authorities trying to work together to improve efficiency” (Hundley 2001, 407).   
CALFED drew the charge of doing four things in the Delta: improving water quality, 
increasing water quantity for export, improving the sustainability of the ecosystem, and 
improving levee integrity, in other words, resolving the unaddressed problems accumulating 
over the previous two plus decades of the socio-ecosystem of the Delta adding the role of 
water export hub.  Collaboration rather than confrontation among the stakeholders initially 
produced interim water quality standards, the Bay-Delta Accords, and a $400 million plan to 
achieve them.  In 1996, California votes approved a $995 million water bond issue, with two-
thirds of the money designated to initiate restoration of the Delta.  CALFED floated three 
alternative plans to do this; two of them relied on improved Delta levees to achieve the goals 
whereas the third relied on the “Open Channel Isolated Facility,” a new name for an old idea, 
the Peripheral Canal.  Each of the three options included additional storage dams upstream 
and downstream of the Delta (on the water export systems), better fish screens, ecosystem 
restoration, groundwater storage, groundwater controls (for the first time in California) and 
each would cost somewhere near $10 billion and thirty years to build (Hundley 2001, 407-
425).  MWD immediately endorsed the third alternative, the revived peripheral canal, but 
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every other stakeholder in the process had major concerns with one element or another of all 
alternatives.  CALFED bowed to the pressure and in late 1998 announced a new approach 
that would incorporate adaptive management, starting with a Preferred Program Alternative 
and essentially only considered an isolated conveyance system (peripheral canal) viable if all 
else failed.  Governor Wilson confirmed the CALFED opinion in December 1998 and put 
consideration of the peripheral canal on a seven-year freeze. 
The collaborative effort of CALFED stood on the brink of collapse in 2000 from too 
much stakeholder input, inducing incoming Governor Davis and Interior Secretary Babbitt to 
order CALFED to end public hearings and privately produce a plan to address the big water 
problems of the state.  In June 2000, CALFED issued its new plan, termed the Record of 
Decision (ROD), that included no canal and no new reservoirs but plans to study both. The 
ROD did include an array of individual projects to accomplish the four goals of CALFED, 
including $450 million for improvements of Delta levees.  The total estimated seven-year 
price tag for all four goals would reach $8.7 billion.  Hundley (2001, 425) optimistically 
stated that CALFED would get the proper governance legislation and strengthened leadership 
to be able to execute the largest “environmental restoration in American history.”   
 Conflict and unexpected setbacks soon engulfed CALFED.  The endangered Delta 
smelt populations collapsed in 2001 (Interview 126-2009) and with their short one-year 
lifespan, they remain on the verge of swift extinction (Moyle 2007).  Other native species 
followed with dramatic declines of their own and by 2008, most of the native fish species and 
salmonoids runs (Weiser 2008) had found their way to the endangered species lists, including 
two kinds of smelt and nine salmonoid runs.  In the first 57 years of operation, the CVP had 
consistently delivered the contracted (except during the 1976-77 severe drought) 863,456 
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hectare-meters of water from the Sacramento and San Joaquin watersheds south to 250 water 
contractors irrigating 1.2 million hectares (three million acres) of Central Valley farmland 
while supplying drinking water to slightly less than two million urban water consumers 
(DWR 2011).  In 1997, however, the streak ended when the 98,680 hectare-meters (800,000 
acre-feet) set aside requirement for the environment forced the USBR to cutback allocations 
to 10% of contract volume to its CVP water contractors (L.A. Times 1997). Since then, the 
DWR and USBR have been forced to curtail water deliveries because, as noted in the 2006 
Annual Report of the SWP, “During the last decade, water management issues in the Delta 
have been complicated by the listing of native species under the federal Endangered Species 
Act (ESA)… issuance of biological opinions under the ESA; and the implementation of 
98,680 hectare-meters (800,0000 acre-feet) of CVP yield for fish and wildlife under the 1992 
Central Valley Improvement Act” (Dreher et al. 2008).  The cutbacks of water deliveries 
came not from the “Big Gulp,” but because of a little fish as the biological opinions forced 
shutdown of the pumps when the suction screens trapped too many endangered fish. 
JONES TRACT, KATRINA, AND THE DEMISE OF CALFED 
 After 1982, the Delta levees had served as a water conveyance system effectively, the 
entire levee system held up except during record high floods in 1986 and 1997, preventing 
the feared “Big Gulp.”  This 22-year successful run ended in June 2004 when the Jones Tract 
levee failed along the Middle Fork of the San Joaquin during low water levels.  The resulting 
in rush of water forced closure of the export pumps as a precaution and flooded the farmland 
at the bottom of the Jones Tract “hole.”  The flood threatened stability of the BNSF railroad 
embankment and tracks and eroded out the foundations of some of the pipe supports for the 
East Bay MUD water pipelines that run through Jones Tract parallel to the railroad (see 
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Figure 4.5).  Newly elected Governor Schwarzenegger flew by helicopter to the site of the 
levee failure and stunned his Director of the Department of Water Resources (DWR) by 
announcing to the accompanying TV cameras that the state would repair and restore the 
tracts (Interviews 103-2009 and 112-2009), a role the in levee failure response the state had 
not taken on previously.  Fortunately, as with earlier sunny-day levee failures deep in the 
Delta, the quality control shutdowns of the export pumps were short and relatively minor.  
The cost of levee repairs and dewatering of the islands, however, would cost an estimated 
$90 million according to official pronouncements (Gaddie,  Mierzwa, and Marr  2008), 
although full accounting has not yet been published and several experts assert that the real 
cost was less than half of that amount (Interviews 112-2009,124-2010A, and 115-2009). 
 When Governor Schwarzenegger thrust the DWR into the new role of managing a 
levee repair, agency officials were still reeling from the decision of the state Supreme Court 
just three months earlier to let stand an appellate court ruling in the Paterno case.  This 
decision declared that the state bore sole liability for the damage resulting when a flood 
control levee failed in Yuba County (well out of the Delta itself) some eighteen years before.  
The USACE built the levee that failed as part of the Sacramento River Flood Control Project 
but as noted earlier, the Flood Control Act of 1936 required that the levees would be turned 
over to the state and locals to maintain and the state would hold the U. S. government 
harmless from any damage claims. The resulting settlement of the Paterno Case would cost 
DWR and the taxpayers of California $464 million (LAO 2005, B-85) and added an element 
of “levee paranoia” to the lives of DWR management.  
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 The failure of the Jones Tract levee and its risk to water supply quality and integrity 
triggered an action-oriented Governor, not enthusiastic about CALFED progress, to fire off a 
request in June 2005 to the Little Hoover Commission, the independent government “watch  
 
 
  
Figure 4.5 – June 2004, Flooded Upper and Lower Jones Tract, and Threatened BSNF 
Railroad Tracks and EBMUD Water Pipelines (left) ( Picture Courtesy of Chris Neudeck) 
 
Lower Jones 
Upper Jones 
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dog” organization in the state (Alpert 2005), to investigate the effectiveness of CALFED.  
Two months later, the storm surge from Hurricane Katrina knocked down and poured over 
the USACE built levee walls in Orleans parish, inundating a city with topography and a 
physical environment similar to the Delta islands.  Pronouncements made by public officials 
in the Governor’s office and DWR, implied that the levees in Delta were built and 
maintained by farmers and were vulnerable because of age, the materials and methods of 
construction, increasing hydraulic loadings, earthquake risk, sea-level rise, and the limited 
resources of the owners.  Delta levees were, therefore, at much higher risk than the pre-
Katrina New Orleans levees built and maintained by the premier levee builder, the USACE.  
The governor quickly signed AB-1200 (Laird) into law that directed DWR and the 
Department of Fish and Game (DF&G) to work with the USACE to assess the potential 
performance of the Delta levees and the economic, environmental, and health/safety impacts 
of such failures.  It was then to develop Delta Risk Management Strategies (DRMS) to deal 
with these (URS 2009, 1.2). 
 In November, the Little Hoover Commission reported back, condemning CALFED, 
calling for stronger leadership, and praising DWR among other findings (Alpert 2005).  
When reforms in CALFED did not occur quickly enough, Schwarzenegger issued an 
executive order dated 17 September 2006 to create the Delta Vision Blue Ribbon Task Force 
of statewide business, civic and political leaders to envision a future Delta that would 
maximize water production and ecosystem functionality and then develop a strategy to get 
there.  Delta Vision kicked off while the consultants hired by DWR pushed forward to 
produce in 13 months what would become the 3000-page DRMS Phase I study (URS 2008).  
Obeying the legislation that authorized this study, DRMS looked at levee stressors of 
113 
 
 
earthquake, subsidence, climate change, and extreme floods.  In late 2007 and early 2008, 
California had four major Delta initiatives in progress, the DRMS study, the Delta Vision 
efforts, the Ecosystem Restoration Program (ERP) Conservation Strategy of a wounded 
CALFED, and the Bay Delta Conservation Plan (BDCP).  The BDCP represents an effort by 
DWR, USBR, and those agencies responsible for protecting endangered species in an effort 
to provide enhanced habitats and environmental protection to offset and compensate for the 
environmental damage caused by water exports.  Of these initiatives, the Delta Vision would 
play out as the statewide political discourse on the Delta as reviewed in Chapter II.  The 
Ecosystem Restoration Program appears to have lost momentum with the demise of 
CALFED, with its 2010-2011 budget identifying its main activity to be support of the Bay 
Delta Conservation Plan BDCP (ERP 2010).  The DRMS study and the BDCP itself, 
however, would have major impacts on all discourses, social and political, on Delta levees.   
THE DRMS REPORT  
 As noted in Chapter III, after Katrina, the legislature mandated an evaluation, based 
on information already available, of the risk and consequences of failures of Delta levees.  
URS would get the contract to complete, under DWR direction, the report called the Delta 
Risk Management Study (DRMS).  This report would attempt to develop a political solution 
to the problems and conflicts in the Delta, which would make winners and losers among the 
various social perspectives about levees held by Delta levee experts that this dissertation will 
identify in Chapter VI.  As such, views on the execution, scientific basis, and presentation of 
DRMS itself became a major part of the discourses about Delta levees.  When the draft report 
hit the internet in June 2007, the findings of its Executive Summary would draw sharp focus 
on two major areas of underlying differences among the perceptions of Delta levee experts, 
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specifically the inherent fragility of the Delta levees and the degree of risk of multiple levee 
failures inducted by earthquakes. 
 Again as noted in Chapter III, the DRMS Executive Summary first highlighted the 
finding that in spite of 25 years of increased state investment in Delta levees, failures 
continued at an unacceptably high level.  Further, sea-level rise and continued subsidence 
would render it difficult to improve this performance in the future.  The Summary concluded 
that there would be 140 levee failures over the next 100 years, a very slight improvement 
over the 158 failures they recorded over the 1900-2006 period used to perform their analysis.  
This established official public support for key elements of the social perspectives of some 
Delta levee experts, whereas it rejected the perspective of others.  As will be demonstrated in 
Chapter VI, the DRMS analysis apparently lacked sufficient width and breadth to change  the 
social perspectives of some of Delta levee experts relative to this issue. 
In addition to focusing on the 158 islands flooded since 1900 (Figure 3.14) and the 
islands like Franks Tract that never were restored, the Executive Summary then noted that 
the Delta levees had “not yet experienced a damaging earthquake.”  In super bold print, the 
Executive Summary pointed to the U.S. Geological Survey report indicating a 62% 
probability of a 6.7 magnitude earthquake hitting the San Francisco Bay area between 2003 
and 2032 that could cause multiple levee failures in the Delta and that several closer faults 
posed an even greater risk to the Delta levees.  The DRMS Executive Summary drew 
attention (URS 2009a) to the finding of the report that between 2003 and 2032, the estimated 
probability of a simultaneous 20-island levee failure resulting from an earthquake and cost of 
levee repair at $2.3 billion stood at 40%.  Again, on this major indeterminate issue, the 
DRMS study supported certain social perspectives and rejected others.  Chapter VI will 
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identify the social perspective and indicate if the DRMS report provided sufficient evidence 
to create unity of views by Delta levee experts on this concern.  The DWR and others 
discussed earthquake risk to Delta levees prior to the June 2007 issuance of the DRMS draft 
report.  URS based the actual earthquake risk assessment in DRMS on the 2000 CALFED 
study (Torres et al. 2000).  Scholarly studies and interviewed Delta experts agree, with the 
exception of one questionably documented reference in one paper (Finch 1988), that levees 
in the Delta remain undamaged by an earthquake or earthquake-related activity.  Geologists 
express concern that tectonic forces have overstressed northern California fault lines, with 
pressures building on the San Andreas Fault since 1906 and the Hayward Fault since 1866.  
They have also located or projected faults under or near the Delta that represent a concern 
regardless of the absence of a surface exposure or record of recent activity. 
A 1980 report (DWR 1980) appears initiated concern for seismic damage to the 
levees of the Delta.  It suggested that whereas the 1906 earthquake did not produce a 
recorded levee failure in the Delta, the levees were not substantial then.  The report 
concluded that risk had become significant and needed investigation.  The 1980 report 
signaled a change in DWR thinking about this subject because the summary report on the 
Peripheral Canal written in 1974 did not mention risk of earthquake damage in the Delta 
(DWR 1974).  In 1975, the plan published by DWR to improve Delta levees mentions the 
possibility of liquefaction and the formation of seiches under earthquake conditions, noting 
that more investigation should be undertaken (DWR 1975, 9).  The U.S. Geologic Survey 
studied this issue (Youd 1982), investigating the six earthquake faults near the Delta, and 
determining the maximum values of moments for earthquakes originating on those faults.  
The investigator identified that liquefaction probabilities are a function of the susceptibility 
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of the soils to liquefaction and the intensity of the seismic shaking.  He concluded that 
“although there is a high likelihood of susceptible sediment in the Sacramento-San Joaquin 
Delta, the opportunity is lower, and thus the liquefaction potential is low” (Youd 1982, 354).  
Other studies in the 1980s and 1990s disagreed as outlined in the DWR summary report on 
the DRMS study to the Delta Vision Task Force (DWR 2007, 3), all reporting that Delta 
“levees are susceptible to liquefaction and could fail in moderate to strong earthquake 
shaking.” Finch (1988) studied Twitchell Island and postulated that one particularily 
troublesome Project levee on Three Mile Slough could suffer failure of the loose sand toe 
berm which could lead to levee failure in the event of a maximum credible earthquake on any 
one of the six nearby faults. 
  In 2000, CALFED authorized the study on the probability of damaging earthquakes 
to resolve the differences in perspectives on this issue to hopefully achieve a guide for  policy 
makers (Torres et al 2000).  As note above, this study would form a major part of the basis of 
the DRMS analysis on the earthqauke risk.  Torres et al. (2000) produced the charts in Figure 
4.6 showing probabilities of the number of levee failures (not number of islands flooded) for 
a 50 year, 100 year and 200 year return earthquake.  The study determined the maximum 
magnitude of the shaking and the probability of magnitude and frequency of earthquake for 
each fault shown on Figure 4.7.  They then estimated the horizontal gravity reaction force, or 
Peak Ground Acceleration (y) based on the energy at the source and the distance related 
attenuation to the various parts of the Delta.  The potentials from the various faults were then 
summed.  This generated a seismic hazard curve for each site in the Delta.  To get from the 
hazard curve to probability number of levee failures, the team developed a “levee fragility 
function”.  The report notes that adequate geotechnical information for the 600 miles of  
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Figure 4.6 – Torres et al. (2000) Levee Fragility Function Curves for 50, 100, and 
200-year Reoccurrence Earthquakes Base on Expert Elicitation 
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Figure 4.7 - Map of Faults in the Delta Region Investigated in Torres et al.  
(2000, A1) 
119 
 
 
levees of interest was not available, nor likely to ever be available, to perform true 
engineering analysis of the resistance of the levees.  Therefore, a sub-team of nine Delta 
levee experts was given the available data (borings, reports, etc.) and ask to prepare an 
estimate of the frequency of levee failure for different levels of earthquake shaking.  The 
experts then met, reviewed the individual findings, and then developed a single averaged 
range of values.  The width of the range of probability versus number of failures shown in 
Figure 4-4 a, b, and  c reflects the differences in perspectives among the Delta livee experts 
of how the levees will react to earthquake forces.  Whereas the potential intensity of 
earthquake shaking and the probability of earthquakes are reasonably estimated with widely 
accepted models, it is the reaction of the levees to the shaking or this “levee fragility  
function” that remains the unknown and, therefore, again subject to expert elicitation.  The 
DRMS report again tackled the issue of the various faults, active, inactive, and projected, and 
how often they will shake the Delta and with how much energy, but it did not directly 
address the issue of vulnerability of Delta levees to damage caused by liquefaction.  So again 
the DRMS report did not, as will be shown in Chapter VI,  eliminate any opposing 
viewpoints.  The “levee fragility  function” of Torres et al. (2000) represents an averaging of 
viewpoints or social perspectives and not a resolution of differences or consensus.  
The DRMS Executive Summary-Phase 1 (URS 2009a) was directed at the general public and 
attracted attention and readership.  DWR hoped to and may have set an established public 
discourse on Delta levee concerns, specifically that the Delta levees are extremely vulnerable 
because of inherent weaknesses and the certainty of future damage from earthquakes.  
Chapter VI will explore the ability of the report to change or influence the social perspectives 
of the Delta levee experts on these issues.  One of the results of the DRMS report is that 
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among the experts, the motivation and execution of DRMS itself became subjects of the 
discourse and conflict, again as will be the subject of Chapter VI. 
The draft report and Phase I heightened the intensity of the debates among Delta levee 
experts. The Phase II report, on the other hand, got held up with the 2009 California state 
budget crisis and the focus of the public debates moved elsewhere, to the Delta Vision 
exercise and its successor, the Delta Stewardship Council and to the development of the Bay 
Delta Conservation Plan (BDCP).  DWR issued the Phase II DRMS on 13 June 2011 with 
little fanfare and stakeholder reaction. 
THE BAY-DELTA CONSERVATION PLAN (BDCP) 
 The listing of nine Delta fish runs under the Endangered Species Act and the 
California state equivalent led to court-ordered restrictions on water exports in 2007 and 
added to the woes of the water exporters. With fish counts and water exports continuing to 
drop, the DWR, USBR, the major water contractors (Kern Count, Westlands, MWD, Friant, 
etc.), the state and federal wildlife agencies, the USACE, and several ENGOs were 
convinced to come together to form a type of expanded, project oriented CALFED team to 
develop a Bay-Delta Conservation Plan (BDCP).  The intent was to obtain a 50-year permit 
to operate new and existing water and energy projects.  The plan calls for agencies enforcing 
the provisions of the endangered species act (USF&W, the National Marine Fisheries (NMF), 
and state Depart of Fish and Game (DF&G)) to issue the permits to allow restored operation 
of the existing CVP and SWP systems. It also calls for streamlining any permits required to 
build the “identified” ecologically friendly ways “planned to move fresh water through 
and/or around the Delta” (BDCP 2011).  This of course strongly suggests a Peripheral Canal, 
which plays a critical role in differentiating the social perspectives of the Delta levee 
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interests.  A large element of the BDCP requires the creation of more habitats, with the hope 
that would support an increasing in the number of endangered fish, prospering in new home 
waters.  The improved habitat would more than offset the losses of fish at the export pumps.  
Eventually the fish species would work their way off the endangered species lists and recover 
in the restored 65,000 acres of freshwater tidal marsh and 10,000 acres of expanded flood 
plain created by levee setbacks (SAIC 2011).  CALFED funds previously allowed acquisition 
of properties on and around Liberty Island. USBR had acquired most of Prospect Island and 
Westlands owned property upstream in the Yolo Basin with the hope that BDCP could 
convert the lower end of the Yolo By-pass and nearby Prospect Island into tidal marsh 
habitat.  The planners also looked at restoration in the Suisun Marsh and smaller potential 
areas to restore environments to allow the many endangered species to recover, even in the 
face of continued fish mortality at the pumps.  This of course all involves land use planning 
which in the Delta means levee planning. Chapter VI will investigate the relationship of  
these plans and discussions over them on the social perspectives of the Delta levee experts.   
The involvement of the water contractors in BDCP stems from their interest in reducing or 
ending the restrictions placed on water exports from the Delta required by the USF&W 
biological opinion on Delta smelt and one by the NMF that covered salmonoids and 
sturgeon, all under the federal Endangered Species Act (Huggett 2010).  The water 
contractors and their customers will probability bear much of the cost of the BDCP.  Part of 
the final plan likely will be a peripheral canal or perhaps tunnel, which again potential 
impacts the Delta levee and drivers for funding levee maintenance.  The BDCP premise that  
approval of the plan will then expedite any permitting and financing required, suggesting that 
a peripheral canal as part of an approved BDCP would be on its way quickly.   
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 BDCP team lost a financially important member in November of 2010 when the 
Westlands Water District withdrew from the negotiations when it became clear that 
execution of the BDCP would not guarantee additional water for agriculture.  The State 
Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) had not renounced the water-for-fish guideline 
recommended by an interagency team reporting to the SWRCB and the DSC, which 
proposed in July 2010 additional limitations on future pumping operations.  Under these 
guidelines for example, exports and net change in upstream storage could not exceed 25% of 
the unimpaired Sacramento River flow into the Delta from November through June (Hanak 
et al. 2011).  In theory, water deliveries out of the Delta are limited to 25% of the average 
total annual normal flows in or which are those in excess to the needs of the watershed.  The 
CVP and SWP historically captured as much of the winter excess runoff in the reservoirs in 
the Basin, the proposed guideline will limit capture and use to no more than 25% of the 
stream flow in any month.  In most years, this would limit water exports below historic 
averages and render additional more storage less valuable from a water supply standpoint. 
The BDCP project continues and time will determine if Westlands withdrew as a negotiating 
step, or if not, what effect that their non-participation would have on the results of the effort. 
 BDCP suffered additional embarrassment when on 5 May 2011, when the National 
Science Foundation issued a press release headlined by: “California’s Draft Bay Delta 
Conservation Plan incomplete; needs better integration to be scientifically credible” (Walsh 
2011), suggesting that the debate over the future of the Delta and its levees will continue.  
DELTA VISION AND THE DELTA STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL 
 As noted in Chapter II, Governor Schwarzenegger created the Delta Vision Blue 
Ribbon Task Force in 2006 when he recognized that CALFED had not produced a widely 
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accepted public discourse that would solve the water supply, environmental and levee safety 
crises in the Delta.  When the Blue Ribbon Panel presented its results in late 2008, the 
Governor had what he wanted, a governing plan for the Delta that included emphasis on 
quickly building the peripheral canal.  This would free the water projects from the problems 
of the Delta, while promising an environmental restoration of the Delta to save the 
endangered species and keep the environmental community on board with the overall plan.  
The statewide composition and reputation of the task force members, plus the approach of 
holding Task Force hearings all over the state help establish the findings as THE California 
perspective. Just as momentum built for the Delta Vision, the 2008 real estate market crash 
and recession hit California hard.  The real estate markets in the Stockton and Sacramento 
areas took some of the most significant drops in national valuation and the unemployment 
rate in Stockton jumped from 6.3% in October 2006, to 8.1% for 2008, then skyrocketed to 
15.3% for 2009, and continued climbing to a March 2011 estimate of 18.4% (USDL 2011).  
The debt service on many billions of dollars of general obligation bonds, many of them for 
flood control, water supply, or environmental restoration projects, already approved and 
spent, became difficult to cover in the face of declining tax revenues.  The governor and 
legislature could not work out a budget, the state furloughed its employees, contract work 
halted, and contractors received state IOUs for work, materials, and services already 
delivered instead of money.  The reclamation districts, first buoyed by additional funding 
promised by the subventions program through the passage of referendums E-1 and 84 were 
left with huge, uncovered loans when DWR could not make the promised 75% 
reimbursement of authorized expenditures for the levee maintenance work completed in 
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2008.  The resulting tension between the DWR managers and the reclamation districts  
impacted some of the elements of the social perspectives uncovered in Chapter VI. 
 Schwarzenegger did manage to keep the Delta Vision moving and in November of 
2009, the legislature passed the comprehensive statewide water package that included four 
major water policy bills.  Major elements of the bills were requirements to establish   
statewide groundwater monitoring, to tighten up Delta water diversions, to develop statewide 
water conservation goals, to established a new governance structure to the Delta (Delta 
Stewardship Council) and re-structure and realigned some governing structures, and to float a 
new package of $11.15 billion in water bonds.  The bills also re-designated $546 million 
from bond packages E-1 and Prop 84 approved by the voters in 2006 (DWR 2009), including 
setting aside $202 million of the 2006 bond money for “flood protection in the Delta to 
reduce the risk of levee failures that would jeopardize water conveyance” (DWR 2009, 6).  
The proposed bond issue includes $2.25 billion for “Delta Sustainability” defined as 
“projects to assist in maintaining and restoring the Delta as an important ecosystem... to 
reduce the seismic risk to water supplies derived from the Delta, protect drinking water 
quality, and reduce conflict between water management and environmental protection” 
(DWR 2009, 7).  Much of wording of legislation supports the discourse of the Delta Vision 
justifying the peripheral canal (or isolated conveyance or water tunnel).  The package also 
included $3.0 billion for unidentified surface and aquifer storage projects designed to 
overcome the effects of climate change on the system.  The rest of the money in the package 
promised some technological solution for the water issues of every region of the state to help 
assure statewide voter support. 
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 The bills also established the Delta Stewardship Council (DSC) consisting of seven 
members with “diverse expertise providing a broad statewide perspective.”  The legislation 
charged the DSC to develop a plan by early 2012 that furthers (once again) “the co-equal 
goals of Delta restoration and water supply reliability” (DWR 2009, 2).  DSC will then 
develop and track performance measures, review state and local governing agencies’ projects 
for consistency with the Delta plan, and act as an appellate body should claims of 
inconsistency be filed by others.  The legislation specifically designed the DSC to review the 
Bay-Delta Conservation Plan (BDCP).  On the governing side, the bills established the 
Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Conservancy to manage the ecosystem restoration activities 
within the Delta.  Finally, the Delta Protection Commission (DPC), got streamlined 
(membership cut from 23 to 15) and responsibilities expanded.  The legislation assigned the 
DPC responsibility to prepare a plan for economic sustainability for the Delta, emphasizing 
flood protection.  The DSC will incorporate the DPC plan in the overall DSC effort.  The 
Legislature established the DSC as the governance process for the Delta.  The DSC became 
the agency charged with listening to and considering for inclusion in public policy, the 
discourses of the social perspectives identified in Chapter VI.  The Q-sorts discussed in 
Chapters V and VI were conducted very early in the life of this process so little can be gained 
from them relative to the effectiveness of the DSC in this role. 
 The governor wasted no time getting the DSC up and running, appointing as 
chairperson the widely respected Phil Isenberg, former mayor of Sacramento, and the 
individual who had chaired the Blue Ribbon Panel.  By March 2010, the DSC was holding 
monthly public meetings as the council organized and set to work on its ambitious objectives.  
The meetings have been open to the public and broadcast live on public television and via the 
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internet.  Back at the Capitol, however, public opinion polls were forecasting defeat for the 
$11.15 billion bond proposition and late in 2010, the popular vote got put on hold until the 
2012 elections. In November of 2010, Governor Schwarzenegger could not run for re-
election because of term limits and California voters returned Jerry Brown to the governor’s 
mansion. Governor Jerry Brown, of course, served as governor during the 1980-82 second 
public debate over the Peripheral Canal.  As if to prove that nothing had changed in 30 years, 
Brown appointed Gerald Meral, once an Environmental Defense Fund scientist, in 1980 as 
Assistant Director of DWR (Reisner 1986, 375) and then 2011 appointed him to a similar 
position.  Meral’s primary assignment is to push the BDCP to completion and acceptance by 
the DSC.  As American philosopher Yogi Berra might explain it, in California, water politics 
can be a case of déjà vu all over again. 
PUBLIC SAFETY VERSUS HABITAT 
As if those working to restore habitat in the Delta did not have enough to deal with in 
February 2007, the USACE surprised DWR and levee owners when it revealed that it was 
enforcing a heretofore ignored prohibition on vegetation on the levees.  This change in 
enforcement was “announced” by inspectors suddenly issuing failing “grades” to the districts 
during annual levee inspections when vegetated levees were found.  By April 2007,  thirty-
three California reclamation districts had failed 2007 annual inspections, leaving them all at 
risk of losing certification under the FEMA National Flood Insurance Program, and more 
inspections were coming (Weiser 2007a).  This created concerns for the DF&G,  DWR, 
USBR, NMF, and USF&W, all of which were trying to create more, not less, “shaded marine 
habitat” (vegetated levees) to restore the endangered species in the Central Valley and Delta.  
The reclamation districts faced two problems, not only would they lose flood insurance, but 
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the cost of removing the vegetation would total millions if not billions of dollars (Interview 
124 -2010A).  In 1993, the Legislature greatly increased the cost of removing vegetation by 
passing Assembly Bill-360 (AB-360) which required replacement of habitat lost during levee 
subventions program work on a three for one basis. 
The change in enforcement policy came directly from the USACE Headquarters, at 
least in part in response to the intense criticism over the Katrina levee failures.  No indication 
exists that Headquarters consulted with the local USACE District offices.  The policy would 
require removal of all levee vegetation in the interest of public safety, not a problem 
elsewhere in the country, but a major issue in the Central Valley of California.  The state and 
USACE had quietly encouraged some vegetation for habitat.  For example, the 2006 
emergency levee repairs on the Sacramento River levee paid for by California and largely 
executed by the local USACE District office, incorporated waterline vegetation and woody 
debris in the design, significantly adding to the project cost.   
Even with resistance from the Sacramento District, USACE Headquarters refused to 
budge. In August of 2007 the Sacramento Area Flood Control Agency (SAFCA), the DWR, 
the USACE Sacramento District, and the California Reclamation Board sponsored a 
symposium on the effects of vegetation on levees.  Experts from as far away as Holland 
presented papers, Van Vuren (2007) indicating that bare levees promoted destructive 
habitation by round squirrel and other burrowing mammals.  Sherman et al. (2007) presented 
data showing the wave energy attenuation of vegetation and field erosion data showing the 
effectiveness of vegetation simulating “bush bundles” in reversing erosion on Delta levees.  
They also presented a chart showing the extent of vegetated levees in the Delta alone, as 
expert after expert challenged the wisdom of the USACE vegetation policy in California.  
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Unimpressed or under impressed, USACE Headquarters refused to withdraw the 
enforcement edict.  A truce developed as the USACE essentially delayed enforcement until 
2012; however, the issue still hangs over Delta levees.  In April 2010,  DWR and DF&G sent 
a 58 page formal request to USACE Headquarters detailing justifications for  major changes 
in the policy for California  (Cowin and McCamman 2010; Interview 124-2010A). 
CONCLUSIONS 
 The accidental role of the Delta levees in the California water supply system has 
greatly added to the importance of the levees and number of people who are stakeholders in 
the levees.  Once merely the concern of handful of farmers living behind them, miles of Delta 
levees now are critical to upwards of 25 million Californians dependent on then for adequate 
domestic water supplies and irrigation water.  Also, the levees themselves, the water exports, 
and other human impacts on the Sacramento – San Joaquin River system have severely taxed 
the ecosystem and pushed the native fish species to the brink of extinction.  About the only 
thing that most stakeholders agree on is that more is unknown than known about the 
workings of Delta socio-ecosystem, from the history of levee failures to the habitat needs of 
the Delta smelt. 
Early attempts to provide governing and governance to this over tapped and complex 
system came through the interactions of single focus government agencies, an approach that 
by the early 1990 had proved impossible and so federal and state leaders then attempted to 
manage the Delta through a collaborative effort of agencies called CALFED.  Much of 
CALFED’s efforts revolved around attempting to reduce the unknowns and identifying the 
“best available science” to employ in policies.  Unfortunately, efforts to draw the knowledge 
from all the stakeholders and scientists take a lot of time as a minimum and as Huntley 
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suggested (2002), solving the problems of the Delta will require the best ideas from all 
involved.  
Starting in the 1940s, the stakeholders concerned with water supply for the southern 
areas of the state have favored drawing water from upstream of the messy, tidal Delta and 
letting the Delta centric interests deal with their problems.  With at least 75 percent of the 
water coming in on the Sacramento, this means a Peripheral Canal around the Delta to the 
Sacramento.  This solves the problems of water exporter but leaves all of the problems for 
the Delta interest but potentially reduces the options and resources, primarily water and 
money, to deal with them.  As outlined in this chapter, much of the political discourses about 
the Delta have focused on this one element since at least June of 1972 when the levee failure 
at Brannan Island reminded all interests of the central role the levees played in all aspects of 
the Delta.  The 2004 failure at Jones Tract and the destruction of the levees in another 
American delta by Hurricane Katrina have served as vivid reminders of the vulnerability of 
levee-dams. 
The last two chapters have outlined the events that have shaped the political 
discourses and the underlying social perspectives of those involved in dealing with the past 
and future of Delta levees.  Chapter VI focus on empirically determining the main social 
perspectives or factors of the groups most knowledgeable about the Delta levees to better 
understand the science and logic behind the political rhetoric.  It also helps understand the 
differences in what various social perspectives view as the best available science.  As the last 
two chapters demonstrate, expert elicitation represents the default method of determining the 
unknowns when time and resource constraints force an answer before sufficient research can 
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be completed.  Expert elicitation means tapping into the social perspectives of the experts, 
the object of Chapter VI.   
Table 4.1 summarizes the events and governing and governance processes discussed 
in the last two chapters that have shaped the four social perspectives or factors of the Delta 
levee experts.  Chapter VI will explore these social perspectives.  
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Table 4.1- Time Line of Events Contributing to Current Social Perspectives of Delta Levee Experts  
Event or Period Date
(s)  
Key actors/ 
Governance  processes 
Discourses, views, frames supported Impacts focused on Delta Levees 
Arkansas Act 1850 US. Congress Swamp and overflowed lands represent a 
waste that the state should encourage 
independent farmers to make them useable. 
Established basis of Delta settlement and 
land title transfer from federal government 
Period of identifying 
lands involved and 
initial efforts to get 
reclamation going 
1850
-
1866 
Surveyors and California 
legislature 
Locally organized reclamation districts should 
lead the effort with state support 
Little progress, acreage limits  (320 A) too 
small to attract capital required,  state 
reinvestment of land sale money also 
inadequate 
Legislature turns 
overflowed lands 
development over to 
counties 
1866 County Engineers and 
Large Investors 
Reclamation requires financial resources and 
risk spreading of large corporations or wealthy 
individuals. 
Acreage limitation quickly dropped 
Development of peat 
levees in Delta  
1866
-
1882 
Land landowners like 
Roberts, Chinese and 
other immigrant laborers 
and lessees. 
Small peat levees can create large profits in 
Delta but floods can produce ruin 
Early levee development, largely a failure. 
Hydraulic gold mining 
in Sierra and resulting 
deposition of sediments 
in Sacramento valley 
streams and farms 
1853
-
1884 
Mining companies, 
valley farmers, courts 
and legislature 
Public priority of private extraction of 
minerals, particularly gold slowly gives way 
to view that the land and waters also had value 
that had to be protected for the public good 
Sedimentation in the Sacramento limited 
navigability and increased frequency of 
levee destroying floods along the 
Sacramento.  In Delta the effects not as 
great and arrived later than those levees on 
the floodplain upstream of the Delta.  
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Table 4.1 Continued  
Event or Period Date
(s)  
Key actors/ 
Governance  processes 
Discourses, views, frames supported Impacts focused on Delta Levees 
Era of levee construction 
in Delta with clamshell 
dredge. 
1882
-
1922 
Reclamation districts, 
land developers, and 
emigrant and immigrant 
farm lessees, purchasers, 
and laborers. 
Continuing battle to reclaim farmland from 
marsh against increasing floods.  Flooding 
peaked in 1907 at flow levels twice as high as 
engineers considered possible. 
Constant struggle to keep levees above 
many floods, Flooding forces 
abandonment of Sherman, Twitchell, and 
Bouldin Islands for several years but 
increasing number and size of clam shell 
dredges finally permits reclamation of 
entire Delta by 1922. 
San Francisco 
Earthquake 
April  
1906 
 Delta levees, such as they existed, were not 
damaged by large earthquake. 
None and it is the largest quake to have 
been felt by Delta manmade levees. 
USACE constructs the 
Sacramento River flood 
control project 
1917 
to 
1953  
USACE, and 
Sacramento Valley 
agricultural and 
navigation interests, U.S. 
Congress. 
Sacramento Valley flooded and navigation 
harmed because of lingering effects of 
hydraulic mining sediment transport of which 
the US government had been the prime 
beneficiary 
While about 15% of Delta levees were 
reworked to accommodate draining 
Kelley’s “Inland Sea”, most of the Delta 
did not benefit from the great flood 
control project, except along the 
Sacramento and its direct distributaries. 
City of Antioch loses 
water rights claim in 
court 
1922 City of Antioch, Delta 
farmers and industrial 
interests, upstream water 
users, State Supreme 
Court 
Rights to water determined  to not include 
rights to “fresh water” 
Contra Costa County and Delta users 
needed to find ways to protect their water 
supply from salinity intrusions 
California Legislature 
approves what will 
become the CVP 
1933 Legislature, San Joaquin 
Valley agricultural 
interest 
Need to move excess water from Sacramento to 
the Central Valley to replace rapidly depleting 
Central Valley ground water ssupplies 
Beginning of Delta involvement in water 
distribution 
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Table 4.1 Continued 
Event or Period Date
(s)  
Key actors/ 
Governance  processes 
Discourses, views, frames supported Impacts focused on Delta Levees 
USBR takes over and 
builds CVP  
1937
-
1951 
FDR, Congress, the 
USBR 
The state water project, stalled because of 
failure of California to sell bonds in Depression 
becomes part of New Deal job creation effort, 
hoping to help save some small farmers from 
additional Dust Bowl conditions. 
Project included Shasta Dam which 
would allow the USBR to wash salinity 
intrusions out of Delta. Makes Delta part 
of the CVP, particularly after construction 
of Cross Delta channel in 1951. 
Burns Act passes – 
establishing State Water 
project and declaring 
Delta a “special place 
deserving protection” 
1959 Governor E. Brown, 
DWR, state legislature, 
Central Valley 
agricultural interests, 
MWD. 
Need to move additional surplus water from as 
far north as the Eel River to the Central Valley 
and South Coastal Region to continue growth 
and prosperity in California.  No acreage limits 
on water recipients.  Established guarantees for 
Delta farmers  
Establishes Legal Delta and promises 
protections as special place.  Further 
cements Delta’s place a center of water 
distribution System 
SWP bond issue passes  
at $1.75 B 
1960 Gov. Brown, public 
relations firms, voters 
North  - Theft of water and opportunity. South 
– Water necessary to sustain growth 
 
Construction of SWP – 
deciding  what kind of 
salinity barrier to 
establish in Delta 
1961
-
1971 
DWR, USBR, Contra 
Costa County, Delta 
interests 
Physical barrier would hurt Contra Costa 
county access to fresh water, restrict 
navigation, but protect Delta and water export 
access to freshwater.  Peripheral Canal 
proposed to protect water export access to fresh 
water, potentially at expense of Delta water 
users 
Money ran out before any Delta facility 
could be built, delaying decision.  Water 
deliveries to LA start in 1971.  Delta 
levees now part and center of large 
reclamation and water supply project. 
National Environmental 
Protection Act passes 
1969 Sierra Club and newer 
environmental NGOs, 
Congress, national press 
Environmental consequence of infrastructure 
projects need to be considered and ameliorated 
before projects permitted. Environmental 
concern raised over Peripheral Cana al  
Peripheral Canal would now require 
environmental review 
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Table 4.1 Continued 
Event or Period Date
(s)  
Key actors/ 
Governance  processes 
Discourses, views, frames supported Impacts focused on Delta Levees 
Levee Failure –Brannan 
Island 
June 
1972 
Brannan Andrus RD, 
USACE, DWR 
Water exports vulnerable to disruption due to 
failure of locally built levees.  Support for 
Peripheral Canal and some state financial 
support for levee maintenance grows.  
First real exposure of Delta levees to 
wide public interest.  DWR reminded of 
need for peripheral canal.  Leads to 
passage of Way Bill giving some support 
to levee districts. 
California Drought 1976
-
1977 
Gov. J. Brown, water 
users, water contractors, 
DWR 
Peripheral canal, additional dams, and perhaps 
connections to other northern California 
watersheds (Eel) needed to keep California 
economically viable. 
Upstream dam releases keep Delta waters 
fresh 
Revival, approval and 
voter defeat of Peripheral 
Canal 
1977
-
1982 
Governor  J. Brown, 
DWR, MWD and other 
water contractors, large 
Central Valley 
landowners, 
environmental groups, 
Contra Costa County and 
other Delta interests, 
California voters 
Peripheral canal needed to support water 
exports vital to California economy, Eel River 
however deserved permanent protection.  
Contra Costa County and Delta users and other 
northern Californians concerned over another 
LA water grab.  Environmental groups oppose 
the peripheral canal. 
Delta levee districts continued to be 
concerned about increased salinity in 
Delta if the Peripheral Canal got built.  
North Delta Water District signs contract 
with DWR for water from canal if 
necessary.  Other Delta water Districts 
refuse to sign such agreements 
Jones Tract and 
McDonald island “sunny 
day” levee failures 
1980 
& 
1982  
DWR experts Issues of salt  water intrusion did not develop 
as severely as expected,  hydrodynamic 
modeling and expert knowledge establish that 
levee failures  on the eight western Delta 
islands posed the greatest risk to water exports 
AB-34 passed in 1986 increases 
subventions moneys but half were 
dedicated to the eight western islands as 
suggested by DWR. 
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Table 4.1 Continued 
Event or Period Date(s)  Key actors/ 
Governance  processes 
Discourses, views, frames supported Impacts focused on Delta Levees 
Wet years in 
California cause 
numerous levee 
failures  
1980-
1986 
Reclamation Districts, 
DWR, FEMA, USACE 
Levee failures during floods of 1980, 1982, 
1983, 1984 and the record flood of 1986 raise 
concerns over safety and cost of Delta levees. 
Rising concern that Burns Act commitment to 
preserving Delta levees may be too costly. 
Need for engineering standards for Delta levees 
identified. 
Legislature gets serious about state 
financial support for Delta levee 
maintenance passing AB-34 with the 
caveat noted above. Reclamation Districts 
also get more serious about levee 
maintenance especially in light of passage 
of AB-955 in 1985 that suggested the 
state might be not able to preserve all 
Delta island and FEMA ruling that after 
9-11-91 levees not meeting the HMP 
standard (FEMA and DWR established) 
would not receive emergency relief 
funding. 
Sacramento winter 
run salmon and Delta 
Smelt listed as 
Threatened under 
NEPA  
1990 
&1993 
respecti
vely 
USF&W and NMF 
acting under NEPA 
Delta environment for native species 
deteriorating because of loss of habitat among 
many other stressors.  Congress sets aside 
800,000 Acre-ft. for fish under Central Valley 
Improvement Act in 1993 
Riverine habitat on levees  becomes more 
important and leads to changes in 1993 in 
the Subventions program to require 3 for 
1 habitat replacement for levee 
maintenance work 
Formation of 
CALFED 
1993 Governor Wilson & 
Secretary Babbitt 
  
CALFED era of Delta 
governance 
1993-
2007 
All 24 agencies (federal 
and state), governors 
Wilson, Davis, and 
Schwarzenegger. 
Adaptive management, commitment to best 
available science and collaboration would 
allow agencies to execute the largest 
environmental restoration project in history 
while enhancing water export quality and 
quantity and provide stronger Delta levees. 
CALFED took credit for subventions 
funding for Delta levees.  CALFED not 
as concerned with Delta levees as other 
responsibilities 
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Table 4.1 Continued 
Event or Period Date(s)  Key actors/ 
Governance  processes 
Discourses, views, frames supported Impacts focused on Delta Levees 
Jones Tract levee 
failure and decision in 
the Paterno lawsuit 
2004 Governor 
Schwarzenegger, DWR, 
BNSF railroad, Upper 
Jones Tract RD, USACE  
Weakness of Delta levees and the problem of 
relying on them for the water supply system 
questioned, State liable for not making levees 
safe or warning residents about dangers of 
levee weakness. Effectiveness of CALFED 
questioned. 
Cost for repairs and dewatering Jones 
Tract was very high raising the issue of 
ability of local levee districts to manage 
the levees of the state, including the 
Delta.  DWR questions what role it 
should play in future levee repairs and 
pump outs 
Katrina knocks over 
New Orleans levees, 
destroying city 
2005 USACE, national press. 
Governor, DWR. 
California characterized as having greater risk 
of levee failure than N.O. pre-Katrina has.  
Delta levees described as weak, not-engineered, 
too old, prone to earthquake damage and a 
greater risk in future because of sea-level risk 
and continued subsidence. 
Governor and DWR spend $50 million 
with USACE and levee district s on 
emergency levee repairs, many in Delta, 
all with vegetation incorporated in design.  
AB-1200 passes establishing Delta Risk 
Management Study of Delta levees. E1 
and Prop 84 bond issues pass with money 
for Delta levees. 
Little Hoover 
Commission reports 
on effectiveness  of 
CALFED 
2005 Governor, DWR, Little 
Hoover Commission, 
CAL-FED 
CALFED sound to be ineffective while fish 
populations and levee safety continued to 
deteriorate, water quality and water exports 
also in decline.  Stronger leadership structure 
required to solve problems 
CALFED had not paid much attention to 
Delta levees 
Creation of Delta 
Vision panel 
2006 Governor 
Schwarzenegger, the 
legislature, Blue Ribbon 
panel 
Clear action plan required to save water supply 
of 24 million Californians and protect salmon 
and smelt from extinction. 
References still made to protecting Delta 
as unique place but not with same 
intensity of coequal goals of water supply 
reliability and ecosystem restoration. 
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Table 4.1 Continued 
Event or Period Date(s)  Key actors/ 
Governance  processes 
Discourses, views, frames supported Impacts focused on Delta Levees 
Legal battles in 
Federal Court (Judge 
Wanger) over 
adequacy of NMF 
and USF&W 
biological opinion on 
now Endangered 
smelt and salmonoids 
2004 to 
present 
Judge Wanger, USF&W, 
NMF, DWR, USBR, 
Environmental NGOs, 
MWD, various water 
contractors, Senator 
Feinstein and others 
from California 
congressional delegation. 
Discourses over how much pumping of water 
from south side of Delta was impacting fish 
survival, discussion of other reasons for 
ecosystem decline pollution, Judge Wanger 
rules in 2007 and 2008 that USF&W and NMF 
(respectively) biological opinions inadequate to 
protect smelt and salmonoids and orders 
reduced exports.  Court approved biological 
opinions pending  
Peripheral Canal debated as either good 
or bad for endangered fish.  Delta water 
rights and contributions to pollution of 
Delta waters questioned along with all 
other water users. 
Bay-Delta 
Conservation Plan 
development (BDCP) 
2006  to 
present 
DF&G, USF&W, NMF, 
DWR, USBR, Water 
Contractors, ENGOs 
Plan can be developed to restore enough habitat 
in Delta for endangered species  to recover and 
keep fish away from pumps  
Concern over economics of effects on 
total agricultural support community of 
taking 75,000 A out of production plus 
P.C.  
Dispute over the 
USACE enforcement  
of bare levee policy 
2007 to 
present 
USACE, DWR, DF&G, 
reclamation districts 
Levees need to be free of vegetation to permit 
inspection. 
Delta and all California levees had long 
been considered also part habitat, 
removing vegetation will require millions 
in expense, a cost increased by the 
mandated 3 to 1 replacement of habitat 
removed. 
DRMS Phase 1 draft 
released to internet 
2007 
(June) 
URS and other 
contracted consultants, 
DWR, DF&G 
Executive Summary emphasizes poor and 
declining performance of Delta levees and the 
high probability of a multiple levee failures in a 
likely earthquake that could shutdown water 
exports for years. 
Effectiveness of subvention program and 
reclamation district efforts questioned.  
Lends support to PPIC/CWS calls for 
planned   abandonment of most, if not all, 
Delta levees and construction of 
peripheral canal. 
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Table 4.1 Continued  
Event or Period Date(s)  Key actors/ 
Governance  processes 
Discourses, views, frames supported Impacts focused on Delta Levees 
Delta Vision Panel 
Report Released 
2008 Delta Vision Blue 
Ribbon Panel members 
State need to move quickly to restore the Delta 
ecosystem and develop statewide water plan to 
improve reliability of water supply.  Isolated 
conveyance system needed immediately.  
Established single state agency to oversee all 
activities in Delta. 
Delta Vision clearly establishes Delta and 
Delta levees a statewide issue, not a local 
concern 
Passage of Statewide 
Water Policy Act of 
2009  
2009 
(Nov.) 
California legislature, 
Delta Vision Blue 
Ribbon Panel, Governor 
Schwarzenegger, DWR 
Included 4 major water policy acts including 
recording of groundwater.  Creates DSC to 
develop a plan for the managing the Delta, 
including review of the BDCP.  It included an 
$11.15 billion bond package for a variety of 
projects, much of it for water supply and 
environmental restoration in Delta.  
Delta Protection Commission reorganized 
and given additional authorizes within the 
overall Delta plan 
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CHAPTER V 
METHODS 
OVERVIEW 
 This chapter describes methods used to achieve the dissertation objectives of 1) 
understanding the social perspectives of the leaders, scientists, and experts of the various 
stakeholders and agencies, which establish the policies governing Delta levees; and 2) 
establishing a concise, widely available and rigorous record of Delta levee failures to 
better inform those who manage the Delta levees today.   
For the first objective, I used the Q-Method to identify and characterize the social 
perspectives.  For the second goal, the dissertation used traditional methods from 
historical geography and application of GIS and remote sensing techniques to fill in many 
of the gaps in our understanding of the history of levee failures.  This chapter will discuss 
in some detail the resources and approaches employed.  Ethnographic interviewing 
techniques provided much of the information included in the Q-Method and the history of 
levee failures, so the process of selecting interviewees, the interview process itself, and 
the coding processes employed will be reviewed.  
UNDERSTANDING DISCOURSES THROUGH Q-METHOD 
Q-Methodology (hereafter Q-Method) 
Geographers increasingly use the Q-Method to address issues and answer 
questions about discourse because of its ability to integrate qualitative and quantitative 
methods (Eden, Donaldson and Walker 2005, 420).  This dissertation represents my first 
opportunity to use Q-Method and I will be extending the use of Q-Method within 
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geography to the relatively unexplored area of identifying the social discourses that guide 
the science and management of natural resources, following most closely the efforts of 
Focht (2002), Raadgever, Mostert, and van de Giese (2008) and Bischof (2010).  In this 
section, I provide a quick overview of Q-Method as an approach to understanding the 
social perspectives of failures of Delta levees.  I will then present a short history of the 
method and trace its recent growth in geography and the environmental sciences.  Then I 
will identify the major steps in the method and trace the development of these since 1980 
as Q expanded from psychology.  I will then show how my use of Q-Method followed 
“best practice” in this growing literature.  Chapter VI presents the results of the Q-
Method study. 
History of Q-Method  
William Stephenson earned Ph.Ds. in physics and psychology at Oxford and 
studied under Charles Spearman, the father of factor analysis (Brown 1997).  Stephenson 
introduced the Q-Method concept to study human subjectivity in a letter to the editor of 
Nature in 1935 (Stephenson 1935a; 1953, 8; Robbins and Krueger 2000; Robbins 2005).  
Stephenson so that instead of measuring n individuals with m tests (or images, essays, 
views, or “other measurable materials”); n tests could be measured by m individuals and 
the result subject to factor analysis (Stephenson 1935b).  He presented this to his fellow 
psychologists and started using the Q-Method terminology to contrast the method with 
standard factor analysis with its Pearson’s r statistic. (Stephenson 1935a; 1936; Webler, 
Danielson and Tuler 2009). Using Q-Method, Stephenson could correlate individuals 
rather than tests or views.  He also argued that all subjective behaviors can be studied 
scientifically using Q-Method (Stephenson 1953, 343; Robbins and Krueger 2000). 
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Stephenson’s ontology assumes that individuals reveal their subjectivity through 
their behavior (Stephenson 1953; Robbins and Krueger 2000, 638).  Stephenson defined 
subjectivity as a measurable internal view of the world in the conscious mind, not the 
subconscious or unconscious (Robbins and Krueger 2000).  As Robbins and Krueger 
express it, Stephenson viewed subjectivity as “the internal frame of reference one calls 
upon to make sense of the world around oneself” (2000, 637).  Robbins (2005) 
pinpointed two characteristics of subjectivity that Q-Method can help expose.  First, 
individuals can communicate this form of subjectivity and they possess an innate 
awareness of the concourse of viewpoints or attitudes about a subject (Stephenson 1980, 
884), a property termed “discourse awareness” by Robbins (2005, 210).  This allows us 
to express our viewpoints or understandings.  Second, subjectivity is assumed to be 
operant, or acted upon without external stimulation; self-referent or reflective of the 
individual point of view; and contextual in that it exists as a consistent part of the 
individual’s totality of attitude toward the world and self (Robbins and Krueger 2000, 63; 
Robbins 2005, 211).  Q-Method does not address any concept of subjectivity as part of a 
pure mental experience divorced from processing inputs and outputs, or any concept 
reflective of physical or social attributes such as gender, race, or job title/employer 
(Robbins and Krueger 2000).    
Q-Method helps identify and define subjective perspectives and can do so with 
relatively small data sets.  It does not attempt, however, to determine statistically what 
portion of a larger population identifies with a particular perspective or factor.  The 
percentage of the participants in a Q-Method study who rank highly; or in Q-Method 
terminology, “load” on a factor, may but most likely do not, reflect the degree of support 
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for that perspective in any other population other than the limited number of participants, 
termed “P-sorters” (Ockwell 2008). 
 Q-Method grew slowly from psychology, hampered within that field by its 
rejection by Cyril Burt and other giants of British psychology in the mid-20th Century 
(Brown 1997).  Stephenson emigrated to the U.S. after World War II and his method 
slowly made gains in psychology and started finding homes in other fields, particularly in 
political science, championed there by Steven Brown (1980).  Brown, Stephenson and 
others promoted the use of Q-Method in a variety of fields, founding in 1977 the 
scholarly journal Operant Subjectivity.  In 1989, the Q-Method practitioners, just before 
the death of Stephenson, established the International Society for the Scientific Study of 
Subjectivity (ISSSS) and developed the now quarterly journal, Operant Subjectivity 
(Brown 1997).  In 1992, ISSSS developed the “PQMethod” freeware package for 
mainframe computers, later making it available in the PC version used in this dissertation 
(Schmolck 2002). 
 Brown (1997) reported that from 1968 to 1997, the Q-Method bibliography had 
grown from 600 to over 2,500 entries in fields ranging from nursing, public policy, 
marketing, and religion, to literary interpretation.  Brown also noted that Q-Method found 
applicability in new areas like postmodernism, deconstruction, social construction, 
feminism and women’s issues, identity theory, narrative analysis, qualitative analysis, 
and discourse analysis. By the period 1990-2003, Eden et al. (2005, 414) found 91 Q-
Method papers in the Web of Science, about half in the fields of political science and 
psychology and a few from business and environmental/geography fields.   
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 Robbins and Krueger (2000, 641) encouraged Q-Method use in human geography 
and lamented that geographers had not tapped its power as a quantitative tool to 
understand people’s knowledge and interpretation of, and feelings toward, the places they 
inhabit.  They specifically noted that Q-Method could effectively serve the increased 
interest of political ecology in understanding the nature, sources, and power of discourses 
of environmental knowledge (Robbins and Krueger 2000).  The paper also suggested the 
same for political geography with its interest in understanding the complex interactions of 
identity, nationalism, and place; along with those exploring the divided and shared human 
perceptions of the environment and relationship of those perceptions with class, race, and 
gender. 
 Robbins and Krueger (2000) provided encouragement and systematic instructions 
for geographers to explore the Q-Method.  Given the relative unfamiliarity of Q-Method 
to many scholars, Appendix K includes a table entitled “Summary of selected Q-Method 
Studies in Geography and related Fields 1999-2011.”   This table summarizes 19 
applications of Q-Method as geographers and scholars in related fields have widened the 
application to areas similar to the issues this dissertation addresses, specifically, the 
understanding of the subjective attitudes of scientists and other experts that controls and 
confounds science-based policy development in water resource and environmental 
management.  The table highlights an increasing confidence by geographers that Q-
Method can help identify the social perspectives of the experts and key actors, which in 
turn can help understand the root of policy conflicts.  The table also highlights applicable 
critical lessons learned in the studies where identified by the practitioner.   
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The following explanation of the Q-Method specialized terminology may prove helpful 
in understanding Appendix K and the remainder of the dissertation: 
Concourse: The complete set of ideas, concepts, and options about the subject of interest 
held by the individuals of interest. 
Q-set:  The subset of items in the concourse, which captures with a manageable number 
of statements, the essential concepts revealed in the concourse. 
P-set:  The participant set, or a subset of individuals whose social perspectives on the 
topic are of interest.  Like the Q-set, the researcher selects the P-set members with the 
criteria of wanting to represent the full range of interests and backgrounds of the 
individuals of interest. 
Q-sort:  The exercise by the members of the P-set to force-rank the items in the Q-set into 
the quasi-normal distribution according to terms of instruction. 
Factors:  The clusters of Q-sorts resulting from the Principle Component Analysis, which 
represent the social perspectives of the P-set. 
           To help identify the Q-Method best practice in geography, Appendix K captures 
the number of statements in the concourse for each study; it identifies the number of 
elements selected for the Q-set; it quantifies the size of the P-set; and then identifies he 
number of factors or shared social perspectives determined by the researchers from the 
factor analysis.  Appendix K provides statistics for the size of the Q-set, P-set and the 
number of Factors identified for the 19 studies from recent years, to provide a 
comparison for the statistics for this Q-Method study.  For each element of researcher 
choice in developing the Q-Method study, the dissertation closely matches the mode, 
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median, and/or mean for the 19 studies, reflecting a common literature rather than an 
established goal or target.  I calculated the group statistics after the completing the Q-
Method analysis. 
EMPLOYING Q-METHOD IN THE DELTA 
Background in the Literature 
Stephenson (1953); Brown (1980); Barry and Proops (1999); Robbins (Robbins 
and Krueger 2000, Robbins 2005); Webler, Danielson, and Tuler (2009); and 
Brannstrom, Jepson, and Persons (2011)  included reasonably consistent explanations of 
the activities involved in employing the Q-Method and these scholars provide the 
guidance for much of what follows.  They did not agree on which activities were 
combined into steps or even the actual number of steps involved, varying from Brown’s 
eight to Brannstrom’s four. To encourage expanded use of Q-Method in their academic 
fields, Brown (1980); Barry and Proops (1999); Robbins (2005); and Webler, Danielson, 
and Tuler (2009) wrote papers that were primarily works that described the Q-Method.  
From them I determined that Q-Method for this application entailed ten activities, eight 
of them defined as steps in Brown (1980).  Brown did not emphasize the importance of 
using interviews to establish the concourse so he did not identify it as a separate activity 
or step.  These interviews played a very critical and time-consuming role in this Q-
Method study so I included it as a separate element.  Geographers Robbins (2005), 
Webler, Danielson and Tuler (2009), and Brannstrom (2011) emphasize the importance 
of a follow-up interview or communication with the P-sorters for verification of the 
findings as a last Q-Method step, something that Brown (1980) did not yet employ.  I 
believe it was a critical element of Q-Method and, thus, it is the tenth activity. 
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I prepared Appendix C to tie my ten activities to Brown’s (1980) eight step 
process and the steps identified in the three major methods papers prepared by 
geographers and related scholars, Barry and Proops (1999); Robbins (2005); and Webler, 
Danielson, and Tuler (2009).  For the most part the four papers describe a consistent but 
flexible process. Each paper emphasized slightly different aspects of the activities, 
combining them conceptually.  The Q-Method continues to grow as noted above with the 
addition of the P-sorter follow-up activity as an example.  Brown’s book (1980) 
represented the first attempt to provide a detailed explanation for the steps required to 
employ Q in studies other than psychology; in his case, political science.  It included a 
particularly detailed primer on the statistics and math of correlation, factor analysis, and 
factor rotation.  These are all now fairly well “black-boxed” thanks to the availability of 
free software packages like PQMethod, use of which is outlined in Webler, Danielson, 
and Tuler (2009).  Kent and Coker (1992) provide a good theoretical background to the 
principal component analysis performed in the computerized “black-box” of PQMethod.  
The use of the “black box” may be one reason why some scholars have combined 
activities as these in later definitions of the Q-Method because these activities are less 
time consuming now than in 1980 when Brown described them.  The computer readouts 
include several of these, further diminishing the differences these steps or activities. 
Q-Method Activity Steps 
The ten activities I identified and adapted (as relation to steps of others shown in 
Appendix B) for my study of the discourse of Delta levee past, present and future are:           
1) Define domain of subjectivity; 2) Conduct semi-structured interviews and other 
research to create the concourse; 3) Select concourse items (Q-set) for sorting 
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representative of the entire concourse; 4) Select P–set, the individuals who will conduct 
the Q sort and schedule time and place for sorting; 5) Establish conditions of instruction 
for the sort; 6) Conduct Q sorts, record results and interview sorters for additional input; 
7) Run factor analysis and determine appropriate number of factors to use; 8) Rotate 
factors to simplify and generate factor scores and loadings; 9) Use statistically significant 
factor statements to interpret, name, and describe the factors; and 10) Prepare summary 
of factor descriptions and review with high loaders on each factor for input and revision 
as appropriate. 
Activity 1) Define the domain of subjectivity of interest 
Robbins (2005) highlights this first step of “defining the domain of subjectivity” 
as one that needs to be guided by the research question but one free from researcher effort 
to predestine what the responses would or should be.  In my case, I want to understand 
the primary messages and knowledge that key managers, engineers, and scientists of the 
Delta socio-ecosystem hold and espouse about the failures of Delta levees.  Following 
Webler, Danielson, and Tuler (2009), I defined the domain as: In the context of failures 
of Delta levees, this study wants to understand the different social perspectives and 
knowledge of how levees should be managed and maintained (if at all) in the future to 
inform the plan for the Delta being developed by the Delta Stewardship Council. 
Activity 2) Create the Concourse using dual-purpose semi-structured interviews of key 
actors 
After defining what area of subjectivity needs better comprehension, the Q-
Method researcher must create a complete list of statements and thoughts (or pictures of 
tree species in the case of Robbins 2000) made or held by the individuals of interest.  Q-
Method practitioners term this creating the Concourse.  Scholars have employed one of 
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two methods or a combination of these methods to create the Concourse, either extracting 
statements from websites, scientific journals (Bischof 2010), newspaper articles, 
testimony in judicial or in legislative hearings, or findings of previous research 
(Brannstrom 2009); or through direct interface with the key people living and working in 
the domain of subjectivity.  This second method to develop the concourse represents the 
“naturalistic” method (Robbins 2005, 212) and can take the form of focus group 
discussions or semi-structured interviews with representative members of the targeted 
group.  Whereas my research also endeavored to also gather firsthand knowledge of 
recent levee failures and the results of those failures from the same targeted group of 
individuals, I elected to use the direct semi-structured interview approach to develop the 
concourse and combine the two research objectives of the dissertation into the same 
interview.  The following description of the interview method employed also represents a 
major part of the second part of the research, the development of the detail history of 
failures of Delta levees. 
While not an activity set by the Q-Method, direct contact with human research 
subjects required approval from the Texas A&M University Institutional Review Board 
(IRB).  The list of instructions and the questions to be asked (provided in Appendix D), 
must have prior approval of the IRB, an approval received in late June 2009.  I next 
began the task of identifying who to interview and how to approach those individuals.  
Whereas I did not wish to use the websites and literature from the Delta Vision, the PPIC, 
and CALFED to generate the concourse, they proved helpful in identifying some of the 
key actors, such as members of the steering committees for these efforts and other 
participants.  I desired to interview individuals with a working knowledge of Delta levees 
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and levee failures with a diversity of backgrounds to develop a complete concourse, a 
“purposeful sample” (Longhurst 2003) of individuals for both aspects of the research.  
Clearly, several basic groups of organizations are involved with the Delta levees, 
specifically, the local reclamation districts (RDs); Delta residents not on the RD boards; 
the engineers and other consultants who support the RDs; the various branches of DWR 
and the federal agencies concerned about levee stability because of a variety of 
sometimes conflicted mandates to provide water export, flood control, and environmental 
restoration; the federal and state agencies involved in environmental protection and fish 
species recovery; and the NGOs and academics supporting their interests.  Identifying 
who should be and would agree to be interviewed became the next challenge. 
 Fortunately, during my involvement in research on erosion of Delta levees, I had 
become acquainted with an interesting and interested Delta farmer, reclamation board 
president, and former Delta Protection Commission member.  He had already shared 
stories of his experience with levee failures, his dealings with the state, county, and 
federal agencies over levee issues, and many of his views on levees.  He became one of 
my first interviewees but he also identified others I should interview, including those who 
he did not totally agree with but respected.  The second break I received came when I 
found a poster developed by the consultant URS in 2008 showing, “Levee Failures in the 
Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta" (Gaddie, Mierzwa and Marr 2008).  I contacted the 
authors and discovered that the chart had been prepared quickly from data provided by 
the DWR.  When I contacted the individuals at DWR who prepared the information used, 
they provided their spreadsheet and they became very interested in this project.  The 
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spreadsheet became a starting reference point for the database of levee failures and the 
two individuals helped identify other interview candidates. 
Starting from the two diverse sources, I was able to use snowball techniques 
(Longhurst 2003) to identify and establish contacts with other interviewees.  By asking an 
interviewee near the end of the interview who else I should interview, I was able to 
schedule and meet 30 key actors in determining the present and future of the Delta levees 
in July and August 2009.  I had some advantage because I could identify myself as a 
Ph.D. candidate who had been involved for four years in researching Delta levee erosion 
rates, and I was a professional engineer in Texas (many of the interviewees had 
engineering backgrounds).  I believe the thing that opened the most doors, however, was 
that I would first identify the individual who had recommended that I request the 
interview.  That sort of “letter of introduction”, I believe, helped create the 97% 
acceptance rate that I experienced.  Only one individual that I approached out of 31 could 
not find the time to meet to do the interview.  It also indicates that the snowballing 
technique helped me reach the “right” people: they all shared a passion about Delta 
levees and the Delta itself and were willing to make time to share their knowledge, fears, 
and hopes.  In every case I was able collect at least one comment to include in the 
Concourse, and most provided new data points about the levee failures not available 
elsewhere. 
I initially approached most interviewees by e-mail (Appendix B shows a typical e-
mail).  If I did not get a response within four or five days, I would follow up with a phone 
call.  I also took advantage of attending a public meeting on Delta issues that several 
interviewees suggested I attend.  It turned out to be the perfect venue because this was the 
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Levee and Habitat Restoration sub-committee originally established by CALFED.  This 
committee continued to function because it seemed to work for everyone even after the 
demise of CALFED.  I attended the meeting in late July 2009.  The sub-committee 
consisted of federal, state, and reclamation district officials and engineers who had been 
meeting regularly and publicly for twenty years to informally coordinate levee and 
environmental issues.  This provided the opportunity to approach several new contacts 
and establish interview schedules. Attendance at the meeting also contributed to 
researcher credibility with the interviewees, the recommendation to attend came from 
several of the early interviewees who were members and attended the meeting in July.  I 
conducted the thirty interviews during July and August of 2009.  
n many respects, the interviewing process represented the easy part of this work. 
As a retired engineer and manager, I had the advantage of interviewing individuals whom 
I was comfortable and experienced dealing with as peers.  This spared my efforts of some 
of the concerns expressed by many researchers of the problems of interviewing “elites.”  
My interviewee list included those clearly recognizable as “elites” - scientists, engineers, 
NGO and agency managers, RD directors, and Delta Vision steering committee members. 
At the same time, some on the list clearly held little positional power.  My experience 
with the combination would tend to confirm the view of Smith (2006) that positional 
“power” does not necessarily flow to interview space.  I did not sense a feeling of 
inequality of power in any interview.  More than one interviewee expressed surprise 
when I showed up because of my “maturity.”  The total number of surprised interviewees 
likely would have been much higher I had not adequately warned many of the 
interviewees beforehand.  My background and appearance may have contributed to 
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reducing any power imbalances in interview space but I believe that the confidentiality 
promised, the concept that power is not always transferable, and like Smith the “good 
nature of the particular research participants I contacted” (Smith 2006) also reduced the 
any structural problems identified by others with interviewing elites.  Indeed some, but 
certainly not all, respondents, trusted in the confidentiality aspects of the process and the 
setting of the interview to be free of the constraints of positional power to share 
information and thoughts that the interviewee probably would not have shared in other 
contexts.  Some interviews lasted several hours with the longest being six hours. 
 All interviewees agreed to be tape-recorded and all conversations recorded except 
the one when researcher-error caused the recorder to malfunction.  I then coded the 
interviews, some from a fully transcribed interview and in some cases from transcription 
of specific comments on the tape.  Coding captured two kinds of comments.  First, it 
captured revelations about past levee failures and near misses and entered them into the 
levee failure datasheet as appropriate as will be discussed below.  Second, it recorded 
strongly held or well elaborated opinions that came out as responses to the open-end 
questions relative to the meaning of the history of levee failure, the interaction of the 
levees and the environment, the best organizations to provide governance and governing 
of the Delta levees, and the catch-all “what else should be known about Delta levees?”  
Following the literature (Robbins and Krueger, 2000, 638; Eden, Donaldson, and Walker 
2005, 416; Venables et al. 2009, 1092; Brannstrom 2011).  I approached the data in the 
comments made in the interviews using “Grounded Theory.  Glaser & Strauss in 1967, as 
outlined by Strauss and his student Corbin, first described this qualitative approach 
(Strauss and Corbin 1990, 8).  Corbin (2009) more recently updated description of the 
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method.  With Grounded Theory, the researcher resists the temptation to start with a 
thesis, instead she approaches the available data, studies and codes it, looks across 
observations for patterns and  correlates the data collected, then uses inductive reasoning 
to develop a theory of what the empirical data, mean.  Pini, Previte and Haslam-
McKenzie (2007, 430) do not use the term Grounded Theory but describe their process of 
distilling a concourse out of 93 interviews as “…statement selection is grounded in an 
inductive design, which in this study emerged from the patterns observed as statements 
were collected; that is, during interview analysis and identification of dominant themes 
discussed by interviewees.”  I started to list the concepts important to the interviewees 
about Delta levees and continued through the thirty interview transcripts listening to the 
tapes repeatedly until the ideas began to repeat themselves or I had reached a “saturation 
point” at about 150 statements.  I did round out the concourse with one item from my 
review of the background literature mentioned earlier; ironically, the document attributed 
the statement to one of my interviewees.   
Whereas the Q-Method literature relies on the concept that the concourse contains 
a finite universe of views, opinions, and perceptions in the domain of subjectivity on any 
subject, guidelines for describing the size of an adequate concourse remain variable as 
shown in Appendix K.  Doody et al. (2009) reported generating a 750-statement 
concourse on sustainable development based on their focus group inputs, and a well-
funded study by Focht (2002) on watershed issues in the Illinois River Basin in 
Oklahoma claimed 3000 statements coming from 150 interviews.  Brannstrom (2011), 
however, reached saturation with 42 statements on Brazilian environmental governance. 
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In developing the concourse, I attempted to capture the selected statements in the 
interviewees own words, revising wording only to correct grammatical errors introduced 
under the constraints of normal conversation by having to think and talk at the same time.  
Many scholars suggest that the potential of Q-Method to remove the subjectivity of the 
researcher from the research is more limited and in many cases less desirable than once 
suggested by Q proponents (Robbins and Krueger 2000, Eden, Donaldson, and Walker 
2005, Brannstrom 2011).  Use of interviewees’ own wording or “raw verbiage” (Eden, 
Donaldson, and Walker 2005) for statements of the concourse can help focus on the 
researched rather than the researcher. 
Activity 3) Select concourse items (Q-set) that cover the entire concourse for sorting 
The next step in Q  involved reducing the 150 element concourse to a reasonable 
number of statements, the “Q-set”, that can be sorted between extremes of “Most 
Accurate” to “Most Flawed” by a subset of the key actors, the “P-set.”  As with the 
standard for the number of elements required for a good concourse, the literature does not 
provide meaningful guidance for the size of an adequate Q-set (Robbins 2005).  I ended 
up reducing the 150 items in the concourse through a process that involved typing the 
statements, including reference to the source and then coding each into areas of concern 
or “foci”.  Again relying on Grounded Theory, the development of the categories came 
from what was in the concourse, not any preconceived hypothesis of what should be 
there.  I tested each foci and then each Q-sort item against my research question,  “How 
does the history of levee failures, as understood by those involved in the Delta, determine 
perceptions and knowledge of the present conditions of the Delta levees and the role 
those levees will play in the future Delta.” 
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In the end, six foci emerged: 1) Concern for levee stability, 2) Issues of levee 
management, 3) Ideas for Delta Governance, 4) Levees and the Peripheral Canal, 5) 
Levee-environmental interactions, and 6) Levee risk and vulnerability with particular 
concern for the risk from earthquakes.  The foci helped me narrow the Concourse to a 35 
statement Q-Set with between four and eight statements covering the range in each focus.  
I originally targeted to have about five foci and 25 Q-Set items but believed that in 
several foci additional statements were needed for comprehensiveness (Eden, Donaldson, 
and Walker 2005, 417) of identifying the critical items of discourse relating to Delta 
levees.  The slightly larger number of Q-set items did not seem to increase the sorting 
activity to the point of tedium on the part of the P set or unduly increase the time required 
to complete the sorts. It also seems in line with many of the Q sets in the studies outlined 
in Appendix K.  
The final wording of the Q-set from the selected concourse items sometimes 
required simplification and shortening to remove or reduce multiple meanings in a 
statement.  I made every effort to preserve distinctive phraseology of the source 
interviewee where appropriate, and in some cases combined phrasing from similar 
concourse items to create the Q-set.  Again, I seized every effort to remove research bias 
in development of the Q-set, a requirement somewhat less important because the each 
sorter can totally accept, reject or anything in between any statement.  To assure a sense 
of balance, I included at least one concept from each of the 30 initial interviewee’s 
comments in the final Q set.  The list of Q-sets items and the instructions to sorters 
appears in Appendix D as the part of the request to the Texas A&M IRB for modification 
to include the Q-sorting exercise. 
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Activity 4) Selection of the P–set individuals 
Selection of the P-set or key actors who would agree to perform the sorts became 
the next challenge.  As with the interviewee list for the development of the concourse, I 
sought individuals from local, state, and federal agencies representing the spectrum of 
skills and interests in Delta levees, including lawyers, engineers, managers, and 
environmental scientists. I attempted to avoid inputs from public relations or public 
affairs officers.  In the end, 22 individuals prepared sorts as listed in Appendix I.  The 
strict confidentiality requirements of the process severely limit the information provided 
on each respondent.  Those with identification numbers above 130 did not participate in 
the first phase interviews.  Several were individuals whom I wanted to interview during 
the 2009 concourse development interview but who were not available for one reason or 
another, others were “targets of opportunity” that I met and who agreed to participate on 
the spot through the ongoing snowball process.  Two of those I originally hoped would 
participate could not because of conflicts with work schedules or illness during my rather 
short interview research schedule (two weeks) in the summer of 2010. 
Activity 5) Establish conditions of instruction for sort 
As shown in Appendix C, only Brown’s (1980) methods paper highlighted the 
step of establishing the conditions of instruction for the Q-sort.  I initially relied on a 
simple “Most Accurate- Least Accurate –Neutral” instruction of forced ranking into a 
normal distribution as shown in the Table 5.1.  My original instructions created problems 
for the sorters in that they had little problem differentiating the accurate and inaccurate 
statements; however, they could not differentiate further based solely on accuracy.  In 
retrospect, I developed the Q-sort list based on six foci, each of the foci could have a 
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most accurate and a least accurate statement, making narrowing to two “Top”, and two 
“Bottom” ranked statement difficult purely based on accuracy.  To permit differentiation 
cross foci, the first respondent and I agreed that a second qualifier would be required to 
help everyone sort effectively and to achieve the intent of the research.  I revised the 
instructions to require forced ranking of the 35 statements into the same distribution 
between “Most Accurate and Most Important” to “Least Accurate and Most Dangerous.”  
Whereas differentiation into the three broad classifications remained a easy step for all 
sorters, the forcing into the restricted -4, -3, +3, +4 rankings challenged most members of 
the P-Set and remained difficult.  All sorters were able to complete the sort as requested 
with one exception. 
 
 
Table 5.1 - Rankings and Distribution for Q sort 
 Least      Accurate   Neutral   Most Accurate 
Rank -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 
Number  2 3 4 5 7 5 4 3 2 
 
 
 
The one exception came where schedule constraints forced one of two individuals 
to respond by e-mail and did not complete the sort in a face-to-face interview.  The 
literature indicates that entire Q-sort exercise can be completed via e-mail (Raadgever, 
Mostert, and van de Giesen 2008); and the two individuals who could not complete the 
face-to-face Q-sort had important fisheries expertise and focus plus first-hand knowledge 
of Delta levees.  Both individuals had serious schedule conflicts and could not meet 
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directly but I thought that to get a comprehensive set of P-sorters, I needed participation 
of these two individuals.  Respondent 127 completed the sort as instructed, but the 
second, Respondent 136, did not match the perfect normal distribution desired, probably 
because he received just the original conditions of instruction and so his rankings 
weighted heavily to the two ends rather than a normal distribution.  Unfortunately, efforts 
to contact the respondent since have not been successful; however, the computer program 
PQMethod used to run the correlations will process sorts that are not quasi-normally 
distributed (Webler, Danielson, and Tuler 2009, 19).  This individual brings a difficult to 
find background, experienced in levee restorations with a fisheries interest.  I elected to 
retain the sort, in part because Stephen Brown (1980) argues that the statistical shape has 
no impact on the results in PQMethod, and in part, because the exercise needed to capture 
the viewpoint of Respondent 136. 
As the sorting went on, it became clear that the “neutral” designation in the 
middle of the distribution did not help because the researcher cannot truly balance the Q-
sort.  So the word “neutral” provides no meaning, a ranking of 0 denotes lack of saliency 
rather than agreement/disagreement, accuracy/inaccuracy.  In some cases where sorters 
questioned giving a 0 ranking to a statement or statements they agreed with or disagreed 
with, I asked them to mark where in the distribution they placed the divide between 
agreement and disagreement.  This did not happen very frequently and did not play a 
major role in the analysis but could in certain situations.  I revised the conditions of 
instruction to explain that a ranking of 0 need not be “neutral” and instead represents the 
middle of the continuum between the two ends and for some may be positive or be 
negative. 
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Brown’s (1980) emphasis on the Condition of Instruction for Q comes primarily 
from the potential of using the same concourse with different instructions to gain 
different insights into social perspectives.  Indeed, in this case, a second condition of 
instruction could have also asked how the individual thinks their boss, their Department 
Secretary, the Governor, their clients, or in the case of the independent farmer, their 
bankers would rank the statements, to give a positional perspective.  I desired to find the 
individual’s perspectives free as much as possible from positional views.  In several 
cases, the respondents would note or refer to a difference between an official view versus 
their view and I assured them the research needed their personal perspective, and would 
remain private. 
One concern that has risen in recent literature is the concern over “shamming” or 
deliberately lying by respondents or sorters to distort the results of a Q-Method study 
(Hunter In press, 10).  One can envision this being a larger threat should Q-Method 
become more prominent in helping mold public policy as suggested by several scholars 
(Bischof 2010; Barry and Proops 1999, Ellis, Barry, and Robinson 2007).  The concern 
over possible manipulation of the results of the study is a primary factor in avoiding 
public relations personnel in the interviews and Q-sorts.  Individuals with the primary 
responsibility to influence, control and manipulate public policy discourse could indeed 
pose a risk to Q-Method approaches; particularly should public communications experts 
recognize them as playing an influential role in decisions about public policy.  Hunter (In 
press, 10) suggests that preventing shamming will require “triangulation of purposive 
sampling, researcher expertise, and theoretical framework.”  He further suggests that for 
Q-Method to work properly, collaborative relationships must exist between the researcher 
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and the respondents where they share ownership of the researched issue.  With 16 of my 
22 sorters having participated in the initial concourse development interviews and the 
deep commitment, all showed to solving the problems of the Delta levees, I do not 
believe this effort got “shammed.” 
Activity 6) Conduct the Q–sorts, record results and interview sorters for additional input 
Because I had to refine my conditions of instruction after I started the Q -sort 
exercises, the discussion of Activity 6 defines much of this step.  The actual sorting 
process involved printing each Q-sort statement on a 3” by 5” paper, which I laminated.  I 
assigned a number to each statement and printed that number upside down on the bottom 
of the card to allow capture of the sort data easily from the other side of the desk from the 
sorter.  Sorting sessions were at the location picked by the sorter, generally their office, 
but several were at coffee shops and restaurants, or at their kitchen tables or outdoor 
patios.  With the exception of the two e-mailed responses, after explaining the Q-sorting 
technique I remained with the sorter during the process, encouraging and recording with 
permission comments about why they ranked certain statements.  Most sorters read the 
statements aloud and started first making piles of agree-disagree-neutral rated cards.  
Several participants required gentle encouragement to move to the next step of further 
differentiating the “Agrees” into the +4, +3, +2 rankings, with most attempting then to 
work from the outside in.  The pattern among all of the sorters proved very similar even 
though only one purported to have ever completed a similar exercise.  My respondents 
generally agonized over the exercise, spending about a half-hour getting to a completed 
sort with little variation in the time involved even though I imposed no time restrictions.  
Upon achieving the required distribution, they all took quick reviews of what they had 
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done but generally it was quick and few made any changes at that point.  Most enjoyed 
the exercise; several seemed surprised by some of the statements. 
As suggested by many from Brown (1980, 184) to Brannstrom (2011) the Q-sort activity 
also represents an opportunity to facilitate another semi-structured interview with 
contributors to the research.  The advantage to this step as Brown put it, “social scientists 
have an advantage over the more esteemed physicist by virtue of the fact that they can 
converse with the objects of observations” (1980, 184).  In my case, I was able to get 
updated with the latest developments since the previous interviews, clarify questions I 
had from those interviews, and obtain new data from individuals previously not 
interviewed.  I did not have to do a lot of follow-up questioning about justification for the 
sorts as most had followed my suggestion of thinking aloud, particularly where the 
privacy of the setting permitted.  Again, the tape recordings provided a way the 
researcher could store great data until she could process it.  As suggested by Brannstrom 
(2011), I found that Q-Method provides the qualitative researcher with the ends 
(statistical supported results) and the means (an interview environment conducive to 
asking difficult questions, particularly of elites), to conduct discourse analysis. 
 Activity 7) Run factor analysis and determine appropriate number of factors to use 
The next step involved downloading the DOS version of PQMethod on a PC and 
entering the 22 sorts into the program.  Peter Schmolck developed this freeware program 
based on a mainframe program created by John Atkinson at Kent State.  Schmolck has 
made it available on his webpage at http://www,rz.unibw-
muenchen.de/~p41bsmk/qmethod.  Fortunately, easy to follow systematic instructions are 
available for download from http://www.seri-us.org/pubs/Qprimer.pdf written by Webler, 
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Danielson, and Tuler (2009).  Once the researcher enters the data, the program 
determined in milliseconds the user’s choice of a Centroid or Principal Component factor 
analysis of the 22 sorts of 35 statements.  The Q-Method literature suggests that 
practitioners most commonly use the Principal Component Analysis (PCA), particularly 
those planning to use another algorithm like Varimax to rotate the factors. (Lopez-i-
Gelats, Tabara, and Jordi 2009; Webler, Danielson, and Tuler  2009; Ockwell 2008).  
Kent and Coker (1992, 186-202) provide a good explanation of Principal Component 
Analysis, which seeks to identify the highly correlated statement responses and reduce 
the data points in this case, from 22 to no more than eight and in most cases fewer.  This 
then permits statistical identification of clusters of subjective perspectives of the P-sorters 
from three, four, five, or even two dimensional space rather than 22 dimensional space.   
PQMethod permits factor analysis by the Centroid method as well as PCA, which 
according to Webler, Danielson, and Tuler (2009), gives the researcher the option of 
focusing on the either the commonality among sorts by using the Centroid method, or the 
specificity of sorts as allowed by use of PCA.  Centroid and PCA tend to give similar 
results in environmental studies but Webler, Danielson, and Tuler (2009) warn that it 
would not always be the case.  They also note that most researchers using the Centroid 
method then rotate the factors manually.  I elected to use PCA to run the factor analysis 
because I did not want to introduce researcher influence as implied by total manual 
rotation.  The literature, with the exception of Danielson (2008), encourages use of PCA. 
PCA finds the principal axis through the data points in the plane that generates the 
highest total eigenvalue first, and then generates orthogonal factors with decreasing 
eigenvalues until it reaches factors equal in number to the number of sorts analyzed.  
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Eigenvalues measure the amount of variance in the sorts explained by the simplifying 
factor, and the percentage of the variance explained can be determined by dividing the 
eigenvalue by the total number of sorts.  The PCA generated the eigenvalues and 
explained variance shown in Table 5.2.  The fifth factor exceeded the cutoff that 
eigenvalues must be greater than 1.00 to be simplifying.  By definition, the eigenvalue of 
an individual sort is 1.00. 
 
 
Table 5.2 – Results of PCA factor Analysis of Q Sorts 
Factor Eigenvalue Percentage Explained Cumulative 
Percentage 
1 7.39 33.60 33.60 
2 4.74 21.56 55.16 
3 1.74  7.89 63.05 
4 1.32  6.00 69.05 
5 1.12  5.11 74.16 
6 0.86  3.91 78.08 
22 0.02  0.10 100.00 
 
 
 
Determining the number of factors to use in a Q-method study becomes somewhat of a 
subjective exercise for the researcher, trying to balance simplicity of fewer factors against 
completeness implied by employing more factors, while striving for consistency and 
explanatory power of the range of subjective perspectives resident in the data.  
Statistically, inclusion of a factor with an eigenvalue lower than 1.00 makes no sense.  As 
shown in Table 5-2, that left options of 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 factor solutions, with the option of 
only one factor quickly eliminated because it would only explain a third of the 
perspectives while implying that only one discourse exists.  The next step involved 
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rotating the 2, 3, 4 and 5 factor cases in PQMethod using the Varimax algorithm, a tool 
that rotates the factors to maximize the total explained variance. 
The output of the factor rotation includes a chart showing the calculated factor loadings 
or Pearson’s correlation coefficients of each of the 22 individual Q-sorts with each of the 
factors of each of the four options (2, 3, 4 and 5 factors).  The two-factor case would 
work but it only explained 55 percent of the discourses and so I discarded it in favor of 
analysis that is more complete.  The three-factor case increased the variance explained to 
63%, with two individuals (118 and 120), one of whom had been a confounder or non-
loader on the 2-factor solution, loading or being highly correlated with the third factor.  
Because the Q-Method approach forces a normal distribution of random sorts, the 
standard error (SE) is equal to the range within about 68% of random sorts would fall and 
is defined by: 
                SE = 1/√N where N equal the number of items sorted. 
In our case, we had 35 items in the Q-sort so: 
                SE=1/√35 =0.167. 
Assuming a normal distribution with a mean of 0 (or nearly 0 in this case), correlation 
factors greater than 1.96 times the standard error, plus or minus, have a 95% probability 
of being non-random.  Conversely, those with correlation coefficients whose absolute 
value exceeds 1.96 times the SE are correlated with a probability of error of 5%  
(p<0.05).  At ±2.58 times the standard error (or ±0.4361 for this case where the number 
of items to be sorted, N, equals 35), the correlation factors have a 99% probability of 
being non-random (Brown 1980, 283).  Some individuals have high correlation 
coefficients with more than one factor in which case they are identified as “confounders.”  
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The significance of whether an individual loads on a factor comes in the next step when 
only the “defining sorts”, that is, Q sorts significantly correlated with one and only one 
factor are then used to calculate the factor scores and then idealized ranking of each 
statement in each factor.  In other words, those sorts that load on a factor help define the 
factor. 
The significance of the number of individuals loading on each factor comes 
during the development of the idealized or defining sort. Should only one Q-sorter load 
on a factor, that sort alone must define the factor. Some scholars insist that as long as at 
least one loader per factor exists, the factor can be determined (Ockwell 2008) while 
others insist that at least two loaders are required (Venables et al. 2009).  I believe that 
for 22 sorts, each factor should have at least two loaders to provide breadth to define each 
factor. Because Q-Method represents an analysis of ideas and views and not just a 
statistical exercise, a factor must be describable..  Without at least two individuals whose 
sorts highly correlate with a factor and whose responses can help define the factor, I 
could not comfortably describe social perspective using Q-Method.  My cutoff of at least 
two loaders is subjective but ultimately the number of factors that the researcher can 
describe adequately represents the limit to the number of social perspective a Q-Method 
study can identify. 
In going from a two factor to a three-factor solution, Factor 1’s loaders did not 
change, suggesting stability.  The three-factor solution does leave some explanatory 
capacity on the table because a four-factor solution increased the explained percentage 
from 63% to 69%.  When the four-factor rotation was made, again the loaders on factor 1 
remained unchanged as did factor 3 whereas the old factor 2 split into 2 and 4.  Not 
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surprisingly, factors 2 and 4 highly correlate with each other and reflect this common 
origin.  In the four factor solution, two individuals failed to automatically load on one and 
only one factor, indeed 125 had statistically significant loading on factors 2 and 3 (as it 
had with a 3 factor solution) and 127 loaded on factors 2 and 4.  
The fifth factor had an eigenvalue slightly above 1.00, so I investigated the 5-
factor solution next.  Exclusively sort 136, with a loading of 0.85, loaded the newly 
created fifth factor on.  Sort 136 had been part of factor 2 in the 4-factor solution.  Factor 
2 changed dramatically, losing 136 to the new factor, losing two members that became 
confounders (non-loaders), while adding previous non-loaders 125 and 127.  Factor 1 lost 
member 133, which became a non-loader.  Therefore, the solution seemed unstable 
compared to lower number factor solutions and it violated the desire to have at least two 
leaders per factor.  To make matters worse, sort 136 had been the nonconforming (to the 
normal distribution requirement) and I had not had the chance to do a follow-up 
interview.  All of this combined to suggest that the extra five percent explanatory power 
in a five factor solution did not justify the problems associated with it and I selected the 
four factor solution to provide the most insight into the social and knowledge 
perspectives on Delta levees of the 22 stakeholders and experts participating in the Q-
sorts.  With an eigenvalue of 15.1912 (out of 22.0), this solution could explain 69% of the 
variance in the perspectives, a number in line with similar studies (see Appendix A). 
Activity 8) Rotate factors to simplify and generate factor scores and loadings 
Having selected a four Factor solution, I then used the Varimax rotation option in 
PQMethod to maximize the total variance between factors.  Varimax rotation holds the 
advantage that researcher does not control the algorithms and reduces opportunity to 
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introduce researcher bias.  PQMethod also calculated the factor loadings or Pearson’s 
correlation coefficients of each of the 22 individual Q-sorts with each of the four factors.  
The researcher can then use PQMethod to determine “objectively” (Robbins 2005, 213) 
which Q-sorts make significant contributions to defining each factor, or “load on a 
factor.”  Completing this step left 20 of the 22 Q-sorts loading on one and only one 
factor.  Q-sorts 125 and 127 loaded heavily on Factor 2 and Factor 4, but not “cleanly” 
enough to be used to help define either factor. 
Researchers can employ a manual rotation to test hypotheses or theories.  
PQMethod will permit the researcher to rotate manually factors any time after a factor 
analysis, including after a Varimax rotation or another manual rotation.  Looking at this 
capability and two confounders in the four factor solution, I elected to experiment with 
the manual rotation function on the solution already run through a Varimax rotation to 
see if could find a nearby set of axis that would modify the factors so the two non-loaders 
would load on only one factor.  At the same time, I needed to sure that the rotations did 
not move one of the Q-sorts initial loaded on one and only one factor so much one or 
more of them became a confounder.  My only motive was to see if I could maximize the 
number of loaders to increase the robustness of the statement rankings and the final 
analysis. 
The literature reviewed was silent on the subject of manual rotation except to say 
that PQROT, a subroutine in PQMethod, will run the rotation.  PQROT allows rotation of 
two axes at a time by whole degrees.  I started to rotate the factors in the program and 
watching each individual sort changing its relative position to the slowing changing axis.  
Each run of the rotation program required a re-running of the factor loadings, complete 
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with implementation of the automatic pre-flagging routine in PQMethod to check to see 
the loadings.  As shown in Table 5.3, I performed this in true hit or miss fashion, 
sometimes having to retreat from a step taken because while trying to get 125 and 127 to 
load on a factor, 133, 106, or 134 would rotate off their factor.  It required 17 small angle 
 
 
Table 5.3 – Manual Rotation Steps Performed on Varimax Rotation 
Step Number First Factor 
Rotated 
Second Factor 
Rotated 
Angle Change in 
Degrees 
1     3     4    -2 
2 2 3 2 
3 2 4 2 
4 3 4 -2 
5 1 2 2 
6 1 3 -5 
7    2    4    -3 
8 2 3 2 
9 1 2 2 
10 2 3 3 
11 2 4 1 
12 1 2 2 
13 2 3 1 
14 2 3 1 
15 2 4 1 
16 3 4 -1 
17 2 4 -2 
18 2 4 -4 
 
 
 
rotations of 5 of the 6 pairs of axis (Axis 1 was never rotated relative to 4) to achieve the 
goal of having all 22 sorts load on one, and only one factor as determined by the 
automatic pre-flagging subroutine in PQMethod.  It took so many steps because of the 
lack of guidance or a real plan resulting in immediate reversal of many steps.  To 
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document and show the subtlety of the manual rotation involved, Appendix L includes 
PQMethod screen shots of the six pairs of principle axes is on a four-factor solution 
before and after rotation.  It should be remembered that the Varimax algorithm works to 
maximize the eigenvalues, not maximize the number of loaders on a factors or anything 
thing else.  Whereas the manual rotations changed the eigenvalues for each of the factors, 
the total explained variability remained at a rounded 69%, presumably only less than a 
half percent below the maximized configuration. PQMethod recalculated the correlation 
coefficients of each Q-sort with each rotation of paired factors, which in reality involved 
a slightly different meaning of each factor. The rotations required to achieve this were 
insignificant enough that all other Q-sorts remained loaded on the same factors, and the 
individual sorts that scored the highest correlation coefficients for each factor remained 
so, suggesting that the rotated and Varimax original factors represent only a small 
deviation of perspective.  By including all 22 Q-sorts, PQMethod developed a richer and 
statistically tighter list of distinguishing statements and key statements for the factors, 
particularly Factor 2 and Factor 4, which each added a defining loader.  The composite 
reliability of F2 increased from 0.952 to 0.960 while F4 went from 0.941 to 0.952 (F1 
and F3 were not affected).  Similarly with an additional loader, the Standard Error of 
factor scores for F2 dropped from 0.218 to 0.200 and for F4 from 0.243 to 0.941 to 0.952 
(F1 and F3 were not affected).  Similarly, with an additional loader, the rotation caused 
differences in Q-sort correlation coefficients with each of the factors. 
From an analysis standpoint, the one-on-one loading option greatly increased the 
number of statistically significant distinguishable statements for three of the four Factors.  
Standard Error of factor scores for F2 dropped from 0.218 to 0.200 and for F4 from 0.243 
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to 0.218.  The standard errors for differences involving F2 and F4 also decreased.  The 
manual rotation increased the number of distinguishing statements of F2 from seven to 
nine, from seven to eleven for F3, and from six to eight for F4.  Only F1 lost a 
distinguishing statement in the rotations, dropping one to thirteen. 
The number of statistically significant consensus statements remained at two, 
however, one changed.  Statement 30 (“The levee districts tackle the critical erosion and 
acute problems very effectively but they are not good at minor, everyday maintenance. 
Unfortunately, this inattention lets minor problems like vegetation on the levees grow 
into overwhelming problems and now they face major engineering and construction 
efforts in some many areas to get the levees back into compliance with Corps 
requirements”) drew a statistically significant lack of support across all four factors, 
reflecting a lack of support in California for the USACE headquarters initiated 
enforcement of the bare-levees (no vegetation) policy in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.  
The manual rotation did change Factor 2 enough that it no longer statistically 
shared what had been a consensus item, the view that Statement 15 (“The water users are 
going to need the Delta levees for another 30 years because it will take that long for the 
environmental, property rights, and water rights lawsuits to be settled and then actually 
build the isolated conveyance system”) was probably true.  Chapter VI will discuss this 
and the other Q-Method results. 
Activity 9) Use statistically significant factor statements to interpret, name, and describe 
the factors  
Once the factor rotation is finalized, the next step is to run the Q Analyze step in 
PQMethod which then determines the correlation coefficients on each Factor, the 
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percentage of variance explained by each factor and the list of statistically distinguishing 
statements (p < 0.05) for each Factor.  PQMethod derives these in turn from the 
calculated normalized score (z-score) for each statement on each factor and assigns a 
ranking using identical criteria to that used in the Q-sort each developed from the sorts of 
those respondents who were identified as loaders on each factor.  The program also 
develops an “ideal Q sort” that represents how an individual loading 100% on that Factor 
would rank each statement (Ockwell 2008, 274).  
I first identified and used the statistically distinguishing statements to describe the 
subjective perspective of each Factor as these represent the ideas where the perspective 
significantly deviates from the other Factors.  By carefully analyzing the words in these 
distinguishing statements, I developed narratives describing each Factor.  The comments 
and justifications made by the sorters and recorded during the exercise help support and 
enrich this effort. I then turned to highest (+4, +3) and lowest (-4, -3) ideal Q-sort 
rankings and related z-scores for each Factor, to identify the other statements most salient 
to a particular factor.  Frequently, the most salient statements show up as distinguishing 
statements, however, when two Factors share a high degree of salience on a statement, 
that particular statement does not differentiate either Factor from ALL other Factors.  It 
does remain, however, essential to defining each of the Factors as demonstrated from the 
high Q-sort rankings. 
Activity 10 – Prepare summary of factor descriptions and review with high loaders on 
each factor 
The final activity in the Q process and one that geographers seem to have played a 
role in adding (see Appendix B) comes in taking the preliminary results of the naming 
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and describing the discourses back to the participants for additional input, clarification, 
and assimilation. The literature suggests several forms of this step.  Webler, Danielson, 
and Tuler (2009) suggest mailing or e-mailing a preliminary summary of results to all 
participants with disguised participant loadings, revealing only the recipient’s scores to 
preserve confidentiality.  These scholars along with others (Robbins 2005; Persons 2010; 
Brannstrom, Jepson, and Persons 2011) mention the advantage of potential of follow-up 
meetings with some of the strongest loaders on each factor to share the same information 
and obtain feedback.   
            I elected to take the preliminary descriptions of the factors and the factor names I 
assigned to the two or three highest loaders on each factor in a follow-up interview in 
early November 2010.  All of the interviewees quickly identified the factor they were 
associated with and agreed that the description went a long way to describe their 
perspective. Several did disagree with the name I had assigned the factor they loaded on.  
The ten interviews reflected the three primary justifications for taking this follow-up step.  
First, it gave me additional direct input to this part of the dissertation, and convinced me 
to change one Factor name and to seriously consider changing another.  Second, it 
opened one more conversation to gather more information from experts, one with a 
repositioned focus from previous discussions.  I found that seeing the total scope of the 
various perceptions created an increased reflexivity on the part of my interviewees in that 
they generally seemed a little more open to the perspectives of the others than they had 
shown in previous meetings.  This provides confirmation of Brannstrom’s (2011) finding 
that Q creates ends and means in qualitative research.  It also supports those who suggest 
that Q can help open and facilitate better policy development in areas of conflicted 
173 
 
 
 
knowledge bases (Barry and Proops 1999; Eden, Donaldson, and Walker 2005; Ellis, 
Barry, and Robinson 2007; Ockwell 2008; Lopez-i-Gelats, Tabara, and Jordi 2009; 
Bischof 2010).  Perhaps the strongest indication of this came when Respondent 120 
concluded this feedback session by indicating he wanted to get me on the docket of a 
future meeting of the Delta Stewardship Council to present these findings because he 
thought that understanding the social perspectives might help the Council develop a 
better Delta Plan. 
CREATING A COMPLETE RECORD OF FAILURES OF DELTA LEVEES 
 As noted earlier, the second part of this dissertation establishes record of failures 
of Delta levees with more detail and completeness than previously attempted.  The record 
also adds a compilation near misses, successful flood fights and emergency repairs.  The 
near miss record represents a starting point to gather important information that engineers 
and managers should communicate widely to maximize learning from prior mistakes.  To 
accomplish this, I applied several methods and approaches to create the database of levee 
failures and near- misses.  Where sufficient data exist, I mapped the failure and near miss 
sites with an ARC MAP file prepared for the dissertation. 
 First, I built on the classic works of Thompson (1957, 1962, 1982, 1996, 2006, 
and 1983 with Dutra) and his student Mitchell (1993, 1994).  I employed some of the 
same approaches that Thompson employed, locating newspaper and magazine reports, 
court records, oral histories, government agency reports, court documents, reclamation 
district documents, and the like from libraries and museums in the area, always trying to 
locate previously untapped sources.  While I consulted holdings of the Bancroft Library 
at Berkeley, the State Library in Sacramento, and the Main County Libraries in Stockton 
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and Sacramento, I also spent time in county library branches in Rio Vista, Antioch, and 
Walnut Grove, and the historical museums in Walnut Grove, Rio Vista and Lodi.  I 
scanned newspapers around dates of indicated failures from Thompson, the DWR (2009) 
spreadsheet, and DRMS (URS 2009c) summary of levee failures, going forward and 
backward from any identified date until reports turned cold.  I also conducted electronic 
searches for other not previously identified times of known levees failures with little 
success.  With the exception of the 1930s when the local and regional newspapers 
seemed more interested in covering world events like the Russo-Finnish war than Delta 
levee failures, newspaper coverage proved excellent.  The 1930s also predate the period 
when state started issuing its annual flood reports (initiated in 1962), leaving it the decade 
with the least complete coverage. 
 I paid particular attention to gathering maps to help reconstruct the pre- and early 
development channels and crevasses and locate landmarks and property owners noted in 
newspaper reports to help pinpoint locations.  Living 1800 miles from the Delta did make 
accessing the local libraries and museums more difficult, particularly considering the 
California budget constraints in 2009 and 2010 triggered reduced library open hours 
when I was conducting this research.  The excellent collection of California and federal 
government documents housed at the Texas A&M library and the inter-library access to 
documents in other libraries helped offset the geographical disadvantage, as did a new 
website, the California Digital Newspaper Collection at http://cdnc.ucr.edu/cdnc/cgi-
bin/cdn.  This website served as an excellent resource for incidents before 1922 and it 
includes a great search engine to help find isolated reports. 
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 As part of the Q-Method, I also employed semi-structured interviews to capture 
knowledge of the scientists, engineers, and the maintenance personnel or the reclamation 
districts to record the experiences of those involved in the levee failures and levee 
management.  These 62 interviews with 35 key individuals provided details of failures as 
well as successful flood fights over the last 50 years.  In addition to firsthand accounts of 
levee failure and near misses, interviewees gave me access to pictures, maps, reports, and 
in one case, a 1931- vintage surveying log. 
 The maps and photographic images gathered during interviews and library visits 
added to the resources I used in pinpointing and confirming failure locations.  I used 
Google Earth to pinpoint changes over the period for which they have historic images, 
generally 1995 to 2010.  Additionally, I made visual comparisons of imagery including 
the USGS topographic maps at 1:32,800 scale from the 1906-1914 era; the USGS 7-1/2 
minute series from circa 1952 and 1978, aerial photography from 1937 for Sacramento 
and San Joaquin Counties housed at the Shields Library at UC Davis, and Atwater’s 
geological maps (1982).  Initially I performed much of the analysis and pinpointing in 
Google Earth but elected to move everything into ARCMAP, including the failure 
database as a dBase IV file.  I used the UTM-10 Geographic grid system with the 1983 
USGS datum in loading the 2008 DWR LIDAR map of the Delta, the Atwater soils 
maps, and historic maps and photographs as required into the ARCMAP file. 
 To process the records captured, I elected to store them in a database.  I established 
three main tables in the database, one for the incident reports themselves, one for 
available information on the islands and tracts, and a table on the levee segments.  To 
provide greater detail to the record, particularly on failure location, I elected to break the 
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island/tract levee description into levee segments based on three factors: 1) by the 
alignment characteristics of the levee, as discussed in Chapter III; 2) by the differences in 
ownership and management (Reclamation District); and 3) by the Project, Direct 
Agreement, and Non Project division of federal-local development responsibility.  Thus, 
one or more levee segments protect each island/tract.   
 I first elected to break the levees into segments based on the type of alignment the 
marsh reclaimers constructed the levees as described in Chapter III.  In addition to the 
five alignments as discussed in Chapter III (main river channel, tidal slough, main 
channel meander bend cut-off, tidal slough meander bend cut-off, and cross-marsh or 
property line, I elected to divide the origin type of the main river channel into two 
divisions: those that function as a flood control levees and those that perform as a levee-
dam.  After review, it was not necessary to divide the other four alignment types this way 
as all of the others now function as levee-dams in the Delta.  This allowed breaking the 
1700 kilometers of Delta levees 393 separate segments, each with a shared history as well 
as common ownership, original builder (USACE or local reclamation district), tractive 
force loadings, hydraulic loadings, boat and ship wake exposures, and the geomorphic 
origins of foundations and levee materials.  These shared factors could each contribute to 
levee stability, however, without the ability to relate failure locations to identified 
segments, researchers cannot begin to explore any relationships that might exist.  
 I determined the alignment type by comparing levee and channel locations on 
current maps and LIDAR images with Atwater’s maps (1982), and historical maps dating 
to the 1860s (Tide Lands Reclamation 1868).  I also added a seventh type, the back 
levees, always on tracts (not on islands) built to protect against overland flow from the 
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highland areas.  Builders of back levees generally used upland material and  these only 
function as flood-control levees.  Finally, I established an “Other” category, which 
primarily represents railroad embankments that sometimes double as levees.   
 The second step involved identifying the island or tract and collecting data on 
each of these.  Information gathered and made part of the database includes the best 
estimate of the first completion of the levee system; the date of abandonment (if 
appropriate); total length of levees; total area of the tract; the reclamation district number; 
the county; the water district/irrigation district; and where available, the 1990 total 
population census data.  The water code legal status of the island/tract, (specifically 
Primary Zone-Delta, Secondary Zone Delta, Suisun Marsh, and Other) is also recorded as 
are the primary activity(ies), either agriculture, wetland recreation/conservation, legacy 
communities, industrial/resource extraction, or new urbanization.  In some cases, the 
island/tract economic assignment reflects multiple activities. These data are all included 
in a datasheet and each levee segment carries an island/tract designator. 
 The designer/builder of the segment also differentiates the levee segments.  These 
categories include the 1) Project levees built by the USACE as part of the flood control 
“project”; 2) the Special Agreement levees also built by the USACE either as part of the 
Stockton or Sacramento Deep Water projects or other areas where the USACE rebuilt a 
levee; and 3) the Non-Project levees built by the local reclamation districts.  I further 
divided the Non-Project levees based on what they were built and maintained to protect - 
agriculture, legacy village, wetland recreation (duck hunting) or preservation, New 
Urban, or “height-restricted.”  “Height restricted” refers to the Non-Project levees, which 
first protect upstream assets by failing at lower water levels than those assets and creating 
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a floodway across the leveed island or tract, primarily Liberty Island, Prospect Island, 
Little Holland Tract in the formal Yolo By-Pass and McCormack-Williamson Tract, 
privately negotiated flood way along the Mokelumne.  These islands/tracts were farmed 
but as subordinated activity to flood relief. Finally, I created the class “None” for places 
in the Delta without levees like Ida Island, a non-leveed sand bar (inhabited) in the 
Sacramento River near Isleton.  It, of course, floods and sometimes shows up in flooded 
island lists.  
 All of the above-described data has been included in the levee segment database, 
along with a best guess of the current minimum design standard for the levee segment.  
This breakdown includes those designed to 200 year frequency urban flood standards; 
100 year frequency urban standard; DWR standard 192-82; the USACE California 
agricultural levee standard PL-84-99; the interim DWR Hazard Mitigation Plan standard 
that represents an interim step toward the 192-82 standard; “Sub-HMP”, where it is clear 
that the levee does not meet the minimum HMP standard; and “Unknown.”  Assignment 
into these categories is based on the lowest standard met on an island or tract and 
represents a guess until verified by qualified engineers and surveyors. 
 I created a georeferenced shapefile in ARCMAP for each levee segment and joined 
the levee segment database to the record.  I employed the LIDAR map (DWR 2006) to 
establish the proper centerline for the levees. 
 The incident (failure) database table includes all of the incident reports from the 
literature search, source document discovery, and interviews.  Each incident report for 
each island/tract gets a separate number and the report include month, day and year of the 
incident, levee segment impacted, the type of incident defined as Successful flood fight, 
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Emergency Repair, Flood, or Other.  I characterized the types of failure as: Levee 
overtopping–sheet flow; Levee overtopping-collapse; Sunny day Collapse; Excessive 
seepage or interior rainfall; Human Error; and Other.  I characterized failure cause, where 
known or theorized, into the following classes: 1) High water, 2) Rodent Damage, 3) 
Excessive Internal Erosion, 4) External Erosion, 5) Excessive seepage or rainfall and 6) 
Unknown or other.  The table also includes the source of the report, the incident number, 
and where available the estimated cost of repair and dewatering, determination of 
whether a government agency declared an official disaster and the date levee repaired.  
Users can access failure photographs when available through the database. 
 I mapped fully documented failure locations as a georeferenced shapefile and joined 
in the database record of failure of Delta levees in ARCMAP. Others (Atwood 1982; 
DWR 1984; URS 2009c) identified many failure locations, most located from eyewitness 
accounts or by locating the large scour ponds often left behind after a failure.  The 
primary contribution of this dissertation was to add to this list by cross-referencing of 
photographic images, maps and other source materials and by interviewing additional 
witnesses.  Also loaded into the GIS system were Atwater’s soil maps (Atwater 1982), 
historic crevasse and slough locations, and DWR developed LIDAR elevation map 
(DWR 2006).  
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CHAPTER VI 
SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE RECORD OF LEVEE FAILURES  
(1874-2010) 
INTRODUCTION 
As noted in Chapter V, analysis of the sorts by PQMethod yielded four factors or 
social perspectives on the meaning of the record of levee failure for the present and future 
of Delta levees. This chapter describes each of the four factors based on the statistically 
significant rankings of opinions (statements) as determined by the Principal Component 
Analysis rotated by Varimax followed by a slight manual rotation.  The five highest and 
five lowest ranked statements of each Factor were also used to describe the Factor, 
regardless of whether they were considered differentiating from the other three factors.  
The analysis also incorporates the comments of respondents who loaded high on each 
Factor to describe the Social Perspectives.  Finally, I validated the preliminary factor 
descriptions by personally reviewing the preliminary results during follow-up interviews 
with the ten individual respondents whose personal perspectives most closely matched a 
Factor. 
Two areas of consensus developed among the four factors and this chapter will 
discuss these and the areas of greatest differences between the perspectives.  These 
differences in subjective knowledge can hinder the communications if not recognized and 
addressed in any governance process for the Delta.  Raadgever, Mostert, and van de 
Giesen (2008, 1097) suggest that the first step to achieve consensus among stakeholders 
181 
 
 
 
in conflicted issues of water management requires defining and understanding the 
shareholder perspectives. 
 Appendix J provides the list of the 35 participants in the interviews, remembering 
that this research was conducted under protocols approved by the Texas A&M University 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) concerning human subjects in research and, therefore, 
the individuals are not identified by name or sex and are disguised as much as possible. 
Six of the thirty-five interviewees are women, however, the use the masculine and 
feminine pronouns in the text does not necessarily denote the sex of the individual quoted 
or referenced.  
 The four social perspectives and the mutually assigned names of the Factors are:   
Factor 1 - Delta Sustainers (F1), the social perspective that views the governance in place 
of the levee system is capable of sustaining the levee system and the agricultural base of 
the Delta long-term, particularly with continued financial support for levee maintenance 
and improvement from the non-resident beneficiaries of the current levees through the 
subventions program.  F1 sees the history of levee failures as an indication of a system 
that has performed adequately and is improving, with primary risks coming from rodents, 
high water, and erosion.  It envisions little risk from earthquakes.  The members of the P-
sort group who loaded most heavily, that is, whose view most closely matched the Delta 
Sustainers Perspective as reflected in their sorting of Q-set were primarily Delta 
farmers/reclamation board members and the engineering and legal consultants who 
support them. 
Factor 2 - Abandon the Levees (F2), the view that seismic forces and rising sea levels 
will destroy the levees and flood the Delta with seawater, converting it to a more 
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sustainable ecosystem.  This perspective holds the continued export of water to be 
political and economic necessity, thus the state must construct the Peripheral Canal.  The 
top loaders on F2 include members of the Center for Watershed Science at UC-Davis 
who advocate a similar political position, along with fisheries scientist and managers an 
engineers working for the one of the major water contractors (recipients of the exported 
water). 
Factor 3 - Levee Pragmatists (F3) view the Delta levees and the socio-ecosystem as not 
viable in the long term but sustainable for several generations, assuming those 
generations use more innovative and environmentally responsible approaches.  Loaders 
on this factor are particularly critical of the USACE policy of zero vegetation on the 
levees and the execution of the subventions program because they inhibit creativity.  The 
perspective worries that time and a lack of commitment to the levees has erode local 
knowledge long held by the reclamation districts.  The top loaders on F3 might describe 
themselves as independent thinkers and students of the Delta levees, not currently 
associated with any organization. 
Factor 4 - The Multi-Purpose Levee Advocates (F4) social perspective anticipates better 
science and knowledge will allow the managers and engineers to operate the flood 
control, water export, and ecosystem aspects of the Delta more effectively.  It perceives 
that the subventions program and habitat restoration projects have been successful.  It has 
concern over the risk of earthquake but not to the exclusion of other dangers.  All of the 
top loaders have enjoyed engineering careers most closely associated with the USACE, 
USBR, DWR or local flood agencies.  
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 Q-Method has limitations that practitioners accept.  First, Q-Method cannot 
identify the relative popularity or acceptance of a particular viewpoint or concept, nor can 
Q-Method assess the strength of support in the population of a social perspective.  It also 
cannot determine the “truth” or accuracy of social perspectives.   
DELTA SUSTAINERS (FACTOR 1) 
The Delta Sustainer factor describes a viewpoint that the Delta levees can protect 
the farmlands, villages, homes, highways, pipelines, and railroads of the Delta 
indefinitely.  Factor 1 bases this view on the observation that levee failures have declined 
since 1986, primarily because of the success the of the subvention program to invest in 
upgrading and improving the levees.  It sees that effort as being very efficient and 
effective, primarily because of the local knowledge employed in the work.  The members 
of the reclamation districts gained this knowledge by responding to the countless threats 
and occasional failures of levees over their lifetimes.  The subventions program takes 
advantage of this local knowledge by cost sharing with the local district on what has 
historically been about a 50-50 basis.  The reclamation district borrows the money first, 
completes the work, and then receives reimbursement equal to 75% of approved cost 
after a $1000/mile minimum annual expenditure.  The reclamation districts finance the 
projects themselves giving them significant incentive to perform efficiently and quickly. 
Confidence in practical local knowledge, informed by experience, allows F1 to 
justify their perspective that the reclamation districts, with technical and financial support 
from the DWR and USACE, should govern the Delta on an island-by-island basis.  This 
perspective sees the strengthening of the existing levee system as benefitting all of the 
Delta stakeholder’s interests, including the environment, recreation, and water exports.  
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The benefits justify the large state investments in levee improvements included in the 
recent successful bond issues Propositions E1 and 84. 
The Delta Sustainer perspective sees continuation of current farming practices as 
the only way to preserve the entire Delta community.  Whereas F1 acknowledges that 
farming methods caused subsidence in the past, it sees additional subsidence to be a 
minor issue because most of the volume reduction in the peat has already occurred.  This 
perspective also rejects the argument that the earthquake risk translates into a high 
probability that multiple simultaneous levee failures will occur, citing the empirical 
record and suggesting that those raising the fears have no understanding of the properties 
of the peat materials that make up the foundations of many of the levees. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Factor 1 explains 29% of the total variance in all perspectives measured and with 
nine of the twenty-two Q-sorts loading on this factor, it had the lowest standard error 
(0.164) (See Appendix G).  Individual P-sorter correlations ranged from 0.5751 to 
0.8930, with six greater than 0.80.  Of the respondents loading on F1, seven are Delta 
residents and all of them actively work to maintain Delta levees.  Six of them serve as 
engineering, legal, or environmental consultants to reclamation districts whereas the other 
three farm the Delta and serve on reclamation district boards (Appendix I). 
The Delta Sustainer factor correlates negatively with each of the other factors, 
particularly the Abandon the Levees Factor (F2) and the Multi-Purpose Levee Advocates 
Factor (F4).  The -0.3464 correlation score with F2 represents significant disagreement 
between these two perspectives.  The -0.1303 correlation with F4 also suggests more 
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conflict than agreement of views whereas the -0.0337 correlation with F3 indicates little 
correlation of views between the two. 
Distinguishing Statements 
In this section I will describe the subjective perspectives of this factor in more 
detail, relying on the statistically distinguishing statements (p < 0.05) identified in the 
correlation coefficient analysis of the Q-sorts of PQMethod.  PQMethod also calculates 
the normalized score (z-score) for each statement on each factor and assigns a ranking 
identical criteria to that used in the Q- sorting on each factor for each statement. 
As defined by the 13 distinguishing statements (p< 0.05) (See Appendix E), the Delta 
Sustainer factor holds that the existing Delta agricultural community can, and should, be 
sustained.  This requires continuing the improvements of the past 25 years in the Delta 
levees that F1 sees as having sustained the viability of farming in the Delta.  Factor 1 
identifies that the recent improvement in levee stability have resulted from proper 
application of local reclamation district (RD) knowledge and modest infusions of money 
and skill from the DWR.  F1 holds that the legislation that created the “subventions” 
program considered the DWR investments in the levees as being on behalf of the 
beneficiaries of the levees from outside of the Delta, primarily the water exporters and 
their customers.  Delta Sustainers perceive little risk of massive damage to the levees 
from seismic activity, and are suspicious that others raise these concerns only to justify 
construction of a water conveyance system going around the Delta (Peripheral Canal) that 
could eventually lead to decreased state support for the Delta levees. The Delta Sustainer 
social perspective envisions an agricultural Delta sustainable through continued diligence 
and investment in the levees, with locals playing a large role in governance of the Delta. 
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For Factor 1, Statement 1 ranked highest at +4, (z-score = +1.50) (“It is very important to 
keep the Delta community and economy whole.  With far less money than is being 
estimated, levees in the Delta can be made taller and stronger and set back enough to 
keep Delta islands afloat indefinitely.”)  This statement highlights the importance of the 
continued viability of the Delta economy, community and lifestyle. It is no surprise that 
Factor 1 ranked this statement so highly because most of the loaders literally live and 
work behind the levees; they have total invested their lives and fortunes in the levees.  
The statement reflects concern for the total community, the farmers and the larger 
population involved in agriculture support activities - warehousing, seed and chemical 
sales, trucking, banking, insurance, ands equipment sales and service.  Statement 1 notes 
the confidence in the sustainability of the Delta agricultural islands as shown by F1 
loader, Respondent 114, who stated that assuming the RDs get “a sensible source of 
revenue that we can fix these levees routinely, year-in, year-out, I think we can save the 
Delta indefinitely – forever!”  (Interview 114-2009, 0:31).  Respondent 111 emphasized 
the efficiency of the RDs:  “Whatever the solution is, the locals can do it much cheaper” 
(Interview 111  2010A, 1:38).This rationale suggests that the USACE, DWR, the DRMS 
study, and others have greatly inflated the cost estimates for the work required to upgrade 
the levees to acceptable standards.  The concept of keeping the Delta “afloat indefinitely” 
recognizes the artificiality of the Delta islands while asserting that the residents do not 
plan on a retreat from the Delta in their lifetimes. 
Related to support for Statement 1, Factor 1 stands strongly supportive of  
Statement 11 (rank = +3, z-score = +1.24) (“Since 1986, there has been a substantial 
reduction in the number of Delta levee failures, primarily because the state subventions 
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program allowed the reclamation districts to begin to improve the private levees.  During 
this time, the state has invested about $130 million while the locals have invested $250 
million, allowing Delta residents to start to feel comfortable living behind the levees.”)  
This statement reflects confidence that the subventions program has helped improve the 
record of levee safety and highlights the central role of reclamation districts in this 
improvement.  Statement 11 also asserts that the state contributes about a third of levee 
maintenance money contrasted to the implications of the state subventions program 
support of 75% of the allowable maintenance expenses.  The program will not reimburse 
the first $1000/mile of levee maintenance work each year and certain administrative 
costs.  Reimbursement comes only after the work is completed.  In the numbers quoted in 
Statement 11, DWR likely does not get credit for the legally mandated mitigation offsets 
in this tabulation of payments, as Delta Sustainers do not necessarily believe that habitat-
loss offsets improve levee safety, and it helps confirm the view that the levee districts 
invested more in the levees than the state or federal agencies.  The statement also 
supports the claim that since 1986 when the subventions program first received 
significant funding, the frequency of levee failures has declined.  Respondent 124 
(2010A) wanted to emphasize that “residents” might not be the best term because the 
subventions program purely dealt with the agricultural levees and residents might be 
construed to include dwellers behind urban levees in the Delta.  He also objected to the 
term “private levee,” noting that only levees built by reclamation districts with elected 
governing boards were eligible for subventions support.  (The correct term is “Non-
project” levees.)  
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Statement 2 directly contradicts the successes referred to in Statement 11 
(“Incremental changes are not going to create a sustainable Delta and even after a few 
hundred million dollars in improvements, we will still have levees that time and tide are 
just going to overwhelm.”)   Not surprisingly Delta Sustainers reject this statement (rank 
= -3, z-score = -1.24), convinced that the Delta can be sustainable forever with modest, 
(less than a few hundred million dollars over all) steady investment over time, not the $40 
million dollars a mile for earthquake-proofing suggested by some or the $3 to $13 billion 
required for an isolated conveyance system required for water exports should the Delta 
levees be abandoned. 
Factor 1 ranked Statement 28 highest (rank =+4, z-score = +1.74) (“The local 
reclamation districts maintaining the levees bring incredible institutional knowledge of a 
constantly evolving system.  They have people who can inspect the levees under all kinds 
of conditions and know what to look for.  They have people who know what to do in an 
emergency and they are ready to defend their homes, livelihoods, and families.”) The 
reference to “incredible institutional knowledge” suggests the individual and collective 
local knowledge not available to the experts of the state (DWR, USACE, URS, etc.) 
considered the scientific and engineering elites.  F1 believes this knowledge continues to 
evolve with new experiences.  They also recognize the weakness of the system but they 
constantly check for signs of those weaknesses becoming manifest, and the farmers and 
engineers of the RDs execute emergency response activities with skills honed in previous 
flood-fights and emergency repairs.  F1 sees survival as an effective motivator. 
 Statement 12 highlights the concern that the Delta levee problems originated 
because farming practices caused island subsidence, and continued farming of the peaty 
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soils will continue this subsidence.  The results will be increased hydrostatic pressures on 
the levees. (“As long as farming continues on peat soils in the Delta, subsidence will 
continue with a concomitant increase in pressure on the levees”).  With a ranking of -1 
(z-score = -0.69), F1 rejects the assertion of Statement 12 that farming should stop on the 
peat soils, with as Respondent 115 noted: “most of the organics that were going to 
oxidize have oxidized”.  He then continued “and most of the oxidation that is taking place 
is taking place in the middle of the island” (Respondent 115, 0:25).  Another respondent 
(124), stated that the “zone of influence” for levee stability for elevation difference 
between the water elevation and island elevation only extends about 400’ from the toe of 
the levee “and everything beyond that point makes no difference, you could create the 
biggest hole you want,” but as long as the elevation and subsidence is controlled in that 
first 400’, the levee “does not feel any more pressure” (Interview 124-2010, 1:42).  
Respondent 112 noted the same thing, indicating that the SB-34 legislation that 
authorized the subvention program and encouraged the DWR to obtain 400’ easements 
on the inside of levees to be able to control subsidence in the “Zone of Influence.”  The 
Delta Sustainers alone reject Statement 12.  Similarly, the Delta Sustainer factor rejects 
Statement 8 (“If we stop federal subsidies to grow subsidence-inducing corn, we have the 
opportunity to create the world’s best carbon sink in the Delta” Rank = -2, z score = - 
0.87).  This represents the rejection of the view that Delta farmers receive direct subsidies 
to grow corn and the claim that corn production induces significant subsidence on the 
peat lands today.  According to Respondent 132, “I’ve grown corn for years and I don’t 
remember getting any subsidies” (Interview 132 - 2010A, 0:57).  The rejection also 
challenges the idea that carbon-sequestering crops represent an “opportunity” for the 
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Delta community, particularly for those support functions that would be out of business 
without products to harvest, store, pack, or ship as you would miss with a carbon-
sequestering crop.  Delta Sustainers see the Delta as an entire community best served by 
growing real consumable crops for whatever market exists, not being a carbon-sink.  
Respondent 113 also explained that rice, a water logged crop considered less subsidence 
causing, or even subsidence reversing, does not do well in the Delta because the cool 
evening breezes coming through the strait inhibit proper pollination (Interview 113-
2010A). 
 Factor 1 is further distinguished by Statement 9 (rank = -2, z-score = -1.20 
(“Delta levees are precarious and a disaster waiting to happen.  They have to work so 
long and hard and are built of the wrong materials, on the wrong materials.  The levee 
districts are trying hard but all it takes is one overzealous beaver.  At the same time, we 
are now appreciating the earthquake risk and we are just lucky that we have not had a 
6.0 or a 6.5 close to the Delta”).  Delta Sustainers reject the notion that the levees stand 
on the verge of collapse and that they will all be flooded out sooner rather than later.  
They will acknowledge that the levees were built on less than perfect foundation 
materials and out of a heterogeneous mix of sediments but they also have worked too 
long and hard to be dismissed as “a disaster waiting to happen.”  The Delta Sustainers 
disagree with the reference in Statement 9 to earthquakes representing a critical risk to 
the Delta levees.  They acknowledge that rodent holes present a major risk to the levees 
and probably cause many failures.  Interviewee 124 summarized the F1 perspective when 
he listed the earthquake risk as a lower priority behind “static stability issues, erosion, 
rodents, vermin, and those kinds of things” (Interview 124- 2010A). 
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 Factor 1 also rejects Statement 33 (rank = -2, z-score = -0.80) because it also 
suggests that earthquakes and resulting liquefaction pose an overwhelming risk to the 
Delta levees (“A lot has been accomplished on reducing risk of normal every day, vanilla, 
levee failures but more and more we need to recognize the vulnerability to extreme events 
such as earthquake and very large floods that are not adequately recognized or 
acknowledged by some of the Delta stakeholders”).  As established with Statement 9, 
Delta Sustainers perceive work completed over the last 25 years has reduced the risk of 
“vanilla” levee failures, assuming anyone can define a “vanilla” levee failure. Factor 1 
stands alone in rejecting the overall thrust of Statement 33, because of the implication 
that earthquake risk represents anything more than a possibility.  Delta Sustainers hold 
strongly to the fact that the levee system has yet to experience earthquake related damage 
and the others introduced the risk into the discourse as incentive for Delta water export 
customers to support building the Peripheral Canal.  Loader 124, a Delta Sustainer, 
engineer, and member of the 2000 CALFED seismic study (Torres et al. 2000) team of 
experts, explained that while he acknowledged the expertise of the four seismologists 
from the team who recently tried to convince him otherwise, he still believed that  
earthquake risk to Delta levees have been greatly overstated.  He explained: “here is my 
perspective…the rubber band is being stretched very tight and we are likely to have a 
major seismic event soon here, I’m just saying the reaction will be different (than forecast 
by the seismologists)… they are basing their view off of three or four borings, I’m basing 
mine off of watching 1200 miles of levee” (Interview 124 2010, 1:14). 
Total rejection (rank = -4, z-score = -2.08) of Statement 6 also defines Factor 1 
(“We have a non-sustainable system.  Many levees in the Delta will very likely not be 
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around in 30, 50, or 70 years from now.  It just doesn’t make economic sense to pour 
more money on top of the ¼ billion dollars the state has already spent to try to maintain 
some very expensive levee systems against threats of earthquakes, sea-level rise, and 
ongoing subsidence.”)  Indeed, Statement 6 is the antithesis of the Delta Sustainer 
perspective, with its references to a non-sustainable Delta and levees that will be gone in 
30 years.  By Factor 1 accounting, it overstates the historic contribution of the DWR to 
levee maintenance by almost a factor of two ($250 million versus $130 million), whereas 
it totally ignores local investment in the levees.  F1 accepted the $130 million state 
contribution number in its support of Statement 11.  Indeed the Delta Sustainers believe 
that the state should be increasing its contribution, For example, Respondent 115 
complained, “we haven’t been truly reimbursed for the damage to our levees caused by 
the water exports and the boat wakes.  People think we have been the beneficiaries of the 
state when in reality we have been the benefactors” (Interview 115 2010A, 1:02).  They 
point to money approved by the voters in 2006  in Propositions E-1 and 84 bond issues 
that included millions for Delta levees as indication that public also rejects the argument 
in Statement 6 which is that earthquake, subsidence, and sea-level rise condemn the Delta 
levees and that society should cut its losses and stop investing in them. F1 rejection of 
sea-level rise as a major concern by is based because it will remain slower than 
subsidence rates and because they believe that the levees can keep growing taller because 
physical room exist to react and build higher.  After winning the E1 and 84 bond issues 
and convincing the voters of California of the correctness of increasing state investment 
in Delta levees, F1 finds unacceptable and unfair the reference in Statement 6 to it 
“doesn’t make economic sense… to maintain some very expensive levee systems.”  
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Delta Sustainers worry that DWR, their partners in levee maintenance since the 
1973 start of the subvention program, may be turning its back on the Delta levees as an 
expedient to meet its primary responsibility and driver of the political economy of 
California, the State Water Project.  F1 reveals this fear in their support for Statement 7 
(z-score = 0.69, rank = +1 “The goal of DWR is to let the Delta go back to salt and build 
a peripheral canal around it“).  Levees and island farmland would be virtual useless in a 
saline Delta but the DWR exports of fresh water south could continue unabated with an 
isolated water conveyance around it.  Combined with concerns expressed in Statement 6 
over cost and liability of DWR involvement in levee maintenance, particularly after the 
Paterno case put so much liability on DWR for Project (USACE) levee failures, Delta 
Sustainers reveal their fear that DWR will abandon the farmers, levees, and the Delta to 
get a more manageable water supply situation in their support for Statement 7.  
Delta Sustainers support for Statement 16, (rank = +1, z-score = +0.53) (“DRMS 
was a DWR conspiracy to justify the Peripheral Canal”) continues to reveal this 
uneasiness with DWR, if not resentment, and fears that the water needs of 24 million 
Southern Californians will outweigh the needs of the fewer Delta residents and concern 
that state interest and financial support for the existing levees stems only from the role 
the levees currently play in water conveyance.  Much of the discussion during 
Respondent 115’s  sort revolved around the official (Delta Vision) position that a “dual 
conveyance” system would be constructed, one that included a dedicated canal or tunnel 
and a “thru-Delta conveyance,” a reinforcement of the non-project Delta levees that 
currently convey water from the Sacramento River to the export pumps. He expressed 
concern that the state planners had already settled on a “full sized” (one with design 
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capacity large enough to match the combined capacity of the SWP and CVP system) 
dedicated conveyance facility.  He believes that with such a peripheral canal (or twin 
tunnels), no need exists for through Delta levees from a water supply standpoint.  He 
believes this would allow the state to renege that part of the project and it would erode 
support for the subventions program.  A less than full sized system would still depend on 
the existing levees to help convey peak export volumes south.  Some Peripheral Canal 
proponents have proposed this option as a concession to the Delta interests. 
Other discourses have used Delta Risk Management Study or DRMS, presented in 
Chapter IV, to refute the views of the Delta Sustainers on earthquake risk, subsidence, the 
stability of Delta levees in general, and as a conclusion, the need for an isolated 
conveyance system.  Factor 1 alone showed agreement with Statement 16.  Respondent 
124 agreed in his response to Statement 16, “I do not think it was a conspiracy… but it 
was a flawed process intended to support the canal…  I think it may backfire on them” 
(Interview 124-2010A, 1:52). 
Delta Sustainers ranked Statement 34 (“In seismic events, Delta soils become very 
pliable allowing the levees to roll through without cracking, subsidence, or settlement.  
The soils are so heterogeneous that they do not behave as poorly as some models project 
they would”) high (rank =+3, z-score =+0.89), further indication that Factor 1 sees the 
earthquake risk as vastly overstated. Statement 34 describes a flexible, “living” levee 
taking the earthquake punch and which cannot be modeled using generalizations of 
critical soil properties in existing engineering models.  Respondent 121, during the 
sorting activity, related a story from 1990 when she was involved in building a levee toe 
berm on the north levee of Holland Tract near the site of the 1980 levee failure.  As the 
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trucks were rolling in with the levee fill material, the levee was just shaking as in an 
earthquake.  She found herself stumbling against her pickup truck, the loss of balance 
very similar to an earthquake experience from her youth.  She suggested that a MIT 
professor had a theory that peat levees did better than expected because the peat got 
stronger as it compressed and that the peat could take considerable flexing without 
breaking or cracking (Interview 2010A, 0:14).  From the Delta Sustainer perspective, the 
verbal descriptions like that of Interviewee 121 feel more comfortable than computer 
printouts of model runs because Delta levee building and maintenance has long been 
more art than science to Factor 1 loaders. 
Finally, only Factor 1 agreed (rank = +2, z-score = +0.89) with Statement 27, 
(“The best governance structure for the Delta would be to let the levee districts tackle the 
issues island-by-island with some funding and guidance from DWR”) while all other 
factors strongly rejected this statement.  This score reflects the confidence of Delta 
Sustainers have in the local knowledge of the reclamation districts and their engineers.  It 
also reveals concern for top down governance structures that would likely favor needs of 
the millions of water users at the expense of the few Delta farmers.  In addition, it 
recognizes the love – hate, hope–fear relationship the Delta Sustainers feel for the DWR.  
F1 holds out hope for continued funding from the levee subventions program, for support 
of the levees section of DWR in flood-flights, for help in repairing future levee failures, 
and perhaps more help de-watering after a break, if it is in the larger interest of the state, 
like keeping Highways 4, 12, or 160 open. This balances against the fear that DWR will 
abandoned the levees because of the pain of the Paterno lawsuit and the potential future 
liabilities the court rule dealt the state. 
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Other Key Statements 
Whereas the statements identified by PQMethod as statistically distinguishing 
define the unique social perspectives of Factor 1 relative to the other three factors, the 
idealized statement rankings also help characterize the social perspectives.  Statistically 
distinguishing statements at the p > 0.05 level as used in this analysis help differentiate 
among all perspectives, that is, the statement ranking identifies a sort as being part of one 
and only one Factor with 95% certainty.  Statements very salient to more than one Factor, 
however, are not statistically distinguishing to either Factor; they do not help isolate the 
Factor from all others.  However, statements with the greatest saliency (ranks -4, -3, +3, 
and +4) do help define the entire social perspective and so these will be describe under 
the “Other Key Statement” subsection for each Factor.  I have noted these with a 
designation “N.S.” to identify that while important to defining the Factor, it shares this 
view with at least on other Factor. 
For the Delta Sustainers, most salient of these statements is Statement 18 (rank = -
4, z-score =-1.817 –N.S.) (“From a water supply perspective, the only reliable, 
sustainable, earthquake proof way to get water around the Delta is the Peripheral 
Canal.”)  Delta Sustainers ranked this so low because it, like Statements 9 and 33, 
suggests that the threat of earthquake damage to the levee should be the major concern 
while arguing that the Peripheral Canal represents an economical, lower risk alternative.  
Respondent 124 (124-2010) suggested that the isolated conveyance proposals do not go 
around the Delta they go through “the same seismic risk zone that they reported on, it 
[the peripheral canal] has nothing to do with it [reducing earthquake risk]”(Interview 
124-2010A, 1:49).  He then admitted that the most efficient way to move water around 
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was a canal or pipeline but dismissed the canal because of the seepage predicted on an 
unlined canal and the cost that he estimated at $75 billion for the tunnels.  He then 
suggested that what appears to be the Factor 1 perspective that the investments in existing 
levees makes more sense than a new isolated conveyance system.  He also suggested that 
the increased cost of the isolated conveyance facilities tacked on the cost of water to end 
users would push water retailers to desalination of brackish ground water and re-use of 
treated wastewater.  Respondent 111 backed up these comments, noting, “We have been 
moving water through the Delta for 60 years now without a hiccup” (Interview 111-2010, 
2:17). 
Not surprisingly, given the ranking of Statement 34, Factor 1 also ranked 
Statement 35 at -3, (z-score = -1.52 –N.S.) (“Earthquakes represent the main risk to the 
water supply for 23 million Californians because of the likelihood of multiple levee 
failures during a significant earthquake, potentially causing severe disruptions to water 
supply drawn from the Delta for years”). In rejecting Statement 35, F1 repeats the 
message that multiple failures of Delta levees triggered by a major regional earthquake 
failures does not represent a main risk to water supply of California.  Respondent 124 
again noted, “I deal directly with the scientists [raising the concern] and they have a 
tremendous background with the seismology and seismic activity. Unfortunately, it is 
with  the consequences that they do not have experience… they claim they have 
experience but they run them [a particular levee section] through a few models and run a 
stability analysis but five feet away from that section I can get another section or run a 
different model that disproves their findings” (Interview 124-2010A, 2:04).  
198 
 
 
 
Delta Sustainers give the levee subventions program high grades in ranking 
Statement 26 (rank = +3, z-score = +1.29 – N.S.) (“The DWR subventions program was a 
model of efficiency; the DWR staff was lean, and the local levee districts, because they 
had their money out there, managed projects very effectively”).  This statement reflects 
the same positive feelings for the DWR involvement in the subventions program 
established in Statement 11 but in the past tense.  The state budget freeze experienced in 
2009 saw promised reimbursements held up for almost a year, financially strapping the 
reclamation districts who largely borrowed the money and got stuck with large debt 
service and strained credit ratings (Interviews 115-2010, 124-2010).  The statement also 
reflects the concern that DWR had added significantly to the number of staff members in 
the levee program without increasing the amount of funding for the subventions and work 
on special levee projects.   Respondent 114 explained: “they have $14 million overhead 
whether they deliver $3 million or $30 million.”  Clearly, Factor 1 supports the 
intentional use of past tense in talking about the leanness of DWR staffing. 
In the same vein, Factor 1 rejected Statement 25 (rank = -3, z-score = -1.30 – 
N.S.) (“The current system of local levee districts performing much of the routine 
maintenance is dysfunctional, disjointed, and inconsistent.  They have a deep distrust of 
DWR and it is disturbing how poorly they work together”).  Delta Sustainers have great 
confidence in the ability of the levees districts to perform routine maintenance and more 
as demonstrated by their strong rejection of Statement 25.  Respondent 124 (Interview 
2010A, 1:59) summarized the rejection by F1 in his remark about DWR, “We work 
together very well with them, if you sat in a meeting with us and you heard the two of us 
talk you could come away thinking we hate each other but…we are passionate people in 
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our business and when we have a disagreement we let it be known and we are 
comfortable together doing that.  But we highly trust DWR.” 
Statement 15 (“The water users are going to need the Delta levees for another 30 
years because it will take that long for the environmental, property rights, and water 
rights lawsuits to be settled and then actually build the isolated conveyance system,”) 
(rank = +3, z-score =+0.98 – N.S.) provides the final key piece of the Factor 1 social 
perspective, noting the complicated permitting process that the Peripheral Canal, or other 
isolated conveyance system, would be required to navigate.  It also highlights the Delta 
Sustainers view that the Delta residents hold senior water rights and property rights that 
must be acquired before major changes can be made in the Delta levees (Interview 115 
2010A).  The struggles have already begun with recent threats of violence (Interview 
135-2010) and legal actions against surveyors working on a route for a Peripheral Canal.  
The Delta Sustainers foresee a long struggle over the twin-tunnel or peripheral canal in 
the courts on environmental as well as water and property rights issues. 
Iteration Phase 
 Three of the six top loaders on Factor 1 were interviewed as part of Step 10 of the 
Q method, the iteration phase, in November 2010 (see Exhibit H for the material 
presented to each of them).  I requested each of them provide feedback, first to confirm 
which factor best described their personal perspective and then to comment on the name 
assigned to their factor.   The six top loaders on Factor 1 all had correlation factors above 
0.8185 on the factors so I selected the most correlated farmer, the highest scoring 
consulting engineer,  and  a second engineer with whom I also wanted to do follow-up 
questioning on some of the historic failures.  Fortunately, with such high factors, all three 
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quickly identified that Factor 1 represented their personal perspective most closely.  The 
name I originally assigned F1, “Levee Preservationist” did not fare as well. 
Starting with Respondent 111, “Levee Preservationist” drew criticism.  First, he 
believed that the factor focused not on the levees but the Delta itself, that his perspective 
revolved around the holistic Delta, the levees, the channels, the farms, the habitat, the 
infrastructure, and the communities.  Respondent 111 also struggled with the word 
Preservationist, first suggesting that his perspective really should possess the title 
“Pragmatists”, the Factor 3 sounded more like “Critics “and “Defeatists” rather than 
“Pragmatists”.  He went on to muse, “Around here ‘preservationist’ has a rather negative 
connotation” (Interview 111-2010B).  After some thought he suggested “Sustainers” as 
reflecting, the more positive approach of the perspective. 
 Respondent 124 also expressed concern for the use of the word “Preservationist” 
because of the confusion generated over what would be preserved, the pristine pre-
settlement Delta or the Delta as reclaimed by the settlers in response to the 1850 
Arkansas Act.  He believed he could accept the idea of preserving the reclaimed Delta but 
was nervous about the connotations of the word.  Given the opposition, I elected to 
change the name to Delta Sustainers. 
Respondent 111 also highlighted his frustration over the focus on the catastrophic 
events that would take place in the Delta in the event of a huge earthquake, suggesting 
that the relative vulnerability of Delta levees to the same event is much lower than of 
other infrastructure such as the Bay Bridge, the water pipelines serving the East Bay, and 
even the other elements of the SWP and CVP water delivery systems.  He also suggested 
that the levee subventions program had provided financial and emotional support to the 
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reclamation districts.  Respondent 111 claimed that in the subventions program, 
California recognized the importance of the Delta levees and role of reclamation districts 
in sustaining the system.  He felt that this program had increased the self-confidence and 
self-worth of the reclamation districts and made them better, more committed levee 
“sustainers.”  He also acknowledged as a real concern, the fear expressed by Factor 3 that 
the RDs were at risk of losing the institutional knowledge of individual farmers.  He 
indicated that the trustees were increasingly dependent on the engineering consultants, 
who in turn were a rather small, relatively “experienced” group that is also aging. 
Respondent 115 went so far as to go through all of the summary statements, 
providing additional support for all of the Factor 1 statements and providing arguments 
against the summary perspectives of the other three factors, with a couple of exceptions.  
He too reluctantly agreed with the Factor 3 perspective that the RD’s local knowledge is 
inconsistent and eroding, stating “There are some islands that have people that are less 
into it than others, there are some islands whose power-trust, if you will, holds 
knowledge tightly and won’t transfer it on to the next generation.  We have trustees that 
are eighty years old and don’t have the energy to do it anymore but they don’t want to 
transfer it to anyone else” (Interview 115-2010B).  This represents one example noticed 
during the Q-Method follow-up step, of individuals reflecting on and recognizing the 
social perspectives of others as meaningful.  Raadgever, Mostert, and van de Giesen 
(2008, 1105) tout the ability to “promote reflection by the stakeholders and increase 
awareness of similarities and differences in each other’s perspectives” as a prime 
advantage of the Q-method to help resolve conflicting technical knowledge and/or values 
and interest in water resource management conflicts. 
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Respondent 115 further agreed with Factor 4 and questioned the degree of risk of 
earthquakes to Delta levees, stating that certain individuals were quoting parts of the 
DRMS study out of context and using it for political purposes.  He also made an 
interesting comment on the Factor summary sheet notation of a lack of enthusiasm by 
Multi-Purpose Levee Advocates for the isolated conveyance system, stating that while he 
opposed an isolated conveyance system, he could not publicly do so because of his role in 
an organization, he was contractually committed to not publicly oppose the Peripheral 
Canal.  In return, the contract signed in 1981, apparently requires DWR to operate any 
isolated conveyance system in a manner that will not impact the quantity and quality of 
water available to the members of North Delta Water Authority .  The North Delta Water 
Authority includes the leveed islands and tracts in the northern part of the Delta all of 
which currently drawing water directly from the Sacramento and Mokelumne Rivers and 
related channels. 
The follow-up interviews of the Factor 1 loaders confirmed the findings on the 
general perspectives but suggested the need to rename the perspective to Delta Sustainers 
from Levee Preservationist, given their intent to sustain the whole Delta not just the 
levees and concern over which vintage Delta would be preserved.  
ABANDON THE LEVEES (FACTOR 2) 
 For the Abandon the Levees factor, Delta levees are structures that cannot be 
sustained much longer, particularly in the face of sea-level rise, the threat of mass levee 
liquefaction and collapse under imminent seismic forces, and continued subsidence of the 
land behind them, driven by unnecessary farming activities in the Delta.  F2 believes that 
it is highly probable that seismic-driven multiple levee failures will disrupt water 
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deliveries to 25 million Californians for many years.  The Abandon the Levees factor 
believes that no one can afford re-building the existing levees to earthquake-proof 
standards because of excessive costs and perceives that California should move as 
quickly as possible to let time and tide overwhelm the levees and let a “New Delta” 
emerge, as an open, mostly salt water bay.  To continue vital water exports, DWR must 
construct immediately the long delayed Peripheral Canal or other isolated water 
conveyance around or under the Delta so continued vital water deliveries via the CVP 
and SWP can continue.  With additional research on the ecosystem, DWR can operate the 
isolated conveyance system in a manner to maximize volumes and quality of water 
exports at the same time as it maximizes salinity variability in the bay to help restore 
estuarine species, particularly the smelt and striped bass.  The Abandon the Levees factor 
believes California should discontinue making major investments in the doomed existing 
Delta levees and carefully plan an immediate withdrawal from most land-based human 
activities in the Delta. 
 Moreover, the Abandon the Levees factor does not support dredging activities that 
might harm the environment while only delaying slightly the inevitable abandonment of 
the levees.  F2 believes that some of the environmental restoration projects, particularly 
those in Liberty Tract and Prospect Island may keep the native estuarine fish species alive 
until the levees are abandoned and a brackish environment established across the Delta.  
F2, unlike the  three other factors, takes the view that it may not take 30 years for an 
isolated conveyance system to be fought over, permitted, and built, thus, eliminating the 
need to maintain the Delta levees for export water conveyance sooner rather than later.  
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The Abandon the Levees factor believes that the natural forces dooming the levees likely 
will force faster action. 
Descriptive Statistics  
 The Abandon the Levees Factor shows the second largest explanatory power with 
17% of the total variance explained with a standard error of factor scores of 0.200 
(Appendix G).  Six of the 22 respondents loaded on this factor, second in numbers only to 
F1.  The individual correlations ranged from 0.5546 to 0.8339.  As identified in Appendix 
I, the six loaders on F2 represent several interests, including a water supply 
engineer/manager, two government biologists concerned with recovery of threatened fish 
species and runs in the Delta, two of the six DWR engineer/managers who participated in 
the Q-sort, and one academic consultant to NGOs working on policy issues in the Delta.  
None of the loaders lives in the legal Delta, but all are long time northern California 
residents. 
 Factor 2 correlates strongly with Factor 4 with a score of 0.6137 and suggests 
considerable overlap of perspectives between the two factors.  As noted above, F2 
correlates very negatively with F1 at -0.3464 and indicates a wide divergence of views 
and knowledge between these factors.   
Distinguishing Statements 
 PQMethod identifies nine statements that statistically distinguish the Abandon the 
Levees factor (p < 0.05); led by Statement 6 (“We have a non-sustainable system.  Many 
levees in the Delta will very likely not be around in 30, 50, or 70 years from now.  It just 
doesn’t make economic sense to pour more money on top of the ¼ billion dollars the state 
has already spent to try to maintain some very expensive levee systems against threats of 
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earthquakes, sea-level rise, and ongoing subsidence”).  Factor 2 ranks this statement at 
+3 and with a normalized score of +1.41 and establishes the F2 perception that the levees 
of the Delta will be destroyed by earthquakes, sea-level rise, and/or increasing subsidence 
on the island side because of farming.  Respondent 125 expressed his pessimism about 
the ability to save many of the existing levees in the short term, stating “we have almost 
lost them already and the storms just keep getting worse, with sea-level rise, no money in 
the state to repair the levees, you know the way to bet is that Patwin Bay is going to be 
there someday, if not in my lifetime, then in the lifetime of the next generation” 
(Interview 125-2009, 0:04).  For Respondent 125, “Patwin Bay” is the pet name for the 
salt-water bay that would replace the Delta, a reference to the Patwin Indians who once 
occupied the Delta. Respondents 125 and 129 expected a nearly complete collapse of 
most the levees because of earthquake, sea-level rise, and/or subsidence within the 30-70 
year timeframe while Respondent 117 expected an unidentified number of 
“unsustainable” levees to fail and remain un-reclaimed.  Statement 6 came directly from 
Respondent 117 who confirmed (Interview 117-2009) that state had invested the $250 
million in total subventions and special projects since the programs began in1974, a 
number almost double that noted in Statement 11 that F1 accepted.  The difference 
appears that F1 only counts the subventions money that runs through the reclamation 
districts and does not credit the special projects money managed directly by DWR, which 
has mostly gone to Sherman and Twitchell, largely owned by the state, or for remediation 
projects. 
 Factor 2 supports this claim with strong ranking (rank = +4, z-score = +1.63) of 
Statement 13  (“It is not affordable or justified at an estimated cost of $40,000,000/mile 
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to build new earthquake resistant Delta levees when you look at the miles of levees that 
would require upgrading”.)  This represents the second highest z-score of all statements 
on all factors in the exercise.  The Abandon the Levees factor strongly asserts that 
earthquake risk runs high on the Delta levees, however, they are not worth the $40 
million per mile some have estimated to make them secure against earthquake-induced 
liquefaction.  This leaves the total cost of securing the water supply and the Delta 
communities around $44 billion, far more than the estimated $3 billion to $13 billion to 
build an isolated conveyance system.  Additionally, Respondent 129 believes that the 
isolated conveyance system will provide the tool to manage the New Delta for exports 
and the environment, while farming in the Delta and the containing levees limit the 
options to do so. 
 Factor 2 agrees with the perception of a highly probable massive, multi-island 
earthquake caused levee failures as revealed in Statement 35 (rank = +3, z-score = +1.10) 
(“Earthquakes represent the main risk to the water supply for 23 million Californians 
because of the likelihood of multiple levee failures during a significant earthquake, 
potentially causing severe disruptions to water supply drawn from the Delta for years”).  
Engineering Ph.D. holder, Respondent 129, explained the F2 view in technical terms, 
stating that when he talks to other experts, “they basically all say that these levees are 
junk, and in an earthquake they are junk, and this is California.  Aside from the engineers 
who make a living keeping these things up, the general consensus is that most of these 
levees are just temporary” (Interview 129-2009, 0:08).  Respondent 129 later referred to 
the DRMS study and Suddeth, Mount and  Lund (2008) for explanation of F2 concern 
over multi-island levee failures in an earthquake and the problems of multiple levee 
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repairs and flushing the salt out after multiple failures.  Statement 35 also indicated that 
25 million Californians depend on the Delta for all or some of their water and a number 
confirmed in the assertion by Respondent 117 that the SWP-supplied MWD alone has 22 
million residential customers. 
 F2 is the only Factor that supports the assertion in Statement  18 (“from a water 
supply perspective, the only reliable, sustainable, earthquake proof way to get water 
around the Delta is the Peripheral Canal”), with a ranking of +1 and a z-score of 0.79.  
This support confirms that F2 holds that the cross-state water supply can be sustainable 
only if the state finishes the original SWP and builds an isolated conveyance system 
across the Delta because the Delta will soon be a salt water bay.  The isolated conveyance 
system would increase reliability because it would free the SWP and CVP from the 
current restrictions of the biological opinions.  Respondent 117 noted that the only risk to 
water supply greater than earthquake is ecological collapse (Interview 117-2010A).  
Respondent 129, the highest loader on F2, argues that the Peripheral Canal would give 
the managers of the “new Delta” the tools to manipulate the Delta for the fish rather than 
water supply concerns.  Respondent 125 explains that it would allow water export 
managers to vary the salinity through the year without losing quality water for export at 
the SWP and CVP pumps.  It would also end flow reversals in some channels that 
confuse already endangered salmon trying to find their spawning gravels up the San 
Joaquin using chemical signals in the stream when no San Joaquin River water gets as far 
downstream as Stockton.  He tempers his enthusiasm because on the Sacramento River, 
“where the winter run and spring run that rarely show up at the export facilities will now 
have to transit the world’s largest water project with bigger fish screens than have ever 
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been built… and there are issues that we just don’t understand…  So I’m a reluctant fan 
of the Peripheral Canal” (Interview 125-2009, 0:35).  Allowing salinity in the Delta to 
fluctuate would more closely simulate natural conditions of seasonal salinity variability, 
viewed as a help to certain endangered species while making life more difficult for 
invasive species in the Delta.  It is not clear whether F2 includes Delta farmers in the list 
of invasive species.  Finally, the arguments of Statement 13 rule out the possibility, for 
Factor 2, that engineers can render the existing levees earthquake-proof in any 
economically viable way.  These perceptions alone are sufficient to lead Factor 2 to  
support the absolute need for the Peripheral Canal. 
 Mild support for Statement 5 (“DWR has a clear legislature-mandated 
responsibility to maintain the status quo in the Delta, but DWR is really working to 
preserve the current conditions in the Delta until it is clear what to do to have a healthy 
Delta ecosystem”) distinguishes Factor 2 with a ranking of +1 and a z-score of +0.42.  By 
contrast, Factors 1 and 3 had negative rankings and z-scores, and Factor 4 had a high 
ranking of +3 (z-score = +1.37.)  This statement holds much more meaning than is 
initially apparent.  The first phrase refers to the wording in the water code that requires 
DWR and other agencies to work to preserve the “unique” agricultural and cultural 
aspects of the Delta, granting special status to the islands and waterways of the Delta 
(Robie 1975, 21).  The CALFED charter, Delta Vision and the Delta Stewardship 
Council have all affirmed this status for the Delta. Respondent 129 dismissed the 
concerns over the salt water intrusion that the Delta will experience following the  
inevitable loss of the Delta levees: “Now that would harm the Delta farmers but a lot of 
them will be gone, the seismic will put them underwater and that problem will solve 
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itself”  (Interview 129-2009, 0:16).  “That problem” refers to Delta farmers losing levee 
side access to fresh water for irrigation. He further elaborates the F2 perspective that the 
“pretty low value agriculture” on the Delta islands should not be preserved and, therefore, 
the Abandon the Levees perspective becomes slightly positive toward Statement 5, 
reflecting that the second part of the statement suggests that DWR recognizes that 
ultimately the status quo cannot be preserved without destroying the ecosystem and the 
water supply system. Factor 2 supports the search by DWR for solutions to restore the 
Delta to a sustainable ecosystem, to gain, in the words of Respondent 129, a “more 
mechanistic understanding of the eco-system” so that people learn to manage the “New 
Delta” (Interview 129-2009).  Inherent weakness of the levees doom efforts to retain the 
Delta communities and agricultural lifestyle and  salt-water recreation represents the best 
economic future for the Delta. 
 Factor 2’s support of the efforts of DWR to gain greater understanding of the Delta 
ecosystem shows in the statistically significant rejection (rank = -2, z-score = -1.04) of 
Statement 22 (“Delta habitat restoration projects have been a big joke and a waste of 
taxpayer’s money.  Planting trees and shrubs on the levees in conflict with new Corps 
guidelines, and within five years it has become just a big weed pile”).  Many of these 
projects, like the Twitchell Island wetlands project, represent experiments in ecological 
restoration. Whereas the results may appear to be weed piles to critical observers, Factor 
2 appreciates the effort and also applauds any increase in the habitat for endangered 
species that may be achieved as noted by Respondent 125, “Habitat restoration is a good 
thing because we know the values they bring” (Interview 125-2009, 0:39).  Factor 2, 
however, sees that the final solution of abandoning levees will wipe out some of current 
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restoration projects.  Respondent 117 highlighted the Decker Island wetland restoration 
project as an exception.  The Decker Island restoration involved removing spoil the 
USACE dumped on the point bar Horseshoe Bend they cutoff as they straightened the 
river at Sherman Island in 1913.  The restoration involved removing the spoil to return 
the surface elevation to water levee and allow it to function as a marsh. It, therefore, does 
not depend on doomed levees to survive which pleased Respondent 117.  
 F2 takes a distinguishingly neutral (rank =0, z-score = 0.36) view of Statement 15 
(“The water users are going to need the Delta levees for another 30 years because it will 
take that long for the environmental, property rights and water rights lawsuits to be 
settled and then actually build the isolated conveyance system”).  The other factors 
accept the view that under normal circumstances the permitting and construction of the 
isolated conveyance system, including resolving litigation, will be a long and drawn out 
process.  Respondent 125 summed up the Abandon the Levees factor perception 
underlying its lack of salience for this topic “when we lose them (the levees), there will 
be a lot of political pressure to build as big a ditch as possible as quickly as possible” 
(Interview 125-2009, 0:05).  When Respondent 129 talks about the earthquakes that will 
make the status quo fail to the “New Delta,” it is in terms of days and weeks, a maybe a 
year, not decades or centuries, reflective of the perception Factor 2 holds that that 
collapse of the existing system could be imminent, which would trigger a rapid change in 
the political attitudes entirely in favor of an expedited development of the isolated 
conveyance. This perception fuels Factor 2’s rejection (rank = -2, z-score = -1.04) of 
Statement 23 (“Restrictions on dredging and use of dredged materials, particularly in the 
north Delta need to be eliminated, because they have no real scientific justification”).  
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Factor 2 sees any investment in or taking any risk to rebuild the non-sustainable, doomed 
existing levees as unacceptable. 
 The statistically significant ranking (rank = -3, z-score = -1.36) of Statement 1 
summarizes the strong opposition of Abandon the Levees factor perspective to that of the 
Delta Sustainers: (“It is very important to keep the Delta community and economy whole.  
With far less money than is being estimated, levees in the Delta can be made taller and 
stronger and set back enough to keep Delta islands afloat indefinitely”).  Respondent 129 
applauded the work by Logan (1989, 1990) that raised the issue of how few Delta islands 
could be economically resuscitated after levee failure and Suddeth, Mount and Lund’s 
recent work (2010) that concludes that it makes no economic sense to even improve the 
existing levees, no matter how strong or weak they were (Interview 129-2009).  To the 
Abandon the Levees factor, no amount of money and effort can protect some of the 
existing levees, even near and intermediate term.  This will convert many of the existing 
agricultural islands into open water fringed with marsh, greatly decreasing the 
agricultural production of the Delta and suggesting reduced economic viability for 
agricultural service functions.  F2 believes that the legacy communities, like Isleton and 
Locke, can be preserved as securely diked enclaves but their economic viability will 
depend less on agriculture and more on tourism. 
Other Key Statements 
 Several statements ranked -4, -3, +3, or +4 did not make the statistically 
distinguishing list generated by PQMethod, but are critical in fully defining Factor 2 as a 
social perspective.  Four of these statements carry similar scores and ranking with F4, the 
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factor highly correlated with the Abandon the Levees factor, and one with Factor 3, 
which explains why they are salient but do not differentiate F2 from all other Factors. 
  Statement 19 (“Nothing could be worse for fish than what we currently have in 
Delta today: rock-lined levees that are serving as water supply channels that are held at 
as constant flow condition as possible.  It is exactly what an estuary should not be”) 
ranks a +3 for F2 and F3, scoring normalized scores of +1.460 and +1.410 (N.S.), 
respectively.  This suggests total agreement; however, comments made during sorting 
suggest that the two factors differ significantly in emphasis.  Respondent 125 noted that 
“that statement is right, we have done as bad as we can for them (the estuarine fish) and 
the loss of the levees and the use of them as a water supply conduit could only be good 
for them (the smelt)… they are used to a fluctuating salinity environment, that’s what 
gives them their ecological edge, so the loss of the levees... would provide more water to 
dilute pollutants, it would in many ways solve the problems those fish face” (Interview 
125-2009, 0:11).  Respondent 129 noted that the fish in trouble are the ones that move in 
and out of high salinity zones and that by controlling the salinity in much of the Delta to 
maximize water deliveries with the current configuration, we have limited the habitat of 
the smelt, striped bass, and longfin. (Interview 129-2009, 0:14). The Abandon the Levees 
factor strongly suggests that the Delta is part of the San Francisco Bay estuary, implying 
a gradient of salinity.  Further, this salinity gradient naturally fluctuates seasonally 
because of the Mediterranean climate of the most of the watershed.  This perspective 
emphasizes the native fish, particularly the smelt species that prosper in an estuary with a 
fluctuating salinity, whereas the invasive species (black bass, pike, etc.) threatening the 
natives benefit from constant fresh water flows in open channels. The Abandon the 
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Levees factors responded to Statement 19 focused primarily on the threatened native fish 
and the constant fresh water flow maintained with the current export pumping schemes in 
place in the Delta.   
 The reference in Statement 19 to the Delta as an estuary made the respondents 
indicate their perspective on whether the Delta functions as a riverine delta or as a salty 
estuary.  This has become an important point of contention in the discourse surrounding 
the future of the Delta, with support of Statement 19 indicating Factor 2’s perspective 
that the Delta was an estuary with salinity fluctuating temporally and spatially, not a 
bayhead delta feeding an estuary with fresh water.  F2 always highlights estuarine fish 
and the need to manage the Delta as an estuary.  Statement 19 originated with 
Interviewee 125, an F2 loader (Interview 125-2009). 
 Following on the habitat theme, F2 and the Multiple Purpose Levees Advocates 
(F4) rejected Statement 20 (“Every ounce of habitat out in the Delta, right now, is either 
behind the levees or between the levees. Once the levees are gone, the habitat is all 
gone”) with rankings of -3 and -2, respectively.  This shared rejection of this statement by 
Factor 2 and Factor 4 stems from refusal to accept the implication that the existing levee-
based habitat represents the only possible habitat.  Respondent 125 voices the Abandon 
the Levees factor perspective that once the levees go away, that natural forces will 
establish a new set of habitats, those of a saline estuarine bay, more desirable and 
sustainable.  This will leave the Delta an ecosystem not unlike Suisun Marsh, the largest 
remaining brackish marsh in the country that sits immediately west and is directly 
connected to the Delta (Interview 125-2009). 
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 The Abandon the Levees perspective and F4 also score Statement 12 (“As long as 
farming continues on peat soils in the Delta, subsidence will continue with a concomitant 
increase in pressure on the levee”) very high with rankings of +4 for both of them and z-
scores of +1.476 for F2 and +1.550 for F4 (N.S.).  In the case of Factor 2, this scoring 
reflects a rejection of continued agriculture behind the non-sustainable levees and 
additional evidence of the eventual demise of the Delta levee and agriculture system.  
Respondent 117 talked about his involvement in a planned program to grow rice on a 
Delta island to reduce subsidence but he noted rice slowed subsidence versus growing 
corn, but does not stop or reverse it.  Factor 2 does not show much concern for levee 
stability and security except to suggest that pressures will only get worse over time as 
long as agriculture continues in the peat soil areas, while for Factor 4, the increased 
subsidence represents a major levee stability issue caused by agriculture in the peat Delta.  
Factor 1 was the only perspective that rejected Statement 12 with a z-score of -.069 and a 
rank of -1 (N.S.). 
 The Abandon the Levees factor strongly rejects (rank = -4 and z-score = -1.88 – 
N.S.) Statement 16 (“DRMS was a DWR conspiracy to justify the Peripheral Canal”).  
Respondent 106 explained that the 2004 Jones Tract failure triggered the DRMS effort it 
suddenly forced DWR into management of a levee repair on an island which some 
believed should be abandoned.  The DRMS consultants were ask to look at everything for 
every island to determine how the levees fit into flood control, agriculture and 
conveyance.  They were to look at the earthquake risk, high water risk, and make an 
island by island comparison of which islands would be resuscitated  in event of failure, 
and what developments should be encouraged or discouraged.  He believed the period 
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was too short to achieve these goals and the politicians applied too much pressure to 
come up with answers (Interview 106-2009).  Respondent 129 thought the URS 
consultants did excellent work but the URS management found itself in over their heads 
in selling the findings and did a poor job of presenting the results (Interview 129-2009).  
Respondent 129 believes that no one conspired, however, the DRMS work simply leads 
to the logical conclusion that the Peripheral Canal is required to be able to operate the 
New Delta for water supply and estuarine fish (Interview 129-2009). 
 Similarly, Factor 2’s rejection (rank = -4, z-score =-1.82 – N.S.) of Statement 32 
(“over the last 35 years, there has never been any earthquake damage to a levee in the 
Delta and the whole earthquake risk thing is junk science. It is a reality that the 
earthquake threat has been wildly overstated and is rather specious”) shows that loaders 
on F2 stand convinced that the Delta is overdue for the inevitable earthquake that will 
liquefy multiple levees. Again, the discourse over the future of Delta levees resonates 
with claims and counter-claims about the likelihood of multiple island failures because of 
earthquake-induced liquefaction. Rejection of Statement 32 firmly establishes where 
Factor 2 stands on this issue. 
Iteration Phase 
 In early November 2010, I conducted follow-up interviews with the two most 
strongly correlated respondents on the Abandon the Levees factor, respondents 129 
(loading on Factor 2 = 0.8339) and 119 (loading = 0.7111).  They were shown a table 
showing the original factor summary sheet dated 9 November 2010 (Appendix H) and 
asked to identify which factor they would have loaded highest on, what they thought of 
the name assigned the factor, “Abandon the Levees”, and whether summary comments 
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were correct from their individual perspective for the viewpoint they were assigned.  
They easily identified that their perspective aligned with the summary sheet description 
of Factor 2; however, Respondent 117 believed the name assigned miss-stated his 
perspective in that he did not believe that all Delta islands should be abandoned, just the 
ones that were non-sustainable.  He produced a map of his view of which islands were 
sustainable and what the final configuration of the Delta would look like after 
abandonment of all the non-sustainable islands. The map had no title and was clearly not 
for publication, and showed perhaps 40%-45% of the Delta agricultural lands remaining 
in “Wildlife-friendly Agriculture.”  Most of the “peat” islands in the lowest part of the 
‘pool” were shown as abandoned to wetlands. Respondent 117 suggested revising the 
summary of social perspectives to reflect that the state should not waste any more money 
on the non-sustainable levees.  He also expressed the view that the people knowledgeable 
of the levees recognized the variability across the Delta of levee designs, elevations, 
materials of construction, and foundations and did not condemn all of the current 
agricultural islands to abandonment.  He expressed concern that those politicians, 
scientists, and general citizenry did not pick up that distinction and the general discourse 
is moving incorrectly to a discussion of abandoning all Delta levees.  He recommended 
changes to the title for F2 “Abandon the Non-sustainable Levees” and minor wording 
changes in the summary and introductory paragraphs of this section of the dissertation, 
which he reviewed. 
 The general agreement with the overview of Factor 2 and the similar but slightly 
different pushback on some points by the two strongest loaders added to confidence in 
the analysis of this factor.  In the end, however, I determined to stay with the Abandon 
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the Levees because even if all loaders agreed on what made a levee sustainable, every 
island could end up on someone’s list of levees “To be abandoned.” 
LEVEE PRAGMATISTS (FACTOR 3) 
 Factor 3, the Levee Pragmatist social perspective, perceives major flaws in the 
approaches of all the prime actors in Delta levee maintenance and management except 
their own different, but very pragmatic approach. This factor views all of the resource 
utilization demands on the Delta as being unsustainable in the long term, while opting for 
pragmatic approaches that can get the get the most out of the Delta for the longest time 
with the least input of resources.  This social perspective sees inherent non-sustainability 
of most human-impacted socio-ecosystems everywhere, and they believe that farms 
protected by levees are no more or no less sustainable than agriculture in the arid Central 
Valley or a city the size of Los Angeles relying on sources of water more than 400 miles 
away.  They do not see sustainability as truly possible; this perspective believes that 
society should do the best it can for as long as it can. 
 Factor 3 is critical of the policies and efforts of the Corps of Engineers, the DWR, 
and the local levee districts because it believes that many of their policies weaken the 
levees by not recognizing the ability of proper vegetation growth to strengthen them.  
Levee Pragmatists have not been impressed with the levee work completed under the 
subventions program and are concerned that the RDs, DWR, and USACE often employ 
methods that cannot achieve the desired results.  F3 worries that the local reclamations 
district stand in danger of losing the levee expertise and dedication they historically 
enjoyed.  Levee Pragmatists see enough variety in the levee system that it remains neutral 
about the risk of the levees failing or being melted by earthquakes, worrying instead 
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about levees weakened by de-vegetation and failure to apply the best methods to find and 
eliminate structural weak points.  Levee Pragmatists remain very concerned about the 
contaminants potentially remaining in the sediments continually deposited in the channels 
of the Sacramento River so they oppose dredging these materials to build up the levee 
system. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Factor 3 explains about 8% of the total variance with two individuals loading on 
this factor.  It correlates with none of the other factors, either positively or negatively.  
The loaders on this factor do not correlate strongly with the other factors.  It might be 
tempting to ignore this perspective as an outlier except that the two loaders on F3 each 
hold Ph.Ds. in scientific fields and each has spent significant time and energy studying 
Delta levees. They are as knowledgeable as any of the other experts are and they bring 
unique expertise and experiences to the discussion.  The loaders have correlation factors 
of 0.7092 and 0.6814.  They work independently and as far as I know do not know each 
other.  One lives along a levee in the Delta, the other does not. 
Distinguishing Statements 
 The PQMethod identified eleven statistically significant distinguishing statements 
at p<0.05.  The high ranking (rank = +4, z-score = +1.51) Statement 25 (“The current 
system of local levee districts performing much of the routine maintenance is 
dysfunctional, disjointed, and inconsistent.  They have a deep distrust of DWR and it is 
disturbing how poorly they work together”) shows the concern over the current levee 
maintenance program and the organization of that work.  The statement comes verbatim 
from Respondent 118 (Interview 118-2009), an F3 loader, who further expressed that 
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whereas the engineers provide guidance to the boards, and the final decisions come down 
to the personal preferences of the 86 local reclamation district (RDs) boards.  Respondent 
118 recognizes that “they [district people] are often strapped for money, and my feeling 
is that they should care more than they do and they have a lot of resentment of the rules 
and regulations and they have a deep distrust of DWR… the dysfunction runs up to 
DWR” (Interview 118-2009 0:15).  Respondent 118 went on to add that the budget 
problems of California that plagued the government during the summer of 2009, when 
DWR could not pay the reclamation districts the promised money that the district had 
already borrowed and spent, added to the this distrust.  
 F3 doubts that the individual RD boards can develop consistent and coordinated 
approaches to levee maintenance. Respondent 120 has spent considerable time boating 
through the Delta channels and comments about seeing completely different maintenance 
methods being employed on levees on the two sides of the same channel.  He summed it 
up saying, “Yes, every district does its own thing!” (Interview 120-2010A, 0:16).  The 
Levee Pragmatists have experienced the greatly varying resources available to the local 
districts and worry that while some landowners hold properties in several districts and 
some serve on more than one board,  no overall coordinating group exists, formally or 
informally, to share best practices or resources.  This may be a legacy of the days when 
the best defense against levee failure involved a weaker nearby levee that would fail first 
and relieve the flood height.   
 The Levee Pragmatist concern over the role of the reclamation districts in levee 
maintenance shows in the response to Statement 24 (“Reclamation districts that own the 
levees are not prepared for levee failure and many of them are poor at communications 
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with their own constituents”).  Agreeing with this statement (rank =+2, z-score=+0.89), 
the Levee Pragmatists distinguish their views by their criticism of the reclamation 
districts (Interviews 118-2009, 2010A, 2010B and Interviews 120-2009, 2010A, 2010B). 
 Criticism of the involvement of the reclamation districts by the Levee Pragmatist 
factor continues in the challenge to what the other factors consider to be a definite 
strength of the RDs as expressed in Statement 28 (“The local reclamation districts 
maintaining the levees bring incredible institutional knowledge of a constantly evolving 
system.  They have people who can inspect the levees under all kinds of conditions and 
know what to look for.  They have people who know what to do in an emergency and they 
are ready to defend their homes, livelihoods, and families”).  With a ranking of -3 for this 
statement (z-score= -1.79) implies that F3 lacks reverence for the local knowledge 
accumulated by the reclamation districts.  The comments made during the sorting 
exercise, however, suggest more of a concern over the ability to maintain and reproduce 
the local knowledge.  When I questioned Respondent 120 (Interview 120-2010A) who 
loaded on Factor 3 about why he rated the Statement 28 negatively during the Q-sort, he 
remarked that the older generation of farmers were really involved and dedicated to the 
levees but that they were starting to die off.  Respondent 120 believes that the younger 
generations do not seem to care as much and it would not be long before time depleted 
the local knowledge.  Respondent 118, the other loader on F3, expressed concern that 
several local reclamation districts did not seem to care about the condition of their levees.  
The historical record and the conventional wisdom in the Delta would suggest that the 
members of levee districts have mobilized quickly in response to any threat and won 
many flood fights.  If Statement 28 is inaccurate, it represents a serious concern for the 
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future of Delta levees under reclamation district leadership, a situation acknowledged and 
noted above by two Delta Sustainers during the iterative phase.   
 Continuing this lack of confidence in the commitment and expertise of the 
reclamation districts, Levee Pragmatists revealed a very negative reaction (rank = -4, z-
score -2.06) to Statement 27, wanting no part of increased reclamation districts 
involvement in the governance of the Delta (“The best governance structure for the Delta 
would be to let the levee districts tackle the issues island-by-island with some funding and 
guidance from DWR”).  This represents another clear rejection of the expertise and 
commitment of local districts, as Respondent 120 bluntly explained quoting Forest 
Gump, “’Stupid  is as stupid does,’ I know enough of them to know that would not work” 
(Interview 120 -2010A, 0:22).  He later added “I know these people and they have 
something to offer and they should be a part of the equation, but to just turn it over to 
them, you see what we have” (Interview 2010A, 0:29). 
 Further, the Levee Pragmatists factor alone questions the cost effectiveness of the 
subvention program that started with passage of the Way Bill in 1973.  The Levee 
Pragmatists scored Statement 25 negatively (rank = -2, z-score =-0.86) (“The DWR 
subventions program was a model of efficiency; the DWR staff was lean, and the local 
levee districts, because they had their money out there, managed projects very 
effectively”).  Factor 3 distinguishes itself by seeing the weakness in the subventions 
program.  Respondent 118 became disenchanted with execution of the program in 2009 
after the infusion of the Propositions E-1 and 84 bond money.  DWR established a higher 
reimbursement percentage but planned to distribute the $50 million in 2009 to the 
districts based on the merits of their project proposals.  They did not even publish the 
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interim guidelines for the selection process until January 2009 and allowed only a short 
lead-time for submittal of proposals (a March 2009 deadline).  DWR did not announce 
the winners until June and the construction windows close for the year in October.  As of 
July 2009, however, the bond money remained frozen by the budget crisis of 2009.  
Respondent 118 (Interview 118-2010A) explained that all of this bond money had been 
approved by the voters to straighten out Delta levees. The voters had been convinced the 
Delta levees were in “dire straits.  And they voted to build them better… and really what 
has happened out there is they developed a ‘Band-Aid’ approach with huge projects 
fixing only a small portion of the weak levee sections with most of the funds going into 
‘over-the-top’ habitat elements” (Respondent 118-2010A).  Respondent 118 believes that 
the minimum levee standard PL-84 should be met everywhere before the money goes to 
the habitat enhancements. (Interview 118-2009, 0:42).  Factor 3 also laments over use of 
less cost effective methods for erosion control such as use of riprap.   
 In addition to being critical of the local reclamation districts and DWR, the Levee 
Pragmatists also see problems with the involvement of the other major entity attempting 
to maintain Delta levees, the USACE.  At a statistically significant level (p < 0.05), F3 
distinguishes itself with its support (rank = +3, z-score =+1.44) of Statement 29 
(“Federal official maintenance practices are destabilizing the levees by denuding them 
completely. We are spending huge amounts of money destroying vegetation and huge 
amounts of money creating habitat that is not sustainable”).  More than just another 
criticism of an entity working Delta levee issues, objection to the vegetation ban on 
levees ordered by the USACE Washington headquarters in 2007 shapes much of 
subjective perspective of the Levee Pragmatists.  Factor 3 emphasizes that properly 
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selected vegetation on the levees provides stabilization of the levees while providing 
habitat for aquatic and terrestrial species.  Whereas other factors and the RDs and DWR 
have all pushed back on the nationwide ruling of the USACE as being inappropriate for 
California and too costly to implement immediately, Factor 3 sees the policy as 
dangerous to levee stability.  Respondent 120 points to the bare levee that failed at Jones 
Tract in 2004 and the unmaintained, abandoned but vegetated and still standing levees at 
Franks Tract and Mildred Island as evidence (Interview 120-2010A) that vegetation adds 
more to levee stability than it detracts.  Respondent 120 asserts that the local levee boards 
that receive the highest scores from the USACE on levee maintenance are the wealthiest 
ones who can in his terms, just “nuke” (heavy spraying of herbicides) the levees to 
comply with the new USACE rules.  In doing so, they lose the strength of a properly 
vegetated levee (Interview 120–2010A). 
 Other distinguishing statements for the Levee Pragmatist factor include Statement 
23 (rank = -4, z-score = -1.94) (“Restrictions on dredging and use of dredged materials, 
particularly in the north Delta, need to be eliminated, because they have no real scientific 
justification”).  As respondent 120, one of the loaders on Factor 3 stated while conducting 
the sort, “there are too many unknown things out there (in the sediments) that are bad, 
going back to the days of hydraulic mining, to disturb them” (Interview 120-2010A).  He 
later concluded, “You never know what is in there, I actually believe that some dredging 
should be done. But no restrictions?”  (Interview 120-2010A, 0:29).  Respondent 118 
expressed concern over the mercury potentially in the channel sediment and suggested 
but “you talk to anybody and they have their own truths about this.  As far as DWR and 
Fish & Game, they create their own ‘truths’ as well” (Interview 118-2009, 0:23). 
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 Consistent with the “pragmatism” indicated in the name assigned Factor 3 is the 
neutral  ranking ( z-score= 0.00, rank = 0) for Statement 2 (“Incremental changes are not 
going to create a sustainable Delta and even after a few hundred million dollars in 
improvements, we will still have levees that time and tide are just going to overwhelm”).  
This ranking statistically distinguishes the viewpoint of F3 from F2 and F4 that support 
this statement with a rank of +2 (z-scores = +0.81 and 0.84, respectively) and the Delta 
Preservationist factor that strongly rejects it (rank =-3, z-score = -1.24).  Levee 
Pragmatists do not find little interest in plans for Peripheral Canals or other grand 
projects to save the Delta levees or habitat, nor does it concern itself with philosophical 
debates about the nature of sustainable outcomes for the Delta. This perspective 
concentrates more on the methods and technologies that reclamation districts can employ 
to improve levee stability one foot at a time, and not the grand schemes or even what the 
ultimate outcome of the battle in the Delta between human effort and the natural 
processes will be.  When questioned during the Q-Sort, Respondent 120 suggested that 
while humans likely could not sustain the levee system forever, the Delta residents have 
enough motivation and energy to overcome their less-than-perfect efforts to sustain the 
system for at least a few more lifetimes, at least in face of the normal threats.  
Respondent 120 sees the Delta levees as just one many non-sustaining human impacts at 
work in the Delta.  Just as the water exporters will work to keep the water flowing south, 
the farmers of the Delta islands will maintain the levees to continue their livelihoods until 
it just becomes impossible.  He did not see that happening in the near future (Interview 
120-2010A).   
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 The lack of salience of F3 with the doomsday forecast reflects also in the 
statistically distinguishing scores and ranking of Statement 9 (rank = 0, z-score = -0.24) 
(“Delta levees are precarious and a disaster waiting to happen.  They have to work so 
long and hard and are built of the wrong materials, on the wrong materials.  The levee 
districts are trying hard but all it takes is one overzealous beaver.  At the same time, we 
are now appreciating the earthquake risk and we are just lucky that we have not had a 
6.0 or a 6.5 close to the Delta”). Respondent 120 placed it in the neutral category and 
indicated parts were true such the developers of the Delta levees built them out of the 
wrong materials and on the wrong foundations; but she also believed that the earthquake 
risk is overstated.  F1 looks at the levees in the Delta and sees many different kinds, some 
robust and well maintained, some poorly built and improperly maintained.  They see the 
rodent problems as real but manageable with different approaches and they do not agree 
that all the RDs work hard or effectively at maintaining the levees.  At the same time, 
while recognizing the possibility of seismic destruction of the levees, Factor 3 remains 
somewhat unconvinced of the inevitability of massive levee destruction by earthquake. 
This bears out in the statistically significant lukewarm rejection (rank = -1, z-score = -
0.28) of Statement 16 (“DRMS was a DWR conspiracy to justify the Peripheral Canal”).  
Whereas the Levee Pragmatists believe in the reality of the risk of earthquake damage 
and that the science of the DRMS report appeared to be a legitimate effort, Respondent 
118 noted that some of “the researchers mean well, but it has been odd to me how the 
academics have fueled the DWR agenda about the earthquake risk” (Interview 118-
2010A, 0:24).  F3 sees much of the emphasis on earthquake risk as political rhetoric 
aimed at paving the way for acceptance of an isolated conveyance system.  To Factor 3, it 
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not so much a conspiracy as it is a politically motivated emphasis (Interview 120-2009) 
and the claim of a conspiracy as just “hearsay” (Interview 120-2010A, 0:41). 
 Similarly, the Levee Pragmatists give the concern that “As long as farming 
continues on peat soils in the Delta, subsidence will continue with a concomitant increase 
in pressure on the levees,” Statement 12, only statistically significant weak support with a 
ranking of +1 and a z-score of +0.52.  Again, the Levee Pragmatists confirm that whereas 
earthquake, additional subsidence, and sea-level rise represent real threats to the levee 
system, they pale in comparison to the daily issues of bare levees maintained by people 
not taking advantage of the latest technologies.  Meanwhile, the rock-lined levees have 
destroyed the riverine environment, making the levees weaker and environmentally and 
aesthetically barren, coming often at a higher installed cost than more pleasing, vegetated 
approaches that strengthen the levees.  
Other Key Statements 
 The Levee Pragmatist factor has five highly ranked (-4,-3, +3, and +4) statements 
which did not make the statistically distinguishing list because the scores were not 
significantly different than one or more other factors.  F3 shared some highly ranked 
statement with each of the other factors, reflecting the low correlation of F3 with any 
other factor.  Levee Pragmatists shared agreement with the Delta Sustainers and the 
Multi-Purpose Levees  (rank = +4, z-score = 1.51) on Statement 15  (“The water users 
are going to need the Delta levees for another 30 years because it will take that long for 
the environmental, property rights, and water rights lawsuits to be settled and then 
actually build the isolated conveyance system”).  This reflects the pragmatic view that 
barring an emergency, the completion of a huge canal or tunnel system around the Delta 
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will take many years DWR receives approval to proceed.  The strong local opposition, a 
plethora of environmental regulations, and a massively oversubscribed water rights 
system suggest that property right and environment lawsuits, injunctions, and other legal 
delays will render realistic a 30-year time frame for the process.  The continuing change 
of political leaders and their  views will like not speed things. 
 Factor 3 and Factor 1 also had nearly identical scores and rankings (rank for both = 
+3, z-scores = +1.48 and +1.45 respectively – N.S.) for Statement 10 (“Although the 
levees are not well-engineered structures, riddled with penetrations and random objects, 
and inherently unstable because of their peat foundations, they survived record high 
water due to very high tides in 1998 and the 2006 high water and wind events without a 
failure.  Somehow they are stronger than they seem to be”).  This statement actually 
originates with one of the Factor 3 loaders (Interview 118-2009) and represents a 
pragmatic acceptance of the strengths and limitations of the Delta levees.  Respondent 
118 has studied many of the reports from non-destructive levee inspection tool 
investigations, hoping to gain greater understanding the strengths and weaknesses of 
these inspection systems.  Respondent 120 comments “It is amazing what hasn’t broken 
out here.  All these lands are all below sea-level and if you believe Jeff Mount, they all 
should have been toast a long time ago” (Interview 2010A, 0:18).  He reflected later on 
the opinion of a geomorphologist who once suggested to him that the constant hydrostatic 
head on the Delta levee may be working them to a higher strength while exposing any 
problems in the levee quickly for immediate repair. 
 Relative to this, Statement 14 (“Improving the reliability of and employing non-
destructive levee inspection tools represent a great opportunity to improve levee safety”) 
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ranked highest by F3 and F4 at +2, but in both cases the sixth highest ranked statement 
(z-scores of F3 = 1.201 and of F4 = 1.00 – N.S.).  This shows the concern of F3 (as well 
as F4) for the unidentified suspected penetrations and anomalies in the levees,  As 
suggested above, this statement came from Respondent 118 who loaded on F3 (Interview 
118-2009).  Some of these non-destructive inspection methods have been used with some 
success since the mid-1980s on Tyler Island (Interview 115-2009) and a lot of inspection 
work was planned under a joint DWR-FEMA program but was cancelled in the confusion 
of the 2009 California budget meltdown (Interview 118-2009). 
 The Levee Pragmatists social perspective joined the Delta Sustainers in giving 
Statement 18 a very low ranking  (F3 rank = -3, z-score -1.20; F1: rank = -4, z-score = -
1.82 – N.S.)  (“From a water supply perspective, the only reliable, sustainable, 
earthquake proof way to get water around the Delta is the Peripheral Canal”), and 
Statement 35 (F3: rank = -3, z-score -1.17; F1: rank = -3, z-score = -1.52 – N.S.)  
(“Earthquakes represent the main risk to the water supply for 23 million Californians 
because of the likelihood of multiple levee failures during a significant earthquake, 
potentially causing severe disruptions to water supply drawn from the Delta for years”).  
Respondent 120’s comment on Statement 35 was “I do not discount that it might happen, 
but I’m more concerned about losing levee vegetation as a more proximal worry” 
(Interview 118-2009, 0:24).  The rejection of Statements 18 and 35 shows that the 
Pragmatists do not accept the discourse about the great risk of earthquake to the Delta 
levees and the rhetoric about the resulting need to build the isolated conveyance system. 
 Finally, the key statements also show agreement on ranking Statement 19 (rank = 
+3, z-score= +1.41 – N.S.) with the Abandon the Levee factor (rank = +3, z-score = 
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+1.46 – N.S.) that (“Nothing could be worse for fish than what we currently have in Delta 
today: rock-lined levees that are serving as water supply channels that are held at as 
constant flow condition as possible.  It is exactly what an estuary should not be”).  The 
agreement of F3 with Statement 19 emphasizes its disappointment in overuse of riprap 
and concrete rubble to resist erosion on the levees, creating a poor habitat for native fish 
and terrestrial species alike, while questioning the need to export a quarter or more of the 
Delta inflows.  As noted above, F2 support of Statement 19 emphasized the lack of 
fluctuation in the flow rates resulting in reduced seasonal variability of salinity in the 
Delta and confusing signals for returning salmonoids trying to find their spawning 
grounds. 
Iteration Phase 
 I reviewed the preliminary findings with both individuals who loaded on Factor 3 in 
mid-November 2010.  Neither suggested a better idea for the factor name and they 
seemed comfortable with the “Levee Pragmatist” moniker.  Also during the follow-up 
interview with F-4 loaders, Respondent 116 looked at the original of the table in 
Appendix H and commented that Factor 3 seemed to be a very negative perspective, 
which he had not heard and was surprised existed.  Then at the follow-up interview with 
Respondent 120, after reading the write-up several times, he agreed that it described 
much of his perspective and then said, “I wish I were not so negative” (Interview 120-
2010B). 
 Appendix H incorporates the suggested changes F3 loaders to the original defining 
descriptions that they reviewed. Specifically, they thought it important to state that the 
Delta levees were sustainable near term with “intelligent inputs” (120) rather than just 
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“minimum inputs” or with “appropriate, targeted, and effective resources” (118) rather 
than just “minimum inputs” as I had originally expressed it.   Respondent 118 also 
suggested that the idea of a maintaining the Delta the way it is long-term is a possibility, 
not a probability.  
MULTI-PURPOSE LEVEE ADVOCATES (FACTOR 4) 
The Multi- Purpose Levees Advocates social perspective earns the title by believing that 
with additional knowledge, investment, and commitment, California can achieve the 
Delta Vision and Delta Stewardship Council goals of maximizing water deliveries, 
restoring and maintaining the Delta ecosystem for the various native and now endangered 
fish species.  It perceives that the state can do this while preserving the Delta as a unique 
place and protecting it from flooding long associated with the Sacramento and San 
Joaquin watersheds.   
F4 has confidence in the science of the DRMS study, particularly in its 
highlighting of the risk of earthquakes inducing levee failures but it is not as confident in 
the ways the study results have been used and interpreted.  F4 sees the DRMS study as 
highlighting the potential of earthquake damage but they remain concentrated on 
improving the stability of Delta levees structurally and finding ways to reverse 
subsidence.  On the environmental side, they strive to first figure out what the endangered 
species need in the way of habitat and then figure out ways to produce that in the 
environment.  They are not convinced that the isolated conveyance is an absolute 
necessity but will make it work if it exists.  The lack of real knowledge about the levee 
failures and the current condition and the processes at work in the ecosystem frustrates 
F4.  Multi- Purpose Levees Advocates are opposed to the denuded levees policy of the 
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USACE.  In many ways, F4 supports the philosophy of behind the CALFED dream: if 
everyone works together, we can get more out of the system. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Factor 4 explained 15% of the total variance in all perspectives measured, and at a 
standard error of 0.218 (See Appendix G).   Five of the 22 respondents loaded on this 
factor, the third highest number of any factor with individual correlations ranging from 
0.5684 to 0.8024.  Four of the five loaders on Factor 4 were identified as “State” 
(includes County) employees or contractors and all were listed as involved in “Water” 
(includes water management - flood control and water supply, as either engineers or 
managers).  All four spent considerable portions of their careers with DWR, giving F4 a 
four to three majority over F2 among the DWR related participants.  The fifth F4 loader’s 
background is as a federal water engineer/manager.  None of the Multi-Purpose Levee 
Advocate  loaders live in the Delta and all office in Sacramento.  Factor 4 shows strong 
correlation with the Abandon the Levees factor (0.6137), suggesting considerable sharing 
of perspectives but F4 loaders remain committed to the levees in the Delta.  Factor 4 
shows strong deviation of perspectives with from Factor 1, with a correlation between 
factor scores of -0.1303. 
Distinguishing Statements 
Eight statements statistically distinguish the Multi-Purpose Levee Advocate factor 
from the factors.  Factor 4 takes the strongest positions on two statements relating to the 
future of Delta without the levees and the approaches of  DWR to levee integrity.  First, 
the Multi-Purpose Levee factor agrees strongly (rank = +4, z- score = +1.63) with 
Statement 3 (“The Delta islands are now well below sea level and if we lose the levees, 
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we are going to have a saltwater bay. It will be a bay rimmed by urban levees, except 
perhaps up the Yolo By-Pass where new tule marsh may become established.”)  The F4 
acceptance of this statement appears to relate the truth that the loss of the agricultural 
levees would increase the size of the tidal prism to the point that all or much of the legal 
Delta would become a saltwater bay.  All perspectives rated this statement positively, but 
F4 was unique in the high ranking it gave it.  Unfortunately, the comments recorded 
during the sorts do not elaborate on this strongly held perspective, it just seemed an 
accepted fact not requiring elaboration. 
The Multi-Purpose Levee Advocates, with so many DWR officials loading 
heavily on the factor, perceive that the DWR works hard to prevent the loss of the levees 
and the resulting undesirable outcome as shown in the strong rejection (rank = -4, z-score 
= -2.16) of Statement 7 (“The goal of DWR is to let the Delta go back to salt and build a 
peripheral canal around it”).  The very strong rejection suggests that Factor 4 holds the 
perspective that DWR remains committed to maintaining the Delta as a unique and viable 
agricultural place as specifically identified as state government policy in the Water Code, 
and is not totally committed to an isolated conveyance.  The very strong rejection of 
Statement 7 by F4 suggests that it does not accept the “back to salt” and the Delta-as-an-
estuary concepts prominent in the F2 discourse. 
The rejection of Statement 7 is affirmed by F4 support (rank = +3, z score = 1.33) 
for Statement 5 (“DWR has a clear legislature-mandated responsibility to maintain the 
status quo in the Delta, but DWR is really working to preserve the current conditions in 
the Delta until it is clear what to do to have a healthy Delta ecosystem”).  This statement 
originated in the 2009 interview with Respondent 127, who loaded on F4.  He went on to 
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say “the jury is not yet in on what the best course of action is and it really depends on 
what you want to manage this already heavily impacted ecosystem to do” (Interview 127-
2009, 0:24).  Statement 5 also represents an insider’s view of DWR knowledge of the 
Delta reflecting a healthy amount of uncertainty.  It also reveals how DWR managers and 
engineers approach the multiple and sometimes conflicted responsibilities of the 
organization.  The California Water Code clearly requires preservation of the Delta as 
much as possible as a unique place and the Multi-Purpose Levee Advocate factor 
perceives that DWR pursues that requirement while trying to work in support of the Delta 
Stewardship Council “co-equal” goals of enhancing the water supply and the protection, 
restoration, and enhancement of the ecosystem.  As Respondent 127 acknowledges, 
however, with the environmental element, “everything is experimental, the uncertainties 
far outflank what we know...The problem is that the Delta is far more complex 
ecologically than we know…we are always behind…”  (Interview 127-2009, 0:14).  
Statement 5 implies frustration with the lack of scientific information and the fact that 
they may be using approaches that may prove very incorrect. 
The uncertainty of Multi-Purpose Levee Advocates over the level of knowledge 
about the Delta extends to the probability of and risk posed by earthquake-triggered 
cascading multi-levee failures. Factor 4 scores a statistically distinguishing neutral 
ranking (Rank = 0, z-score = 0.39) on Statement 35 (“Earthquakes represent the main 
risk to the water supply for 23 million Californians because of the likelihood of multiple 
levee failures during a significant earthquake, potentially causing severe disruptions to 
water supply drawn from the Delta for years.)  Whereas F1 and F3 strongly reject (F1:  
rank -3, z-score =-1.52; F3: rank -3, z-score = -1.17) this view that earthquakes induced 
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failures of Delta levees represents the main risk to the SWP and CVP water supply,  
Factor 4 distinguishes itself as being concerned over earthquake risk but not ready to 
declare it the main risk, a middle ground position.  Respondent 116 notes that “this 
statement [35] is not provable, we don’t really know the true underlying frequency of 
earthquakes and nor when the next one is coming.  I would say that an earthquake is one 
of the big risks, the other is hydrologic, and another is terrorism…it [earthquake] is a big 
risk but I cannot accept that it is the main risk” (Interview 116-2010A, 0:54).  
Respondent 131 suggested that whereas earthquake represented a risk, drought presented 
the largest risk because the resource has been so terribly overcommitted (Interview 131-
2010A).  F4 backs away from classifying the odds of a multiple levee failure scenario as 
“likely” and recognizes the other risks to the water supply system such as earthquake 
damage to the long distribution system of pumps, canals, and pipelines. 
The strong support of the Multi-Purpose Levee Advocates for the efforts of the 
DWR in the Delta continues with the distinguishing rejection (rank = -3, z-score = -1.70) 
of Statement 22 (“Delta habitat restoration projects have been a big joke and a waste of 
taxpayer’s money.  Planting trees and shrubs on the levees in conflict with new Corps 
guidelines, and within five years it has become just a big weed pile”).  Since 1992, DWR 
and DF &G have directed the habitat restoration projects required as environmental 
offsets and enhancements required in the levee subventions program (Interview 127-
2009).  Factor 4 perceives the direct benefits to the environment and what is learned 
about habitat restoration in the Delta well worth the money and time invested.  The 
mention of the planting of trees and shrubs, in conflict with USACE guidelines, refers to 
the 2006 emergency levee repair program in which DWR spent millions installing riprap 
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on eroded levees.  Part of the project included planting shrubs, trees, and dead logs near 
the water line to improve the riverine habitat.  The state provided the money and the 
USACE and at least one reclamation district managed the construction (Interview 111-
2010A).  As noted in Chapter IV, 2007 saw USACE headquarters issue the enforcement 
of the zero-vegetation policy for levees nationwide, making most of the plantings of the 
previous year subject to removal.  Respondent 131 explained his rejection of Statement 
22 as “Yes we probably have planted some stuff will have to take out to meet the new 
Corps guidelines, but part of the idea of restoration projects is learning, and you learn 
from the mistakes as well as from the things that go right” (Interview 131-2010A, 1:42).  
Respondent 127 (Interview 127-2009) explained that the riparian projects have been 
particularly successful and expects that the Corps will rescind the “Zero Vegetation” 
policy.  It also sees the plants growing on the Decker Island restoration site and the 
Twitchell Island marsh project not as weeds but vegetation that restore Delta habitat. 
Multi-Purpose Levee Advocates loaders find little salience with the strong 
criticisms of the reclamation districts in the concourse.  Statement 25 (“The current 
system of local levee districts performing much of the routine maintenance is 
dysfunctional, disjointed, and inconsistent.  They have a deep distrust of DWR and it is 
disturbing how poorly they work together”) received a neutral score (rank = 0, z-score = 
0.02) suggesting either a perception that average best describes the effort of the 
reclamation districts or possibly that the performance of the different RDs varying from 
good to poor and averages out to neutral.  Respondent 131, the highest loader on F4 
stated during the ranking session.  “They are not all that way (dysfunctional, disjointed, 
and inconsistent) but the system is somewhat dysfunctional with all the districts being 
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independent” (Interview 131-2010A 1:49).  Respondent 116 allowed “it is a series of 
fiefdoms but there is more cooperation than you might think and there is a fair amount of 
consistency in how they do their work.”  Further, she suggested that the reclamation 
districts are “wise and they know they can’t count on DWR in the long term because 
programs and people are constantly changing” (Interview 116-2010A). 
In a related item, The Multi-Purpose Levee Advocates take a distinguishing 
neutral view (rank = 0, z-score =+0.08) of Statement 24 (“Reclamation districts that own 
the levees are not prepared for levee failure and many of them are poor at 
communications with their own constituents”).  Again, with 86 districts with very 
different resource bases and personalities, F4 loaders find it difficult to characterize the 
situation, or they may believe that RDs make average emergency preparations.  Again 
Respondent 131 explained, “you have some very good ones (Reclamation Districts) and 
some that are just a few farmers.  Most can’t afford to do what they need to do and most 
can’t afford to prepare for a levee failure” (Interview 131-2010A, 1:25). 
The final statistically distinguishing comment for Factor 4 comes in the lack of 
support (rank = -2, z-score = -0.70) for the concern outlined in Statement 4 (“The voices 
of those who have a local knowledge of the role of levees in Delta are probably not as 
strong as voices of the water exporters and the environmentalist advocates focused solely 
on endangered fish species”).  Respondent 103, an F4 loader, perhaps summed it up best, 
“I think everyone is pretty vocal…  I think the underrepresented voices are the other 53 
counties, the ones who are not getting the water, who are not interested in the 
environment...  Sutter County… sometimes when they get grumpy they comment to the 
Department, ‘all you care about is the Delta’” (Interview 103-2010A). 
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Other Key Statements 
 Given the strong correlation between the Abandon the Levees and the Multi-
Purpose Levee Advocates, four of the ten statements ranked very strongly (defined as +4, 
+3, -3, -4) but did not earn the statistically significant distinguishing category because the 
views of the statements were shared by the two factors.  The Multi-Purpose Levee 
Advocates also share similar high rankings on one statement with both the Delta 
Sustainers and the Levee Pragmatists. 
 One major view shared between Factor 4 and Factor 2 relates to Statement 16 
(“DRMS was a DWR conspiracy to justify the Peripheral Canal”).  Both perspectives 
reject this statement, accepting the DRMS as a valid scientific study and supportive of the 
role DWR role in guiding the effort.  Factor 4 recorded the most negative z-score for this 
statement of any factor on any statement (rank = -4, z-score = -2.16 – N.S.).  Three of the 
five loaders as Multi-Purpose Levee Advocates ranked this statement at -4, one at -3 and 
the other at -2.  Respondent 134 stated that as much as people “sometimes don’t like to 
hear the truth, there is a science behind it [the DRMS report]” (Interview 134- 2010, 
0:23).  All the other F4 loaders refused to respond to the claim that DWR tried to steer 
the findings of the DRMS to recommend building the Peripheral Canal.  Factor 2, again 
with many DWR employees, also strongly rejected efforts to taint the DRMS work with 
suggestions of political manipulation (rank = -4, z-score = -1.88 – N.S.). 
 Factor 4 also strongly rejects (rank=-3, z-score =-1.54 – N.S.) Statement 32 
(“Over the last 35 years, there has never been any earthquake damage to a levee in the 
Delta and the whole earthquake risk thing is junk science. It is a reality that the 
earthquake threat has been wildly overstated and is rather specious”).  This comment 
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takes clear aim at the DRMS earthquake risk section and studies sponsored by PPIC 
(Suddeth, Mount and Lund 2008; Mount and Twiss 2004; Mount and Twiss 2005) and 
others raising concern over multiple levees failures caused by an earthquake.  Statement 
32 references the lack of a history of earthquake induced levee failure, citing most 
exactly the lack of damage experienced during the Loma Preita 1989 earthquake.  
Respondent 116 noted that she knows of creditable reports of Delta levees visibly moving 
up and down during the Loma Preita quake, and she questioned if anyone could say 
categorically that they were not damaged (Interview 116-2010A).  Citing the 2010 Haiti 
earthquake, Respondent 134 in rating this comment very negatively noted that “just 
because it hasn’t happened doesn’t mean it won’t happen… and 35 years is geologically 
nothing ” (Interview 134-2010, 0:26).  Whereas the risk of earthquake damage to Delta 
levees did not show up as dominant perspective with the Multi-Purpose Levee 
Advocates, they respect the scientists who have been raising the concerns as Respondent 
116 states, “I think very good scientific work has been done and we have applied the very 
knowledge that is available” (Interview 116-2010A, 0:24). Again, this perspective is 
shared with Factor 2 (rank = -4, z-score =-1.82 – N.S.). 
 Factor 4 (rank= +3, z-score = +1.22) and Factor 2 (rank = +1, z-score = +0.80 – 
N.S.) both support Statement 33 (“A lot has been accomplished on reducing risk of 
normal every day, vanilla, levee failures but more and more we need to recognize the 
vulnerability to extreme events such as earthquake and very large floods that are not 
adequately recognized or acknowledged by some of the Delta stakeholders”).  Again, the 
issue of the susceptibility of Delta levees to failure by liquefaction forms a giant divide 
among interviewed levee experts, a divide created by widely varying perceptions of 
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probabilities.  Clearly, the claims and counter claims stem from both sides’ frustration of 
having much at stake but having little or no “science” to convince the public or 
themselves. 
 Another area of agreement between Factors 4 and 2 comes in the concerns over 
additional subsidence caused by continued commercial farming in the Delta as 
demonstrated by the strong acceptance of Statement 12 (rank = +4 for both Factor 2 and 
Factor 4; Factor 4 z-score= +1.55, Factor 2 z-score = +1.48 – N.S.) (“As long as farming 
continues on peat soils in the Delta, subsidence will continue with a concomitant increase 
in pressure on the levees”).  Much of the discussion with the Multi-Purpose Levee 
Advocates revolved around finding ways to halt subsidence and to reverse it.  Some 
Multi-Purpose Levee Advocates talk about the experimental test plots where DWR grows 
rice on Bradford Island and a private effort on Bract Tract to grow a cooler weather 
variety of rice, thereby retaining agriculture and slowing subsidence. Respondent 116 
suggested in his support of this statement a novel idea that Delta subsidence could be 
reversed through a subsidized effort to grow water hyacinth, the invasive species that 
otherwise chokes the waterways of the Delta, in flooded section inside of the islands 
(Interview 116, 2010-B).  This farming would provide a carbon sink and the cut and 
submerged “crop” would be an in situ biomass generator. 
 Where Factor 4 diverges its views from the Abandon the Levees factor and finds 
some agreement with Factors 1 and Factor 3 comes in Statement 15 (“The water users 
are going to need the Delta levees for another 30 years because it will take that long for 
the environmental, property rights, and water rights lawsuits to be settled and then 
actually build the isolated conveyance system”).  Factor 3 strongly agreed (rank = +3, z-
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score =+1.11 – N.S.) with the concept that regardless of one’s views of the sustainability 
of the Delta levees long term, they must be maintained for a generation before a suitable 
replacement system can be designed, permitted, fought over in the courts, and built.  
Interviewee 116 only commented “Certainly at least 30 years, perhaps more” (Interview 
116-2010A, 0:46).  Only the Abandon the Levees factor keeps this perspective from 
becoming a consensus item. 
 Finally, the Multi-Purpose Levee Advocates rejected (rank =-3, z-score = -1.19 – 
N.S.) Statement 27 (“The best governance structure for the Delta would be to let the 
levee districts tackle the issues island-by-island with some funding and guidance from 
DWR”).  Whereas Factor 3 rejected this statement with even more vigor because of the 
disappointment with the reclamation districts, DWR, and the lack of Delta-wide thinking 
about the levees, Factor 4’s objections from Factor 4 come primarily with the concept of 
island-by-island governance and secondarily, heavy reliance on the reclamation districts. 
Iteration Phase 
 I reviewed the preliminary findings with the top three loaders on the Multi-Purpose 
Levee Advocates factor (Respondent 131 (loading 0.8024), Respondent 116 (loading 
0.7343), and Respondent 103 (loading 0.6428).  All three had little difficulty redacting 
that they loaded most strongly on Factor 4.  Two of them were particularly fond of the 
title “Multi-Purpose Levee Advocates.”  No one had changes to the summary comments 
or the draft of the introduction.  Respondent 103 commented that the statement “Believes 
that DWR tries to manage the Delta and the levees in compliance with the requirement to 
maintain status quo in the Delta while exploring a better path for the environment and 
water supply” sounded like a restatement of the Delta Stewardship Council charter.  The 
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state legislature charged the DSC (DSC 2010a) to prepare a plan by 2012 to manage the 
Delta with the two co-equal goals of maximizing water supply and restoration of the 
environment.  This led Respondent 103 to additionally comment that the newly created 
Delta Stewardship Council, just nearing its first year of existence (November 2010), 
while largely staffed by former DWR employees, regularly placed huge stresses on the 
DWR and presumably many Factor 4 loaders.  The DSC members were making requests 
for information and data to DWR staffers with very tight deadlines, that by the nature of 
the political process, the DWR employee sensed great pressure to respond to the request.  
He suggested that DWR employees tried hard to avoid these requests because of the un-
budgeted effort involved and also because the information request often took the form of 
investigating the results, methods, and execution of old and current DWR programs.  
While Respondent 103 allowed that the Delta Stewardship Council staff was acting to 
execute its mandate to challenge how the Delta has been managed, he saw a rise in stress 
within the DWR from having to answer questions and sometime admit to mistakes made 
to this new and suddenly powerful organization, one whose power was been defined and 
refined each day (Interview 103-2010B).    Given the strong support some Factor 4 
loaders feel for the programs and effort of the DWR, such second guessing by the Delta 
Stewardship Council could prove stressful for Multi-Purpose Levee Advocates within the 
Department. 
 Respondent 103 also noted that one thing he saw was that if he went into a meeting 
to solve a problem, he thought it would be easier to come to a solution with the people 
sharing the same social perspective.  Whereas this might seem intuitive, it also points out 
how groupthink might represent a challenge for members of any one of these factors 
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interacting consistently and exclusively with people with similar social perspectives.  It 
makes it easy to come to a solutions, however, those solutions may lack innovation or 
ready acceptance by others factors. 
 Respondent 116 did not have any suggestions to improve the naming or description 
of Factor 4, but when reading the Levee Pragmatist description he questioned, “How can 
there be people out there who are so negative about everything?” (Interview 116-2010B). 
AGREEMENT IN THE DISCOURSE 
 Two of the 35 sorted statements created a statistical consensus.  Statement 21 (“We 
need more innovation like the $2.5 million CALFED funded project on Tyler Island to 
restore subtidal berms and levee vegetation.  About two miles of shaded shallow riverine 
habitat were gained long term while reducing potential flood damage to the levee”) 
scored neutral rankings from all four factors (Factor 1: rank = 0, z-score =+0.33; Factor 
2: rank = 0, z-score +0.05; Factor 3: rank = -1, z-score = -0.38; Factor 4: rank =+1, z-
score = +0.64).  The fact that Statement 21 lacked salience in all the factors surprised me 
in that statement had come from one of the strong loaders on the Delta Sustainers factor 
and had been very positively reviewed during the sorting exercise by Factor 3 loader 118 
(Interview 118-2010 A).  Also during the sorting process one of the loaders on The 
Multi-Purpose Levee Advocates supported the concept of the statement but believed that 
I had the location incorrect, he had been involved with a similar successful project on 
Staten Island (Interview 116-2010A).  I went back to review the individual sort results 
and found that indeed the Factor 1 loaders ranked this statement from a -1 to a +3, the 
two loaders on factor went in opposite ways with -3 and +2 rankings.  Overall as 
individuals, a full 8 of the 22 ranked this statement at 0, or 36.3% as compared to the 
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20% average percentage of 0 rankings for a statement.  This ranking by all the 
perspectives suggest that encouragement of  innovation lacks salience for those working 
levee issues, particularly with regard to attempting to use organic materials instead of rip-
rap to prevent levee erosion.  I began to think that the concept of encouraging innovation 
was the part of Statement 21 lowering its saliency, particularly after my follow-up 
meeting with one of the top loaders on the Multi-Purpose Levee Advocates.  After 
reviewing the preliminary name and description of Factor 4, Respondent 116 started 
discussing his concept to reverse subsidence, specifically growing and drowning water 
hyacinths inside the islands.  Then he dismissed the prospects of trying out his idea with 
the words “I have lots of ideas that can help the Delta but no one wants to listen” 
(Interview 116-2010B).  My observation is that Respondent 116 is one of the most 
experienced and respected senior managers working Delta levee issues for the state and 
his big picture ideas form  the heart of some of the major Delta projects now under 
construction or in the final planning stages.  Looking carefully at Statement 21, I realize 
now that it is the smallest scale idea in the concourse and Q-set.  Similarly, Respondent 
116’s idea of growing water hyacinths as an experiment is a relatively small.  Meanwhile, 
CALFED, the Delta Vision, and now the Delta Stewardship Council efforts have re-
scaled Delta levee issues to the statewide scale.  It seems probable that the scores for 
Statement 21 reflect not so much consensus except perhaps that local scale issues just are 
not as important as the larger scale issues.  Perhaps the problem comes back to the 
researcher forcing a local issue in the Q-set. Q-Method identified a consensus that local 
issues have little salience, which does not represent the kind of consensus conflicted 
social perspectives can build on. 
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 All factors also reached consensus on Statement 30 (“The levee districts tackle the 
critical erosion and acute problems very effectively but they are not good at minor, 
everyday maintenance.  Unfortunately, this inattention lets minor problems like 
vegetation on the levees grow into overwhelming problems and now they face major 
engineering and construction efforts in some many areas to get the levees back into 
compliance with Corps requirements”).  This statement originally came from a 
representative of the USACE (Interview 126-2009). The ranking of this statement, 
(Factor 1: rank = -2, z-score =-0.92; Factor 2: rank = -1, z-score -0.66; Factor 3: rank = 0, 
z-score = -0.18; Factor 4: rank =-1, z-score = -0.25) suggests that the USACE (perhaps 
more accurately the USACE Headquarters) stands alone with their policy of requiring 
denuded levees.  The rejection of Statement 30 by Factor 3 seems weak in light of Levee 
Pragmatists view that vegetation helps strengthen not weakens levees; however, this 
statement is also critical of the everyday maintenance practices of the reclamation 
districts as are the Levee Pragmatists. 
 This consensus item captured in Q-Method seems be to showing in the public 
discourse and legal actions.  DWR has filed a challenge to the USACE enforcement 
(Cowen and McCamman 2008), backing the reclamation districts, and questioning the 
suitability of the requirements for California levees.  A set of interim agreements have 
been developed between the reclamation districts and the USACE that set a go-slow 
approach but it is only good until 2012.  As the discussions continue, the consensus at the 
Delta-wide scale rejects the national scale answer of the USACE to the role of vegetation 
on levees. 
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SUMMARY 
 Q-method has provided a mechanism to quantify social perspectives of experts on 
Delta issues.  Four social perspectives emerged: 
F1 - the Delta Sustainers factor holds that the existing levee system is sustainable long 
term, primarily because of the improvements made under the subventions program of 
state sharing investment in locally executed levee maintenance and improvement projects 
and the dedication and local knowledge of the Delta residents, the reclamation boards and 
the engineers and consultants they employ.  They are far more concerned with rodent 
damage, levee heights, and erosion than earthquake damage that they see as potentially 
overstated to support the building of a Peripheral Canal they oppose. 
F-2 - the Abandon the Levees factor believes that sea level rise, continued subsidence 
behind the levees and the high probability of multiple levee-destroying earthquakes doom 
the existing system.  The levees support and control an undesirable ecosystem where the 
estuarine native species struggle to survive so replacement with an open water 
environment will probably be more desirable.  With an isolated conveyance system, 
DWR can manage an open water Delta to maximize water export quality, quantity, and 
reliability while creating a simulated natural estuarine environment. 
F3 - the Levee Pragmatist factor envisions the Delta levee and the Delta socio-ecosystem 
as just one of many human impacted system places that are not viable long term (excess 
of 100 years) but they are sustainable for several generations with more innovative and 
environmentally responsible approaches.  They are particularly critical of the USACE 
policy of zero vegetation on the levees and the execution of the subventions program 
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because they inhibit trying new approaches.  F3 worries that local knowledge of levees is 
declining in quantity and quality. 
F4 - The Multi-Purpose Levee Advocates believe that the managers, engineers, and 
scientist operating the flood control, water export, and ecosystem aspects of the Delta  are 
effectively keeping the system, including the levees, functioning while they also try to 
close the information gaps, to “learn what levers we can pull” (Interview 103-2009).  
They believe that money spent on the subventions program and habitat restoration 
projects associated with Delta levees have been a good investment. 
 The four factors explain approximately 69% of the total variance in social 
perspectives about the failures of Delta levees as of the date of the sorting by the P-set of 
levee experts. It would be encouraging if some ideas got enthusiastic support or rejection 
from all Factors but this did not happen.  Two “Consensus Statements” exist but these 
were statements of a shared lack of salience.  The first related to innovation coming in the 
form of a perhaps in a too specifically defined vegetated erosion prevention project.  The 
second consensus item came on a statement concerning the new USACE enforcement of 
the zero levee vegetation that drew low to neutral scores from all factors.  The common 
ground identified would not appear to be the starting point of for consensus building 
among factors. 
 The four factors hold significantly different perspectives as evidenced by years of 
conflicted discourse in the Delta.  Understanding of the social perspective of the 
managers and engineers in the system could be the first step in reconciling the 
differences.  The Delta Stewardship Council needs to do this to achieve consensus on a 
247 
 
 
 
Delta Plan or to overcome resistance to an imposed plan, even if the non-consensus plan 
represents a majority plan.  
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CHAPTER VII 
THE HISTORY OF FAILURES AND NEAR MISSES OF THE DELTA LEVEES  
(1868-2010) 
INTRODUCTION  
 To understand a potential source of divergent social perspectives, the second 
research question this dissertation asked was: What is the history of the failures of Delta 
levees?  This chapter introduces the Access 2010 empirical database and ARCMAP GIS 
mapping of the data point developed to answer the question.  It then presents the findings 
from this research.  In addition, this chapter reviews the catalogs and maps of the near-
miss incidents experienced by Delta levees where information is available. This 
dissertation defines “near misses” as levee failures narrowly avoided through successful 
flood fighting or completion of emergency repairs. Flood fights involve the stacking or 
sandbags or other methods of raising the levee height or otherwise strengthening weak 
points on a levee during flooding events, usually involving contractors with large 
earthmoving equipment and large numbers of volunteer hand laborers.  Emergency 
repairs involve cases where crews find and fix on a non-stop; no resources spared basis a 
major flaw or problem that poses an imminent threat to the levee. The near miss record, 
particularly of emergency repairs, remains far less complete and does not go back in time 
far because engineers, managers, and public have only recently recognized the value of 
documenting and discussing such incidents.  The lack of public interest in what does not 
fail and, thus, does not gain media attention renders it difficult to re-create this record 
from newspapers and journals.    
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 The chapter will then discuss the sources and compare the findings for the period 
1868 to 1956 with Thompson’s reporting (1958, 1962, 1996, and 2006).  It will then 
compare the levee failure history as defined in the DRMS report (URS 2009c) which also 
appeared verbatim as a staff white paper prepared for the Delta Stewardship Council 
(DSC 2010b).  Comparison with DRMS will include the difference in base number of 
failures recorded.  Definitional restrictions on what is recorded as a “levee failure” will 
be used to make the trends and history more insightful for those wanting to understand 
the past, present, and future of Delta levees.  The chapter will review the implications of 
the differences in the definitions used to establish trends.  
 Several findings relevant to the contested social perspectives explored in the 
previous chapter will be introduced including (1) records from the year 1906 of the 
effects of an 8.3 (Richter) magnitude San Andreas Fault earthquake on the Delta levees 
as they were at that time; (2) discussion of the implications of the past abandonments of 
Delta levees; and (3) the differences in statistical performance of various types of levee 
sections. 
 This dissertation represents the first attempt to locate the failures and near misses 
to levee sections rather than islands as discussed in Chapter V.  Therefore, statistical 
comparisons of the rates of historic failures by levee construction method and levee 
original builder (Project-Direct Agreement, Non-Project), purpose (agricultural, urban, 
wetland control and height-restricted), and hydrostatic loading (levee-dam or flood 
control levee) will be calculated and presented. 
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THE DATABASE OF DELTA LEVEE FAILURES AND NEAR MISSES 
 The dissertation developed a database in Access 2007, containing 997 incidence 
reports of levee failures and near misses that documented 265 failures of levees dating 
back to 1868 that have occurred in the Legal Delta.  Appendix M provides a full list of 
the identified failures of Delta levees.  I have identified the exact levee segment (out of 
404 identified segments) on which 155 failures have taken place.  Of these, the 
dissertation identifies the precise location of 102, which Figures 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 show. 
This precision extends to the location of all 46 failures since the 1972 Brannan-Andrus 
failure except one failure on Van Sickle Island and one on Prospect Island.  In total, the 
record includes one hundred twelve (112) failures recorded in the past one hundred years 
(1911-2010) and 188 since 1900.   
 The 188 represents 26 more than the number of “flooded islands” the DRMS (URS 
2009c) reported for the same period.  Figure 7.4 shows numerically how this difference 
developed.  Part of the difference stems from definitions.  Appendix M and Figure 7.4 for 
the dissertation include only records from the Legal Delta and excludes failures of levees 
in the Suisun Marsh and elsewhere, which the DRMS list sometimes includes and 
sometimes does not.  The dissertation database does not include records of failures 
outside of Legal Delta.  Appendix N provides a list of “Other Reports not Failures of 
Delta Levees” which includes some of reports of levee failures outside of the Legal 
Delta, reports of floods on areas not leveed (Ida Island for example), and floods that were 
not caused by failure of a levee.  Some of these were included in the DRMS list.  
Appendix O lists the “Questionable” reports, some of which also made the DRMS list.  
These are primarily isolated reports of a failure that cannot be substantiated with another 
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Figure 7.1 - Map of Known Levee Failures – North Delta 
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Figure 7.2 – Map of Known Levee Failures – Central Delta 
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Figure 7.3 – Map of Known Levee Failures – South Delta 
Failures – South Delta 
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Figure 7.4 - Comparison of Numbers by Decade of DRMS “Flooded Islands” and 
Dissertation List of Delta Levee Failures 
 
 
 
report and lack adequate detail and/or confirming and independent reporting.  Some are 
simply reports that reference only the calendar year and not the correct “water year.”  The 
database records the failure in the proper water year in the database.  Some of these may 
prove to be documented failures through future investigation; however, this research 
uncovered data that challenge the validity of the many of these failure reports listed in 
other sources. 
 The database also documents 24 cases of emergency repairs, all since 1981 that 
prevented imminent levee failures and 53 records of successful flood-fights, 23 since 
1950, 13 since 1973, and 5 since 1986.  Engineers consider near-miss analysis an 
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important learning tool and can learn more from sharing detailed knowledge of these near 
misses failures can be learned from actual failures.  This is perhaps most true with 
earthen levees where the floodwaters wash way and destroy everything, rendering 
reconstruction of “failures” impossible in most cases.  Near-miss analysis often is the best 
way to add to engineering knowledge.  Appendix P includes the list of emergency repairs 
in the database.   
SOURCES 
 The 35 experts interviewed in the summer and fall of 2009 and 2010 added 
significant contributions to database and mapping, particularly relative to events of the 
past 40 years.  Thompson’s work over the last 50 years represents about one-quarter of 
the total entries into the database.     
 The number of incident reports in the database by source breaks down as follows: 
237 – Thompson (1958, 1996, 2006 and 1983 with Dutra) 
159– DWR reports (DWR undated; 1964; 1973, 1983; 1984, 1985, 1988, 1997, 2008, 
2009; Cole, Finch, and Newmark1986; Rabbon and McCullaugh 1986; Robie 1974; 
1975; 1985) 
139 – Newspaper reports (San Francisco Chronicle; San Francisco Call; Slack 2003, 
Sacramento Bee; Sacramento Daily Union; River News Herald; Pittsburg Post Ledger, 
Los Angeles Times, Los Angeles Herald; Delta Herald; Antioch Ledger; Alta California) 
68 – Eyewitness reports collected during 2009-2010 interviews 
161 - DRMS report (DRMS 2009c)  
28 – Other Agency reports (CALFED 1998, S4; Siegfried 2000; Neudeck 2008) 
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44 – Google Earth and other maps and aerial images 
96 – Other (URS 2009c; Cosio 2009; Dillon 1982; GlobalSecurity.org 2005; Houston, 
Duncan, and USACE 1978) 
1 –Legal (Higgins-Monckton 1938) 
 Taken all together, recording data from these sources helped expand the list of 
failures of Delta levees, initiate compilation of lists of emergency repairs and successful 
flood fight, and provide detail to make analysis more powerful. 
COMPARISON TO THOMPSON’S HISTORY 
Thompson’s dissertation (1957), as augmented by later work (1962, 1996, 2006), 
provides the base for understanding the geography of the Delta and the early Delta levee 
failures.  Figure 7.5 summarizes the number of failures he identified by five-year period 
and compares that to the Dissertation levee failure record complied for the period 1868 to 
1956 when his record keeping stops.  Figure 7.6 provides a cumulative total of failures 
recorded for Thompson, the Dissertation, and DRMS for the period 1900-1956, the 
period the three records overlap.  These charts should provide some indication of just 
how complete Thompson’s record was for his period of interest, particularly from 1868 
through1911. After 1911, I did find a few new records that he never mentioned, however, 
his did not focus on levee failures.  I was able to add to Thompson’s work relative to the 
1906 earthquake.  Thompson never mentions the earthquake and only describes high 
tides as causing flooding on seven islands in July 1906 in the Delta, unlike his detailed 
description of 1904 and 1907 floods and levee failures.  Given the current interest in 
earthquake risk in the Delta, I checked to see if evidence existed in the record that would
  
 
257 
  
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
'68-'72 '73-'77 '78-'82 '83-'87 '88-'92 '93-'97 '98-02 03-07 08-12 13-17 18-22 23-27 28-32 33-37 38-42 43-47 48-52 53-57
Thompson Dissertation
Figure 7.5- Comparison Thompson vs. Dissertation - Failures Recorded 1868-1957 
  
 
258 
 
y = 1.0517x + 38.186 
y = 1.6075x + 37.627 
y = 1.2328x + 22.687 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 55 57
Year (19XX)) 
Thompson Dissertation DRMS
Linear (Thompson) Linear (Dissertation) Linear (DRMS)
Figure 7.6 – Cumulative Number of Levee Failures Reports -1900-1957 (Period of Overlap) - 
Thompson, DRMS, and Dissertation Database 
259 
 
 
 
link the April earthquake to the 1906 levee failures.  I found reports of six islands that 
were flooded by a late season high water event on the San Joaquin that first knocked a 
hole in the Union Island levee, and then the levee on what is now Roberts Island failed 
and the flood ending up inundating Venice, Twitchell and Sherman as the high levels 
moved downstream.  I looked back to the time of the earthquake and found no levee 
failures.  I did find that the earthquake dropped the foundation of the railroad bridge on 
the Middle River one meter and twisted it, while the pier supporting the bridge over the 
main San Joaquin River sank 8 cm. (Youd and House 1978).  Meanwhile, the railroad 
tracks that cross the Delta on the levee built in 1899 (San Francisco Call 1899) appeared 
to have suffered no damage.  One might think that Thompson’s newspaper sources could 
have been limited because of a slow recovery of the San Francisco papers still reeling 
from the April disaster, but some of my data entries did come from the San Francisco 
Call in July and August of 1906.   
 In summary, Thompson’s work forms the base of the levee failure history in the 
Delta and this record serves to extend it. I did spot check Thompson’s records, and found 
that particularly before 1911, they appear very well researched and complete, and so this 
database does rely very heavily on Thompson’s work.  Whereas 2006 represents the most 
recent date on work on the Delta produced by Thompson, I could not find any case where 
he described any flooding or levee failure that occurred after the date of his dissertation 
(1957). 
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DISSERTATION IMPROVEMENT OVER THE DRMS LIST OF DELTA LEVEE 
FAILURES 
 As shown in Figure 7.4, the Dissertation database list of “failures of Delta levees” 
differs significantly the DRMS (URS 2009c) listing of “flooded islands.”  The objective  
of the two studies was essentially the same: to understand the historical geography of the 
failures of Delta levees to understand the stability of the levee system and the trends as 
identified empirically.  The DRMS report developed an accounting of the failures that 
suggested a dim future for the Delta levees as summarized in the DRMS Executive 
Summary (URS 2009a).  This dissertation actually increased the number of levee failures 
since 1900, however, the detail and the analysis that the new list facilitated led to a 
significantly different perspective on the meaning of the history.  
 The DRMS recording of “flooded islands” by year since 1900 (URS 2009c, Table 
7-9) represented a checkpoint for the work.  Three major problems stood out however.  
First, the DRMS list provides little detail about the failures, often leaving it unclear 
whether the flood took place in the listed calendar year or the water year (October 1 – 
September 30), generally omitting any other information.  The list includes no references 
to permit check the information, the second major issue.  It makes it impossible to learn 
more from the record or check the accuracy of the reports.  The third problem stems from 
a definition of what should be reported.  DRMS confused the Delta failures with the 
Suisun Marsh levee failures.   
 Treating the levees in the Suisun Marsh the same as the levees in the Delta 
represents the first definitional problem with the DRMS report, as the history, purpose, 
funding, governance, and location of Suisun Marsh make its levees very different from 
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the Delta agricultural levees.  Until the 1990s, few paid any attention to flooding in the 
Suisun Marsh and counted or documented levee failures (Interview 132-2010).  Even the 
landowners, primarily absentee duck-hunting club members, paid far less attention to 
Suisun marsh levees than Delta farmers do their levees.  The levees in the Suisun Marsh 
largely control flooding, not necessarily prevent it, and the cost of failure tends to be far 
less, at least until DWR determine that certain levee failures in the Marsh could increase 
salinity in the Delta pool.  Counting Suisun Marsh floods as Delta levee failures but only 
starting in 1993 when about 22 miles of the 230-mile system became eligible for 
subventions money, skews trends in the records over the past 50 or 100 years (Interviews 
109-2009 and 132-2010).  The dissertation database includes failures from two islands in 
the Suisun Marsh that were included in the Legal Delta, Spinner and Van Sickle. 
 The DRMS list also suffers with ambiguity because it lists “Flooded Islands” which 
may or may be related to a failure of a levee.  When Houston, Duncan, and the USACE 
(1978) collected a list of levee failures to work their empirical model of Delta levee 
failures, they recognized that it was critical to consider only failure data on the type of 
levees of importance to the study.  In their case, they were interested in modeling the 
response of the levees to protect the main 34 agricultural islands.  They specifically 
excluded the levees designed to fail so as to provide floodway entry; floods that were not 
related to failures of levees such as the over washing of sandbars without levees in the 
Sacramento River; floods on swamp remnants that had been reclaimed by overly 
optimistic developers who lacked the resources because of the small size and large levee 
length to be viable as reclaimed farmland.  The DRMS list includes examples of all of 
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these in its attempt to help assess the failure rate for the levees in the subventions 
program. 
  Again, the issue of inadequate detail in the DRMS list (URS 2009c) creates the real 
concern in that it included seven Suisun Marsh levee failures and thirteen incidents on 
levees vulnerable to flooding because of height restrictions place on them because of 
their location in or near a floodway.  It also included ten floods of marginally reclaimed 
marsh remnants smaller than 100 hectares and three cases of non-leveed sandbars in the 
Sacramento River as suffering “levee failures”.   
 The DRMS report is not alone in recording incidents that have little in common 
with the 50 or so Delta subvention program eligible agricultural islands (termed AG in 
Figure 7.8 and 7.9) in the Delta.  This only confuses the record of how stable those 
islands are and the success of failure of the Subvention Program.  Appendix M also 
includes failures of the “Height Restricted Levees,” levees “protecting” small (less than 
100-hectare) recreational islands, and includes some levee failures of levees not eligible 
for the Subventions Program.  It even includes failures from two islands in the Suisun 
Marsh as noted earlier.  Figure 7.7 reveals that the cumulative list of the DRMS flooded 
islands and the Dissertation Database list of failures of Delta levees show similar slopes, 
in the slope suggesting an overall failure rate of around 1.3 failures per year since 1900.  
Figure 7.6 also shows the failures of only the Agricultural levees included in the 
Subventions program, which have a much flat slope and a different slope and reveals a 
different perspective.  Figure 7.8 and 7.9 show similar curves for analysis since 1950, and 
since the 1973 start of the early subventions program.  
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 The argument to treat the failures of the “Restricted Height,” small and wetland 
island levees, and the non-subvention eligible levees differently requires explanation and 
justification.  The restricted height levees are located in two areas and the levee failure 
list for Prospect and Liberty Islands reflect their significance.  The USACE incorporated 
Prospect and Liberty into the Yolo Bypass Flood Protection system for Sacramento.  
Their levees routinely “fail” to save Sacramento from floodwater.  As noted earlier, the 
Yolo Basin historically and prehistorically served as the flow path for most of the 
floodwaters of the Sacramento River and so it remained marsh until the construction 
(1917-1940) of the USACE Sacramento River Flood Control project.  This project 
included levees restraining the floods and deliberately smaller levees protecting fields in 
the floodway from minor flooding and permitting farming of those fields between 
significant floods.  The project also included two sets of weir gates to control flow from 
the Sacramento into the By-Pass, one at Sacramento and the second upstream at Fremont.  
The USACE constructed the By-Pass facilities between 1918 and 1938 and designed 
them to handle 17,052 cubic meters per second, or almost four times the flood capacity of 
the main channel of the Sacramento south of Sacramento.  Engineers designed Prospect 
Island and Liberty Island to function as exit points for flood flows as they return to the 
main river channel between Rio Vista and Isleton through Cache Slough.  The first 
planned overtopping of the limited height levees (3.505 meters -11.5 feet above sea level) 
came in 1938, as the USACE first opened the weirs to protect Sacramento.  
Appropriately, over toppings of these levees escaped mention in the DRMS reports 
before 1963, even though the islands flooded every time flood hit the Sacramento River 
since 1938.  To make matters worse for Prospect Island, the construction of the 
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Sacramento Ship Channel in the 1950s and 60s severed it from the rest of floodway and 
removed about half of the area of the island.  Prospect was left with too little area to 
justify building stronger and taller levees at that point.  The Port of Sacramento 
purchased most of property and developed a plan to incorporate it in a proposed North 
Delta Wildlife Refuge.  When Congress refused to fund the Refuge in 1999, the Port 
turned Prospect over to the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation.  In January of 2010, USBR 
transferred the island to DWR, the latest government agency to manage the levees of this 
island through seven floods since 1980.  It currently sits in a purgatory-like state waiting 
for approval for conversion into habitat.  Meanwhile, it helped swell the record of Delta 
levee failures (flooded islands officially) and particularly contributed to the indication of 
a decline since it was not farmed until 1938.  Liberty Island finally was abandoned in 
1995 or so.  
 After the 2007 failure of the Prospect levees, the USBR left them unrepaired and 
the island remained inundated.  Anglers boated into the flooded island but often were 
grounded and trapped when the tide went out.  The USBR then closed the gaps in the 
levee to protect boaters, trapping many endangered fish in the slowly drying island lake, 
creating a media event as local groups organized a giant fish rescue operation (Weiser 
2007b).  Meanwhile, with the Ship Channel levees forcing more water against the levees 
on Liberty, floods breached them so many times that the state purchased the island for 
habitat.  Liberty remains flooded on the southern end and waits for likely inclusion in the 
habitat developed in the BDCP.   
 The levees of the McCormack-Williamson Tract along the Mokelumne River 
serve a similar purpose.  Not a formalized floodway, the McCormack-Williamson Tract 
Liberty Island 
Prospect I. (RD 1667) 
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(MWT) nonetheless plays a similar role for the Mokelumne River as it enters the Delta.  
As MWT was one of the last Delta tracts reclaimed, the neighbors forced the developer of 
MWT to limit the height of the upstream levees to elevation 6.264 meters to protect the 
town of Thornton.  Floodwaters on the Cosumnes and Mokelumne Rivers collect 
upstream of MWT, blocked partially by the restricted height east MWT levee.  Before 
they can rise to a level to damage upstream property, they overtop the deliberately lower 
levee section and dump into MWT.  MWT becomes a 6.4-kilometer long flood channel 
with an elevation drop of 0.7-meters as the floods surge from west to east across it on one 
of the steepest gradients in the Delta (Interview 114-2010A).   
Whereas the developers of MWT planned and expected normal flooding of the 
tract, the steep gradient serves to accelerate flood velocities across the tract and then the 
floodwaters slam into the MWT west levee.  The waters surge over that levee and then 
run straight as a wall of water across narrow Dead Horse Channel to the east levee of 
Dead Horse Island.  Thus, the restricted height levee and the hydraulics of MWT as a 
flow channel create the so-called “toilet bowl effect” which helps overtop the east levee 
on Dead Horse every time the low levee of MWT has been breached except in 1964 
(Interview 114-2010).  In 1986, the flood surge roaring down MWT dislodged boats 
anchored at the marina where the Dead Horse Cut meets the Mokelumne.  The flood 
carried the boats that formed a raft en masse down the Mokelumne where they lodged 
against the bridge on the Walnut Grove –Thornton Road, creating a temporary dam.  The 
floodwater piled up behind and then broke through the logjam (boat jam) at the bridge, 
releasing another flush of water, which probably overtopped the Tyler Island levees on 17 
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February 1986 (Interview 114- 2010A).  Figure 7.10 maps the location of these restricted 
height levees and shows the resulting failures. 
 Island size, particularly relative to length of levee required, can also limit levee 
viability.  The list of “flooded island” (DRMS) and “Failures of Delta Levees” includes                
the numerous floods of 40 hectare Fay Island, 40 hectare Rhode Island, 80 hectare Little 
Mandeville Island, and 140 hectare Little Franks Tract.  The first three started as point 
bar meander bend cutoffs from the construction of the Old River levees on Bacon Island 
and Holland Tract.  These small island reclamation projects developed very late in the 
levee building era and contained very little farmable area, particularly on a per mile of 
levee basis.  Lack of area and resources to support large levees made it difficult to 
maintain levees, particularly for relatively low value agricultural use.  The levees tended 
to deteriorate, leading to frequent overtopping and failure.  Little Franks Tract represents 
part of the old Franks Tract that was saved from flooding by a cross levee when that 
island flooded for good in 1938.  It too was not economical viable as farmland and the 
levees deteriorated.  Contra Costa County Parks took over the site and tried to maintain 
Little Franks Tract as a natural wetland education center.  Eventually levee failure led to 
permanent flooding, as the necessary repairs were (Mitchell 1993) never funded.  So of 
the four, only Fay is currently completely leveed and dry and is apparently being used as 
a private recreational area (Interview 124-2010A). Figure 7.11 shows these islands and 
the resulting levee failures. 
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Figure 7.10 – Location of Restricted Height Levees in Delta and Related Levee Failures 
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Figure 7.11 – Location of Central Delta Small Leveed Islands and Located Failure  
Locations 
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 The third type of levee failure that should not affect the assessment of success of 
Delta Levee Subventions Program are those not eligible to participate in the program.  
Most islands and tracts are eligible in the Legal Delta except those in the Secondary Zone 
that are protected by Project Levees, in other words, the few true Flood Protection levees 
(not dams) in the Delta up the San Joaquin River as shown on map Figure 7.12.  In the 
past 25 years, these levees have high rates of failure as will be discussed later; however 
the failure rate cannot be attributed to the Subventions Program to which they are not 
eligible. 
 The DRMS list contains what appear to be outright errors, but poor referencing 
makes it difficult to confirm or deny.  One of the more significant apparent errors comes 
from the listing of some 15 islands as flooding in 1950, other records, including 
Thompson’s,  indicate that no more than two islands flooded in water year 1950 and six 
more in December of 1950 (or water year 1951 by DWR definition and practice).  To 
compound the error, one of two levees that failed in June 1950 was not recognized 
(Bradford Island) while the  other June 1950 failure was listed as a sunny-day failure and 
was used in the six event list of sunny-day failures used to predict frequency of future 
sunny-day failures (URS 2009b).  Newspaper reports (Pittsburg Post Ledger 1950) 
indicate that Webb Tract failed because of unusually high tides, winds, and atmospheric 
pressure conditions that caused adjacent Bradford to also flood the same day.  This would 
indicate that the Bradford and Webb Tract 1950 failures were high-water, not “sunny-  
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Figure 7.12 – South Delta (Secondary Zone) Levees Not Eligible for Subventions  
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 day” events.  In listing Webb Tract 1950 as a “Sunny-Day” failure, the DRMs report 
invalidates its empirical analysis of the rate of forecasted “Sunny-day” failures, which 
relied on it as one of six total data points they had available for the analysis.  
 The major problem with DRMS “Flooded Island” lists comes because of not 
following the recommendations of Houston, Duncan, and the USACE (1978) to consider 
only failure data on the type of levees of importance to the study.  This led DRMS to 
include many levee failures unrelated to the subventions-assisted levees on the 50 or so 
main agricultural islands.  Figures 7.13 and 7.14 show the results of separating out 
failures that took place directly on levees designed to fail, the “height restricted” levees.  
Secondly, it separates the incidents on the smaller (less than 200 hectares) islands levees 
from the total list along with those in the Suisun Marsh and not designed to protect the 
agricultural, residential, and other economic activities of the main Delta agricultural 
islands.  Figures 7.15 and 7.16 then show the locations of the failures of Delta levees 
occurring since 1972, breaking down the levees into the categories listed.   
 The detailed data on the failures of Delta levees indicates that the performance of 
the levees on the Delta  Analysis based on the DRMS history of “flooded Islands 
agricultural levees has been far better than indicate in the DRMS Executive Summary, a 
performance that appears to be improving under the subventions program.  Any analysis 
based on the conclusions of the DRMS study relative to the history of levee failures, 
including but not limited to the DRMS “sunny day” levee failure analysis, should be 
review and potentially reevaluated. 
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Figure 7.14 – Summary of Types of Delta Levee Failures Since 1983 
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Figure 7.15- Location of the Non-Ag Type Levees in the Northern Delta and the 
Located Levee Failures 
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Figure 7.16 – Location of the Non-Ag Type Levees in the Southern Delta and the Located Levee Failures 
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based on the conclusions of the DRMS study relative to the history of levee failures, 
including but not limited to the DRMS “sunny day” levee failure analysis, should be 
review and potentially reevaluated 
OTHER FINDINGS FROM RECONSTRUCTING THE HISTORY OF 
FAILURES OF DELTA LEVEES  
 The Q-Method study presented in Chapter VI identified several other contested 
issues between the social perspectives to which the historical record speaks, specifically,  
the reaction of Delta levees to the effects of an 8.3 (Richter) magnitude San Andreas 
Fault earthquake, the causes of past levee abandonment, and a comparison of the 
performance of USACE Project levees and levees built purely by farmers through the 
local reclamation districts. 
Record of the Effects of the 1906 Earthquake on the Delta 
 As noted in Chapter IV, Torres et al. (2000, 5) defined the conventional wisdom 
about the role of the historical record in understanding the earthquake risk, stating that  
“no report could be found to indicate that significant damage had ever been induced by 
earthquake shaking…the 1906 San Francisco earthquake occurred 81 kilometers to  the 
west, on the San Andreas Fault and produced only minor levels of shaking in the Delta; 
as the levees were not very tall yet in 1906, these shaking levels posed little threat…lack 
of historic damage to date should not lead, necessarily, to the conclusion that the levee 
system is not vulnerable to moderate to strong earthquake shaking.  The current levee 
system simply has never been significantly tested.”  Thompson (1957) took little note of 
the earthquake, indicating  that in 1906, several months after the April earthquake, six 
islands flooded because of unusually high tides.  As noted in Chapter VII, I initially 
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concentrated on these late June and early July 1906 levee failures as possible evidence of 
earthquake damage that did not manifest for a couple of months.  This hypothesis does 
not appear to be proven, I found instead evidence of a   large, late season snowmelt flood 
that started moving down the San Joaquin River in late June.  The San Francisco 
Chronicle on 26 June 1906 reported a levee failure at Kuckuk Landing on Union Island 
on the Old River, indicating that a 15-meter gash soon widened to 60 meters.  The river 
remained high and apparently after Union Island filled with water, river levels began 
rising again, reaching 3.81 meters at Clifton Court (now the forebay for the State Water 
Project pumps), thereby breaking the old record high levee on that gauge by 7.62 cm (3 
inches).  The same article indicated that water levels upstream on the San Joaquin at 
Paradise Cut were finally starting to fall.  The next day, the levees at the Drexler Tract,  
(attached to  Middle Roberts) on the Middle River gave way, followed down river by 
failures of levees on Venice, Twitchell, and Sherman Islands the following day (July 10, 
1906).  Reports of receding waters finally hit the paper over a week after the Sherman 
levee failed.  Before that, however, reports were appearing in the newspapers that 
residents had requested the sheriff to investigate possible sabotage to the Union and 
Drexler levees.  Locals felt that two levees that failed were among the most substantial in 
the Delta so the failures appeared suspicious.  The records discovered so far do not 
indicate that the sheriff ever caught anyone or even really investigated this charge, but it 
is reasonable to conclude that the 1906 levee failures relate to a late San Joaquin River 
high water event and high tides in the Delta pool, and possibly saboteurs, but not an 
earthquake. 
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 I then looked at reports of other structural damage or shaking recorded in the 
Delta in April 1906.  A collection of oral histories of Grizzly Island residents (Suisun 
Marsh) in the Rio Vista Historical Museum that recorded the remembrances of one 
resident of the 1906 earthquake shaking her home on Grizzly Island and tilting it.  She 
claimed they could see the flames (smoke?) from San Francisco from Grizzly so her 
father, apparently knowing that his levees had not been damaged, loaded up provisions 
on their boat to go help the citizens of San Francisco (Frost 1963).   
  A better-documented and more official report, however, came from Geological 
Survey Professional Paper 993 (Youd and Hoose 1978).  It records that on April 18, 
1906, the “big” Santa Fe Railroad Bridge across the Middle River between Richmond 
Junction and Stockton sank a little less than a meter (3 feet) and was shoved out of line.  
Sixteen (16) kilometers away, the bridge on the San Joaquin River main channel settled 
several inches.  The tracks connecting the apparently liquefaction damaged bridges cross 
the Delta on an east-west alignment on a “levee-like” embankment.  The alignment and 
elevations of these tracks are likely at or near those originally constructed. This suggests 
that this railroad embankment could serve as a test levee after the fact, one at that has 
been exposed to real earthquake conditions.  A San Francisco Call article dated 30 April 
1899 (see Figure 7.17) described the construction of this same levee-railroad 
embankment and the two bridges.  Figure 7.18 represents a current picture of the bridge, 
still in use, which sank one meter.  According to the newspaper article, the railroad 
engineers supported the bridge built on concrete piers with a timber pile foundation.  This 
type of failure could indicate that the subsurface layer on which the piles rested liquefied 
and lost bearing capacity during the San Francisco earthquake.  Even on the east edge of 
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the Delta it appears that some liquefaction took place.  Yet the “levee” running through a 
known area of liquefaction appeared to have suffered no damage.  Figure 7.19 shows a 
Google Earth image of the Middle River and the Santa Fe railroad embankment levee and 
the pile-supported bridge that reportedly suffered significant damage from the 1906 
earthquake. 
        Torres et al. (2000) dismiss the significance of no damage in the Delta from the 
1906 earthquake because the Delta levees of 1906 were small and unsubstantial.  The 
record is not clear how large most of the levees were that day but an article in the San 
Francisco Call dated July 21, 1907 indicated that the Victoria Island levees, reportedly 
completed in 1905 (Thompson 1957) were over 30 meters wide at the base, 3 to 6 meters 
wide on top and from 1.22 to 1.83 meters above the high water mark.  This levee today 
has similar dimensions.  This levee also ran very close to the railroad embankment 
discussed above.  No record exists of failures on Victoria Island until the great flood of 
1907.  The record suggests that Union Island levees and perhaps others were also at or 
near current dimensions in 1906.  None of this proves that the science of any of the social 
perspectives of Delta experts is better than the others; however, it does suggest that 
potentially enlightening empirical data does exist.  The fragmentary reports of the bridge 
foundation failures and the lack of damage to the tracks require detailed investigation.  If 
the Delta soils did liquefy in 1906 but the railroad embankment and other levees did not 
fail, or if they did fail, investigation of the soil conditions in those levees and foundations 
might reveal more about the reaction of at least some of the Delta levees to earthquake 
and liquefaction.  More scientific information could lead to different social perspectives  
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Figure 7.17 – Picture from the San Francisco Call 30 April 1899 Showing a Clamshell 
Dredge Building the Railroad Embankment Levee that is Still Used to Cross the Delta 
Today.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.18 – Picture of the Drawbridge over the Middle River that Reportedly Sank 91 
cm on 18 April 1906. 
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Figure 7.19 – Google Earth Image of Sante Fe (BNSF) Levee Embankment and Bridge at 
Middle River. 
 
 
 
of Delta experts, which in turn could lend to a different “best available science.”  
Normative science depends on the social perspectives of its practitioners to fill in the 
gaps when hard questions need time critical answers.  Scientific findings change the 
social perspectives of scientists which in turn then modifies what is produced as science 
The Record of Levee Abandonment in the Delta 
  The information collected for the database the on failures of Delta levees provides 
a record of levee abandonments that contradicts the viewpoint of Factor 2 that the leveed 
islands of the Delta cannot survive for long.  The list of leveed islands/tracts that owners 
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have abandoned include the Big Break near Oakley (1928), Franks Tract (1938),  Rhode 
Island (1971), Mildred (1983), Little Franks Tract (1983), Little Mandeville (1994), 
Liberty (1995), and Prospect (2007).  Additionally, Sherman Island was abandoned from 
1880 to 1894, Twitchell from 1882 to 1894, and Bouldin from 1908 to 1918 (Thompson 
1957).  As discussed earlier, Rhode and Little Mandeville Islands were cutoff point bars 
each smaller than 80 hectares, farmland too small support maintenance of levee-dams.  
The abandonment of eastern Franks Tract in 1938 left the west side still protected by a 
cross interior levee.  This remnant also proved to be too small to make leveed agriculture 
profitable.  When the levee failed, the cost of restoration and future maintenance 
overwhelmed the owners and they elected not to rebuild.  Contra Costa County reclaimed 
it once for recreation but then found it too small to maintain the levees for public use.  
Quimby, Fay, and Dead Horse represent islands that are also small for agriculture but the 
owners rebuilt the levees for personal recreational uses or because of other non-
agricultural economic reasons. 
 Gathering information on the “Big Break,” now a county park near Oakley proved 
to be difficult.  Farmers reclaimed the area in the late 1800s by building levees against 
the waters of Dutch Slough and the San Joaquin River, growing asparagus there until 
either 1927 or 1928.  It appears that part of the levee crumbled into the San Joaquin 
following heavy rains in one of those years and caused a "big break, ” flooding 640 
hectares of asparagus.  Before the owner could recover financially and rebuild, the Port of 
Stockton apparently condemned the property and incorporated it somehow into the 
Stockton Deep Water Channel project (Slack, 2003).   
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 Franks Tract, also now a State Park, represents a more interesting case.  John 
Franks, a rancher from Monterey County, got involved with partners in land reclamation 
in the Delta starting about 1898.  The partnership rented clamshell dredgers to reclaim 
Bradford Island and then purchased two dredgers to reclaim Bethel Island and Franks 
Tract between 1902 and 1906 (Thompson, 1957; Thompson and Dutra 1983, 255).  The 
Franks family ended up owning about five clamshell dredges, under the direction of son 
Fred Franks.  Their dredging company worked through the reclamation boom in the Delta 
that lasted until about 1918 and then under Fred the company diversified into industrial 
and harbor dredging and other construction work.  By 1936 when the levee on Franks 
Tract failed, John Franks had apparently died as had most of his original partners in the 
Franks Tract venture.  Tenants had leased most of the farmland on the island.  The 
flooded out renters sued the owners because they failed to maintain the levees.  None of 
the Franks was listed as defendants at trial but the University of California – Berkeley 
and the Bank of America as trustees were listed; apparently, the ownership position had 
been left to the University as a gift, the bank’s involvement was less clear.  The owners 
repaired the levee in time for the 1937 growing season and a lower court found for the 
plaintiffs.  In March of 1938, however, the judgment against the defendants was 
overturned by the State Supreme Court who ruled that because the Franks Tract 
developers had agreed to build and maintain the levees as a voluntary activity, they were 
free to stop maintaining the levees anytime they wanted to regardless of other agreements 
like a lease (Higgins vs. Monckton 1938).  About the same time the floodwaters of 1938 
damaged the levee, and this time the owners, apparently decided it was time to stop the 
association and avoid further litigation and repair cost.  Fred Franks that same year 
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terminated dredging operations in the Central Valley and moved with his last dredge, a 
suction dredge purchased in 1929, to San Diego where he operated a construction firm 
until the 1970s  (Thompson and Dutra, 1983, 255).  The owners did not the restore the 
levee and it currently is a state park known for its invasive game fishery (Mitchell 1993).   
 The abandonment of Mildred Island also involved an unusual ownership twist.  
Mildred was a small (364-hectare) reclamation, one of the very last major reclamations in 
the Delta, with the first crops produced in 1922 (Thompson 1957).  It first flooded in the 
high water of 1969 that also took down the Sherman Island levee.  Its owners rebuilt the 
levee and restored the fields but fourteen years later the property sat in escrow during the 
negotiated sale to new owners when another levee section failed.  The purchasers fought 
the unsuccessful flood fight but the uncertain ownership status made it impossible for 
anyone to commit the estimated $250,000 local share of the repairs (FEMA had approved 
funding of the restoration of the island from the federal side). Nevertheless, Mildred, like 
the other permanent island abandonments, involved extenuating circumstances and 
cannot be taken as a sign of a trend toward mass island abandonment.  When Tyler Island 
flooded in 1986, the reclamation district tackled the repair and pump out.  Although they 
Whereas they received FEMA flood insurance money, it took RD 562 about 22 years to 
repay the bank loan taken out to fund the repairs (Interview 113-2010).  
 In summary, over the years, owners abandoned lands after levee failures on several 
smaller islands that have a high levee length and thus high cost to farmable or usable area 
ratio.  Only a handful of islands smaller than 400 hectares have survived intact, notably 
Fay, Quimby, and Dead Horse, all more valued by their owners as a home than as 
farmland.  Franks Tract represents the largest levee land that has been allowed to return 
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to the waters, however it was still relatively small compared to other Delta tracts.  The 
Great Depression, generational change, the impact of two levee failures in two years, and 
an unusual court ruling likely contributed to the decision to not rebuild the levees in 
1938.  Whereas some owners have abandoned their tracts, levee history lends credence to 
the Factor 3 social perspective that the Delta residents exhibit sufficient energy to 
maintain their homes, lifestyles and levees for another at least another 100 years. 
The Record of Performance of Delta Levees by Classification of Builder 
 As noted in Chapter V, records in the database are tied to as much as possible to the 
one of the 404 levee segments I identified that share some uniformity of properties.  I 
located 165 of the 265 total failures to a particular levee segment, not just the associated 
island.  Of these, I pinpointed 106 failures to more exact locations within a particular 
levee segment, including most failures suffered since 1950.  The database also includes 
segment identification on 45 near-miss incidents.  This breakdown facilitates analysis not 
possible when failures identification takes place on an island/tract basis, such as provided 
in the DRMS study and as used by Duncan and Houston (1978, 1983) in their empirical 
models of Delta levee failures.   
 Spurred by the assumption of Houston, Duncan, and the USACE (1978) that the 
“Project” levees were so strong that the probability they would fail approached zero, I 
wanted to determine if this assumption was justified. With the segments in part decided 
by which type of organization built them or built them to the current standard, it becomes 
possible to determine failure rates for each type as shown on Table 7.1.  
 The term “Project” levee, as used in the Delta, implies the pinnacle of engineering 
standards for levees because the USACE designed and re-built these from 1917 to about 
289 
 
 
 
1953 as part of the Sacramento and the San Joaquin River flood control projects.  I 
measured 330 miles of “Project” levees in the Delta and found that since 1950, when the 
 
 
Table 7.1– Summary of Comparison of Historic Rates of Failures of Various 
Classifications of Delta Levees 
Levee Standard Miles in Delta 
Failures Since 
1951 
Historic Failure 
Rate Per Mile 
Historic Failure Rate 
Per Year Per Mile 
     
Project 330 9 0.0273 0.0005 
Direct Agreement 66 6 0.0909            0.0016 
Non Project Ag 511 16 0.0314 0.0006 
Non Project Restricted 40.6 23        0.5665 0.0140 
Other 39.8 3        0.0754            0.0013 
Non Project Wetland 30 8        0.2667            0.0045 
  
 
 
projects were completed, that nine failures have taken place on Project levees (1951 
failures on the San Joaquin River levees in the Secondary Zone are not included in this 
count because the USACE had not yet start construction on these levees) (Interview 124-
2010).  As shown in Table 7.1, the USACE designed levees share almost identical 
statistical performance with the Non-project Agricultural levees, assuming separate 
calculation of the failures of Non-Project restricted height levees.  The performance of 
the Direct Agreement levees, also the product of the USACE, primarily along the two 
ship channels, has failure rates almost three times higher than these two.  The Non-
Project levees suffer the stigma “not being engineered” and the product of local farmers 
and developers, whereas “Project” and “Direct Agreement” levees wear the mantle of the 
USACE and assumed state-of-the-art approaches.   
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 In reality, soil engineering really did not get its start in the US until after the arrival 
of the father of soils engineering Terizaghi from Europe in the 1930s.  By then most of 
the Project, Direct Agreement (Stockton Ship Channel) and all of the Non-Project levees 
in the Delta had been complete.  None of the engineering standards applied in the Delta 
today include any detailed specification for soil properties or soil compaction.  Cost 
considerations make it unlikely that engineers will be able to apply specifications for 
stringent properties for soil materials used in the construction of levees in the Delta 
region in the future, including the levees that would become the Peripheral Canal.  Soils 
required for “engineered fill” does not exist near the surface of the Delta, including the 
last half of Peripheral Canal route.  
 Engineers from the Sacramento Delta applied the best engineering practices of the 
day  to the construction of the levees and they were in communications and shared 
knowledge with levee engineers in the Mississippi Valley at least as early as 1912 
(Haviland, Dozier and Tibbetts 1912).  The development of the tracked-tired construction 
equipment (also forerunner of the military tank), the “caterpillar” tractor (Hugill 1999), 
took place in Stockton and Delta levee builders perfected the clamshell dredge building 
Delta levees, Project and Non-Project.  The engineering of levees experienced a 
Darwinian phase, in that only the fittest levee sections survived the next flood.  The 
agriculturalists simply employed new techniques and geometries as they rebuilt the failed 
sections.  They repeated this process until only the strongest levee sections survived, or 
the builders gave up.  As late as 1997, floods were knocking down the weakest sections 
of the 1950s vintage USACE built Project levees along the San Joaquin in the south-east 
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corner of the Delta.  The USACE have since re-built the levees to new standards 
informed by the failures suffered in 1997. 
 As suggested earlier, the “Restricted Height” levees and the levees protecting 
small or wetland habitat or recreational island (Van Sickle, Little Mandeville, etc.) 
experience very high failure rates.  The “Other” category includes primarily railroad 
embankments that under certain conditions (Lower Jones Tract, Glanville Tract) double 
as flood control levees with mixed success.  The Houston, Duncan, and the USACE 
(1978) and Logan (1989, 1990) developed their models of levee failures on the 
empirically determined relationship of the thickness of peat under the island or tract and 
the rate of failure of the levees on that particular island, all the analysis performed at the 
“island/tract scale.”  By identifying and establishing fine scale levee segments for data 
collection, similar analysis could be performed at a more detailed level, for example the 
failure rate of a levee segment versus the thickness of peat under that segment.  In 
defining the particular segments, I considered the original builder and purpose defined 
above and I considered the characteristics of the levee alignment.  Levee alignment could 
reflect the sediment characteristics of the material used in the particular segment, which 
could be a factor in determining failure rates.  Table 7.2 presents relationships between 
alignment-type and implied original geomorphology to the rate of levee failures. The rate 
calculated reflects the number of failures over the life of the levee and only reflects the 
102 failures that were pinpointed to an exact location.  This includes almost all of the 
failures since 1950 but lesser numbers from the early years (1860-1950).  It, therefore, 
cannot be considered a failure rate because it does not include all failures and the relative 
length of service of the levees is not taken into account.  So it represents an indicator, not  
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Table 7.2 – Summary of Levee Failure Database Breakdown of Miles, Historic Levee 
Failures and Historic Levee Failure Frequency by Type of Levee Alignment  
Type of Alignment Miles 
Located Failures in 
record 
Located 
Failures/mile  
Straight main channel 494.3 43 0.086992 
Slough 250.0 17 0.068000 
Meander Channel  48.2   4   0.0829878 
Meander Slough  38.3   3 0.078329 
Cross Marsh 152.2 18   0.1118265 
Other  37.6   5 0.132979 
Landside  81.4   1 0.012285 
Flood control  23.1 11     0.47619 
 
 
 
a rate. It also breaks out the straight main channel levees in the Secondary Zone which 
function as true levees, not “levee-dams”.  I have listed these as “Flood control” levees 
and surprisingly, at least in the Legal Delta, this group has experienced more failures per 
mile than any of the “levee-dam” categories, suggesting that the near constant hydrostatic 
loading on the ‘levee-dams” becomes a positive, rather than a negative factor.  Greater 
diligence on the part of those protected represents the most logical explanation for this 
difference. 
Another category that does not function as “levee-dams” comes in the “Other” 
classification, hold the second highest frequency number.  This category includes the 
railroad embankments that double as secondary flood control levees.  In four of the five 
cases, either trestle sections or culverts broke the containment of the embankment that 
either people did not realize existed, or they forgot that they needed to be closed in the 
event of a flood emergency.  The “Landside” levees, those generally built of drier upland 
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soils to protect tracts from  overland flow flooding from the upland areas, not 
surprisingly, have the best history. 
Among the “levee dam” groups, the calculated failures per mile are similar for the 
channel and slough types whereas the “cross-marsh” category calculated slightly higher.  
Closer investigation, however, reveals a different story.  All of the “restricted height” 
levees in the Delta were constructed as “cross marsh” levees.  If we take out the 14 
failures on the 13 miles of restricted height levees (Liberty, MWT, and Dead Horse), the 
remaining 139.2 miles of  “cross marsh” levees have suffered only four failures ( one 
since 1907), for a rate of 0.0287 per mile.  It can be argued, therefore, that the “cross 
marsh” type of alignment has performed with much lower frequency of failures.  This is 
not necessarily intuitive as the back marsh from which they were constructed likely had 
the highest content of organic material (peat), any of the “levee dam” alignments.  
Perhaps the lower rate of failures can be explained by the concept that the back marsh 
levees were built by clamshell dredges that in the back marsh could deliver relatively dry 
and undisturbed sediment to an undisturbed foundation (also with a highly organic 
content).  In addition, many of the cross-marsh levees sit on thinner peat layers and the 
clamshells may have gotten into underlying layers of clays, silts, and sands to top off the 
levees in these back-marsh areas.  In these areas, the mix of soil types (peat, sand, and 
clay) and the relatively dry conditions during excavation potentially created a stronger 
levee.  
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS  
The database of Delta levee failures introduced in the chapter closes significantly 
the gap in the shared knowledge of failures of Delta levee.  Whereas Thompson (1957, 
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1962, 1996, 2006) provided a strong base of knowledge of levee failure through 1957, the 
efforts to maintain record keeping has faltered.  Proponents of the state initiated DRMS 
hoped to close the information gaps but the limitation placed on the consultant to compile 
only existing reports left the record open. This is unfortunate given the importance the 
DWR and other state agencies assigned to the findings of the report.  The DRMS defined 
a poorly performing and perhaps doomed Delta agricultural levee system with levees 
failing at an excessive and increasing rate.  The dissertation database, however, shows 
that the Delta levees have performed adequately against their individual design 
requirements.  Moreover, the subvention program has helped the reclamations districts 
reduce the risk of failure.   
The database provides a more detailed synthesis of the overall performance and 
problems of the levees.  Potentially this record can help pinpoint specific areas of concern 
by looking at performance against a large list of variables of levee differences and history 
and by sharing information about near-miss incidents.  In this regard, the dissertation 
database helps fill the void of sharing information on the causes of Delta flooding created 
when the DWR was forced to slow down issuance of the planned annual Series 69 - 
Reports on High Water in California.   
The historical geographic research involved in this dissertation also uncovered 
evidence that the 1906 Earthquake may provide empirical evidence of how the Delta 
levees will perform in future earthquake events, an area where certainly more work is 
required.  The database and GIS mapping of records will allow scholars to continue to 
close the gap, correcting errors in the record and expanding the information available to 
help form better understand of where the levees have been and how they stand today. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
DISCUSSION 
INTRODUCTION  
 This dissertation measured and defined the social perspectives regarding the 
history of failures of Delta levees.  It also created a detailed history of the levee failures.  
This chapter will discuss the advantage of using discourse analysis, and particularly the 
quantitative/qualitative approach of the Q-method to understand the social perspectives of 
experts who manage complex human altered environments.  The chapter will also discuss 
the relationship between an incomplete or contested knowledge of the history of levee 
failures and the diversity of social perspectives found.  The chapter will close with a brief 
comparison of observations of the scholars discussed in Chapter II with the social 
perspective of the four factors. 
SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES OF DELTA LEVEE EXPERTS 
 The Abandon the Levees Factor (F2) reflects the political perspective of the PPIC-
CWS at UC-Davis identified in Chapter II.  The Abandon the Levees factor represents 
what appears to have the widest variety of loaders from an organizational affiliation 
standpoint, with one university professor, a federal environmental scientist, a state 
environmental manager, an engineer from DWR, and an engineer with a water contractor.  
The perspective sees the Delta levees as unsustainable at any cost because of the poor 
condition they are in, sea-level rise, continued subsidence, and the high probability of 
massive failures in a likely earthquake.  This translates into political support for the 
Peripheral Canal and the elimination of state financial support for the levees. 
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 On the other end of the spectrum, in what Focht (2002) would term the bi-polar 
opposite perspective, are the Delta Sustainers (F1).  This perspective sees the Delta 
levees as sustainable with moderate investments.  They see local knowledge as the 
critical element by extension, a governance scheme that fully appreciates that local 
knowledge is vital to success.  The Delta Sustainers (F1 loaders) are almost exclusively 
the reclamation district board members and the engineers and consultants who support 
them.  Seven of the nine strongest loaders on Factor 1 live in areas protected by a Delta 
levee.  As a group, they have been directly involved in most, if not all, of the flood fights 
since the 1972 Brannon-Andrus levee failure, and in one case as early as 1956.  Six of 
them volunteered how they participated in their first flood fight with their fathers.  
Politically, they align with the Restore the Delta group because they sense reduction in 
interest by the public in the levees and water quality will deteriorate in the Delta once 
DWR builds the Peripheral Canal. 
 Factor 4, the Multi-Purpose levee advocates, is the other somewhat predictable 
Factor; four of the five loaders on F4 hold engineering degrees and the fifth holds of 
couple of degrees in environmental science.  All have worked much of their professional 
careers with DWR, USBR, and/or the USACE.  They are all dedicated to the work of 
those organizations.  None of them, however, lives in the Delta.  This social perspective 
comes from the individuals who have been striving to provide reliability in water exports, 
to re-establish a viable ecosystem, and help to provide flood protection for those living 
behind the Delta levees.  They are lukewarm in their support for a peripheral canal, and 
take a middle ground position between F1 and F2 on the stability of Delta levees and risk 
of multiple liquefaction related levee failures. 
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 F3, the Levee Pragmatists, represent a viewpoint that surprised the eight strongest 
loaders from the other factors that I met for follow-up interviews.  One can speculate that 
the eight were surprised because the agencies, reclamation boards, and scholar focusing 
with each other in discourses on Delta levee have ignored or just not heard less vocal and 
less powerful local interests.  Uncovering this social perspective demonstrates a benefit 
of discourse analysis in general and Q-Method in particular.  With only two loaders and a 
low interest in the politicized Peripheral Canal debate, society and the key actors could 
easily miss this perspective.  Yet as with all valid perspectives, the public should not 
ignore this contrarian viewpoint with its healthy amount of criticism for many.  The 
loaders of F3 are two of the most diligent and knowledgeable students of the Delta levees 
interviewed for this dissertation, topping a list of interviewees whose knowledge and 
commitment are exceptional.  Both of the loaders hold Ph.Ds. in sciences and live behind 
levees, one in Delta itself.  Both extensively travel and work on Delta levees so their 
concerns others should not dismiss their perspectives.  The best solutions for Delta levees 
would likely come from parts of all the social perspectives, making the need to recognize 
them and deal honestly with the differences so important in levee governance.  
 One of the advantages of Q-Method is to help identify areas of agreement among 
perspectives.  USACE Headquarters provides one such area of consensus of social 
perspectives in that all agree that the USACE should rescind its bare levees policy.  The 
perspectives share also a high confidence in technology and science and  all appear to 
agree that engineering created the problems and engineering can solve them.  The Delta 
Sustainers believe that more rip-rap and more height and wider toe berms can make the 
levees work for generations, just as they have in the Dutch polders and the English Fens.  
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The Abandon the Levees factor sees a well-engineered isolated conveyance system easily 
allowing the water exporters to draw the best water for Californians and Central Valley 
agriculture and manage the salt-water bay that will replace the Delta as the best possible 
habitat for smelt and striped bass.  The Levee Pragmatists see the need for more subtle 
technologies and techniques to improve the levees as flood protection structures and as 
habitat.  Finally, the Multi-Purpose Levee Advocates perspective, most closely associated 
with the engineers and managers who run the Delta today, insist that the best technology, 
the best levees, the best habitat restoration projects, and the best Folsom Dam spillway 
configurations give the greatest flexibility to manage the Delta.  They are not uniformly 
enamored with the Peripheral Canal but, if built, they will use it. 
AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN PERSPECTIVES 
 Three concepts stand out as dividing Delta levee experts into views that would seem 
to be irreconcilable, absent efforts to break down, or at least soften, the differences in 
basic understandings.  The first differences stem from views of stability and security of 
the existing levees to withstand the current level of destructive forces and increased 
future loads imposed by climate change and continued subsidence.  Delta Sustainers 
perceive a history that indicates that Delta levees have never been stronger and the 
number of levee failures is reasonable and declining.  In addition, with appropriate 
investment by all the stakeholders, they will continue to get stronger.  The other 
perspectives, quoting the levee failure history outlined in DRMS (URS 2009a; 2009c), 
are less confident in the stability of the existing levee system, finding an unacceptable 
history of performance of the levees that continues to deteriorate in spite of increased 
state investment.  The Abandon the Levees factor that considers Delta levees doomed by 
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nature and not worth saving, represents a perspective contradictory to that of the Delta 
Sustainers.  The Abandon the Levees factor sees the process of levee abandonment well 
under way with the abandonment of the Big Break Area, Franks Tract, Mildred, Liberty, 
and Prospect with the rest to follow.  The other two perspectives fall in between but they 
are generally concerned about stability of the existing levees.  Multi-Purpose Levee 
Advocates mainly worry about the levees because of continuing subsidence and all the 
challenges from rising sea levels to rodents to possible earthquakes.  Levee Pragmatists 
fret because they see reclamation districts employing inadequate maintenance practices 
on Delta levees.  Many who worry about the stability of the Delta levees picture the 
Chinese labor crews building the levees with wheelbarrow and shovel out of blocks of 
peat a century ago or more without the benefit of engineering skills or knowledge 
 Second, the level of risk to the levees and the Delta from earthquakes, and 
specifically multi-island, simultaneous failures caused by liquefaction represents a 
significant area of difference that appears impossible to resolve between F1 and F2.  The 
Abandon the Levees perspective, supported by the DRMS Executive Summary (URS 
2009a), sees the catastrophic earthquake as a near certainty, an overdue event that should 
be the primary focus of future planning for the Delta.  This risk drives the need for quick 
action on an earthquake-proof isolated conveyance system and reluctance to commit any 
funds for maintaining or improving the existing, but doomed, Delta levees, even for 
habitat.  On the opposite side, the Delta Sustainers look at the entire levee history and 
find no earthquake-related failures.  They have fought and stopped too many boils, filled 
in too many beaver and squirrel dens, rocked over too many erosion scallops, sandbagged 
too many settled levee sections during floods, and even rebuilt half of the Bradford Island 
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levee in August 2009, torn out by a “softly colliding” runaway Greek freighter (Interview 
103-2010A) to have much time to worry about hypothetical earthquake damage they have 
not experienced.  The Delta Sustainers hold that whereas earthquake forces could shake 
the Delta, the levees themselves are more resilient to earthquakes than other structures 
and features.  This view received additional support in August of 2011when NSF funded 
researchers from UCLA simulated a near 7.0 magnitude Hayward Fault earthquake and 
failed to damage the test levee they build on Sherman Island (Weiser 2011).  Between 
these views, the Multi-Purpose Levee Advocates and the Levee Pragmatists respect the 
scientists sounding the alarm, but long for more convincing proof one way or another, 
hopefully not in the form of a levee-wrenching earthquake.  The heart of the science in 
the DRMS study relies on the 2000 CAL-FED study (Torres, et al. 2000), which relied on 
“expert elicitation” to help quantify the risk.  Several of the nine participants on the 
expert panel of the CALFED-sponsored Torres study continue to question publicly qthe 
results of the elicitation they participated in. 
 A third bi-polar concern is the F3 view that the local knowledge of the reclamation 
districts and their ability to manage Delta levees has deteriorated and is now vastly 
overrated.  They also feel that the DWR and the local districts work poorly together on 
the wrong things.  The negative beliefs of F3 toward the strength and importance of local 
knowledge holds them in significant conflict with F1.
 Finally, the Q-Method analysis focused on the role of the Delta levees in future 
water conveyance, especially relative to the desirability of a Peripheral Canal to take over 
that responsibility.  Whereas in the political discourses, two of the three identified 
strongly supported the necessity of the Peripheral Canal, only the Abandon the Levees 
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social perspective perceives the absolute necessity of a Canal.  F3 and F4 remain 
unconvinced of the need while the Delta Sustainers strongly oppose the construction.  
This research only focused on the meaning of Delta levees.  The social perspectives of 
environmental restoration issues, water rights, all of which influence the Peripheral Canal 
debate were not addressed.  Only F2 perceives that the Peripheral Canal is justified by the 
history and anticipated future of the Delta levee failures. 
THE HISTORY OF THE FAILURES OF DELTA LEVEES AND THE FOUR 
SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES 
 A primary focus of this dissertation was to understand why Delta levee experts 
expressed such conflicting views of the stability and sustainability of Delta levees.  Q-
Method identified different views of the performance of Delta levees as a major factor in 
determining perspectives.  The  DRMS report appeared to resolve this problem, as the 
consultant used the existing documentation to create a list of historic levee failures back 
to 1900.  However, as noted in Chapter VII, this DRMS listing (URS 2009c) which then 
got copied directly by the Delta Stewardship Council staff (DSC 2010b) for the DSC’s 
use in policy-making, lacks detail, precision, and references.  Its conclusion that the 
annual Delta-wide frequency of island flooding increased from 0.80 during 1950 to 1980 
to 1.39 between 1980 and 2006, (URS 2008c, 25) suggests that the increased 
maintenance and subvention program money were not paying off is inaccurate at best.   
 Questions about this analysis led to the development of the levee failure history 
database in this dissertation.  As noted on Figure 7.11, in the past 25 years since the levee 
subvention program finally received significant funding (see DRMS Figure 4-4c URS 
2008e, 26), only three failures of agricultural levees in the subventions program occurred 
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and only 12 since 1980 for a frequency of 0.4 failure per year between 1980 and 2010.  
When considering the period 1981-2010, the rate drops to 0.233.  The rate for the last 25 
years is 0.08 failures per year.  Houston, Duncan, and the USACE (1978) might suggest 
this still overstates the rates because they include the flooding of Dead Horse Island in 
1980, 1986 and 1997, an island they did not include in their analysis because it is so 
directly affected by the hydraulic surge created by the height-restricted levee on 
neighboring McCormack-Williamson Tract. 
 One of the statements in the Q-sort related to whether DRMS was merely a 
conspiracy to justify the Peripheral Canal.  Whereas the conspiracy theory drew little 
support among any of the Factors, the DRMS consultants and staff were under 
considerable political and time pressure.  Just a year before, the Little Hoover 
Commission (Alpert 2005) issued its report that would help kill the CALFED effort.  It 
was critical of the lack of metrics to determine the progress made on the goal of 
improving the integrity of the levees.  The Little Hoover report suggests that while the 
numbers that were available indicated that the integrity of the levees seemed to be 
improving, it dismissed those trends with the conclusion that the metric “does not account 
for levee foundations that compress under new loads, causing the levees to sink” (Alpert 
2005, 33).  Kallis, Kiparsky and Norgaard (2009, 634) determined that Governor 
Schwarzenegger concluded that CALFED “…had largely failed to achieve its goals, 
particularly those of reversing declining species populations and improving levee 
stability.”  With no standard measured record of the failures, plus pronouncements from 
the governor and the chairman of the Little Hoover Commission that things were getting 
worse out on levees, and no real funding for research or science, the consultant and DWR 
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folks who were asked informally to provide data did the best they could.  This 
environment made it hard, however, for consultants trying to keep some 90 islands and 
tracts straight to remember the warning of Houston, Duncan, and USACE about 
“supposed failures that were not failures” (1978, 7).  Perhaps the extreme case in the 
DRMS history of levee failures was the listing of a 2006 levee failure on Honker Bay 
Club Island.  This particular levee district is not in the Delta but rather in the Suisun 
Marsh where the owners have built and maintained the levees to control flooding to 
promote the care, feeding, and luring of migratory waterfowl for conservation and 
hunting.  The owners of Honker Bay Club only became eligible for state support to 
maintain levees in 1999 (Dreher et al. 2008) and then only for the one levee section 
fronting Honker Bay itself.  No one was keeping track of a history of levee failures, with 
only the absentee sportsmen owners possibly noticing a Suisun Marsh levee failure prior 
to recent concerns raised over the possible effects of Marsh levee failure on Delta salinity 
levels.  Given the differences in purposes, levees in the Suisun Marsh do not even 
approach the standards of Delta HMP levees.  Perhaps the worst case of confusing 
“flooding” and with “levee failure” shows in the recording of the flood at Honker Bay 
(Suisun Marsh) in 2006 in the DRMS record.  The island was covered with water in early 
October 2006 (water year 2007) after DWR, USBR, and other sponsors deliberately cut 
18.6 meters of the levee to create 28.3 hectares of new tidal wetlands known as the 
Blacklock Restoration project.  The perceptions of the levees made it possible for DRMS 
preparers to see in this planned restoration project as a levee-failure related flood.   
 The DRMS study (URS 2008c, URS 2009a) and Executive Summary portray a 
subventions program that has failed to save the levees from continuing deterioration, 
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whereas the work presented in Chapter VII suggests certain improvement.  The 
subventions program has enjoyed success making a levee system grow stronger in spite 
of poor pedigrees, sea-level rise, continuing subsidence, and a variety of rodent and 
ocean-going vessel groundings on the levee.. 
LOCAL KNOWLEDGE 
 I expanded the database of levee failures to document also emergency repairs and 
successful flood fights.  With one possible exception, Tyler Island, this record is 
incomplete.  Since 1980, one reclamation district experienced one over-topping levee 
failure flood but had to make six emergency repairs and fight at least one successful flood 
fight.  Assume the ratio of near-misses to floods at Tyler is anywhere near reflective of 
the Delta as a whole, it suggests that Delta levees performance results more from the 
constant human input than the  inherent strength of the levee system.  The levees as 
structures do not function as impervious, impregnable structures that generate a great deal 
of confidence.  They leak constantly but island farmers have learned how to control the 
leakage.  The levees also settle differentially but sandbags raise the elevation of low spots 
in a flood fight to avoid significant overtopping.  Rodents burrow into the levees along a 
1760-kilometer front.  Every reclamation district engineer and director interviewed 
stressed that the critical factor for survival of Delta levees is constant patrolling of every 
inch of the levee system.  The Delta levees form a system with human inputs, one well  
suited to an agricultural setting where residents are equipped with Earth moving and 
smoothing machinery and skills and are constantly monitoring soil moisture conditions.. 
 Tyler Island experience suggests the importance of the local knowledge and 
diligence of the reclamation districts and the flood fighting and repair assistance from 
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DWR and the California Conservation Corps in preventing additional failures.  This 
elevates the concern in the difference in perception between Factor 1 and Factor 3 over 
the effectiveness and depth of local knowledge about the levees.  Key to this concern is 
admissions by Factor 1 loaders 111 and 115 that the distribution of local knowledge lacks 
uniformity and consistency across levee districts and may soon face a generation gap as 
the current leaders fail to pass on the knowledge fully to the next generation.  A prime 
reason for differences in social perspectives is difference in experiences.  Factor 3 loaders 
with implicit agreement by factor loader, suggest that local knowledge and involvement 
is not uniform across the Delta and these levee systems are as dependent on the people as 
they are on the rock and soil of the levees themselves. 
 One might suggest that the USACE or DWR could take a larger role, with the 
perception that the “Project” levees are perfect.  As noted in Chapter VII, the Project and 
Direct Agreement levees have performed no better than the Non-project levees over the 
60 years since the USACE completed their work on the Georgiana Slough and the San 
Joaquin River south of Stockton levees.  The local reclamation districts have maintained, 
patrolled, and repaired the Project and Non-Project levee alike, so it should not be 
surprising that they would have similar rates of failure.  The Project levees also have the 
advantage or disadvantage that many miles of that system are “Upland” or Secondary 
Zone flood control levees not exposed to water lapping against the side of levee except 
during high water.  This should give Project levees an advantage over the Non-Project 
levees, which are mostly levee-dams under constant hydrostatical  loading and stress.  
Perhaps it is that constant testing that triggers patrols that are more diligent and exposes 
seepage points of weakness before the middle of high water events.   
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CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE 
 As noted in Chapter II, a number of scholars have studied the development of 
wetland reclamation, flood control, and large water transfer projects in the American 
West.  Their writings have influenced the discourses about these activities in general and 
about Delta levees specifically and this dissertation reveals how the Delta levee experts 
interviewed view these scholars’ opinions today.  
 Prince (1999) explored the changing discourses on the value of the wetlands, 
suggesting that in the Midwest, changing definitions of Nature by society were forcing 
farmers of reclaimed wetlands to reinvent their farms as “mixed species communities” 
(Prince 1997, 346) where humans were one of the acceptable species.  Whereas the 
subsidence precludes returning the Delta island to anything like the pre-development tidal 
freshwater marsh, the Abandon the Levees social discourse push for an open salt water 
bay as the most desirable habitat option.  The Delta Sustainers (Delta farmers) social 
perspective talks about the value of the terrestrial and marsh ecosystems protected by the 
levees while resisting any need to modify farming methods.  F4, represented in the P-Set 
largely by engineers and managers from DWR and the USACE strongly supports 
statement 5 that the agencies “preserve current conditions in the Delta while it is clear 
what to do to have a healthy Delta ecosystem.”  This dissertation confirms that the social 
redefining of nature places the same pressures on the farmers of the Delta as experienced 
in the Midwest to work to continue the perception that their activities in the Delta remain 
legitimate.. 
 O’Neill (1998, 2006) argues that the USACE, the states and local agencies and 
elites over time developed a seamless governing of the flood control system.  A challenge 
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she saw was that the system might be too rigid to execute effectively the environmental 
protection and restorations that society expects in these systems.  Factors 1 and 4 see the 
DWR, local reclamation district and the local USACE office as working effectively 
together, albeit with some tension around how to execute elements of habitat restoration.  
The apparent inflexibility of USACE Headquarters on the bare levees policy and the 
friction it has created with the DWR and RDs supports O’Neill’s concern that the smooth 
working relationships could break down in the face of ecosystem restoration. 
 The dissertation extends Kelley’s (1989) work describing the levee failure along 
the Sacramento by detailing those in the Delta, which he largely ignored.  In a negative 
way, the social perspectives identified confirm his argument that the “Whig-Republican” 
view dominates.  None of the Factors questioned the concept of the state and federal 
governments building and managing major infrastructure projects to help support 
economic activities.  Politically, support for the Peripheral Canal does not appear to be 
associated directly with a political party.  We do see, however, support from Factor 3, 
particularly for Kelley’s concept that the USACE, reclamation districts, and DWR can be 
“a people slow to learn.” 
 As noted in Chapter II, four scholars,  Worster (1985), Reisner (1986), Hundley 
(2001), and Pisani (2002), have looked at the great hydraulic engineering projects in the 
American West including the systems supplied by the Sacramento-San Joaquin River 
systems and developed very different perspectives on them.  The social perspectives of 
Delta levee experts reflect these differing views. 
 Worster’s search for the evil hydraulic empire in the CVP and SWP does not gain 
full support in the social perspectives of Delta levee experts but concerns may be 
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reflected in the rejection by F1 and F3 and the lack of salience by F2 and F4 for a single 
agency to manage the Delta (Statement 3).  No perspective sees DWR and the USBR as 
despots,  the view from Reisner’s (1989) argument that political leaders cannot be trusted 
when it comes to water politics.  F1 with acceptance of Statement 16 that “DRMS was a 
DWR conspiracy to justify the Peripheral channel” reveals some support for Reisner’s 
concerns.  Perhaps the greatest contribution of Reisner and Worster was to raise 
awareness of at least the appearance of transgressions and warn of the potential of future 
corruption of California water politics by powerful and wealthy water interests. 
 Hundley (2002) focused more fully on the Delta and its role.  His work was either 
the most insightful or the most convincing, because he suggested a Task Force be 
established to tackle Delta issues and that, of course, happened with Delta Vision and the 
Delta Stewardship Council.  Hundley suggests that the sins of water resource abuse in the 
American West can be blamed on the continued willingness of the American Public to 
support major water export projects, perhaps reflected in the fact that only Factor 3 even 
questions the idea of water exports from the Delta.  Factor 3 perspective appears to be the 
one factor most aligned with Huntley’s view that the important issue is to educate the 
public to “abandon those attitudes and institutions that were born of an earlier era when 
abundance encouraged abuse” (Huntley 2001, 564). 
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CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
CONCLUSIONS 
 The social perspectives of key actors on the governance and role of Delta levees 
has been hidden by the prolonged and fierce debate and discourse alliances developed 
over the desire of southern California and Central Valley water users to gain direct access 
to Sacramento-San Joaquin through a Peripheral  Canal or other Isolated Conveyance 
System.  Those arguing for such a Canal use the apparent or assumed weakness and 
instability of Delta levees as a major part of the argument advanced in support of  the 
Canal. 
 Understanding the social perspectives of experts and decision makers in areas 
where resource utilization and sustainability debates have become contentious is 
important for at least two reasons.  First, the science and knowledge of those expected to 
provide the “best available science” for policy makers can be, and often are, subsumed, 
integrated, or implicit in major political debates.  This hides scientific uncertainty in the 
effort to make simple, sellable arguments.  Second, normative science typically deals 
with unknowns or unknowables. Therefore, as Bischof (2009) suggests, when science 
provides input into policymaking, we should have understanding of the social 
perspectives that support the recommendations. 
 In the case of the Delta levees, an accidental water supply hub since 1951, public 
discourses have been structured around the idea of fatal defects in the levee system, 
rather than idea that a strong levee is better able to fill the water hub role than at any time 
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in history.  Each political perspective has developed a set of “facts” that have become 
what Bischof (2009) would term a “polarizing certainty” that drives the discord in the 
political debate and makes formation of coalitions between the parties difficult to form.  
The Q-Method determination of social perspectives of Delta levees found two social 
perspectives strongly connected to the political arguments and two that diverge.  For 
Factor 3, problems with the governance and governing of the levees themselves are major 
concerns.  For Factor 4, engineering and science can extract increasing demands  from 
the Delta and its levees.  The need for a Peripheral Canal only became a major element of 
in Factor 2; however, in the political arena this means little as Q-Method cannot 
determine the political support each perspective holds. 
Q-Method revealed bi-polar perspectives with differences based on conflicted 
views of the past performance (not having failures) and the probability of massive 
damage to Delta levees in an earthquake.  The Abandon the Levees and Delta Sustainers 
factors held perspectives so conflicted that collaboration or even compromise appears 
unlikely.  Raadgever, Mostert, and van de Giesen’s (2008) assertion that understanding 
and sharing social perspectives can help resolve conflicts will likely go untested with 
Delta levees given the bi-polar nature of the perspectives.  Reducing the uncertainty level 
for all perspectives will be required to begin the close the gaps between perspectives.  
This dissertation compiled and analyzed the history of failures of Delta levees.  I found a 
levee system that performed much better than the DRMS analysis implies.  The historical 
review also uncovered evidence that indeed Delta levees in near-current configurations 
experienced liquefaction caused by the San Francisco Earthquake of 1906.  However, no 
evidence exists of damage to any of the Delta levees from those forces. These 1906 
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reports require further investigation and confirmation.  If appropriate, follow-up could 
include detailed soils and geotechnical analysis.  It would seem prudent to do so before 
Californians commit to a Canal, costing an estimated $13 billion and justified largely 
because of the potential of earthquake damage and a faulty or exaggerated  history of 
levee failures. 
 The stability of Delta levees represents just one of many issues related to 
justifying the Peripheral Canal, but it might be the only one that if proven or widely 
believed, would demand the building of the Peripheral Canal.  More broadly, other 
influences on the Peripheral Canal include consideration of the best and legal use of the 
Delta and the water resources of the state and the desired socio-ecosystem that can be 
sustained in the Delta.  On the habitat side, goals for smelt recovery conflict with those of 
the Sacramento River Chinook runs and sturgeon.  Q-Method study of Delta 
environmental issues could help bring clarity to what the experts think can and should be 
done (Focht 2002). 
 Q-Method, as demonstrated by Focht (2002), Raadgever, Mostert, and van de 
Giesen (2008) and Bischof (2010) is an effective way to understand what scientific issues 
underlie the political discourses and disputes.  Q-Method represents an effective approach 
to perform discourse analysis to gain this understanding without the practiced skills 
involved in other forms of discourse analysis.  Particularly for scientific, technical and 
policy areas, its quantitative elements serve to reassure the scientific, technical, and 
management communities whose discourses are of interest.  It also permits scholars with 
an understanding of the science or technology but inexperienced with discourse analysis 
methodologies to have confidence in the results.  Unfortunately, Q-Method cannot 
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measure how widely held a social perspective is; nor can generalization be made based 
on the factors identified. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 The two major findings of this dissertation, the presence and nature of four social 
perspectives on the past, present and future of Delta levees and a detailed compilation of 
the history of failures and emergency repairs, should be shared with all experts and 
decision-makers on Delta levees.  Scholars (Ellis, Barry, and Robinson 2007; Swedeen 
2007; Raadgever, Mostert, and van de Giesen 2008; Lopez-i-Gelats, Tabaran and Jordi 
2009)  have suggested that knowledge and recognition of the perspectives of others can 
lead to better collaboration and selected outcomes.  Each of the perspectives has validity 
and should be valued by policy makers and should be considered in the solutions and 
decisions reached. 
 The record of levee failures challenges previous studies, most importantly, 
DRMS.  Studies, decisions, and even social perspectives based on earlier studies should 
be reconsidered based on the details provided in the database of levee failures.  Earlier 
studies presented little more than a simple count of flood events in the Delta, but did not 
identify the individual circumstances of failure that provide the ability to explain the past 
and provide the necessary information to improve future outcomes.    
 The discovery of this dissertation that the 1906 earthquake caused significant 
damage in the Delta but apparently not to the levees deserves further investigation.  
Empirical evidence of effects of a major earthquake on the Delta levees may exist that 
has largely been ignored with the frustration of not being able to simulate such an event.  
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The disparity of views on this risk divides the social perspectives on the Delta levees 
more that the Peripheral Canal.  
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APPENDIX A 
Expanded List of Selected Q-Method  Studies in Geography and related Fields 1999-2011 
Year Referenc
e 
Subject Concourse Q-set P-Set Factors 
       
1999 (Barry and 
Proops) 
“Attitudes 
towards the environment by 
members of several 
Local Employment and 
Trading Systems (LETS) 
Groups. “(England) p 339 
Finite diversity of concourse.  
Created by structured 
interviews. 
36  
Found 
to be 
manage
-able, 
develop
ed 
through 
discours
e matrix  
25 4 ideal sorts 
2000 (Robbins) Explores the differences 
between state and local 
environmental knowledge in 
Rajasthan, India, both within 
and outside the state forest 
bureaucracy 
17 pictures of vegetation 17 
pictures 
of 
vegetati
on 
62 stratified by 
caste 
4 Factors 
explain 67% 
of variance 
in species 
preference 
2000 (Robbins 
and 
Krueger) 
Development of a 
participatory planning 
process for the Northern 
Forest Lands region of the 
US 
400  reliance on “Grounded 
Theory” to develop 
representative concourse 
stressed 
45 
(target 
range 4 
to 5 
dozen) 
37 people 
Purpose-fully 
sampled to 
represent 
variety of 
(Scale -5 to 
+5) 
5 
2001 (Fairweathe
r and 
Swaffield) 
The ways tourists 
experienced Kaikoura N.Z. 
as a vacation spot 
220 pictures  30 
pictures 
66 randomly 
selected but 
with 
local/internatio
nal split 
5  61% of 
variance 
explained  
2005 (Eden, 
Donaldson, 
and Walker) 
Examining the production 
and use of environmental 
science by NGOs. 
 
(More of a discussion of Q 
Method and details of case 
application not specifically 
noted) 
200-500 Naturalistic  using 
“raw verbiage” “Grounded 
Theory” used to take to 
“Saturation Point” 
40? 
36-60 
target 
Compre
hensive
ness 
rather 
than 
represe
ntativen
ess 
(p. 417) 
Four 
foci 
13? 
Not 
 identified 
2? 
2006 (Robbins) Looks at how First World 
(North Yellowstone region) 
local hunter elk knowledge  
converge with that of state 
officials, environmentalists, 
landowners and others to 
see how discourse coalitions 
(following Hajer, 1997) 
actually work and the 
interaction of  knowledge, 
policy, and power in this 
environment. 
20 from informal interviews 
and literature search 
20 30 including 
original 
interviews  
2 
2007 (Swedeen) Used Q to gain insight into a 
classically conflict-ridden 
ecosystem management 
concern, forest management 
in the Northwest of the 
United States. 
 
200 items from interviews 
and documents (EIS, etc.) 
Stopped when started 
repeating 
64  
stateme
nt 
derived 
using 4 
X 4  
political 
matrix 
30 3 Used 
Centroid 
factor 
analysis 
followed by 
both 
Varimax 
rotation and 
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Year Referenc
e 
Subject Concourse Q-set P-Set Factors 
manual 
rotation 
2007 (Pini et al.) Stakeholder perspectives on 
rural government 
management of natural 
resources in Australia per 
the Local Agenda 21 of the 
UN 
Concourse developed from 
93 interviews with local 
officials in 15 different local 
sub- divisions across 4 
Australian states 
56 
Target 
30-60, 
ended 
up with 
56 from 
a 7 by 8 
matrix 
21 face to 
face,   
7 telephone, 
28 total is 
consist-en 
with literature 
5 
22 sorts 
loaded with 
statistical 
significance 
with the five 
factors 
2007 (Hall) Scottish farmer attitudes 
toward genetic modified 
crops 
700 from mailed survey with 
13 open ended questions 
48 
selected 
using 
matrix  
15 3 
2007 (Ellis, Barry 
and 
Robinson) 
Identify the discourses of 
support and objection to 
wind farms offshore 
Northern Ireland . 
458 – Dryzek & Berejikian 
4X4 matrix used   
50 71 agreed, 
only 46 
finished it 
correctly 
4  
supporters, 
4 objectors 
2008 (Raadgever
, Mostert, 
and van de 
Giesen) 
Identify stakeholder 
perspectives 
on future flood management 
in the lower Rhine basin in 
Germany and Holland. 
 
Literature search and 23 
semi-structured interviews. 
Unidentified number 
collected on 4 issues 
46   47 
200 were  
asked to 
participate 47 
did using 
online 
tool, set up 
using free 
web-based 
software 
(available at 
http://q.sortser
ve.com) 
(p. 1099) 
3 
2008 (Ockwell) Investigating Q as a method 
to open up and make more 
reflexive fire management 
policies in the Dry Cape 
York region of Australia 
304 drawn mostly from 
literature and prior research 
with particular attention paid 
to studies of aboriginal 
anthropological studies 
because of language 
problems 
36  
Develop
ed 
using 
4X4 
matrix 
32 stake-
holders 
representing 
cross section 
of key interest 
groups 
4 
2008 (Hawthorne, 
Krygier and 
Kwan) 
Use of Q –method and GIS 
to study NIMBY effects 
relative to rails to trails 
convergence in Delaware, 
Ohio. 
19 pictures of trail sites 19 
pictures 
of trail 
sites 
18  
Members of 
community 
with 2  
conditions of 
instruction at 
two scales 
2 for each 
scale 
2008 (Danielson) Does Grid Group Cultural 
Theory (GGCT) help 
understand views of wildfire 
risk in N.J. and N.S.W. 
Australia? 
Based on 11 field interviews 
+ various published papers 
56 25-N. J. 
28- N.S.W. 
Australia 
5- N.J. 
4 –NSW 
For both 
discourses 
2009 (Venables 
et al.) 
Understand the perspectives 
on nuclear power plant 
operating risk of long term 
neighbors to two plants in 
the UK. 
400 - Generated from 32 
biographical narrative 
interviews 
62 
based 
on ten 
themes, 
mostly 
from 
concour
se with 
addition 
of a 
couple 
added 
by 
researc
her 
84, 41 from 
each site who  
were initially 
identified 
using 
professional 
recruitment 
4 
At least two 
Q-sorts 
“load” 
uniquely on 
each factor 
(p 1094) 
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Year Referenc
e 
Subject Concourse Q-set P-Set Factors 
2009 (Tuler and 
Webler) 
Learn about perspectives 
and goals of oil spill 
emergency response in four 
US regions 
Created from literature and 
two oil spill case studies 
42 49 
12 each from 
3 regions, 13 
from Washing-
ton state. 
 4 
2009 (Lopez-i-
Gelats, 
Tabara, and 
Jordi) 
Local perspectives of what 
is rural in an area of the 
Spanish Pyrenees  
21 interviews generated 200 
statements  
36 
(manag
eable) 
Same 21  
completed sort 
4- Used 
PCA and 
Varimax 
rotation to 
get  75% 
explained 
variance 
2009 (Hennessy) Exploration of key 
stakeholder perspectives on 
the barriers to graywater 
reuse in Vancouver, B.C. 
250 written from literature 47 to 
cover 
10 
categori
es 
25 3  
2009  (Doody et 
al.) 
Developing bottoms up and 
tops down sustainability 
measures  using Q 
750 items from 11 focus 
group meetings 
40 
develop
ed in 
the 4 by 
4 matrix 
37 from public 6 
Used 
PCQwin 
software 
(http://www.
pcqsoft.com
/)  Varimax 
rotation 
2010 (Person) Understand the social 
perspectives of the elites in 
Nolan County relative to the 
wind energy business 
arriving in the region. 
300  
Mainly  from semi-structured 
interviews with Key actors 
27 -  16 
categori
es 
reduced 
to 5 
21 purposively 
chosen key 
actors. 
5 - 77% of 
variance 
explained 
no factor 
with less 
than two 
loaders 
2011 (Brannstro
m) 
Describe and analyze 
discourses concerning 
environmental governance 
in the expanding soy belt in 
Bahia state, Brazil. 
42 -Develop with Naturalistic 
approach supplemented 
with written material  Use 
Grounded theory to create 
categories 
26 
stateme
nts  
develop
ed from 
four foci 
21,  
12 
government 
farming  
&environ- 
mental; 
4 NGOs; 
5 farmers  
4 extracted 
using PQ-
Method 
2010 (Bischof) Finding consensus among 
competing scientific 
discourses about what to do 
about the worldwide coral 
158 Scientific “Facts” from 
the literature that are 
contextualized in human 
arenas, making them 
43 
generat
ed 
around 
240 reef 
specialists 
contacted-31 
e-mailed sorts 
4 
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Year Referenc
e 
Subject Concourse Q-set P-Set Factors 
reef environmental crisis subjective enough to be part 
of a concourse. 
three 
major 
topics 
and 
included 
issues 
of scale, 
governa
nce, 
and 
forecast
s 
by target date. 
(Stated goal 
was not more 
than one P-
sorter for each 
2 Q-sorts 
  AVERAGE  41.04 33.26 4.22 
  LARGEST 750 64 66 8 
  SMALLEST 19 17 15 2 
  MEDIAN  42 30 4 
  MODE  36 21 4 
  THIS DISSERTATION 150 35 22 4 
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APPENDIX B 
This is a copy of an e-mail message I sent to introduce myself to a potential interviewee 
who agreed and became Respondent 116.  Other e-mails varied slightly over time as 
conditions changed schedule and the snowball technique provided the name of candidates 
for interviews and the name of the individual who suggested the name changed. 
-----Original Message----- 
From: Hopf, Frank, Jr. [mailto:fhpf@neo.tamu.edu]  
Sent: Wednesday, June 24, 2009 6:59 AM 
To: (Respondent 116) 
Subject: Interview request 
Dear Mr. __________ 
My name is Frank Hopf and I was given your name by (Respondent 115) who suggested 
that I request an interview with you.  I am a Ph. D. candidate in Geography at Texas 
A&M University working on my dissertation on the historical geography and 
implications of the levee failure in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta.  I am also a 
professional engineer (civil) in 
Texas and for the last four years I have been part of a research team measuring erosion on 
Delta levees.  
I have proposed two major parts to my dissertation. Both parts require input from 
interviews of the key players like you from the levee district to federal levels in Delta 
levee management, maintenance, and failure response.  The first effort is to a compile a 
detailed database of the location, causes, and factors in the Delta levee failures since 
1869.  Your comments on the accuracy of the detail compiled on the incidents you had 
direct involvement on will be requested.   
The second part requires confidential 45 minute interviews of the key players to learn the 
major concepts and messages that those involved have taken away from the levee failures 
and flood fights they have experienced.  This will be a key piece of a study using a 
methodology recently being used by geographers to add to the understanding of complex 
issues in environmental and resource governance. 
I will be in Sacramento-Stockton area from July 13 to 24, 2009 to conduct these 
interviews and request the opportunity to interview you at a time and location convenient 
to you for my dissertation.  If this impossible, or you have additional questions before 
agreeing, please contact me via e-mail or call my cell phone at 832-687-2147.  I will also 
return in August for a similar round of interviews if the July time period does not work 
for your schedule.  Thank you and I look forward to talking with you. 
Frank Hopf 
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APPENDIX C 
Dissertation Q Method Steps Compared to those defined in Selected Methods Papers 
.                   
Source 
 
Dissertation  
(Brown 1980) (Barry and Proops 
1999) 
(Robbins 2005) (Webler, 
Danielson, and 
Tuler  2009) 
1 Define domain 
of subjectivity. 
1)Identify a 
relevant problem 
and select 
statements from 
books, 
newspapers, etc. 
and then complete 
with interviews to 
define concourse 
about subject 
1) Identify the areas 
of ‘discourse’ 
of interest and the 
population of 
important in the 
discourse 
1) Determine 
the domain of 
subjectivity, 
carefully 
considering the 
breadth of 
scope of the 
area of interest. 
 
1) Determine 
objectives and 
identify topic and 
subset of 
population. Need 
to identify 
context, what 
social perspectives 
as being studied 
and the purpose. 
2) Conduct 
semi-structured 
interviews and 
other research 
to create 
concourse 
See step 1 (above) 2) Conduct 
interviews with a 
sample of the 
relevant population. 
From these identify 
the statements that 
define the 
concourse, generally 
using interviewees 
own words. 
2) Obtain or 
develop a 
concourse 
statements 
about the 
domain, using 
“naturalistic” 
methods or 
statements 
drawn from 
interviews or 
from secondary 
sources. 
2) Conduct 
Interviews and 
prepare 
concourse. 
Interviews should 
be with persons 
with a deep 
knowledge of the 
subject and site.  
Use “grounded 
theory “to 
establish 100-300 
Q statements 
3) Select 
concourse items 
(Q-set)that 
cover the entire 
concourse for 
sorting 
2) Produce 40 to 
50 statements and 
for prepare for Q- 
sorting.   
3) Select Q-
statements to be 
sorted.  Found 36 to 
be manageable. 
Used 4 by 4 
concourse matrix of 
Dryzek and 
Berejikian (1993) 
 
3) Select the Q- 
set, 10 to 1000 
statements, 
pictures, 
sounds, smells, 
etc.  
representative 
of the 
concourse. 
3) Select an edit 
Q-statements to 
create 20-60 
statements for the 
Q-sample. 
Good Q 
statements are 
salient and may 
have excess 
meaning 
4) Select P–set, 
individuals to 
conduct the sort 
and establish 
time and place 
for sorting. 
3) Select 40-60 P-
set members (or 
far fewer) who are 
theoretically 
saturated per 
Glaser and 
Strauss, (1967, 61-
62).  Really need 4 
or 5 per factor 
4) 25 participants do 
Q-sort with 
condition of 
instruction to  rank 
the 
statements on the 
scale ‘Agree to  
‘Disagree with most 
strongly’ 
 
4) Depending on 
objective. Key 
actors or 
randomly 
selected 
individuals sort 
the Q-set under 
the condition of 
instruction such 
as  
4) Recruit 12 to 36 
P- Sorters, using 
snowball 
sampling. They 
should be 
knowledge with 
range of 
perspectives (1:3 
or 1:2 P Sorter to 
Q statements 
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.                   
Source 
 
Dissertation  
(Brown 1980) (Barry and Proops 
1999) 
(Robbins 2005) (Webler, 
Danielson, and 
Tuler  2009) 
‘‘most 
agree/most 
Disagree’’ 
Actual shape of 
normal 
distribution 
curve not 
important. 
ratios 
recommended 
5)Establish 
conditions of 
instruction for 
sort 
4) Set conditions 
of instructions 
which may be 
simple or complex 
and multiple 
See step 4 (above) See  step 4 
(above) 
Not specifically  
discussed  
6) Conduct Q –
sorts, record 
result and 
interview 
sorters for 
additional input 
 See step 4 (above) See step 4 
(above) and 5) 
Conduct “open-  
ended” 
interview with 
sorters to get 
obtain reasons 
and logic for the 
sorting of items 
5) Conduct Q-
Sorts with cards 
and sort board, 
voice record (with 
permission) the 
session.  Record 
results and ask 
follow up 
questions. 
7) Run factor 
analysis and 
determine 
appropriate 
number of 
factors to use 
5)Use computer 
program to run 
correlations and 
factor analysis 
5) Run statistical 
analysis to 
allow the extraction 
of a few ‘typical’ Q 
sorts. 
6) Compute 
correlation 
coefficients for 
each pair of sort 
and run factor 
analysis using 
the centroid or 
simple 
summation 
method. Select 
the number of 
factors to use, 
generally all 
those with 
eigenvalues 
greater than 
1.00 
6) Run Factor 
Analysis, Decide 
on final set of 
factors, determine 
meaning of 
factors and 
compare and 
contrast social 
perspectives.  Use 
freeware 
PQMethod 
(includes 
instructions for 
running DOS 
program on PC.) 
8) Rotate 
factors to 
simplify and 
generate factor 
scores and 
loadings. 
6) Rotate factors 
unless the 
computer’s 
rotation 
accidently works 
out acceptably, 
pursue revise 
loadings to test 
theory; AND  
7) Identify pure 
factor loaders as 
those loading on 
only one factor 
See step 5 above? 7) Use an 
“objective” 
(such as 
Varimax) or 
theory-testing 
manual method 
to simplify 
factors by axis 
rotation. 
Interpret the 
factors from 
these results. 
See Step 6 (above) 
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.                   
Source 
 
Dissertation  
(Brown 1980) (Barry and Proops 
1999) 
(Robbins 2005) (Webler, 
Danielson, and 
Tuler  2009) 
with loadings 
greater than 
2.58(1/√N) where 
N is the number 
of Q-sorts. 
Determine factor 
scores for each 
factor from these 
loaders.  Use 
computer 
program and 
factor scores 
differing by 2 or 
more are 
distinguishing. 
9) Use 
statistically 
significant  
factor 
statements to 
interpret, name, 
and describe the 
factors 
8) Using factors 
scores and 
loading, describe 
and interpret 
each.  Either 
accept or reject 
original theory (if 
there was one) or 
create hypothesis 
de novo 
6) Interpret the 
typical Q sorts,  
giving a series of 
“ideal” discourses 
See step 7 
(above) 
See Step 6 (above) 
10) Prepare 
summary of 
factor 
descriptions 
and  review 
with high 
loaders on each 
factor for input 
and revision as 
appropriate. 
Not mentioned  Not mentioned 8) Return to the 
participants in 
the Q-sort with 
results for 
validation and 
additional 
insight. 
Particularly 
important if one 
of the objectives 
is to promote 
communications 
or help establish 
policy. 
7) Share results 
with Q 
participants by 
mail in a 
consensus making 
process. 
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                     APPENDIX D 
INFORMATION SHEET 
Levee failures in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta: Characteristics and Characterizations 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this form is to provide you (as a prospective research study participant) 
information that may affect your decision as to whether or not to participate in this research. 
You have been asked to participate in a research study about the history and meaning of levee 
failures in the Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta. The purpose of the study is two-fold.  First 
purpose is to document the history of levee failures in the Delta.  The second purpose is to 
determine the views held by key actors regarding the meaning of this history of levee failures and 
what changes in levee maintenance and planning should be initiate in response to this 
experience. You were selected to be a possible participant because you are a key actor in past 
Delta levee failure response(s) and/or are involved in governance of levee maintenance and/or 
emergency response planning.  This study is being conducted to support Frank Hopf’s 
dissertation (PhD. – Geography) at Texas A&M University. 
 
What will I be asked to do? 
If you agree to participate in this second phase of the study, you will be asked to force rank from 
“most accurate” (+4) to “most flawed” (-4) with zero a neutral ranking, 35 statements about what 
the history of Delta levee failures could mean to the present and future of the levees and the 
therefore the Delta itself.  The force rankings will be into a quasi-normal distribution developed for 
this study.  The statements were largely generated from the study’s first phase of 30 interviews 
conducted during the summer of 2009.  The original interviewees were members of the same 
pool of candidates as for this phase.  Participation in both phases is acceptable for this research.  
After the sorting is complete, you will be asked to briefly explain some of the rankings assigned.. 
Your contribution to this phase of the study will take approximately 45 minutes to an hour.  Your 
participation may be audio recorded.    
 
What are the risks involved in this study? 
The risks associated with this study are minimal, and are not greater than risks ordinarily 
encountered in daily life. 
 
What are the possible benefits of this study? 
You will receive no direct benefit from participating in this study; however, potential benefits to 
society include greater understanding of views held by other stakeholders in the role of levees in 
the future of the Sacramento- San Joaquin River Delta.  
 
Do I have to participate? 
No.  Your participation is voluntary.  You may decide not to participate or to withdraw at any time 
without your current or future relations with Texas A&M University being affected.   
 
Who will know about my participation in this research study? 
This study is confidential. Your name will be coded and the records of this study will be kept 
private.  No identifiers linking you to the study will be included in any sort of report that might be 
published.  Research records will be stored securely and only Frank Hopf and his advisors, 
Professors Douglas Sherman and Christian Brannstrom will have access to the records. 
 
If you choose to participate in this study, you may choose to be audio recorded.  Any audio 
recordings will be stored securely and only Frank Hopf, Professor Sherman, and Professor 
339 
 
 
 
Brannstrom will have access to the recordings.  Any recordings will be kept for five years and 
then erased.  
 
Whom do I contact with questions about the research?  
If you have questions regarding this study, you may contact Frank Hopf, telephone +1 979 690-
2420 or 832-687-2147 (fhpf@.tamu.edu). 
 
Whom do I contact about my rights as a research participant?   
This research study has been reviewed by the Human Subjects’ Protection Program and/or the 
Institutional Review Board at Texas A&M University.  For research-related problems or questions 
regarding your rights as a research participant, you can contact these offices at (979) 458-4067 
or irb@tamu.edu. 
 
Participation 
Please be sure you have read the above information, asked questions and received answers to 
your satisfaction.  If you would like to be in the study, we will begin when you are ready. 
 
Q-sort statements to be sorted 
 
1) It is very important to keep the Delta community and economy whole.  With far less 
money than is being estimated, levees in the Delta can be made taller and stronger and set 
back enough to keep Delta islands afloat indefinitely.   
 
2) Incremental changes are not going to create a sustainable Delta and even after a few 
hundred million dollars in improvements, we will still have levees that time and tide are 
just going to overwhelm.  
 
3) The Delta islands are now well below sea level and if we lose the levees, we are going 
to have a saltwater bay. It will be a bay rimmed by urban levees, except perhaps up the 
Yolo By-Pass where new tule marsh may become established.   
 
4) The voices of those who have a local knowledge of the role of levees in Delta are 
probably not as strong as voices of the water exporters and the environmentalist 
advocates focused solely on endangered fish species. 
 
5) DWR has a clear legislature-mandated responsibility to maintain the status quo in the 
Delta, but DWR is really working to preserve the current conditions in the Delta until it is 
clear what to do to have a healthy Delta ecosystem.     
 
6) We have a non-sustainable system. Many levees in the Delta will very likely not be 
around in 30, 50, or 70 years from now.  It just doesn’t make economic sense to pour 
more money on top of the ¼ billion dollars the state has already spent to try to maintain 
some very expensive levee systems against threats of earthquakes, sea-level rise, and 
ongoing subsidence.  
 
7)  The goal of DWR is to let the Delta go back to salt and build a peripheral canal 
around it.  
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8) If we stop federal subsidies to grow subsidence-inducing corn, we have the 
opportunity to create the world’s best carbon sink in the Delta.   
 
9)  Delta levees are precarious and a disaster waiting to happen.  They have to work so 
long and hard and are built of the wrong materials, on the wrong materials.  The levee 
districts are trying hard but all it takes is one overzealous beaver.  At the same time, we 
are now appreciating the earthquake risk and we are just lucky that we have not had a 6.0 
or a 6.5 close to the Delta.  
 
10) Although the levees are not well-engineered structures, riddled with penetrations and 
random objects, and inherently unstable because of their peat foundations, they survived 
record high water due to very high tides in 1998 and the 2006 high water and wind events 
without a failure.  Somehow they are stronger than they seem to be. 
 
11) Since 1986, there has been a substantial reduction in the number of Delta levee 
failures, primarily because the state subventions program allowed the reclamation 
districts to begin to improve the private levees.  During this time, the state has invested 
about $130 million while the locals have invested $250 million, allowing Delta residents 
to start to feel comfortable living behind the levees. 
 
12) As long as farming continues on peat soils in the Delta, subsidence will continue with 
a concomitant increase in pressure on the levees. 
 
13)  It is not affordable or justified at an estimated cost of $40,000,000/mile to build new 
earthquake resistant Delta levees when you look at the miles of levees that would require 
upgrading.  
 
14) Improving the reliability of and employing non-destructive levee inspection tools 
represent a great opportunity to improve levee safety.   
 
15) The water users are going to need the Delta levees for another 30 years because it 
will take that long for the environmental, property rights, and water rights lawsuits to be 
settled and then actually build the isolated conveyance system.  
16) DRMS was a DWR conspiracy to justify the Peripheral Canal. 
 
17) We have created this massively altered system and it isn’t working very well but 
everyone thinks we need just one more structural fix. The Peripheral Canal is not the 
solution; we need a broad water policy based on alternatives developed recognizing 
realistic values of the state’s water. 
 
18)  From a water supply perspective, the only reliable, sustainable, earthquake proof 
way to get water around the Delta is the Peripheral Canal. 
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19) Nothing could be worse for fish than what we currently have in Delta today: rock-
lined levees that are serving as water supply channels that are held at as constant flow 
condition as possible.  It is exactly what an estuary should not be. 
 
20) Every ounce of habitat out in the Delta, right now, is either behind the levees or 
between the levees. Once the levees are gone, the habitat is all gone.  
21)  We need more innovation like the $2.5 million of CALFED funded project on Tyler 
Island to restore sub tidal berms and levee vegetation.  About two miles of shaded 
shallow riverine habitat were gained long term while reducing potential flood damage to 
the levees.   
 
22) Delta habitat restoration projects have been a big joke and a waste of taxpayer’s 
money.  Planting trees and shrubs on the levees in conflict with new Corps guidelines, 
and within five years it has become just a big weed pile. 
 
23) Restrictions on dredging and use of dredged materials, particularly in the north Delta, 
need to be eliminated, because they have no real scientific justification.  
 
24) Reclamation districts that own the levees are not prepared for levee failure and many 
of them are poor at communications with their own constituents.   
 
25) The current system of local levee districts performing much of the routine 
maintenance is dysfunctional, disjointed, and inconsistent.  They have a deep distrust of 
DWR and it is disturbing how poorly they work together.  
 
26) The DWR subventions program was a model of efficiency; the DWR staff was lean, 
and the local levee districts, because they had their money out there, managed projects 
very effectively.   
 
27) The best governance structure for the Delta would be to let the levee districts tackle 
the issues island-by-island with some funding and guidance from DWR.  
 
28) The local reclamation districts maintaining the levees bring incredible institutional 
knowledge of a constantly evolving system.  They have people who can inspect the 
levees under all kinds of conditions and know what to look for.  They have people who 
know what to do in an emergency and they are ready to defend their homes, livelihoods, 
and families.  
 
29) Federal official maintenance practices are destabilizing the levees by denuding them 
completely. We are spending huge amounts of money destroying vegetation and huge 
amounts of money creating habitat that is not sustainable. 
 
30) The levee districts tackle the critical erosion and acute problems very effectively but 
they are not good at minor, everyday maintenance.  Unfortunately, this inattention lets 
minor problems like vegetation on the levees grow into overwhelming problems and now 
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they face major engineering and construction efforts in some many areas to get the levees 
back into compliance with Corps requirements.  
 
31) A single agency should be established to manage the Delta, working with counties on 
land use planning, superseding DWR and the Corps to execute its carefully, but 
expeditiously developed plan, funded on a tax on water crossing the Delta. 
 
32) Over the last 35 years, there has never been any earthquake damage to a levee in the 
Delta and the whole earthquake risk thing is junk science. It is a reality that the 
earthquake threat has been wildly overstated and is rather specious.  
 
33) A lot has been accomplished on reducing risk of normal every day, vanilla, levee 
failures but more and more we need to recognize the vulnerability to extreme events such 
as earthquake and very large floods that are not adequately recognized or acknowledged 
by some of the Delta stakeholders. 
 
34) In seismic events, Delta soils become very pliable allowing the levees to roll through 
without cracking, subsidence, or settlement.  The soils are so heterogeneous that they do 
not behave as poorly as some models project they would. 
 
35) Earthquakes represent the main risk to the water supply for 23 million Californians 
because of the likelihood of multiple levee failures during a significant earthquake, 
potentially causing severe disruptions to water supply drawn from the Delta for years. 
Interview Matrix for Q-Sort 
                     Most Flawed                             Neutral                            Most Accurate 
 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 
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APPENDIX E 
Z-scores and rank of each statement by factor.  Bold indicates significance at P < .05; bold underline identifies significance at P < .01 
(for information only.) 
  Factors 
No. Statement 1 2 3 4 
  
z-score rank 
z-
score 
rank 
z-
score 
rank z-score rank 
1 It is very important to keep the Delta community and 
economy whole.  With far less money than is being 
estimated, levees in the Delta can be made taller and 
stronger and set back enough to keep Delta islands afloat 
indefinitely. 
1.50 4 -1.36 -3 -0.31 -1 -0.50 -2 
2 Incremental changes are not going to create a sustainable 
Delta and even after a few hundred million dollars in 
improvements, we will still have levees that time and tide 
are just going to overwhelm.. 
-1.24 -3 0.81 2 0.00 0 0.84 2 
3 The Delta islands are now well below sea level and if we 
lose the levees, we are going to have a saltwater bay. It will 
be a bay rimmed by urban levees, except perhaps up the 
Yolo By-Pass where new tule marsh may become 
established 
0.18 0 0.66 1 0.48 1 1.63 4 
4 The voices of those who have a local knowledge of the role 
of levees in Delta are probably not as strong as voices of 
the water exporters and the environmentalist advocates 
focused solely on endangered fish species. 
0.86 2 0.43 1 0.62 2 -0.70 -2 
5 DWR has a clear legislature-mandated responsibility to 
maintain the status quo in the Delta, but DWR is really 
working to preserve the current conditions in the Delta until 
it is clear what to do to have a healthy Delta ecosystem 
-0.27 -1 0.42 1 -0.89 -2 1.37 3 
6 We have a non-sustainable system. Many levees in the 
Delta will very likely not be around in 30, 50, or 70 years 
from now.  It just doesn’t make economic sense to pour 
more money on top of the ¼ billion dollars the state has 
already spent to try to maintain some very expensive levee 
systems against threats of earthquakes, sea-level rise, and 
ongoing subsidence.  
-2.08 -4 1.41 3 -0.83 -2 -0.41 -1 
7 The goal of DWR is to let the Delta go back to salt and build 
a peripheral canal around it  
0.69 1 -1.27 -3 -0.58 -1 -2.16 -4 
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  Factors 
No. Statement 1 2 3 4 
  
z-score rank 
z-
score 
rank 
z-
score 
rank z-score rank 
8 If we stop federal subsidies to grow subsidence-inducing 
corn, we have the opportunity to create the world’s best 
carbon sink in the Delta. 
-0.87 -2 -0.01 0 0.00 0 0.54 1 
9 Delta levees are precarious and a disaster waiting to 
happen.  They have to work so long and hard and are built 
of the wrong materials, on the wrong materials.  The levee 
districts are trying hard but all it takes is one overzealous 
beaver.  At the same time, we are now appreciating the 
earthquake risk and we are just lucky that we have not had 
a 6.0 or a 6.5 close to the Delta. 
-1.20 -2 0.84 2 -0.24 0 0.71 1 
10 Although the levees are not well-engineered structures, 
riddled with penetrations and random objects, and 
inherently unstable because of their peat foundations, they 
survived record high water due to very high tides in 1998 
and the 2006 high water and wind events without a failure.  
Somehow they are stronger than they seem to be. 
0.88 2 0.02 0 1.48 3 0.13 0 
11 Since 1986, there has been a substantial reduction in the 
number of Delta levee failures, primarily because the state 
subventions program allowed the reclamation districts to 
begin to improve the private levees.  During this time, the 
state has invested about $130 million while the locals have 
invested $250 million, allowing Delta residents to start to 
feel comfortable living behind the levees. 
1.24 3 0.36 0 0.00 0       -0.15 0 
12 As long as farming continues on peat soils in the Delta, 
subsidence will continue with a concomitant increase in 
pressure on the levees.  
-0.69 -1 1.48 4 0.52 1 1.55 4 
13 It is not affordable or justified at an estimated cost of 
$40,000,000/mile to build new earthquake resistant Delta 
levees when you look at the miles of levees that would 
require upgrading.  . 
0.12 0 1.63 4 0.55 1       -0.09 0 
14 Improving the reliability of and employing non-destructive 
levee inspection tools represent a great opportunity to 
improve levee safety.  
-0.01 0 -0.25 -1 1.20 2 1.00 2 
15 The water users are going to need the Delta levees for 
another 30 years because it will take that long for the 
environmental, property rights, and water rights lawsuits to 
be settled and then actually build the isolated conveyance 
system 
0.98 3 0.36 0 1.51 4 1.11 3 
16 DRMS was a DWR conspiracy to justify the Peripheral 
Canal 
0.53 1 -1.88 -4 -0.28 -1 -2.16 -4 
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  Factors 
No. Statement 1 2 3 4 
  
z-score rank 
z-
score 
rank 
z-
score 
rank z-score rank 
17 We have created this massively altered system and it isn’t 
working very well but everyone thinks we need just one 
more structural fix. The Peripheral Canal is not the solution; 
we need a broad water policy based on alternatives 
developed recognizing realistic values of the state’s water. 
0.65 1 0.08 0 1.13 2 0.45 1 
18 From a water supply perspective, the only reliable, 
sustainable, earthquake proof way to get water around the 
Delta is the Peripheral Canal. 
-1.82 -4 0.79 1 -1.20 -3   -0.73 -2 
19 Nothing could be worse for fish than what we currently have 
in Delta today: rock-lined levees that are serving as water 
supply channels that are held at as constant flow condition 
as possible.  It is exactly what an estuary should not be. 
-0.39 -1 1.46 3 1.41 3 -0.45 -1 
20 Every ounce of habitat out in the Delta, right now, is either 
behind the levees or between the levees. Once the levees 
are gone, the habitat is all gone.   
0.47 0 -1.55 -3 0.31 0 -1.10 -2 
21 We need more innovation like the $2.5 million of CALFED 
funded project on Tyler Island to restore sub tidal berms 
and levee vegetation.  About two miles of shaded shallow 
riverine habitat were gained long term while reducing 
potential flood damage to the levees.  
0.33 0  0.05 0 -0.38 -1 0.64 1 
22 Delta habitat restoration projects have been a big joke and 
a waste of taxpayer’s money.  Planting trees and shrubs on 
the levees in conflict with new Corps guidelines, and within 
five years it has become just a big weed pile.. 
-0.13 0 -1.04 -2 0.34 1 -1.70 -3 
23 Restrictions on dredging and use of dredged materials, 
particularly in the north Delta, need to be eliminated, 
because they have no real scientific justification.  
0.93 2             -1.04 -2 -2.03 -4 0.44 1 
24 Reclamation districts that own the levees are not prepared 
for levee failure and many of them are poor at 
communications with their own constituents  
-0.79 -1 -0.75 -1 0.89 2 0.08 0 
25 The current system of local levee districts performing much 
of the routine maintenance is dysfunctional, disjointed, and 
inconsistent.  They have a deep distrust of DWR and it is 
disturbing how poorly they work together. 
-1.30 -3 -1.12 -2 1.51 4 0.02 0 
26 The DWR subventions program was a model of efficiency; 
the DWR staff was lean, and the local levee districts, 
because they had their money out there, managed projects 
very effectively. 
1.29 3 0.81 2 -0.86 -2 0.84 2 
27 The best governance structure for the Delta would be to let 
the levee districts tackle the issues island-by-island with 
some funding and guidance from DWR. 
0.71 1 -0.95 -2 -2.06 -4 -1.19 -3 
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  Factors 
No. Statement 1 2 3 4 
  
z-score rank 
z-
score 
rank 
z-
score 
rank z-score rank 
28 The local reclamation districts maintaining the levees bring 
incredible institutional knowledge of a constantly evolving 
system.  They have people who can inspect the levees 
under all kinds of conditions and know what to look for.  
They have people who know what to do in an emergency 
and they are ready to defend their homes, livelihoods, and 
families. 
1.74 4 0.90 2 -1.79 -3 0.95 2 
29 Federal official maintenance practices are destabilizing the 
levees by denuding them completely. We are spending 
huge amounts of money destroying vegetation and huge 
amounts of money creating habitat that is not sustainable. 
0.08 0 -0.41 -1 1.44 3 -0.28 -1 
30 The levee districts tackle the critical erosion and acute 
problems very effectively but they are not good at minor, 
everyday maintenance.  Unfortunately, this inattention lets 
minor problems like vegetation on the levees grow into 
overwhelming problems and now they face major 
engineering and construction efforts in some many areas to 
get the levees back into compliance with Corps 
requirements. 
-0.92 -2 -0.66 -1 -0.18 0 -0.25 -1 
31 A single agency should be established to manage the Delta, 
working with counties on land use planning, superseding 
DWR and the Corps to execute its carefully, but 
expeditiously developed plan, funded on a tax on water 
crossing the Delta 
-0.79 -1 0.27 0 -0.83 -2 -0.12 0 
32 Over the last 35 years, there has never been any 
earthquake damage to a levee in the Delta and the whole 
earthquake risk thing is junk science. It is a reality that the 
earthquake threat has been wildly overstated and is rather 
specious. 
0.73 1 -1.82 -4 0.31 0 -1.54 -3 
33 A lot has been accomplished on reducing risk of normal 
every day, vanilla, levee failures but more and more we 
need to recognize the vulnerability to extreme events such 
as earthquake and very large floods that are not adequately 
recognized or acknowledged by some of the Delta 
stakeholders. 
-0.80 -2 0.80 1 0.24 0 1.22 3 
34 In seismic events, Delta soils become very pliable allowing 
the levees to roll through without cracking, subsidence, or 
settlement.  The soils are so heterogeneous that they do 
not behave as poorly as some models project they would. 
0.89 2 -0.58 -1 -0.34 -1 -0.37 -1 
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  Factors 
No. Statement 1 2 3 4 
  
z-score rank 
z-
score 
rank 
z-
score 
rank z-score rank 
35 Earthquakes represent the main risk to the water supply for 
23 million Californians because of the likelihood of multiple 
levee failures during a significant earthquake, potentially 
causing severe disruptions to water supply drawn from the 
Delta for years. 
-1.52 -3 1.10 3 -1.17 -3 0.39 0 
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APPENDIX F 
 
Correlations between factor scores with 98 percent confidence interval 
(Brown 1980: 286) Formula: SE=1-r
2
 /SQRT(N) 
 
 1 2 3 4 
1 1.0000 -0.3464±0.1487 -0.0337±0.1688 -0.1303±0.1662 
2 -0.3464±0.1487 1.0000 0.0015±0.1834 0.6137±0.1054 
3 -0.0337±0.1688 0.0015±0.1834 1.0000 0.0958±0.1675 
4 -0.1303±0.1662 0.6137±0.1054 0.0958±0.1675 1.0000 
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APPENDIX G 
General statistics of factors extracted and rotated. 
Factor Characteristics 
 1 2 3 4 
No. of Defining Variables (Loaders) 9 6 2 5 
Eigenvalue 7.3923 4.7439 1.7351 1.3199 
Composite Reliability 0.973 0.960 0.889 0.952 
Standard Error of Factor Scores 0.164 0.200 0.333 0.218 
% Variance Explained 29 17 8 15 
No. of distinguishing statements 13 9 11 8 
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APPENDIX H 
Summary of social perspectives on levee failure history for the Sacramento-San Joaquin 
River Delta. Revised after review with highly correlated sorters. 
 
Social 
Perspective 
Defining Ideas  
Delta  
Sustainers 
(F1) 
 
 
-The Delta agricultural community levees are sustainable long term with 
adequate but relatively small investment. 
-Local knowledge and state support through the subventions program have 
created considerably safer and stronger levees than 25 years ago. 
-Concern over continuing subsidence of the islands and earthquake risk to 
the levees is overblown, probably for political reasons 
.  
Abandon the 
Levees (F2) 
-The current fresh-water Delta is non-sustainable and we should not waste 
more money improving doomed levee systems.  
-The probability is very high that multiple levee failures will be induced by 
seismic activity, converting the Delta to a sustainable salt-water estuary. 
-If water exports are to continue, the isolated conveyance system around the 
Delta will be required. 
 
Levee 
Pragmatists 
(F3) 
 
 
-The Delta levees may not be sustainable over the long term (100 years 
plus) but they can be maintained for some time with minimum resources. 
-The RDs, state and federal agencies all make huge errors in their work and 
they do not work well together in trying to manage the Delta levees. 
-The RDs’ local knowledge is inconsistent across the Delta and tends to be 
eroding with time. 
- USACE policies on vegetation on levees decreases levee stability and 
damage the environment. 
-The effectiveness of the subventions program is overrated, in part because 
new methods are not encouraged. 
 
Multi-Purpose  
Levees  
(F4)                                                      
-Recognizes that if the levees fail that the Delta will become a saltwater bay, 
but disagrees that DWR is promoting that development. 
-Believes that DWR tries to manage the Delta and the levees in compliance 
with the requirement to maintain status quo in the Delta while exploring a 
better path for the environment and water supply. 
- Concerned about the earthquake risk but not totally convinced it represents 
the main threat to Delta levees. 
- Open to idea of an isolated conveyance system but not enthusiastic 
supporters. 
- Believes that the environmental restoration projects have been a good 
investment. 
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APPENDIX I 
ID Respondent Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
135 State, Env., Manager, NR  0.1985 0.5546 -0.1038 0.2216 
103 State, Water, Eng./Manager, NR -0.0476 0.1985 0.2643 0.6428 
105 State, Water, Eng., NR -0.1085 0.6223 -0.3996 0.3972 
111 Consult. RD, Res 0.8377 -0.0980 -0.0941 -0.2128 
112 Consult. RD, Res 0.8153       -0.2552 0.0939 -0.0787 
114 Farmer, RD official, Res 0.6898 -0.2809 -0.0055 -0.1883 
115 Farmer, RD official, Res 0.8930 -0.1593 -0.0379 0.0867 
116 State, Water, Manager, NR 0.1287 0.0824 -0.1211 0.7343 
117 Water Contractor, Eng., NR -0.4199 0.7111 -0.0130 0.3438 
118 Consult Independent, Res. -0.2477 -0.2556 0.7092 -0.0134 
119 State, Water, Manager, NR 0.1987 0.6628 -0.1279 0.5064 
120 Consult, Independent, NR  0.0966 0.2662 0.6814 0.2167 
124 Consult. RD, Res. 0.8185 -0.1301 0.0749 0.1352 
125 Fed., Env. Scientist, NR -0.3890 0.6305 0.3260 0.3650 
127 State, Env. Manager, NR -0.0865 0.4777 0.2636 0.5684 
129 NGO, Env., NR -0.2956 0.8339 -0.0053 0.1412 
131 Fed., Water, Eng., NR -0.1903 0.2046 -0.0037 0.8024 
132 Consult. RD, Res. 0.8321 -0.0358 0.3036 -0.1534 
133 Consult. RD, Manager, NR 0.5751 0.4321 0.2011 0.3531 
134 State, Water, Manager, NR 0.0738 0.4519 -0.3241 0.6218 
135 Farmer, RD official, Res. 0.8413 0.0479 -0.0415 -0.2462 
121 Consult. RD, NR 0.7788 -0.1728 -0.0906  0.2526 
NOTES: 1) Consult.  RD = provides engineering, management, and/or legal 
support primarily to levee districts 
2) Consult. Independent = provides construction, environmental, or engineering 
support at all levels 
                3) State includes state and county agencies 
    4) “Water” includes flood control and water supply 
    5) NR = Not a Delta resident, Res. = Legal Delta resident    
    6) Env. = environmental resources
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APPENDIX  J 
   
Respond
ent  
Number  
Background 2009 
Interview 
Month 
-2009 
2010 
Q-Sort 
Month 
 -2010A 
 2010  
Q-Sort Verification 
-2010B 
101 Consult, Industry,Eng., NR       July      N/A   N/A 
102 Manager, RD, Advocacy, NR      July      N/A   N/A 
103 Eng./Manager, State, Flood control, NR      July   July   November 
104 Consult., General, Flood control, NR      July      N/A   N/A 
105 Engineer, State, Flood control, NR      July      July   N/A 
106 ENGO, Manager, NR       July       N/A   N/A 
107 Consult. Ind. Eng/ Manager, NR      July       N/A   N/A 
108 Consult. Ind. Engineer, NR       July       N/A   N/A 
109 Consult-RD, Eng. NR      July       N/A   N/A 
110 Consult.- Gov, Engineer/Manager, 
Flood Control 
     July       N/A   N/A 
111 Consult. RD, Engineer ,Res      July       July   November 
112 Consult. RD, Law, Res      July       July   N/A 
113 Gov., Advocacy, NR      July       N/A   N/A 
114 Farmer, RD official, Res      July       July   N/A 
115 Farmer, RD official, Res      July       July  November 
116 State, Water, Manager, NR      July       July  November 
117 Water Contractor, Eng., NR      July       July  November 
 
118 Consult-Independent, Eng., Levee, NR.      July       July  November 
119 State, Water, Manager, NR      July       July  N/A 
120 Consult, Independent, Res.      July       July  November 
121 Consult. RD, Eng., NR       August       July  November 
122 State, Water, Eng. NR       August      N/A   N/A 
123 Political official, Law, Resident       August       July   N/A 
124 Consult. RD,  Eng, Res.       August       July   N/A 
125 Fed., Env. Scientist, NR       August       July   N/A 
126 Fed., Engineer, Flood Control, NR       August       N/A   N/A 
127 State, Env. Manager, NR       August E-Mail   N/A 
128 State, Engineer  Manager, NR       August      N/A   N/A 
129 NGO, Engineer, NR       August       July   November 
130 Local activist, Res.       August      N/A   N/A 
131 Fed., Eng., Flood control, NR        N/A       July   November 
132 Consult. RD,Law, Res.        N/A       July   N/A 
133 Consult. RD, Manager/Biology, NR        N/A       July   N/A 
134 State, Water, Manager, NR        N/A       July   N/A 
135 Farmer, RD official, Res          N/A       July   N/A 
136 State, Environmental/Manager NR.        N/A     E-Mail   N/A 
Consult RD = provides engineering, management, and/or legal support primarily to levee 
districts; Consult-Ind. (Indepedent) -  consults for all, Consult Gov.=consulting for state 
or federal; Political official= elected or appointed; State includes state and county 
agencies, NR = Not resident of Legal Delta, Res . = Resident of Legal Delta, Fed. = 
federal employee 
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Summary of selected Q-Method Studies in Geography and related Fields 1999-2011 
Paper  Subject Concourse Q-
set 
P-Set Factor
s 
Finding and Notes 
(Barry and 
Proops 1999) 
 How individuals think about the 
environment so that socially and 
politically acceptable policies can 
be generated. (England)  
Created by 
structured 
interviews. 
  36  
 
   25      4 Q-Method is a statistically rigorous approach to 
the subjective perceptions of human–nature 
relationships, making it useful for environmental 
policy making. 
(Robbins 
2000) 
 Differences between state and 
local environmental knowledge 
(India) 
     N/A 
 
17  62        4  Found that the state versus local epistemological 
division was less meaningful than the daily 
conflict over resources in the local political 
economy. 
(Robbins and 
Krueger 
2000) 
 A participatory planning process 
for the Northern Forest Lands 
region of the US 
     400  
“Grounded 
Theory” 
important  
45    37  
 
5 Q-Method is qualitative and quantitative, and 
can lead to “discursive democratization” but 
cannot nor necessarily should it totally remove 
the subjectivity of the researcher. 
(Focht 2002)  Watershed management in 
Oklahoma where scientific 
uncertainty exist about the 
probable impacts of policy 
options and persistent value 
disagreement over ends and 
goals.  Divided into: 
A) Impact concerns 
B) Impact Management 
Preferences 
    3000 
(from 150 
Interviews) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
47 
58 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   99 
   99 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
4 
Q-Method found to be powerful in assessing 
conflict allowing opportunities for resolution 
between parties 
 
“Q methodology gets beneath positional posture 
by providing insight into the underlying 
premises and values” (1337) 
(Eden, 
Donaldson, 
and Walker 
2005) 
 Production and use of 
environmental science by NGOs. 
200-500  40 
 
 
13? 
Not 
stated 
2? 
Not  
stated 
Q-Method helps render viewpoints more explicit 
which helps make it useful in policy 
development. Judgment required infuses Q with 
researcher subjectivity. 
APPENDIX K 
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Paper  Subject Concourse Q-
set 
P-Set Factor
s 
Finding and Notes 
(Robbins 
2006) 
 Investigation of interaction of 
state, civil society, and local 
knowledge and power in the 
formation and working of 
discourse coalitions. 
     20  20   30  2 Montana wildlife management policies have 
developed from discursive alliance of 
landowners, outfitters, and environmentalists, to 
the exclusion and disadvantage of the local 
hunters. 
(Swedeen 
2006) 
 Conflict-ridden ecosystem 
management concerns in the 
forest management in the NW 
United States. 
    200     
64  
 
30   3 (See 
Note 1) 
 
Q-Method can help gain understanding of the 
values held by various stakeholders’ discourses 
about ecosystem management.  Talks about 
several ways to employ Q in consensus building 
efforts. 
(Pini, Previte 
and Haslam-
McKenzie 
2007) 
 Rural government management 
of natural resources in Australia 
per the Local Agenda 21 of the 
UN 
Developed 
from 93 
interviews  
56 28  
 
5 
 
 
Several perspectives exist which do not support 
the concept of local government agencies taking 
a larger role in environmental management, 
contrary to Agenda item 21 of the UN. 
(Hall 2008)  Scottish farmer attitudes toward 
genetic modified crops 
   700  48  15 3 Scottish farmers looking at genetic modified 
crops have concerns but hold a middle ground 
position between the pro and anti GM interests. 
(Ellis, Barry 
and Robinson 
2007a) 
 Discourses of support and 
objection to wind farms offshore 
Northern Ireland. 
   458  50   46      8 
Note 2 
Q-Method can add to understanding of how 
public acceptance is constructed (of wind 
power), gained by bridging positivist and post-
positivist approaches. 
(Raadgever, 
Mostert and 
van de Giesen 
2008) 
 Stakeholder perspectives on 
future flood management in the 
lower Rhine basin. (Germany 
&NL) 
N/A - 23 
semi-
structured 
interviews. 
46  47 
(See 
Note 
3) 
3 Q-Method can help develop an overview of 
stakeholder perspectives, which can increase 
awareness of other perspectives, potentially 
facilitating interactions and reflection, which 
may help develop consensus. 
(Ockwell 
2008) 
 Fire management policies in the 
Dry Cape York region of 
Australia 
304 – (see 
note 4) 
36  
 
32  4 Q-Method allowed the fire policy in Queensland 
to be opened; it gave voice to some 
marginalized, but valuable, perspectives. Q can 
take snapshots of discourses only, cannot 
measure trends. 
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Paper  Subject Concourse Q-
set 
P-Set Factor
s 
Finding and Notes 
(Venables et 
al. 2009) 
 Perspectives of neighbors of 
operating risk of two UK nuclear 
power plant.  
     400  
 
     
62  
84 
(Note 
5) 
4 
 
Q-Method helped confirm that “. nuclear power 
in the United Kingdom continues to elicit strong 
opposition as well as support.” (p. 1102) 
(Lopez-i-
Gelats, 
Tabara and 
Jordi 2009) 
 Local perspectives of what is 
rural in an area of the Spanish 
Pyrenees  
  200  36  21        4 Q-Method enables emerging and neglected 
perspectives to be identified. It also can 
encourage more meaningful and open policy and 
discourse dialogue identifying areas of 
difference/consensus.  
(Hennessy 
2009) 
 Key stakeholder perspectives on 
the barriers to graywater reuse in 
Vancouver, B.C. 
     250  
(from 
literature) 
47  25 3  Exposed opportunity to study graywater users  
in other area or understand the perspectives of a 
wider population 
(Doody et al. 
2009) 
 Bottoms up and tops down 
sustainability measures  using Q 
750  from 
11 focus 
group 
meetings 
40  37 
from 
public 
6 
(See 
note 6) 
“Q-Method helped generate robust sustainability 
indicators that reflected the technical needs of 
the government agencies and that reflected the 
concerns, interest, and views of the general 
public. 
(Person 2010)  Social perspectives of the elites 
in Nolan County, Texas relative 
to the wind energy business 
arriving in the region. 
     300  
 
   
27   
  21       5  Q-Method generated understanding of 
perceptions of the elites, decision makers, and 
key stakeholders, information that can help wind 
power companies understand how their projects 
are perceived. 
(Brannstrom 
2011) 
 Environmental governance in the 
expanding soy belt in Bahia state, 
Brazil. 
       42     
26  
21 
 
4  Q-Method is an ends and a means in research, 
providing social perspectives as it develops an 
interview setting conducive to asking 
confrontational questions. 
(Bischof 
2010) 
 Find consensus among 
competing scientific discourses 
about what to do about the 
worldwide coral reef 
environmental crisis. 
     158  43     31  
(See 
Note 
7) 
4 Q-Method provides an organized way to 
understand basic beliefs embedded in scientific 
knowledge (of coral reefs), allowing them to be 
reorganized in different ways to better guide 
policy and research. 
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Paper  Subject Concourse Q-
set 
P-Set Factor
s 
Finding and Notes 
  STATISTICS  FOR  19 
STUDIES 
     
  Average (Mean)  41.
04 
33.26 4.22  
  Maximum 3000 64 66 8  
  Minimum 19 17 15 2  
  Median  42 30 4  
  Mode  36 21 4  
  THIS DISSERTATION 150 35 22 4  
Summary notes:  1) Swedeen used centroid factor analysis followed by both Varimax rotation and manual rotation  
2) Ellis et al. initially found just two factors, supporters and non-supporters of wind energy, but when they divided the responses into 
those two groups, four factors or perspectives emerged from each of those viewpoints.  
3) Raadgever et al, In establishing their P-set,  200 were invited to participate,  47 did so using online tool, set up using free web-
based software (available at http://q.sortserve.com)  
4) Concourse included items from aboriginal anthropological studies because of language problems 
5) Venebles et al. in the P-set, 41 from each site who were initially identified using professional recruitment service 
6) Doody et al. used PCQwin software (http://www.pcqsoft.com/) and Varimax rotation 
7) In Bischof, for the P-set, 240 reef specialists were contacted by e-mail, 31 sorts returned by target date 
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APPENDIX  L 
 
Screen shots of P-Method before and after manual rotation steps.
 
Figure L.1- Plot of Factors 1 and 2 Before and After Manual Rotation 
L.1A  FACTOR 1-2 After Varimax Rotation 
 
 
L.1B  FACTOR 1-2 After subsequent manual rotations 
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Figure L.2 - Plot of Factors 1 and 3 Before and After Manual Rotation 
L.2A  FACTOR 1-3 After Verimax Rotation 
 
 
L.2B  FACTOR 1-3 After manual rotation 
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Figure L.3- Plot of Factor 1 and 4 Before and After Manual Rotation 
L.3A  FACTOR 1-4 After Varimax Rotation 
 
L.3B  Factors 1-4 after Manual rotation 
 
Note: factors 1 and 4 were not directly rotated against one another, however they rotated 
relative to each other as part of their respective rotations with Factors 2 and 3.  
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Figure L.4- Plot of Factor 2 and 3 Before and After Manual Rotation 
L.4A  FACTOR 1-2 After Varimax Rotation 
 
 
L.4B  FACTORS  2-3 after rotation 
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Figure L.5- Plot of Factor 2 and 4 Before and After Manual Rotation 
L.5A  FACTOR 2-4 After Varimax Rotation 
 
 
L.5B  FACTOR 2-4 After Manual Rotations 
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Figure L.6- Plot of Factor 3 and 4 Before and After Manual Rotation 
L.6A  FACTOR 3-4 After Varimax Rotation 
 
L.6B  FACTOR 3-4 After Manual Rotation 
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                      APPENDIX M -  DELTA LEVEE FAILURES 1868-2010  
W, Island or tract Date  Levee Classification Subvention Area 
Year Segment status Acres 
1868 R.D. 17   Peat levee N/A 5800 
1872 Brannan-Andrus  BRA-SAC Peat levee N/A 15003 
 Grand   Peat levee N/A 16000 
 Sherman 1/8/1872 SHE-SAC Peat levee N/A 10420 
 Twitchell   Peat levee N/A 3633 
 Twitchell   Peat levee N/A 3633 
1873 Jersey   Peat levee N/A 3471 
1874 Bethel   Peat levee N/A 3520 
 Bouldin   Peat levee N/A 6047 
 Twitchell  TWI-SAN Peat levee N/A 3633 
1875 Byron Tract  BYR-OLD Peat levee N/A  
 R.D. 17  D17-SAN Peat levee N/A 5800 
 Rough and Ready  Peat levee N/A 1216 
 Sherman    Peat levee N/A 10420 
 Twitchell 1/15/1875  Peat levee N/A 3633 
1876 Sherman 2/1876  Peat levee N/A 10420 
 Union   Peat levee N/A 24951 
1878 Brannan-Andrus 2/21/1878 BRA-SAC Peat levee N/A 15003 
 Byron Tract 2/24/1878  Peat levee N/A 6933  
 East Sacramento 2/5/1878 SAC-SAC Peat levee N/A    
 Freeport area 2/3/1878 SAC-SAC Peat levee N/A  
 Grand 2/21/1878 GRA-STE Peat levee N/A 16000 
 Jersey 2/24/1878  Peat levee N/A 3471 
 Lisbon -  Peat levee N/A  
 Merritt Island 2/22/1878 MER-ELK Peat levee N/A  
 Netherlands  2/22/1878   Peat levee N/A  
(Clarksburg) 
 Pierson District 2/22/1878   Peat levee N/A 8990 
APPENDIX M 
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                                                                APPENDIX M -  Continued    
W. 
Year 
Island or tract Date  Levee 
Segment 
Classification Subvention 
status 
Area 
Acres 
 Ryer 2/25/1878  Peat levee N/A 11600 
 Sherman 2/19/1878 SHE-SAC Peat levee N/A 10420 
 Staten Island 2/21/1878  Peat levee N/A  
 Twitchell   Peat levee N/A 3633 
 Tyler 2/24/1878 TYL-MKN Peat levee N/A 8583 
 Union 2/21/1878 UNI-MID Peat levee N/A 24951 
 Union 5/15/1878  Peat levee N/A 24951 
 Venice 2/24/1878  Peat levee N/A 3220 
1879 Brannan-Andrus  BRA-SAC Peat levee N/A 15003 
 Grand  GRA-SAC Peat levee N/A 16000 
 Sherman  SHE-SAC Peat levee N/A 10420 
 Sutter  SUT-SAC Peat levee N/A  
1880 Roberts, Lower 6/22/1880  Agricultural  N/A 10600 
 Roberts, Middle   Agricultural  N/A 13687 
 Roberts, Upper   Agricultural  N/A 8260 
1881 900 1/31/1881 900-SAC Agricultural  N/A  
 Bouldin   Agricultural  N/A 6047 
 Brannan-Andrus 1/29/1881  Agricultural  N/A 15003 
 Brannan-Andrus 2/2/1881 BRA-SAC Agricultural  N/A 15003 
 Grand 2/4/1881  Agricultural  N/A 16000 
 Lisbon 1/31/1881  Agricultural  N/A  
 Merritt  MER-ELK Agricultural  N/A 4900 
 Pierson District 2/2/1881 PEA-SAC Agricultural  N/A 8990 
 Roberts 2/5/1881  Agricultural  N/A  
 Sherman 2/3/1881 SHE-SAC Agricultural  N/A 10420 
 Staten 2/1/1881  Agricultural  N/A 9088 
 Sutter 2/3/1881 SUT-SUT Agricultural  N/A  
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                                                        APPENDIX M -  Continued   
W. 
Year 
Island or tract Date  Levee 
Segment 
Classification Subvention 
status 
Area 
Acres 
 Sutterville-Freeport 1/31/1881 SAC-SAC Agricultural  N/A  
 Union 2/6/1881  Agricultural  N/A 24951 
1886 R.D  17 1/26/1886 D17-SAN Agricultural  N/A  
 Roberts, Lower 1/31/1886 ROL-SOU Agricultural  N/A 10600 
 Roberts, Middle 1/26/1886 ROM-SAN Agricultural  N/A 13687 
 Staten Island 2/12/1886  Agricultural  N/A  
1890 900 12/22/1889 900-SAC Agricultural  N/A  
 Brannan-Andrus 3/12/1890 BRA-SAC Agricultural  N/A 15003 
 Drexler Tract 5/29/1890 DRE-MID Agricultural  N/A  
 Lisbon 1/26/1890 LIS-BAB Agricultural  N/A  
 New Hope Tract 3/5/1890 NEW-MOK Agricultural  N/A 9743 
 Paradise  
Junction 
PAR-SAN Agricultural  N/A 9300 
 Ryer 12/16/1889  Agricultural  N/A 11600 
 Sutter 12/26/1889 SUT-SUT Agricultural  N/A  
 Tyler 3/8/1890  Agricultural  N/A 8583 
 Union 5/23/1890 UNI-GRA Agricultural  N/A 24951 
1892 Rough and Ready  Agricultural  N/A 1216 
1893 Roberts, Lower   Agricultural  N/A 10600 
 Roberts, Middle   Agricultural  N/A 13687 
 Roberts, Upper   Agricultural  N/A 8260 
 Ryer 1/2/1893  Agricultural  N/A 11600 
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                                                          APPENDIX M -  Continued   
W, 
Year 
Island or tract Date  Levee 
Segment 
Classification Subvention 
status 
Area 
Acres 
1899 New Hope Tract 3/27/1899 NEW-MOK Agricultural  N/A 9743 
 Terminous Tract 3/27/1899 TER-SMO Agricultural  N/A 10470 
1900 Jersey   Agricultural  N/A 3471 
1901 Clifton Court 2/24/1901  Agricultural  N/A 3100 
 Fabian Tract 2/24/1901 FAB-OLD Agricultural  N/A 6530 
 Fabian Tract 5/20/1901 FAB-OLD Agricultural  N/A 6530 
1901 Pescadero 5/20/1901 PES-PAR Agricultural  N/A 3000 
 R.D. 17 2/21/1901 D17-SAN Agricultural  N/A 5800 
 Stewart Tract  STE-PAR Agricultural  N/A 3900 
 Victoria 2/24/1901 VIC-OLD Agricultural  N/A 7250 
1902 Brack Tract 3/2/1902  Agricultural  N/A 4873 
 Brannan-Andrus 3/2/1902 BRA-SAC Agricultural  N/A 15003 
 Egbert Tract 3/1/1902  Agricultural  N/A  
 Ryer 3/2/1902  Agricultural  N/A 11600 
 Sargent-Barnhart 
Tract 
3/2/1902  Agricultural  N/A 1214 
1904 900 (Washington 
'West Sac") 
2/26/1904  Agricultural  N/A  
 Bishop Tract 3/3/1904  Agricultural  N/A 2169 
 Bouldin 3/3/1904 BOU-SMO Agricultural  N/A 6047 
 Brack Tract 3/1/1904 BRK-SYC Agricultural  N/A 4873 
 Brannan-Andrus 3/2/1904  Agricultural  N/A 15003 
 Cohen Tract 3/3/1904  Agricultural  N/A  
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                                                     APPENDIX M -  Continued   
W, 
Year 
Island or tract Date  Levee 
Segment 
Classification Subvention 
status 
Area 
Acres 
 Edwards Break 2/28/1904 SAC-SAC Agricultural  N/A  
 Egbert Tract   Agricultural  N/A  
 Jersey 3/2/1904  Agricultural  N/A 3471 
 New Hope Tract 2/29/1904 NEW-MOK Agricultural  N/A 9743 
 Ryer 3/2/1904 RYE-CAC Agricultural  N/A 11600 
 Sargent-Barnhart 
Tract 
3/2/1904  Agricultural  N/A 1214 
 Sherman 3/2/1904 SHE-SAC Agricultural  N/A 10420 
 Staten 2/29/1904  Agricultural  N/A 9088 
 Terminous Tract 3/2/1904  Agricultural  N/A 10470 
 Tyler 2/29/1904 TYL-MKN Agricultural  N/A 8583 
 Venice 3/3/1904  Agricultural  N/A 3220 
1906 Drexler Tract 7/9/1906 DRE-MID Agricultural  N/A  
 Sherman 7/9/1906  Agricultural  N/A 10420 
 Twitchell 7/8/1906  Agricultural  N/A 3633 
 Union 6/25/1906  Agricultural  N/A 24951 
 Upper Jones Tract 7/11/1906  Agricultural  N/A 6259 
 Venice 7/9/1906  Agricultural  N/A 3220 
1907 Bethel 3/26/1907 BET-SOU Agricultural  N/A 3520 
 Bouldin 3/26/1907 BOU-POT Agricultural  N/A 6047 
 Brannan-Andrus 3/23/1907 BRA-SAC Agricultural  N/A 15003 
 Bryon Tract 3/26/1907  Agricultural  N/A  
 Clifton Court 3/26/1907  Agricultural  N/A 3100 
 Coney   Agricultural  N/A 935 
 Franks Tract  FRA-FAL Agricultural  N/A 3300 
 Jersey 3/26/1907  Agricultural  N/A 3471 
 Lisbon District 3/24/1907 LIS-SAC Agricultural  N/A  
 Lower Jones Tract 3/1907  Agricultural  N/A 5894 
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                                                            APPENDIX M -  Continued   
W, 
Year 
Island or tract Date  Levee 
Segment 
Classification Subvention 
status 
Area 
1907 New Hope Tract  NEW-MOK Agricultural  N/A 9743 
 Palm Tract 3//1907 PAL-OLD Agricultural  N/A 2436 
 Pierson (Private) 
Gammon Ranch 
  Agricultural  N/A 8990 
 Pierson(Private ) 
Terry Estate 
3/24/1907  Agricultural  N/A 8990 
 Pierson (Private) 
Hollister Ranch 
3/24/1907  Agricultural  N/A 8990 
 Pierson (Private) 
Johnson Ranch 
3/24/1907  Agricultural  N/A 8990 
 Randall 3/26/1907 RAN-SAC Agricultural  N/A 420 
 RD 813 3/24/1907  Agricultural  N/A  
 Rindge Tract  RIN-SAN Agricultural  N/A  
 Ryer 2/24/1907 RYE-CAC Agricultural  N/A 11600 
 Sargent-Barnhart  
Tract 
 Agricultural  N/A 1214 
 Smith Tract 3/26/1907  Agricultural  N/A  
 Staten   Agricultural  N/A 9088 
 Terminous Tract   Agricultural  N/A 10470 
 Twitchell   Agricultural  N/A 3633 
 Tyler 2/24/1907  Agricultural  N/A 8583 
 Union 3/26/1907  Agricultural  N/A 24951 
 Veale Tract 3/26/1907  Agricultural  N/A 1298 
 Venice 3/26/1907  Agricultural  N/A 3220 
 Victoria 3/1/1907 VIC-NOR Agricultural  N/A 7250 
1908 Bouldin 1/15/1908  Agricultural  N/A 6047 
 Jersey 1/1/1908 JER-SAN Agricultural  N/A 3471 
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                                                   APPENDIX M -  Continued   
W, 
Year 
Island or tract Date  Levee 
Segment 
Classification Subvention 
status 
Area 
Acres 
1909 Bethel 1/24/1909 BET-SOU Agricultural  N/A 3520 
 Brannan-Andrus   Agricultural  N/A 15003 
 Clifton Court 1/21/1909 CLI-BAC Agricultural  N/A 3100 
 Jersey  JER-SAN Agricultural  N/A 3471 
 Lower Sherman   Agricultural  N/A  
 Sherman 1/21/1909 SHE-SAC Agricultural  N/A 10420 
 Twitchell 1/21/1909 TWI-SAN Agricultural  N/A 3633 
 Venice 1/21/1909 VEN-SAN Agricultural  N/A 3220 
1911 Bethel   Agricultural  N/A 3520 
 R.D. 17 2/1/1911 D17-SAN Agricultural  N/A 5800 
1919 Prospect   Agricultural  N/A 1100 
1925 Bouldin   Agricultural  N/A 6047 
 Donlon   Agricultural  N/A 3000 
 Lower Sherman   Agricultural  N/A  
 Pico/Naglee   Agricultural  N/A 3000 
1928 Big Break  BIG-SAC Abandoned N/A 2200 
 New Hope Tract   Agricultural  N/A 9743 
 River Junction 3/26/1928 RIV-STA Agricultural  N/A 3000 
1932 Venice  VEN-SHC Direct Agreement N/A 3220 
1934 Donlon 1/2/1934  Agricultural  N/A 3000 
1935 River Junction 5/31/1935 RIV-SAN Agricultural  N/A 3000 
1936 Franks Tract 2/23/1936 FRA-FAL Agricultural  N/A 3300 
 Liberty 2/15/1936 LIB-PRO Non-Project- 
Restricted height 
N/A 3449 
 Little Holland 2/15/1936 LHO-ALL Non-Project- 
Restricted height 
N/A  
 Medford 2/2/13/1936 MED-MID Agricultural  N/A 1219 
 Quimby 2/15/1936 QUI-OLD Agricultural  N/A 769 
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APPENDIX M -  Continued   
W, 
Year 
Island or tract Date  Levee 
Segment 
Classification Subvention 
status 
Area 
Acres 
1937 Donlon  DON-WES Abandoned N/A 3000 
1938 Franks Tract 2/11/1938 FRA-FAL Abandoned  N/A 3300 
 Liberty 2/12/1938 LIB-DRE Non-Project- 
Restricted height 
N/A 3449 
 Mandeville 2/13/1938 MAN-SAN Direct Agreement N/A 5238 
 Pescadero 2/12/1938  Agricultural  N/A 3000 
 Prospect 2/19/1938  Non-Project- 
Restricted height 
N/A 1100 
 Quimby  QUI-OLD Agricultural  N/A 769 
 Rhode Island 2/13/1938 RHO-OLD Agricultural  N/A 100 
 River Junction 2/14/1938  Agricultural  N/A 3000 
 Stewart Tract   Agricultural  N/A 3900 
 Venice  VEN-SAN Direct Agreement N/A 3220 
1940 Egbert Tract 3/1/1940 EGB-LIN Agricultural  N/A  
 Hastings Tract 3/1/1940  Agricultural  N/A  
 Liberty  LIB-DRE Non-Project- 
Restricted height 
N/A 3449 
 Little Holland 1/12/1940  Non-Project- 
Restricted height 
N/A  
 Prospect 3/2/1940  Non-Project- 
Restricted height 
N/A 1100 
 Rio Vista 3/3/1940  Urban N/A  
1950 Bradford 6/2/1950 BRD-SAN Direct Agreement N/A 2143 
 Webb Tract 6/2/1950 WEB-SAN Direct Agreement N/A 5490 
1951 McMullin Ranch 11/25/1950 MCM-SAN Agricultural  N/A 6792 
 Mossdale   Agricultural  N/A 1325 
 Pescadero 12/5/1950  Agricultural  N/A 3000 
 R.D. 17 12/7/1950 D17-SAN Agricultural  N/A 5800 
 Venice 12/3/1950 VEN-SHC Direct Agreement N/A 3220 
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APPENDIX M -  Continued   
W, 
Year 
Island or tract Date  Levee 
Segment 
Classification Subvention 
status 
Area 
Acres 
1952 McMullin Ranch 6/15/1952 MCM-SAN Agricultural  N/A 6792 
1956 Bradford 12/24/1955 BRD-SAN Direct Agreement N/A 2143 
 Dead Horse 12/26/1955 DEA-DEA Non-Project Ag N/A 211 
 Empire Tract 12/26/1955 EMP-LPO Non-Project Ag N/A 3723 
 Hastings Tract 12/26/1955 HAS-CAC Project N/A  
 McCormack-
Williamson Tract 
12/25/1955 MWT-EAS Non-Project- 
Restricted height 
N/A 1639 
 McMullin Ranch 12/25/1955 MCM-SAN Project N/A 6792 
 Quimby  QUI-HOL Non-Project Ag N/A 769 
 River Junction 12/25/1955 RIV-SAN Project N/A 3000 
1958 Dead Horse 12/25/1957 DEA-DEA Non-Project Ag N/A 211 
 McCormack-
Williamson Tract 
4/4/1958 MWT-EAS Non-Project- 
Restricted height 
N/A 1639 
1963 Liberty 10/16/1962 LIB-DRE Non-Project- 
Restricted height 
N/A 3449 
1963 Liberty 2/2/1963 LIB-DRE Non-Project- 
Restricted height 
N/A 3449 
 Little Holland 10/15/1962  Non-Project- 
Restricted height 
N/A  
 Little Holland 2/1/1963 LHO-ALL Non-Project- 
Restricted height 
N/A  
 Prospect 10/15/1962 PRO-MIL Non-Project- 
Restricted height 
N/A 1100 
 Prospect 2/1/1963 PRO-MIL Non-Project- 
Restricted height 
N/A 1100 
1965 Egbert Tract 12/24/1964 EGB-LIN Project N/A  
 McCormack-
Williamson Tract 
12/1/1964 MWT-EAS Non-Project- 
Restricted height 
N/A 1639 
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W, 
Year 
Island or tract Date  Levee 
Seg. 
Classification Subvention 
status 
Area 
Acres 
1969 Mildred 2/16/1969 MIL-MID Non-Project Ag N/A 998 
 Sherman 1/20/1969 SHE-SAN Direct Agreement N/A 10420 
1971 Rhode Island  RHO-CUT Non-Project - 
Wetland 
N/A 100 
1972 Brannan-Andrus 6/21/1972 BRA-SAN Direct Agreement N/A 15003 
1973 Liberty 1/17/1973 LIB-DRE Non-Project- 
Restricted height 
N/A 3449 
1980 Holland Tract 1/18/1980 HOL-SMS Non-Project Ag N/A 4225 
 Liberty 1/16/1980 LIB-DRE Non-Project- 
Restricted height 
Subventions-
Limited height 
3449 
 Lower Jones Tract 9/26/1980 JOL-MID Non-Project Ag Subventions-Ag 5894 
 Prospect 2/12/1980 PRO-MIL Non-Project- 
Restricted height 
Subventions-
Limited height 
1100 
 Upper Jones Tract 10/23/1980 JOU-UPR Other Subventions-Ag 6259 
 Webb Tract 1/18/1980 WEB-SAN Direct Agreement Subventions-Ag 5490 
1982 Little Franks Tract 12/24/1981 LFR-FAL Non-Project Ag Subventions 
Wetland 
350 
 McDonald 8/23/1982   Subventions-Ag 6145 
 Prospect 12/23/1981 PRO-MIL Non-Project- 
Restricted height 
Subventions-
Limited height 
1100 
1983 Fay 1/29/1983 FAY-OLD Private - Wetland Subventions 
Wetland 
100 
 Little Franks Tract 1/27/1983 LFR-PIP Non-Project Ag Subventions 
Wetland 
350 
 Mildred 1/27/1983 MIL-LAT Abandoned Subventions-Ag 998 
 Prospect 1/30/1983 PRO-MIL Non-Project- 
Restricted height 
Subventions-
Limited height 
1100 
 Prospect 3/1/1983 PRO-MIL Non-Project- 
Restricted height 
Subventions-
Limited height 
1100 
 River Junction 3/6/1983 RIV-SAN Non-Project Ag Non-Subventions 3000 
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W, 
Year 
Island or tract Date  Levee 
Segment 
Classification Subvention 
status 
Area 
Acres 
 Shima Tract 1/27/1983 SHM-WES Non-Project Ag Subventions-New 
Urbanization 
2394 
 Van Sickle 1/16/1983 VAN-MON Non-Project - 
Wetland 
Subventions-
Suisun 
2500 
 Venice 11/30/1982 VEN-POT Non-Project Ag Subventions-Ag 3220 
1984 Bradford 12/3/1983 BRD-SAN Direct Agreement Agriculture, 
Subventions-Ag 
2143 
1986 Dead Horse 2/19/1986 DEA-DEA Non-Project Ag Subventions-Ag 211 
 Glanville Tract 2/19/1986 GLA-RRE Other - Railroad  Subventions-Ag 7092 
 Little Mandeville MAL-OLD Non-Project - Ag Subventions-Ag 200 
 McCormack-
Williamson Tract 
2/18/1986 MWT-EAS Non-Project- 
Restricted height 
Subventions-
Limited height 
1639 
 New Hope Tract 2/18/1986 NEW-MOK Non-Project Ag Subventions-Ag 9743 
 Prospect 2/19/1986 PRO-MIL Non-Project- 
Restricted height 
Subventions-
Limited height 
1100 
 Spinner 1/27/1983 SPI-MON Non-Project - 
Wetland 
Subventions-
Suisun 
51 
 Tyler 2/19/1986 TYL-MKN Non-Project Ag Subventions-Ag 8583 
1994 Little Mandeville 8/2/1994 MAL-OLD Abandoned Subventions-Ag 200 
1995 Liberty  LIB-CAC Non-Project- 
Restricted height 
Subventions-
Limited height 
3449 
 Prospect  PRO-MIL Non-Project- 
Restricted height 
Subventions-
Limited height 
1100 
1997 Dead Horse 1/3/1997 DEA-DEA Non-Project Ag Subventions-Ag 211 
 Glanville Tract 1/3/1997 GLA-RRE Other Subventions-Ag 7092 
 McCormack-
Williamson Tract 
1/3/1997 MWT-EAS Non-Project- 
Restricted height 
Subventions-
Limited height 
1639 
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Segment 
Classification Subvention 
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 McMullin Ranch 1/7/1997 MCM-SAN Project Non-Subventions 6792 
 Mossdale 1/10/1997 MOS-PAR Non-Project Ag Non-Subventions 1325 
 Paradise Junction 1101997 PAR-PAR Project Non-Subventions 9300 
 Pescadero 1/5/1997 PES-TOM Non-Project Ag Non-Subventions 3000 
 Prospect 1/5/1997 PRO-MIL Non-Project- 
Restricted height 
Subventions-
Limited height 
1100 
 River Junction 1/5/1997 RIV-SAN Non-Project Ag Non-Subventions 3000 
 Walthall Tract 1/7/1997 WAH-SAN Project Non-Subventions 1025 
 Wetherbee Lake 1/7/1997 WEL-LAN Non-Project-Urban Non-Subventions 155 
1998 Van Sickle 2/1/1998 VAN-MON Non-Project - 
Wetland 
Subventions-
Suisun 
2500 
2004 Upper Jones Tract 6/3/2004 JOU-MID Non-Project Ag Subventions-Ag 6259 
2006 Prospect 1/1/2006 PRO-MIL Non-Project- 
Restricted height 
Subventions-
Limited height 
1100 
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        APPENDIX N - Other Reports not Failures of 
Delta Levees  
  
Year Island or 
tract 
Date of 
Incident 
Subvention 
status 
Notes Reference 
1868 Yolo Basin 
and Maine 
Prairie 
 N/A High water flooded Maine Prairie in Yolo Basin in mid-
winter of 1868 
Thompson 1957 p. 450 
1876 Big Break  N/A High water in Marsh Creek floods reclamations south of 
Jersey Island from the unleveed up side 
Thompson 1957 p. 451 
1878 Bacon 2/24/1878 N/A $10MM in Estimated total damages in Delta, all islands 
flooded north of San Joaquin except Bouldin and Randall 
Thompson 1957 p. 455 
1880 mainland 
tracts along 
Mokelumne 
  N/A Seepage ruined crops along mainland tracts along 
Mokelumne, April 1880. 
Thompson 1957, p 455 
1881 Tyler 2/4/1881 N/A Thompson 1958 says it held but wet from seepage, 
Thompson 1996 says it was submerged.  It had just finish 
the tallest levees in the Delta. High water on Mokelumne 
and Sacramento Basin combine to over top levee,7 ' 
Thompson 1957, p 488. 
1881 Rough and 
Ready 
  N/A Levees is not break but seepage covered island Thompson 1996 
1890 Roberts, 
Lower 
1/27/1890 N/A Only pre- March 1890 flooding before destruction of 
Paradise Cut dam.  Seepage likely cause. 
Thompson 1996 
1902 Staten 3/2/1902 N/A Awash but apparently due to seepage only, no levee 
breaks 
Thompson 1996 
1902 Ida 2/27/1902 N/A Thompson 1996, Island not leveed Thompson 1996 
1902 Wood 2/27/1902 N/A Island not leveed Thompson 1996 
1904 Sherman 2/29/1904 N/A Dredger Sierra sucked in, hit submerged pile working on 
Sherman Island while working the flood fight 
Sac Bee 2/29/1904 
APPENDIX N 
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     APPENDIX  N Continued   
Year Island or 
tract 
Date of 
Incident 
Subvention 
status 
Notes Reference 
1904 Staten 2/29/1904 N/A Staten Island levee will not hold out the day. Sac Bee 2/29/1904 
1904 Brannan-
Andrus 
2/29/1904 N/A Levee on lower end feared weakest in entire lower river 
system, still hold with highest water this aftenoon 
Sac Bee 2/29/1904 
1907 Pierson 
District 
2/21/1907 N/A March 1907 floodwater were 532,000 cu feet per minute 
on the Sac between 3/18 and 3/21.  SJ ran at 227,000 cu ft 
per minute. 
Numerous breaks into Yolo basin from breaks north of 
Sacramento.  Breaks into Pierson District after 2/21/1907. 
Thompson 1957 p462 
1907 Donlon   N/A Lower Sherman - never restored - could not have failed CAL-FED 1998, S-4 
1907 Vincine Island 
(Venice?) 
3/26/1907 N/A Island flooded and acreage as of 3/26/1907: Vincine Island 
3500 
Sacramento Union 
3/26/1907 
1909 Collinsville 1/22/1909 N/A Suddenly flooded, emergency evacuation by fishing boats San Francisco 
Chronicle 1/23/1909 
1936 Dead Horse 2/15/1936 N/A During recent Heavy rains in Delta district, this Dead Horse 
flooded 
River News 47:2 
3/15/36 
1950 Ida  N/A ICAL-FED does not show this, only DRMS and White 
Paper, Ida is an unleveed sandbar in the Sacramento 
River, 
URS 2009,Table 7-9b; 
DSC 2010, 3-11 
1951 Stewart Tract  N/A Recorded as "1950" flood of 3,900 ACRES, likely did flood 
but water escaped under railroad trestle from Mossdale 
Cecil Report 1960 
1951 River Junction 11/25/1950 N/A Stanislaus River flows reached 68,000 cfs. Extensive rains 
on Thanksgiving Day caused last general flood of 
area. Flood peaked at 68,000 cfs. Flood waters broke out 
south of intersection of Mohler and Moncure 
Roads and extended north of Mohler and Moncure 
KSN map 2011 
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     APPENDIX N Continued    
Year Island or 
tract 
Date of 
Incident 
Subvention 
status 
Notes Reference 
1956 Grizzly 12/26/1955 N/A Levees on south end began to fail but dredger dispatched. 
State fish and game cancelled duck hunting to prevent accidental 
shooting of levee workers 
River News 12/29/1955   
66:45 p1 
1956 Collinsville 12/27/1955 N/A "The Collinsville area, scene of annual flooding was well under 
water." 
River News 12/29/1955   
66:45 p 1+-+ 
1956 Ida  N/A Sandbar (inhabited) in Sacramento River, no levee, reported as 
1955 flood (DEC) 
URS 2009,Table 7-9b; 
DSC 2010, 3-11 
1958 Brack Tract  N/A No data provided map indicates only lower quarter flooded DWR "Delta Levee" 1973 
1958 Terminous Tract  N/A No data provided DWR "Delta Levee" 1973 
1958 Shin Kee Tract  N/A No data provided DWR "Delta Levee" 1973 
1958 Canal Ranch 
Tract 
4/6/1958 N/A Canal Tract experience standing landside runoff trapped by the 
Blossom Road levee but levees held.  About 288 A affected 
KSN Inc, noted 
1958 Roberts, Middle  N/A Listed as 500 acre flood Cecil list 1960 
1958 Roberts, Upper  N/A Listed as 500 acre flood Cecil list 1960 
1983 Grizzly   N/A Listed as Grizzly West, on DRMs and WP only URS 2009,Table 7-9b; 
DSC 2010, 3-11 
1986 Ryer 2/19/1986 Subventions-Ag Miner Slough spilling water on Ryer Island River News Herald 
2/19/1986 96:14 
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      APPENDIX N Continued    
Year Island or 
tract 
Date of 
Incident 
Subvention 
status 
Notes Reference 
1986 Rio Vista 2/19/1986 Legacy 
community 
Edgewater Drive and its expensive home flooded. 
High gauge at 9.7' 
Thornton, Lodi, and Gault inundated 
2/26/86 $1.8 million damage estimate by Mayor 
River News-Herald 
2/19/1986, 2/26/1986 
1986 Shin Kee Tract 2/19/1986 Subventions-Ag Dante Nomelini indicated there was no levee break 
Gage B95586 
DWR list 2009 
1986 Decker   Not leveed CAL-FED 1998 reported flooding on Decker, a spoil pile 
and island created by the Sac River Straightening in 1917 t 
CAL-FED 1998, S-5 
1997 Stewart Tract 1/10/1997 Non-Subventions Gil Casio indicated Stewart Tract did not fail, Adjacent tract 
did fail, overflowed from Paradise Junction failure 
DWR list 2009 
1997 Stewart Tract 1/10/1997 Non-Subventions Levee damage in cut to release water  taken in after 
Mossdale District levee failure on Paradise Cut 
FEAT 1999 
1998 Grizzly   Subventions-
Suisun 
February 1998 
Gage E32750 
DWR list 2009 
1998 Simmons-
Wheeler 
2/1/1998 Subventions-
Suisun 
El Nino storms of February 1998 brought high tides and 
winds that caused significant levee breaches, overtopping, 
and erosion on Montezuma Slough and northern shore of 
Honker, Suisun and Grizzly Bays, Flood waters completely 
inundated public and private lands 
GlobalSecurity.org, 
2005 
1998 Joice 2/1/1998 Suisun Marsh El Nino storms of February 1998 brought high tides and 
winds that caused significant levee breaches, overtopping, 
and erosion on Montezuma Slough and northern shore of 
Honker, Suisun and Grizzly  
GlobalSecurity.org, 
2005 
1998 Hammond 2/1/1998 Suisun Marsh  El Nino storms of February 1998 brought high tides and 
winds that caused significant levee breaches, overtopping, 
and erosion on Montezuma Slough and northern shore of 
Honker, Suisun and Grizzly Bays 
GlobalSecurity.org, 
2005 
  
379 
 
      APPENDIX N Continued   
Year Island or 
tract 
Date of 
Incident 
Subvention 
status 
Notes Reference 
1998 Grizzly 2/1/1998 Subventions-
Suisun 
El Nino storms of February 1998 brought high tides and 
winds that caused significant levee breaches, overtopping, 
and erosion on Montezuma Slough and northern shore of 
Honker, Suisun and Grizzly Bays, Flood waters completely 
inundated public and private lands 
GlobalSecurity.org, 2005 
1998 Lower Joice 2/1/1998 Suisun Marsh El Nino storms of February 1998 brought high tides and 
winds that caused significant levee breaches, overtopping, 
and erosion on Montezuma Slough and northern shore of 
Honker, Suisun and Grizzly Bays, Flood waters completely 
inundated public and private lands 
GlobalSecurity.org, 2005 
1999 Sunrise Duck 
Club 
7/1/1999 Suisun Marsh 
 
High tide and possible beaver activities DRMS Risk Report 
Section 9, 2009 
2004 Upper Jones 
Tract 
6/3/2004 Subventions-Ag News report in Sac Bee in January 2009 that the levee 
failure repair was still leaking,, due to the closure method 
of placing big rocks in the hole and dump finer material on 
top to fill in voids.  Estimated cost of additional repairs 
$350,00 
Weiser 2009 
2005 Simmons-
Wheeler 
7/20/2005 Subventions-
Suisun 
Water level 7.51', top of levee 7.3',High tide, breach 
occurred between two water control structures; beaver 
activities suspected 
DRMS Risk Report 
Section 9, 2009 
2005 Liberty   Subventions-
Limited height 
Chunk of In 1995, a more than routine flood occurred, as a 
big chunk of levee at the island's southern tip crumbled 
into Cache Slough. Repaired, it failed for good in 1997. 
Hart 2010 
2006 Honker Bay  Subventions-
Suisun 
After CAL-FED list, on DRMS and WP URS 2009,Table 7-9b; 
DSC 2010, 3-11 
2006 Simmons 
Wheeler 
    After CAL-FED list, on DRMS and WP URS 2009,Table 7-9b; 
DSC 2010, 3-11 
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   APPENDIX O – QUESTIONABLE RECORDS IN 
DATABASE 
 
Water 
year 
Island or tract Date of 
Incident 
Notes Reference 
1878 Bacon 2/21/1878 Not positive Bacon flooded Thompson 1878 p.4 
1881 New Hope Tract 2/4/1881 Submerged? Broken levee or seepage? Thompson 1996 
1886 New Hope Tract 1/26/1886 Additional tract on Mokelumne may also have flooded Thompson 1957 p. 
457 
1890 Fabian Tract 3/11/1890 Failure data not clear.  Problem starts when submerged dam at 
Paradise Cut built by Corps in 1888 has its weir destroyed.  This dam 
was built to encourage flow down the new channel, the loss of the weir 
sends higher flows down the Middle and Old forks. 
 
High water floods the southern division of Union Island 
Thompson 1996 
1900 New Hope Tract   No detail CAL-FED 1998, S-4: 
URS 2009,Table 7-9b; 
DSC 2010, 3-11 
1904 Walnut Grove 2/29/1904 Break at floodgate on cross levee between Millers Ferry and Jackson 
Slough on the C. Clark Ranch near camp 3  Dredger on way, Water 
from Edwards Break 
Sac Bee 2/29/1904 
1905 New Hope Tract   Not on 1998 CAL-FED list, no other record URS 2009,Table 7-9b; 
DSC 2010, 3-11 
1907 Bradford 3/27/1907 Grand, Sutter, Merritt, Sherman, Bradford and RD 744 intact everything 
else under water between Sacramento and Antioch 
Sacramento Union 
3/27/1907 p 1 
1907 Brooks Tract 3/26/1907 Island flooded and acreage as of 3/26/1907 Brooks Tract 3500 Sacramento Union 
3/26/1907 
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   APPENDIX O – Continued   
Water 
year 
Island or tract Date of 
Incident 
Notes Reference 
1908 Bethel   No detail CAL-FED 1998, S-4: 
URS 2009,Table 7-9b; 
DSC 2010, 3-11 
1909 Bouldin   CAL-FED 1998 showed failed but never recovered from 1908 flood until 
1918 
CAL-FED 1998, S-4 
1920 Paradise Junction 
 
  No detail _ DRMS and White paper only URS 2009,Table 7-9b; 
DSC 2010, 3-11 
1920 Roberts, Middle   No detail _ DRMS and White paper only URS 2009,Table 7-9b; 
DSC 2010, 3-11 
1926 Bethel   Listed as 3,400 A flood "Cecil" 1960 report for 
Delta Water Project, 
List of Historical 
Inundations 
1927 Big Break   On list of levee failures, no detail, remains flooded CAL-FED 1998, S-4: 
URS 2009,Table 7-9b; 
DSC 2010, 3-11 
1928 Hastings Tract   Listed as 6,900 A flood "Cecil" 1960 report for 
Delta Water Project, 
List of Historical 
Inundations 
1928 New Hope Tract   New corner listed as 2,000 acre flood "Cecil" 1960 report for 
Delta Water Project, 
List of Historical 
Inundations 
1936 Jersey 2/15/1936 Heavy rains, islands flooded River News 47:2 
3/15/36 
1936 Mildred 2/15/1936 Island flooded  - heavy rains River News 47:2 
3/15/36 
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   APPENDIX O – Continued  
Water 
year 
Island or tract Date of 
Incident 
Notes Reference 
1936 Prospect 2/15/1936 No doubt of the large amount of damage done due to flooding River News 47:2 
3/15/36 
1937 Donlon   Noted as remaining flooded, no other detail CAL-FED 1998, S-4: 
URS 2009,Table 7-9b; 
DSC 2010, 3-11 
1937 Sherman   No detail - DRMs and White Paper only URS 2009,Table 7-9b; 
DSC 2010, 3-11 
1938 Bacon   On list of levee failures, no detail CAL-FED 1998, S-4: 
URS 2009,Table 7-9b; 
DSC 2010, 3-11 
1938 Hastings Tract 2/14/1938 50 families evacuating for second time this winter Sacramento Union 
2/14/1938 
1938 Medford     Robie, 1975 
1938 Roberts, Middle     Robie, 1975 
1938 Roberts, Upper   No Detail CAL-FED 1998, S-4: 
URS 2009,Table 7-9b; 
DSC 2010, 3-11 
1938 Shin Kee Tract   No detail CAL-FED 1998, S-4: 
URS 2009,Table 7-9b; 
DSC 2010, 3-11 
1938 Stewart Tract   No details CAL-FED 1998, S-4: 
URS 2009,Table 7-9b; 
DSC 2010, 3-11 
1939 Pescadero   No Detail Robie, 1975 
1939 Quimby 12/1/1938 No Detail  Robie, 1975 
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Water 
year 
Island or tract Date of 
Incident 
Notes Reference 
1950 Dead Horse   No Detail CAL-FED 1998, S-4: 
URS 2009,Table 7-9b; 
DSC 2010, 3-11 
1950 Empire Tract   DRMS and White paper show this, CAL-FED 1998 does not URS 2009,Table 7-9b; 
DSC 2010, 3-11 
1950 McCormack-
Williamson Tract 
  No details CAL-FED 1998, S-4: 
URS 2009,Table 7-9b; 
DSC 2010, 3-11 
1950 New Hope Tract   CAL-Fed 1998 does not show only DRMs & White paper URS 2009,Table 7-9b; 
DSC 2010, 3-11 
1950 Paradise Junction   CAL-Fed 1998 does not show only DRMs & White paper URS 2009,Table 7-9b; 
DSC 2010, 3-11 
1950 Pescadero   No details CAL-FED 1998, S-4: 
URS 2009,Table 7-9b; 
DSC 2010, 3-11 
1950 Quimby   CAL-Fed 1998 does not show, only DRMs & White paper URS 2009,Table 7-9b; 
DSC 2010, 3-11 
1950 R.D. 17   No detail CAL-FED 1998, S-4: 
URS 2009,Table 7-9b; 
DSC 2010, 3-11 
1950 Roberts, Upper   CAL-Fed 1998 does not show, only DRMs & White paper URS 2009,Table 7-9b; 
DSC 2010, 3-11 
1950 Stewart Tract   No details (Probably 12/5/1950 Mossdale water escaping under railroad 
tracks reported in 1951 record 
CAL-FED 1998, S-4: 
URS 2009,Table 7-9b; 
DSC 2010, 3-11 
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Water 
year 
Island or tract Date of 
Incident 
Notes Reference 
1956 Bouldin 12/26/1955 Reported flooded on 12/29/1955 by higher water than 1907 River News 
12/29/1955 66:45 p. 4 
1956 Grand   Only DRMS &White Paper reported this URS 2009,Table 7-9b; 
DSC 2010, 3-11 
1956 New Hope Tract   CAL-Fed 1998 does not show, only DRMs & White paper, reported as 
1955 flood (DEC) 
URS 2009,Table 7-9b; 
DSC 2010, 3-11 
1958 River Junction   CAL-Fed 1998 does not show, only DRMs & White paper URS 2009,Table 7-9b; 
DSC 2010, 3-11 
1958 Terminous Tract   Listed as 5,000 acre flood Cecil list 1960 
1964 McCormack-
Williamson Tract 
  No Detail, probably same as 12/1/1964 CAL-FED 1998, S-4: 
URS 2009,Table 7-9b; 
DSC 2010, 3-11 
1965 Little Holland   Listed as 2,800 acre flood in 1964 Cecil List updated date 
post 1972 
1965 Mildred   CAL-Fed 1998 does not show, only DRMs & White paper URS 2009,Table 7-9b; 
DSC 2010, 3-11 
1965 New Hope Tract   No data provided DWR "Delta Levee" 
1973 
1965 Shin Kee Tract   CAL-Fed 1998 does not show only DRMs & White paper URS 2009,Table 7-9b; 
DSC 2010, 3-11 
1965 Shin Kee Tract     Robie, 1975 
1980 Dead Horse 2/1/1980 Gage B94150 DWR list 2009 
1980 Little Mandeville   No details CAL-FED 1998, S-4: 
URS 2009,Table 7-9b; 
DSC 2010, 3-11 
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Water 
year 
Island or tract Date of 
Incident 
Notes Reference 
1980 Van Sickle   On CAL-FED list, not on DRMS or WP CAL-FED 1998, S-4 
1981 Little Franks Tract   No detail - Must be 12/23. 1981 listed in water year 1982 CAL-FED 1998, S-4: 
URS 2009,Table 7-9b; 
DSC 2010, 3-11 
1982 Little Mandeville   Listed on CAL-FED 1998, not in DRMS or WP CAL-FED 1998, S-4 
1982 Venice   No detail - Probably the November 27, 1982 failure listed in 1983 water 
year 
CAL-FED 1998, S-4; 
URS 2009,Table 7-9b; 
DSC 2010, 3-11 
1983 Edgerly   Not on CAL-FED 1998 list, on DRMS and WP URS 2009,Table 7-9b; 
DSC 2010, 3-11 
1983 Little Franks Tract   Flooded twice in 1983, Remains flooded, second flood only on CAL-
FED 1998 
CAL-FED 1998, S-4: 
URS 2009,Table 7-9b; 
DSC 2010, 3-11 
1983 Shima Tract   Second flood in 1983 CAL-FED 1998, S-4: 
URS 2009,Table 7-9b; 
DSC 2010, 3-11 
1984 Little Franks Tract   No data Available. Believed to be a mistake DWR (not dated- 
Schwarzenegger 
Governor) 
2006 Fay   No indication of problems comparing 12/30/2005 and 8/29/2006 Google 
images.  Levee repair work does show up on April 2008 image centered 
at noted coordinates 
Google Earth 
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     APPENDIX P - RECORDED EMERGENCY REPAIRSIRRS    
EPAIRS 
 
Inc #  YEAR 
Island or 
tract Date  Levee Seg. Classification Subvention ? Notes 
1016 2004 
Drexler 
Tract 7/2004 DRE-TRA Non-Project Ag Subventions-Ag 
There were active boils all along other side of 
Trapper Slough during the summer of 2004 
while Upper Jones was inundated 
1004 1983 Twitchell 7/30/1983 
  
Subventions-Ag 
Near -miss, boil was flowing 200 gal/min of 
material laden material, usually enough to 
lead to evacuation, but CCC and Rd was 
able to stop the boil with classical methods 
1020 2007 
Wright-
Elmwood 
   
Subventions-
New 
Urbanization 
Many places where broken concrete was 
dumped as rip-rap, not acceptable now 
because of the high pH of concrete, and 
such a surface makes great squirrel habitat.  
In 2006 or 2007, the district had a dozer 
working on other parts of the levee and they 
say an  
1019 2006 Staten 
   
Subventions-Ag 
We were fighting a boil, water was flowing 
through the levee slope, we were out there 
with this big Blue Iron rig to drive piles and 
they were driving the piles that a 18 wheeler 
delivered to the island levee and the pulled 
them off and dropped the piles  
1006 1984 Bouldin 12/9/1983 BOU-POT Non-Project Ag Subventions-Ag 
Seep started flowing on south side on Potato 
Slough from flooded Bradford, dredge pulled 
up and dump, gravel, muds and rock on 
water side of levee to stop leakage 
1022 2009 Bradford 8/27/2009 BRD-SAN 
Direct 
Agreement 
Agriculture, 
Subventions-Ag Ship moving up to Stockton ran into levee 
APPENDIX P 
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    APPENDIX P Continued   
Inc #  YEAR 
Island or 
tract Date  Levee Seg. Classification Subvention ? Notes 
1007 1997 Tyler 1/7/1997 TYL-MKN Non-Project Ag Subventions-Ag 
200 Workers sent to Isleton to fight seepage  
and boils on surrounding islands, including 
Tyler where Squirrel holes  apparently 
caused a lot of seepage at location noted by 
S Mello on map 
1000 1981 Tyler 
 
TYL-MKN Non-Project Ag Subventions-Ag 
A human built cave was discovered in the 
levee by the R.D. board president around 
1981, complete with a timber beam 
supported roof structure, intent of the cave 
and who built it never determined Levee 
repaired immediately. 
1017 2006 Tyler 1/15/2006 TYL-GEO Project Subventions-Ag 
Boils develop near duck club field, flowing 
material, added to berms to stop boil flow 
1015 2004 Tyler 2/2004 TYL-GEO Project Subventions-Ag 
900' section of levee with multiple boils, 
repaired with expansion of  landside berm 
1018 2006 Twitchell 1/1/2006 TWI-SAN 
Direct 
Agreement Subventions-Ag 
We had lots of problem at Chevron Point 
which we then purchased for $3 million 
1014 1998 
Webb 
Tract 2/1/1998 WEB-FAL Non-Project Ag Subventions-Ag 
Wind came up across from south across 
Franks Tract, and waves cost us half of the 
Webb Tract levee for about a mile very 
quickly during high tide, DWR got the 
CORPS in to make repairs and island was 
saved 
1021 2009 Medford 1/24/2009 MED-COL Non-Project Ag Subventions-Ag 
Sinkhole in levee turned out to be collapsed 
roof of beaver den that totally penetrated the 
levee 
1003 1938 
Brannan-
Andrus 2/14/1938 BRA-SAN 
Direct 
Agreement Subventions-Ag 
50 families moved from low areas to higher 
ground as winds washed water over levee 
and gravel had to be barged in to fix the 
levee 
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    APPENDIX P  Continued   
Inc #  YEAR 
Island or 
tract Date  Levee Seg. Classification Subvention ? Notes 
1005 1984 Tyler 8/21/1984 TYL-MKN Non-Project Ag Subventions-Ag date of incident listed as 8/21/1984 
1010 1997 Ryer 1/1/1997 RYE-SUT Project Subventions-Ag 
Sutter slough levees suffered waterside 
sloughing 
1001 1997 
Brannan-
Andrus 1/1/1997 BRA-SAC 
Direct 
Agreement Subventions-Ag 
Fighting numerous boils in Upper Andrus 
district on Sacramento 
1012 1997 
Brannan-
Andrus 1/1/1997 BRA-GEO Project Subventions-Ag Georgiana levee high seepage rates 
1013 1997 
Brannan-
Andrus 1/1/1997 BRA-MOK Non-Project Ag Subventions-Ag 
On Mokelumne at Georgiana , cracking and 
slumping of levee Mokelumne at 165 year 
flood 
1008 1997 Twitchell 1/1/1997 TWI-7MI Non-Project Ag Subventions-Ag 
High seepage and cracking of 7 Mile slough 
levee 
1009 1997 Twitchell 1/1/1997 TWI-SAN 
Direct 
Agreement Subventions-Ag 
Cracking and slumping of San J. levee at 7 
Mile slough 
1011 1997 R.D. 17 1/1/1997 D17-SAN Project 
Non-
Subventions 
East side SJR levee high seepage and boils 
during high water , Also Walthall Slough 
levee suffer wave over wash and erosion 
1023 2008 
Brannan-
Andrus 1/2008? BRA-SAN 
Direct 
Agreement Subventions-Ag 
"I went out and the waves were washing over 
the roadway and had eaten it away, crews 
came in and dumped this huge rock and 
repaved the roadway but I thought the levee 
was gone.” 
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APPENDIX Q 
Water Date of 
year Island or tract Incident Subvention status Reference 
1881 Randall 2/4/1881 N/A Thompson 1996 
1881 Randall 2/4/1881 N/A Thompson 1996 
Sacramento Bee 
1902 Terminous Tract 3/2/1904 N/A 3/2/1904 
1904 Grand 2/29/1904 N/A Sac Bee 2/29/1904 
1904 Lisbon District 2/29/1904 N/A Sac Bee 2/29/1904 
1904 Merritt 2/29/1904 N/A Sac Bee 2/29/1904 
San Francisco 
1904 Bouldin 3/2/1904 N/A Chronicle 3/3/1904 p 4 
Thompson 1957 p. 
1906 Roberts, Lower 7/10/1906 N/A 460, 488 
1906 Clifton Court 7/7/1906 N/A L. A. Herald, 7/8/1906 
San Francisco Call, 
1906 Fabian Tract 7/9/1906 N/A 7/10/1906 
1906 Victoria 7/10/1906 N/A S.F. Call 7/11/1906 
1906 Woodward 7/10/1906 N/A S.F. Call 7/11/1906 
Lower Jones 
1906 Tract 7/10/1906 N/A S.F. Call 7/11/1906 
Sacramento Union 
1907 Merritt 3/24/1907 N/A 3/24/1907 
Sacramento Union 
1907 Grand 3/24/1907 N/A 3/24/1907 
Antioch Ledger 
1909 Franks Tract 1/30/1909 N/A 1/30/1909 
Antioch Ledger 
1909 Veale Tract 1/30/1909 N/A 1/30/1909 
Antioch Ledger 
1909 Bradford 1/30/1909 N/A 1/30/1909 
Antioch Ledger 
1909 Woodward 1/30/1909 N/A 1/30/1909 
 
Pittsburg Post-Dispatch 
1936 Donlon 2/24/1936 N/A 2/24/1936 
Sacramento Bee 
1938 Tyler 2/13/1938 N/A 2/14/1938 
Sacramento Bee 
1938 Brannan-Andrus 2/13/1938 N/A 2/14/1938 
Sacramento Bee 
1938 Tyler 2/13/1938 N/A 2/14/1938 
APPENDIX Q 
390 
 
 
 APPENDIX Q  Continued   
Water Date of 
year Island or tract Incident Subvention status Reference 
     
Sacramento Bee 
1938 Brannan-Andrus 2/13/1938 N/A 2/14/1938 
Sacramento Bee 
1938 Brannan-Andrus 2/12/1938 N/A 2/12/1938 
Sacramento Union 
1938 Brannan-Andrus 2/14/1938 N/A 2/14/1938 
McCormack-
Williamson Sacramento Union 
1938 Tract 2/14/1938 N/A 2/14/1938 
Sacramento Union 
1938 Webb Tract 2/14/1938 N/A 2/14/1938 
Sacramento Union 
1938 Brack Tract 2/14/1938 N/A 2/14/1938 
Sacramento Union 
1938 Jersey 2/14/1938 N/A 2/14/1938 
Pittsburg Post- 
1938 Egbert Tract 2/15/1938 N/A Dispatch 2/15/1938 
Antioch Ledger 
1940 Ryer 3/2/1940 N/A 3/4/1940 
1956 Venice 12/26/1955 N/A Thompson 1957 p. 466 
Thompson 1957 p. 
1956 Brannan-Andrus   N/A 466. 
River News 12/29/1955   
1956 Twitchell 12/26/1955 N/A 66:45 p 
1956 Brack Tract 12/26/1955 N/A Interview 112-2009 
1956 Tyler 12/26/1955 N/A Thompson 1957 p. 466 
 
1956 Jersey 12/26/1955 N/A Thompson 1957 p. 466 
River News Herald 
1965 Twitchell 12/26/1964 N/A 12/30/1964 
River News-Herald 
1973 Brannan-Andrus   N/A 1/17/1973 
1982 Medford   Subventions-Ag DWR 1983 
1983 Tyler 1/29/1983 Subventions-Ag Neudeck 1984 
1983 Webb Tract 1/29/1983 Subventions-Ag Neudeck 1984 
 APPENDIX Q Continued    
Water 
year Island or tract 
Date of 
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 APPENDIX Q Continued    
Water 
year Island or tract 
Date of 
Incident Subvention status Reference 
1983 Jersey 1/29/1983 Subventions-Ag Neudeck 1984 
1983 King 1/29/1983 Subventions-Ag Neudeck 1984 
1983 
Wright-
Elmwood 1/29/1983 
Subventions-New 
Urbanization Neudeck 1984 
1983 Bouldin 2/2/1983 Subventions-Ag 
River News Herald 
2/2/1983 
1983 Twitchell 2/2/1983 Subventions-Ag 
River News Herald 
2/2/1983 
1986 Walnut Grove 2/20/1986 
Subventions -Legacy 
community Interview 114-2009 
1997 Webb Tract   Subventions-Ag Interview 101-2009 
1997 Brannan-Andrus 1/10/1997 Subventions-Ag Interview 111-2009 
1998 Sherman 1/1/1998 Subventions-Ag Interview 117 - 2009 
2006 Sherman 1/1/2006 Subventions-Ag Interview 103-2009 
2006 Twitchell   Subventions-Ag Interview 124-2009 
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